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PART VII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

232

July to September 1912.

F.O. 424/232 — FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING AFFAIRS OF ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA. PART VII.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir G. Lowther ..	532	June 22, 1912	Bussorah and Bagdad Railway. Difficulties in purchase of land at	1
2	„ „ ..	537	23,	Bagdad Railway. Chief engineer is going to Khanikin to choose site for custom-house. Present intentions respecting route of Bagdad–Khanikin line	1
3	„ „ ..	540	24,	Messrs. Lynch's rights of navigation. He has received a despatch from His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, confirming his view of the inopportuneness of the moment for approaching Porte respecting	2
4	„ „ ..	546 Commercial	25,	Anatolian Railway scheme. Transmits extract from "Gazette financière" commenting on recent visit of Mr. Carter respecting	2
5	„ „ ..	551	25,	Mesopotamian irrigation works. Negotiations with Jacksons on points of detail have broken down. New tenders will be asked for. Possible solutions ..	3
6	Sir R. Rodd ..	175	28,	Kalymnos. Information that Italians have proclaimed autonomy of, is incorrect ..	4
7	Admiralty	Confidential	29,	Italian action in Ægean. Transmits memorandum dealing with effect of, on British naval policy	4
8	Sir G. Lowther ..	555	27,	Mesopotamian irrigation. Refers to No. 5. Transmits *arrêt ministériel*, giving fresh regulations for adjudication	6
9	India Office	July 1,		Bagdad – Bussorah section. Lord Crewe understands Foreign Office have decided proposal for British participation of 50 per cent. would be unacceptable to French and Russian Governments. Refers to Part VI, Nos. 113 and 172	7
10	Mr. O'Beirne ..	237 Tel.	2,	War. Turkish Ambassador has communicated *aide-mémoire* to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of meeting of Emperors. Summary of	7
11	Sir G. Lowther ..	208 Tel.	2,	Turco-Persian frontier. Six months will be reckoned from 28th April	7
12	To India Office ..	..	2,	Dioptric lanterns for Bushire. Transmits Part VI, No. 192. Suggests an answer to Treasury letter	8
13	To India Office .. „ Board of Trade ..	..	2,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits Part VI, No. 216. Italian Government's request should be made known to shipping companies concerned	8
14	To Sir J. Jackson and Co.	..	3,	Mesopotamian irrigation. Enquires as to truth of report that, owing to onerous terms, they have submitted no tender for	8
15	India Office ..	..	3,	Transport of material for Bagdad Railway. Comments on draft statutes of Société de Transports fluviaux	9
16	India Office ..	..	July 3, 1912	Bagdad Railway. Forwards copy of telegram to Viceroy dated 1st July respecting possible concessions to Turkey	9
17	„ „ ..	..	4,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits telegram from Political Resident, Persian Gulf, dated 4th July, respecting giving résumé of Lieutenant Wilson's survey	10
18	To Sir G. Lowther ..	291	4,	Italian action in Ægean. Conversation with Tewfik Pasha. Sir A. Nicolson told him nothing could be decided until the end of the war	10
19	„ „ ..	293	4,	Italian action in Ægean. Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Report that His Majesty's Government had assured Porte that islands would be given back intact ..	11
20	To Earl Granville ..	168	4,	Bagdad Railway. Conversation with German Ambassador, who thought agreement could be reached for terminus to be at Bussorah	11
21	To India Office ..	..	4,	Koweit. Requests map showing limits of, for communication to Turkish Ambassador	11
22	To Sir G. Lowther ..	364 Tel.	5,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Refers to Part VI, No. 216. He should obtain information through Dr. Clemow	12
23	To India Office ..	..	6,	Bagdad Railway. Shatt-el-Arab Commission. Acknowledges Part VI, No. 214. Requests views of India Office may be communicated immediately	12
24	„ „ ..	..	6,	Hawizeh. Turco-Persian frontier. Acknowledges No. 17. Reply to Turkish Government cannot await receipt of Lieutenant Wilson's map	12
25	Sir R. Rodd ..	183	June 30,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Refers to Part VI, No. 216. Transmits note from Minister for Foreign Affairs suggesting names of British ships engaged in, should be communicated to Italian Government ..	13
26	Sir G. Lowther ..	562	July 2,	Jeddah. Transmits despatch from consul at, on two demonstrations by Bedouins near ..	14
27	India Office ..	..	6,	Dioptric lanterns for Bushire. Concurs in No. 12	15
28	Consul Shipley to Mr. Parker	Private	3,	Turco-Persian Commission. Summary of events. Turkish informal proposal ..	15
29	Board of Trade ..	Very Secret	8,	Bagdad Railway. Comments on, and suggests alterations in memorandum to be communicated to Turkish Ambassador ..	18
30	India Office ..	Confidential	8,	Memorandum to Turkish Government. Concurs generally in. Bagdad Railway. El Katr. Persian Gulf. Koweit. Turkish tariff	22
31	Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha	..	9,	Sporades. No reason for arguments of Pan-Hellenes in favour of union on grounds of Turkish maladministration	24
32	Joint letter addressed to Sir Edward Grey	..	9,	Shatt-el-Arab Commission. Submits draft convention	25

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
33	Mr. Marling ..	217 Tel.	July 8, 1912	Lebanon. Refers to Part VI, No. 183. Dilatory action of Porte in carrying on discussions. Their desire to avoid emphasising privileged position of. Lebanon meanwhile without a governor	29
34	To Mr. Marling ..	302	9,	Adana riots. Concurs generally in Part VI, No. 84. Messrs. Waugh and Ryan to be thanked	30
35	„ „ ..	303	9,	Yumurtalyk–Suleimania Railway. Transmits letter from Mr. Lightfoot respecting. Question whether this scheme conflicts with "Chester" scheme	30
36	To India Office .. „ Board of Trade ..	..	9,	Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission. Transmits report of departmental committee. Does India Office concur? ..	31
36*	To Mr. Marling ..	371 Tel.	10,	Lebanon reforms. Refers to No. 33. To support French Ambassador if Russian Ambassador similarly authorised .	31*
37	India Office ..	..	11,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits telegram from Political Resident in Persian Gulf, dated 10th July, respecting details of islands claimed by Sheikh of Mohammerah	31
38	Board of Trade ..	..	11,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Suggests that names, &c., of ships engaged in should be communicated direct to Embassy at Rome by Boards of Health at Constantinople and Alexandria	32
39	India Office ..	..	12,	Koweit and Bagdad Railway. Transmits telegram from Political Resident, Persian Gulf, dated 10th July, respecting alleged German negotiations with Sheikh of Koweit	32
40	Mr. Marling ..	223 Tel.	11,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Refers to No. 22. Transmits suggestions from Dr. Clemow as to means for obtaining information desired by Italian Government and enquiring details required	33
41	To Treasury ..	..	12,	Lanterns for Bushire. Refers to Part VI, No. 192. Points out no special sanction is required, as cost is to be met by saving on general vote..	33
42	India Office ..	..	12,	Bagdad Railway. Transmits telegram from India, dated 5th July, respecting "cahier des charges"	33
43	Mr. Marling ..	572	5,	Italian administrative measures in Ægean islands. Transmits despatch from consul-general, Smyrna, on	35
44	„ „ ..	573	5,	Bagdad Railway. Transmits report from consul at Adana on progress of section Ulu Kishla–Bozanti–Dorak	35
45	„ „ ..	574	6,	Meeting of delegates at Patmos. Transmits report from consul-general at Smyrna on	36
46	„ „ ..	576	7,	Occupation of Rhodes. Transmits despatch from vice-consul, Rhodes, on disastrous economic effect on inhabitants of ..	37
47	„ „ ..	577	7,	Meeting of delegates at Patmos. Transmits despatch from vice-consul, Rhodes, giving General Ameglio's version of	39
48	„ „ ..	578	7,	Alleged plot to assassinate General Ameglio. Transmits despatch from consul-general, Smyrna, respecting	40

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
48A	To Mr. Marling ..	375 Tel.	July 15, 1912	Pilgrim traffic. Refers to No. 40. To instruct consuls as suggested	41*
48B	To Sir R. Rodd ..	224 Tel.	15,	Pilgrim traffic. Refers to No. 40. Do Italian Government wish information as to all ships, and what details do they require? ..	41*
49	Sir R. Rodd ..	181	June 30.	Italian action in Ægean. He suggested, unofficially, that if any further, were contemplated, Powers should be informed. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to think it over	41
50	„ „ ..	187	July 6,	Ægean islands. Italian Government will probably give up islands on condition guarantees are given. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Lister of conversation with M. Roussos, delegate from the islands	42
51	India Office ..	..	16,	Shatt-el-Arab. Transmits telegram from Political Resident, Persian Gulf, dated 15th July, respecting anchorage and landing places in	43
52	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	16,	Bagdad–Khanikin Railway. Forwards letter from agent at Kasr-i-Shirin respecting ..	44
53	Sir F. Cartwright ..	60 Tel.	17,	Rumoured Italian intention to seize Chios. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks there is no ground for	45
54	To Sir G. Buchanan..	245	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits copy of memorandum to Turkish Ambassador respecting Mohammerah. He should communicate copy to Russian Government ..	45
55	„ „ ..	248	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 54. Transmits maps	48
56	To Mr. Marling ..	326	17,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits No. 25. He should communicate copies of instructions to consular officers mentioned in No. 48A, and those in Red Sea	48
57	To India Office ..	Confidential	17,	Mohammerah frontier. Transmits enclosure in No. 61. Enquires views of Lord Crewe. Status of sheikh on right bank should not be raised	48
58	„ „ ..	..	17,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits Nos. 25 and 40. Suggests Government of Bombay should furnish His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome with information mentioned in No. 40	49
59	Sir R. Rodd ..	195	18,	Camaran. He has handed in memorandum as instructed..	49
60	India Office ..	..	17,	Mohammerah frontier. Concurs in No. 57. Status of Sheikh of Mohammerah on right bank and Treaty of Erzeroum ..	49
61	To Tewfik Pasha ..	Confidential	18,	Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf. Reply of His Majesty's Government to Part VI, No. 24, with annexes. Annex 1. Duties on cotton goods. Annex 2. Draft convention for railways in Asiatic Turkey. Annex 3. Draft convention for Shatt-el-Arab navigation	50
62	To Mr. Marling ..	333	18,	Bagdad Railway. His Majesty's Government's reply respecting was handed to Turkish Ambassador	59
63	Trans-Atlantic Trust Company	..	17,	Yumurtalyk-Suleymanieh Railway. Their project is in the main similar to Mr. Carter's	59

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
64	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox	741 Tel.	July 18, 1912	Mohammerah. Transmits report on present position of Sheikh of, and personal attitude towards frontier question . .	60
65	Mr. Marling ..	239 Tel.	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador points out that course proposed still involves delay. Our position respecting Mohammerah and Hawizeh strengthened since Minister for Foreign Affairs handed in map	60
66	To India Office ..	..	19,	Bagdad Railway. Memorandum was communicated to Tewfik Pasha on 18th. Concurs generally in provision regarding sheikh in India Office letter	60
66*	Board of Trade ..	Confidential	19,	Transport of material for Bagdad Railway. Sees no objection to proposed agreements for. Enquires nature of understanding between Foreign Office and Lynch, and as to rights of latter in respect of navigation of both rivers	61*
67	Mr. Marling ..	244 Tel.	20,	Hodeidah. Consul at, reports rumour of projected raid on by Seyyid Idrisi. Italian bombardment of. Farsan captured by Seyyid Idrisi	61
68	Mr. O'Beirne ..	252 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Government maintain view that Persian delegates should accept explanatory note. Possible conditions of acceptance. Mohammerah–Hawizeh frontier. Identic map ..	61
69	Mr. Marling ..	594	11,	Meeting of delegates at Patmos. Refers to No. 47. Transmits despatch from vice-consul, Rhodes, giving further details of, and resolution passed at	62
70	„ „ ..	599	17,	Damascus. Transmits report from consul at, on tribal fight between Ibn Rashid and the Ruwela	63
71	„ „ ..	605	16,	Samsun–Sivas Railway. M. Revoil completed negotiations for signature of contract for, but owing to strong Russian protest, Porte refused to sign at last moment	63
72	„ „ ..	606	17,	Bagdad Railway. Transmits report from consul at Aleppo on progress of ..	64
73	„ „ ..	607	17,	Damascus. Transmits quarterly report on, by consul at	65
74	To Mr. Marling ..	388 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. He should concert with Russian colleague and advise Persian delegates to accept explanatory note ..	67
75	To Sir G. Buchanan..	589 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. His Majesty's Government willing to advise acceptance of explanatory note. Question of. Turkey's acceptance of various lines suggested by mediating Powers in 1850 and 1870 ..	67
76	Sir R. Rodd ..	88 Tel.	23,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Dutch Government also asked to furnish information. Sufficient for British consuls to report British ships. Details required.. ..	67
77	To India Office ..	Secret	23,	Bagdad Railway. Refers to No. 9. Porte have virtually refused British participation of 50 per cent. Attitude of France and Russia	67

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
78	To Colonial Office ..	..	July 24, 1912	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits correspondence respecting, and asks that Governor of Singapore be instructed to supply required information	68
79	Board of Trade ..	Secret	26,	Negotiations with Turkey. Transmits, and suggests communication to Turkey of note amplifying annex respecting duties on cotton goods in Memorandum of 18th July	68
80	Colonial Office ..	..	26,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Acknowledges No. 78. Governor of Singapore has been instructed	69
81	Memorandum communicated to Tewfik Pasha	..	27,	Duties on cotton goods. Substance of No. 79	69
82	Mr. Marling ..	620	23,	Van vilayet. Transmits report from consul at Van on, during past quarter	70
83	„ „ ..	625	24,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Refers to No. 76. Consuls instructed. Telegraphic communication with Jeddah interrupted. Suggests it as a suitable moment to urge Italian Government to permit cables in Ægean to be repaired	72
84	Treasury	..	30,	Dioptric lanterns for Bushire. Acknowledges No. 41. Points out amount of expenditure authorised, but willing to bear half cost of	72
85	India Office ..	..	31,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Acknowledges No. 36. Concurs in draft	73
86	Board of Trade ..	Secret	31,	Shatt - el - Arab Navigation Commission. Refers to No. 36. Board of Trade concur in terms of draft convention, and in recommendations	73
87	India Office ..	..	31,	Bahrein. Transmits copy of telegram from Government of India respecting attempt by Vali of Bussorah to interfere in affairs of. Lord Crewe does not recommend protesting at Constantinople at present ..	73
88	Sir R. Rodd ..	215	28,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits note from Italian Government and reply respecting danger of Turks getting through at Suakin in guise of pilgrims	74
89	„ „ ..	217	29,	Italian occupation in Ægean. Transmits semi-official communiqué from "Popolo Romano"	75
90	Admiralty	Confidential	Aug. 1,	Shatt-el-Arab Commission. Suggests amending clause 5 of draft convention by substituting "the captain of the port and chief engineer" for "the chief engineer and surveyor"	76
91	To Mr. Cheetham ..	47 Tel.	3,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Presumes precautions also taken at Port Soudan ..	76
92	To Sir F. Cartwright	67 Tel.	3,	Rumoured Italian intention to occupy Chios. Has Austrian Government any information?	76
93	Mr. Marling ..	267 Tel.	5,	Hodeidah. Consul reports panic at as result of Italian bombardment, and asks to be allowed to communicate direct with His Majesty's ships	77

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
94	Mr. Marling ..	630	July 24, 1912	Lebanon reforms. Settlement delayed by recent crisis and still remote. Summary of negotiations to date	77
95	„ „ ..	636 Confidential	30,	Mesopotamian irrigation. Is informed by Mr. Hugo Baring that Jacksons and Pearsons acted by arrangement in not tendering for	78
96	„ „ ..	637	27,	Petroleum near Mosul. Mr. Baring is trying to arrange with Deutsche Bank for concession to work	79
97	Mr. Cheetham ..	82	28,	Rebellion in Asir. Transmits Soudan Intelligence Report, giving details of and comments	79
98	Mr. Marling ..	640	30,	Rhodes. Transmits correspondence with consul-general, Smyrna, on regulations issued by Italians at, respecting local judiciary	84
99	„ „ ..	649	Aug. 1,	Trebizond. Consul at, reports rumour that partisans of committee had promised to raise 10,000 volunteers. Rumour exaggerated and town quiet	85
100	„ „ ..	271 Tel.	7,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Refers to No. 48A. Consuls at Jeddah and Hodeidah cannot comply with Italian requirements owing to cable interruptions. Suggests Italian Government should be asked to repair them	86
101	To Sir W. Townley..	469 Tel.	7,	Turco-Persian frontier. Persia should be satisfied if Turkey agrees to His Majesty's Government's present proposal. Asks observations of mode of procedure ..	86
102	To Sir R. Rodd ..	244 Tel.	7,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. He should address note to Italian Government in sense of No. 100	87
103	To Sir G. Buchanan..	269	7,	Memorandum communicated to Porte. He should communicate annex 3 confidentially to Russian Government. Refers to No. 54	87
104	To India Office ..	..	7,	Buoyage of Persian Gulf. Transmits No. 84. Requests India Office observations ..	87
105	To Admiralty ..	..	7,	Hodeidah. Transmits No. 93. Enquires whereabouts of His Majesty's ships, and requests authority asked for by consul ..	87
106	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	7,	Proposed arrangement with Bagdad Railway. Will give His Majesty's Government six months' notice of intention to transfer shares to other company ..	88
106A	India Office ..	..	7,	Lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island. Transmits letter to Trinity House requesting plans and specifications of works, and enquiring whether arrangements can be made for testing Anglo-Persian Oil Company's samples	88*
107	To Mr. Marling ..	415 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Enquires views on No. 101	88
108	To Sir R. Rodd ..	184	8,	Italian action in Ægean. Italian Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government had made any arrangement with France respecting. He was told "No"	88

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
109	To India Office ..	..	Aug. 8, 1912	Shatt-el-Arab Commission. Transmits No. 90. Requests views. Sir E. Grey indisposed to concur in Admiralty suggestion. Thinks Porte would also not agree	88
110	Admiralty	..	8,	Hodeidah. Admiralty see no reason to depart from procedure laid down ..	89
111	Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha	..	9,	Bombardment of Manzariyé. Protests against, Manzariyé not being fortified ..	89
112	Mr. Marling ..	273 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 101. In favour of communicating map to Persian delegates. Danger of Turks bringing No. 61 to knowledge of Persian delegates	89
113	„ „ ..	274 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador maintains correctness of interpretation of article 3 of 1847 treaty, and that joint note of 1849 bears out contention. Question of Shatt-el-Arab	90
114	„ „ ..	275 Tel.	8,	Turco-Persian frontier. Procedure which Russian Ambassador is proposing to his Government	90
114A	To Sir W. Townley..	479 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. In view of No. 112, communications in No. 101 should be made as soon as possible. To instruct Sir P. Cox to go to Mohammerah with copies of maps	90*
114B	To Mr. Marling ..	418 Tel.	9,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 112. Agrees to communication of map to Persian delegates. To make joint communication with Russian colleague. Russian Government will be given copy of draft Shatt-el-Arab Convention ..	90*
115	„ „ ..	422 Tel.	10,	Hodeidah. Refers to No. 93. Admiralty object to departure from usual procedure	90
116	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Mr. Parker	Confidential	July 16,	Turco-Persian frontier. Information as to islands in Shatt-el-Arab claimed by Sheikh of Mohammerah as Persian territory ..	90
117	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to India Office	Confidential	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Transmits copy of letter to Government of India, transmitting report by Lieutenant Wilson on position of Hawizeh and frontier west and north-west of that place	91
118	Mr. Marling ..	650	Aug. 3,	Adana. Transmits report from consul at, on celebration of constitution day, and Pan-Islamic speeches	97
119	„ „ ..	652	3,	Yumurtalik-Suleimanieh Railway. Refers to No. 35. Though Chester scheme is dropped, Mr. Morgan is negotiating for a similar one, but has withdrawn application for concession for Yumurtalik-Suleimanieh Railway. Mr. D'Arcy might come to an arrangement with Lightfoot group ..	97
120	„ „ ..	656	4,	Attitude of Smyrna army. Transmits despatch from military attaché respecting ..	99
121	„ „ ..	660	6,	Seyyid Idris. Transmits despatch from consul, Jeddah, on fight at Zuhra between Turkish troops and	101
122	„ „ ..	661	6,	Italian action at Rhodes. Transmits despatch from consul-general, Smyrna, on ..	102

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
123	Sir W. Townley ..	449 Tel.	Aug. 12, 1912	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 101. Course proposed seems to meet the case, though it seems unnecessary to communicate map to sheikh	102
124	To Sir H. Babington Smith	Confidential	12,	Petroleum deposits in Mosul. Requests further information concerning National Bank of Turkey's application for concession to work an arrangement with Deutsche Bank	103
125	Mr. Marling ..	289 Tel.	13,	Shatt-el-Arab Convention. Consul at Bussorah's remarks on articles 6 (c), 16, and 17 of	103
126	To Sir W. Townley ..	488 Tel.	13,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 123. Approves giving sheikh oral explanation only	103
127	India Office ..	..	13,	Navigation of rivers of Mesopotamia. Transmits letter from Government of India respecting	103
128	To Mr. Marling ..	371	14,	Bombardment of Manzariyé. Transmits No. 111. Requests report	104
129	Mr. Marling ..	291 Tel	14,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 114 B. Persian delegates have agreed to form of acceptance of explanatory notes ..	105
130	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox	Telegraphic	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 114 A. Is ready to proceed, but if further instructions are coming, will await them in Bushire	105
131	To Tewfik Pasha ..	..	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. His Majesty's Government and Russian Government are advising Persians to accept explanatory note. His Majesty's Government confident Porte will meet wishes as regards Mohammerah frontier	105
132	Tewfik Pasha ..	..	15,	Italian attack on Hodeidah. Gives details of, and protests against latest attack (3rd August)..	105
133	India Office ..	..	16,	Turkish intrigues at Aden. Transmits letter from Government of India, dated 27th June, respecting	106
134	Mr. Marling ..	294 Tel.	16,	Pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea. Consul, Hodeidah, asks Italian Government be requested to authorise passage of boats with consular flag between Hodeidah and Camaran	108
135	Sir W. Townley ..	458 Tel.	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 129. Should communication sketched in No. 101 be made now to Persian Government, or should it be made jointly with Russian Minister, as appears to be indicated in No. 114 B	108
136	Mr. Marling ..	146 Commercial	7,	Blockade of Red Sea and pilgrim traffic. Transmits despatch from Dr. Clemow respecting measures taken by Italian authorities to mitigate blockade in favour of pilgrim traffic	108
137	„ „ ..	671	8,	Kurdistan and Northern Mesopotamia. Transmits report from consul at Mosul on political and administrative aspects of ..	109
138	„ „ ..	675	8,	Steamers for Bagdad Railway. Transmits extract from "Gazette financière" on formation in Belgium of syndicate to purchase	112

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
139	Mr. Marling ..	685	Aug. 14, 1912	Montific district. Transmits despatch from consul at Bussorah respecting disturbed state of tribes in	114
140	„ „ ..	686	14,	Italian naval operations off Yemen. Transmits report from consul, Hodeidah, on ..	115
141	„ „ ..	691	14,	Bagdad Railway at Bussorah. Consul reports that land registration difficulty has been solved. Company will receive river frontage. Refers to No. 1	116
142	India Office ..	..	17,	Shatt - el - Arab Conservancy Commission. Refers to No. 109. Clause 5 of draft convention seems satisfactory, but suggests slight alteration	118
143	Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha	..	19,	Bombardment of Hodeidah. Refers to No. 132. Protests against fresh attack on 15th August..	119
144	To Sir W. Townley..	497 Tel.	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 144. No need to defer proposed action at Mohammerah pending joint communication at Tehran	119
145	To Sir G. Buchanan..	675 Tel.	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 135. Informs of communication of Mohammerah maps and advice given at Constantinople to Persian Ambassador to accept explanatory note. To suggest that the two representatives should take similar action at Tehran	119
146	Sir F. Bertie ..	363 Confidential	16,	Islands in Ægean. French Government concur in His Majesty's Government's views. Annexation of islands. Greek population. Attitude of German Government	119
147	Mr. Marling ..	308 Tel.	19,	Turco-Persian frontier. Is consulting His Majesty's consul - general at Bagdad. Valleys of Kileh, Shahine, and Dereh might revert to Turkey	120
148	Sir G. Buchanan ..	297 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 145. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to communication of maps, but understands Persian delegates have already accepted explanatory note	120
149	To India Office ..	..	21,	Shatt - el - Arab Commission. Transmits No. 125. Asks views on amendments suggested by Mr. Crow, objections to which are pointed out	120
150	Mr. Beaumont ..	117	14,	Island of Icaria. Transmits communication received from the "Administrative Committee of the Free Island of Icaria," expressing desire of inhabitants for union with Greece	121
151	Mr. Marling ..	321 Tel.	22,	Bombardment of Hodeidah. Repeats telegram of 20th August from Hodeidah reporting. Recommends stationing of one of His Majesty's ships at Camaran .	121
152	To Sir G. Buchanan..	706 Tel.	22,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 148. Explains basis of proposal. If Russian Government think communication respecting explanatory note unnecessary, His Majesty's Government will not press the point	122

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
153	To India Office ..	..	Aug. 22, 1912	Bahrein. Refers to No. 87. No protest need yet be made at Constantinople. Action proposed in enclosure in No. 87 would be expedient	122
154	Sir R. Rodd ..	239 Confidential	14,	Italian operations in Ægean. Denial given in Paris to Italian enquiry as to truth of report of Franco-British agreement to prevent. German and Austrian enquiry at Paris as to agreement between *Entente* Powers for protection of their interests in Near East	122
155	„ „ ..	240	19,	Pilgrim traffic. Mr. Cheetham's telegram No. 44 of 5th August communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Transmits reply	123
156	Sir G. Buchanan ..	300 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 145 and 152. Russian Minister instructed to concert with Sir W. Townley as to proposed communication	123
157	To Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	23,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Transmits convention of July 1904. Enquires whether Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Mr. D'Arcy would welcome association with Deutsche Bank, National Bank, and Shell Transport Company, who are trying to secure concession to exploit	124
158	Admiralty	Confidential	23,	Hodeidah. Transmits correspondence with Commander-in-chief, East Indies ..	124
159	Sir G. Buchanan ..	304 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Gives substance of *aide-mémoire* of Russian Government in reply to representations based on instructions to Mr. Marling	125
160	Sir R. Rodd ..	94 Tel.	24,	Dardanelles. Refers to No. 151. Secretary-general states no operations intended ..	125
161	To Mr. Marling ..	491 Tel.	24,	Hodeidah. Refers to No. 151. To inform consul that His Majesty's ship "Fox" has been ordered to Camaran	125
162	To Sir R. Rodd ..	261 Tel.	24,	Bombardment of Hodeidah. Refers to No. 151. To make friendly representations	125
163	To Admiralty ..	Confidential	24,	Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Commission. Refers to Nos. 207* (Part VI) and 90. Commissioner should be officer of political and consular experience. Clause 5 appears satisfactory as it stands	125
164	Sir G. Buchanan ..	306 Tel.	25,	Turco-Persian frontier. Concessions to foreigners. While adhering to views of His Majesty's Government, Russian Government advise postponing declaration ..	126
165	„ „ ..	258	19,	Ægean islands. Has informed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of language held to Italian Ambassador. M. Poincaré told M. Sazonof he was opposed to "a number of little Cretes"	126
166	Mr. Marling ..	704	21,	Defeat of Seyyid Idrisi by Imam Yahya. Refers to No. 140. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Jeddah reporting on, and on capture of dhows in Red Sea by Italians	127

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
167	Sir G. Buchanan ..	309 Tel.	Aug. 26, 1912	Bagdad Railway. Minister for Foreign Affairs has learnt with surprise of Lynch's contract with German Bank	127
168	Sir R. Rodd ..	96 Tel.	26,	Hodeidah. Regulations made in sense of No. 162. Secretary-general believes no further bombardment contemplated ..	127
169	To Sir G. Buchanan..	745 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to Nos. 159, and 164. Desirability of complete understanding with Russia as to general lines of settlement. Difficulty of getting Turkey to agree to *status quo* of 1848 along the whole frontier	128
170	To Sir R. Rodd ..	264 Tel.	26,	Hodeidah. Refers to No. 160. Danger due rather to unrest amongst Arabs than any special operations in contemplation	128
171	To Mr. Marling ..	393	26,	Bagdad Railway. Refers to No. 141. Enquires as to exact location and extent of purchase of land	128
172	Sir W. Townley ..	481 Tel.	27,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Minister instructed to make joint communication. May he do so?	129
173	Mr. Dering ..	98 Tel.	27,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Minister of Marine cannot sanction passage of launch	129
174	To Sir G. Buchanan..	760 Tel.	27,	Bagdad Railway. Explains circumstances of Messrs. Lynch's agreement and position of His Majesty's Government	129
175	To Sir W. Townley..	544 Tel.	27,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 172. To act accordingly. To communicate maps of Mohammerah frontier, and say His Majesty's Government consider this frontier in accordance with Treaty of Erzeroum	129
176	To Sir F. Bertie ..	353 Tel.	27,	Expedition to Samos. Admiralty ask what should be done with ship if captured. She might be interned at Suda Bay. To enquire views of French Government	130
177	Mr. Marling ..	339 Tel.	27,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Ambassador opposed to prolonging period of negotiation	130
178	Consul-General Cumberbatch	Telegraphic	28,	Italian squadron at Beirout. Reports arrival of six ships. Panic in town	130
179	To Mr. Marling ..	525 Tel.	28,	Pilgrim traffic. Transmits telegram for Beirout enquiring whether Turkish combatants are being conveyed disguised as pilgrims in British ships	130
180	To Mr. Cheetham ..	58 Tel.	28,	Pilgrim traffic. No. 174 was outcome of complaint by Italian Government. Could pilgrim-ships be inspected at Suakin before proceeding to Jeddah?	131
181	To Sir G. Buchanan..	292	28,	Carriage of railway materials up Shatt-el-Arab. Russian chargé d'affaires has enquired as to truth of report that Lynch had come to an agreement with Deutsche Bank and Ottoman Government for .	131
181*	Admiralty ..	Confidential	28,	Samos. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reporting dispatch of "Medea" to	131*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
182	Mr. Dering ..	100 Tel.	Aug. 28, 1912	Hodeidah. Confirms information in No. 168. Italian ships will be at disposal of British refugees if necessary	131
183	Sir G. Buchanan ..	316 Tel.	29,	Bagdad Railway. Refers to No. 174. Has explained matter to Minister for Foreign Affairs	131
184	Mr. Marling ..	342 Tel.	29,	Italian squadron at Beirout. Repeats telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting arrival of six ships and panic in town	132
185	Consul-General Cumberbatch	Telegraphic	29,	Italian squadron at Beirout. Refers to No. 178. Reports departure for the north	132
186	To Mr. Marling ..	536 Tel.	29,	Turco-Persian frontier. To push Mohammerah negotiation in most expedient manner. Frontier indicated forms part of *status quo* in Gulf region on which assent of His Majesty's Government to customs increase depends	132
187	Mr. Marling ..	345 Tel.	30,	Italian ships at Jaffa. Refers to No. 184. Repeats telegram from Jaffa reporting arrival and departure of three ships ..	132
188	„ „ ..	346 Tel.	30,	Italian squadron at Beirout. Repeats telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout (see No. 185) reporting departure of. Measures taken to prevent outbreak in town	132
189	„ „ ..	347 Tel.	30,	Italian ships at Jaffa. His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reports arrival of six ships at Jaffa, 27th August. Three left same day and three (mentioned in No. 187) later in same day	133
190	To Mr. Lightfoot ..	Confidential	30,	Proposed Yumurtalik-Suleimanieh Railway. Replies to questions in Part IV, No. 169 ..	133
190*	National Bank of Turkey	..	29,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Gives details of agreement between National Bank, Deutsche Bank, and Asiatic Petroleum Company	133*
191	Admiralty	Confidential	31,	Samos. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, giving scheme for watching Samos coast. Local complaints as to presence of Turkish troops	133
192	Mr. Marling ..	350 Tel.	31,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to No. 173. Cannot Italian naval authorities give vice-consul facilities for travelling between Hodeidah and Camaran under necessary surveillance?	134
193	Consul-General Wratislaw	117 Tel.	31,	Expedition to Samos. "Medea" reports excitement in the island..	134
194	To Sir F. Bertie ..	381 Tel.	31,	Expedition to Samos. Refers to No. 193. Instructions given not to land men, and to refrain from intervention in affairs of island. To ask French Government to give similar instructions	134
195	Mr. Marling ..	356 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Expedition to Samos. Reports arrival of "Medea," 29th August, at Samos. Everything quiet at present..	135
196	„ „ ..	713 Confidential	Aug. 23,	Bagdad Railway. Details as to *tracé* of Eregli-Euphrates section	135

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
197	Mr. Marling ..	719	Aug. 25, 1912	Turco-Persian frontier. Turkish frontier posts east of Shatt-el-Arab. His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reports despatch of soldiers to Zain. Will repeat representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject	135
198	Mr. Dering ..	253	26,	Bombardment of Hodeidah. Has spoken in sense of No. 162. Secretary-general's reply	136
199	Admiralty	Confidential	31,	Samos. Transmits telegram to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, warning commander of ship at Samos to abstain from interference in internal affairs	136
200	„ „		31,	Expedition to Samos. Concurs in proposed instructions to commanders	137
201	Mr. Marling ..	357 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Expedition to Samos. Russian Ambassador hears that secret committee was formed in Samos to assist	137
202	To Consul-General Wratislaw	149 Tel.	2,	Samos. Refers to No. 193. To repeat news from	137
203	To Mr. Dering ..	285 Tel.	2,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. To enquire of Italian Government in sense of last sentence of No. 192.	137
204	To Mr. Marling ..	410	2,	Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission. Refers to No. 125. Lord Crewe concurs with Sir E. Grey's conclusions respecting Mr. Crow's recommendations.. ..	137
205	To Admiralty ..	..	2,	Expedition from Crete to Samos. Refers to No. 191. Transmits No. 193. No men should be landed on Samos in any event..	138
206	Mr. Beaumont ..	122	Aug. 27,	Island of Icaria. Refers to No. 150. Transmits further communication from "Executive Council of the Free State of Icaria"	138
207	Mr. Marling ..	731	29,	Rebellion in Yemen and Assyr. Transmits copy of despatch from Hodeidah respecting. Newspaper report of defeat of Seyyid Idris	139
208	Admiralty ..	Confidential	Sept. 2,	Samos. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reporting excitement in Samos. People and Government demanding withdrawal of garrison..	142
208*	Mr. Greenway ..	..	2,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Refers to No. 157. Mr. D'Arcy unfavourable to proposed association with National Bank, Deutsche Bank, &c., but is ready to take up concession independently. Requests continued support of His Majesty's Government ..	142*
209	Consul-General Wratislaw	118 Tel.	2,	Expedition to Samos. "Medea" reports demonstration in Samos postponed. It would be pity to recall "Medea" yet ..	142
210	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	3,	Turco-Persian frontier. Concessions to foreigners. Asks that their rights shall be safeguarded	142
211	Mr. Marling ..	362 Tel.	3,	Pilgrim traffic. Refers to Nos. 76 and 83. Vice-consul, Hodeidah, suggests Aden be instructed to telegraph necessary details to Rome	143

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
212	Mr. Cheetham .	52 Tel.	Sept. 4, 1912	Pilgrim traffic. Refers to No. 180. Difficulties of inspection at Suakin	143
213	To Mr. Marling ..	421	5,	Blockade of Yemen coast. Refers to No. 140. No use protesting against connivance of Italian authorities at violation of blockade at Taif. Consul to report any fresh case	143
214	Mr. Marling ..	366 Tel.	6,	Pigrim traffic. Refers to Nos. 179 and 180. Repeats telegram from Beirout. No knowledge of sale of British ship named. Combatants should be easily detected ..	144
215	Consul-General Wratislaw	121 Tel.	8,	Expedition to Samos. Project abandoned. French ship has returned to Suda Bay .	144
216	Mr. Marling .	741	4,	Situation in Kurdistan. Despatches from consular officers describe state of unrest. Gives résumé of reports received ..	144
217	„ „ ..	742	2,	Facilities for vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to Nos. 134 and 192. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul respecting difficulty of communicating with Camaran owing to blockade ..	145
218	Mr. Dering ..	267	3,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to No. 203. Has made representation to secretary-general, who will refer case again to Ministry of Marine	146
219	Mr. Marling ..	748	4,	Situation in Aleppo. Transmits copy of despatch from His Majesty's consul respecting	147
220	To Admiralty ..	..	9,	Expedition to Samos. Refers to No. 191. Point of public law need not be raised. Question unlikely to become a practical one..	148
221	„ „ ..	..	9,	Expedition to Samos. Transmits No. 215. Suggests withdrawal of "Medea" ..	148
222	To Mr. Marling ..	431	10,	Expedition to Samos. Porte have thanked His Majesty's Government for sending ship	148
223	Consul-General Wratislaw	123 Tel.	10,	Samos. "Medea" reports disturbance in interior 9th September, and fears conflict between troops and inhabitants.. ..	149
224	To India Office ..	..	11,	Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea. Transmits No. 211. Would it be possible for resident at Aden to telegraph direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome details referred to in No. 76?	149
225	Mr. Marling ..	372 Tel.	12,	Mutiny of Broussa reserve. Vice-consul at Dardanelles reports that they are being disbanded, as they are out of hand ..	149
226	To Mr. Marling ..	608 Tel. Confidential	12,	Turkish oilfields. Informs of agreement between National Bank, Deutsche Bank, and Asiatic Petroleum Company. Danger which would arise from their obtaining the concession. Is there any likelihood of it?	149
227	To Mr. Beaumont ..	60	12,	Samos. Greek Minister has enquired whether Powers would take some action with a view to removal of Turkish troops ..	150

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
227*	To Admiralty ..	..	Sept. 13, 1912	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Transmits Nos. 124 and 226. Résumé of discussions with Mr. Greenway. Suggestion that National Bank might take Anglo-Persian Oil Company into the group in place of the Shell Company or form combination with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company	150A
228	India Office ..	..	14,	Lighting and buoying of Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Viceroy. Large circular buoy being prepared at Bussorah by Turks. Consul presumes it is for bar	150
229	Mr. Marling ..	373 Tel.	15,	Camaran. Refers to No. 182. Vice-consul at Hodeidah reports that His Majesty's ship "Fox" called at Camaran 29th–30th August. Situation quiet	151
230	„ „ ..	375 Tel.	15,	Bombardment of Mandar. Vice-consul at Hodeidah reports, on 17th and 26th July, Mandar is undefended and ungarrisoned..	151
231	„ „ ..	754	6,	Expedition to Samos. Refers to No. 201. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting that he has no information respecting formation of committee in Samos to assist ..	151
232	„ „ ..	756	9,	Expedition to Samos. Refers to No. 231. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Samos respecting	152
233	„ „ ..	759	10,	Cretan expedition to Samos. Refers to No. 231. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna respecting. Agitation for reform in administration of Samos	153
234	„ „ ..	766	10,	Lebanon. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting excitement amongst Druses and Maronites	155
235	„ „ ..	768	10,	Bagdad Railway. Refers to No. 171. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, giving particulars of lands acquired by railway company (see also No. 3)	156
236	„ „ ..	770	11,	Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission. Refers to No. 204. Gives observations on question whether Commission should have any dealings with local authorities ..	157
237	„ „ ..	777	11,	Situation in Eastern Anatolian provinces. Refers to No. 216. Reports atrocities committed by Kurds on Armenians. Action of Armenian Patriarchate. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum on situation in that vilayet ..	158
238	Sir F. Bertie ..	124 Tel.	16,	Ægean islands. Minister for Foreign Affairs prepared to repeat warning, and instructions being sent to Rome	161
239	Mr. Marling ..	378 Tel.	17,	Turkish oilfields. Refers to No. 226. Minister of Mines favourably disposed towards scheme. This fresh instance of Anglo-German co-operation may be misunderstood at St. Petersburgh	161

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
240	Mr. Dering ..	103 Tel.	Sept. 17, 1912	Ægean Islands. French chargé d'affaires instructed to concert joint warning. No instructions received from His Majesty's Government. French chargé d'affaires seemed relieved, as he objects to representations. Minister for Foreign Affairs has hinted to him that islands will be given up	161
241	To Consul-General Wratislaw	163 Tel.	17,	Samos. Prince reports to Porte that 1,000 Cretans are preparing descent on, and asks for return of ships of war. Is rumour true?	162
242	To Mr. Marling ..	624 Tel.	17,	Samos. Refers to No. 241. Any information?	162
	,, Mr. Beaumont ..	155 Tel.			
243	Mr. Beaumont ..	40 Tel.	18,	Samos. Refers to No. 242. Prime Minister attaches no importance to rumour	162
244	Mr. Marling ..	380 Tel.	18,	Samos. Refers to No. 242. No information	163
245	,, ,, ..	382 Tel.	20,	Turco-Persian frontier. Russian Government have suggested journey of the two consuls at Bagdad. Recommends consultation with vice-consul at Kasr-i-Shirin ..	163
246	,, ,, ..	383 Tel.	20,	Samos. Refers to No. 244. Vice-consul at Samos reports movement of armed party in interior in anticipation of landing of Cretans. He considers situation serious	163
247	,, ,, ..	385 Tel.	20,	Samos. Refers to No. 246. Vice-consul at Samos reports fighting outside Vathy. Great excitement prevailing	163
248	,, ,, ..	386 Tel.	20,	Samos. Refers to No. 247. Vice-consul at Samos reports landing of 300 armed Cretans. All troops concentrated at Vathy. Requests man-of-war	163
249	To Mr. Marling ..	638 Tel.	20,	Canaan. To enquire of Hodeidah whether difficulties of provisioning still exist ..	164
250	To Sir F. Bertie ..	463	20,	Bagdad Railway, Bagdad–Busserah section. French Ambassador says his Government are desirous of participating in. This intimation has come too late, as His Majesty's Government have decided to abstain from demanding participation ..	164
251	,, ,, ..	469	20,	Samos. French Ambassador has been informed of news respecting projected descent of Cretans on. Two Powers will presumably have to send vessels, as before	164
252	Admiralty ..	Confidential	20,	Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Commission. Refers to No. 163. Observations on status of naval officers designated to serve on ..	165
253	Consul-General Wratislaw	129 Tel.	21,	Island of Nicaria. Refers to No. 246. Small parties of Cretans may have landed in .	165
254	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	896 Tel.	21,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 245. To submit Mr. Marling's suggestion to Russian Government	166
254*	To Sir F. Bertie ..	434 Tel.	21,	Samos. Refers to Nos. 247 and 248. Admiralty being asked to send a ship. To request French Government to do the same. Instructions will be the same as on last occasion	166*

No.	Name	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
255	To Admiralty ..	..	Sept. 21, 1912	Expedition to Samos. Transmits Nos. 247 and 248. Requests ship may be sent, with same instructions as on previous occasion. French Government asked to to take similar measures. Transmits No. 254*	166
256	Sir F. Bertie ..	132 Tel.	22,	Samos. Refers to No. 254*. "Bruix" ordered to proceed to, to co-operate with British vessel. Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as to scope of their action ..	166
257	Mr. Dering ..	110 Tel.	22,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to No. 218. Further request reported by Ministry of Marine. They offer to transport vice-consul, when necessary, on man-of-war	166
258	Mr. Marling ..	787 Confidential	17,	Armenia. Minister for Foreign Affairs says no massacre has occurred, but admits lawlessness, and says Government are apprehensive. He hints that it is the work of the committee. Steps taken by Government	167
259	,, ,, ..	789	17,	Lebanon. Refers to No. 94. Transmits proposals of Porte for revision of statute. These are inacceptable. Transmits French counter-proposals (see Part VI, No. 75) ..	167
260	,, ,, ..	792	17,	Armenian outrages. Refers to No. 237. Culprits not yet arrested. Armenian National Council again adjourned. Two more murders	169
261	,, ,, ..	793	18,	Land routes between Bussorah and Fao. Military Intelligence Branch have asked consul at Bussorah for information respecting. Only means of obtaining it is by personal inspection. May Mr. Crow be authorised to make the trip? ..	169
262	Sir F. Bertie ..	497	21,	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and Bagdad Railway. Transmits article from "Figaro" on agreement between, and its probable effects on building of the railway and Russia's obligations under the Potsdam agreement	170
263	Mr. Dering ..	111 Tel.	22,	Ægean Islands. Italian Cabinet, except Ministers of War and Marine, in favour of restoring, and are only considering question of guarantee. Enquires views of His Majesty's Government on this point	170
264	Mr. Marling ..	Telegraphic	23,	Armenian outrages. Refers to No. 258. Telegraphic instructions sent by Sheikh-ul-Islam to his subordinates	170
265	,, ,, ..	390 Tel.	28,	Samos. Vice-consul reports situation unchanged. Imperial troops hold strong position	171
265*	To Mr. Marling ..	651 Tel.	23,	Samos. Refers to No. 248. Informs of No. 254*	171*
266	,, ,, ..	652 Tel.	23,	Pilgrim ships. Refers to No. 214. To ascertain whether His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout has my further information	171

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
267	Admiralty	..	Sept. 23, 1912	Samos. Refers to No. 255. Orders sent to "Medea," 21st September, to return at once to Samos, with instructions as requested	171
268	Consul-General Wratislaw	131 Tel.	24,	Samos. Vathy reports visit of Italian man-of-war. Fighting going on at Vathy ..	171
269	Sir F. Bertie ..	156 Tel.	24,	Ægean islands. Political director thinks question concerns all the Powers. He hears peace negotiations are making no progress	172
270	To Sir F. Bertie ..	443 Tel.	24,	Samos. Refers to No. 256. His Majesty's Government would prefer instructions to stand as they are, but they will accept slight modification	172
271	Admiralty ..	Confidential	25,	Samos. Senior naval officer reports continuous fighting since 2 p.m. 23rd September. Fear of massacre. Armed parties landed from British and French ships	172
272	Consul-General Wratislaw	132 Tel.	25,	Samos. "Medea" reports small parties have been landed from French and British ships	172
273	" " ..	198 Tel.	25,	Samos. "Medea" reports necessity for protecting Vathy municipality, and requests instructions	173
274	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	324 Confidential	25,	Bagdad Railway. Sadijé-Khanikin branch. Manager of Russo-Asiatic Bank in Paris hears that Herr von Gwinner has decided to push on construction. He considers Russia should at once apply for concession from Astara to Tehran	173
275	Note by Sir E. Grey ..	..	25,	Ægean islands. M. Sazonof's suggestion as to guarantee to be obtained from Turkey in event of restoration of ..	173
276	India Office ..	..	25,	Lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 228. Transmits letter showing that Turkish Government are endeavouring to procure a vessel for use as a lightship in the Gulf. Suggests warning at Constantinople	174
277	Admiralty	Confidential	26,	Samos. "Bruix" ordered by French Government to restore order in Vathy. Proposes to dispatch a second ship	174
278	Consul-General Wratislaw	154 Tel.	26,	Samos. "Media" reports French commander has orders to restore order in Vathy. "Medea" cannot leave Vathy ..	174
279	To Mr. Marling ..	661 Tel.	26,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to No. 257. Proposes to accept Italian offer, but enquires views	175
280	" " ..	662 Tel.	26,	Land routes between Bussorah and Fao. Refers to No. 261. No objection to journey, which may be sanctioned, and expenditure authorised	175
281	To Consul-General Wratislaw	173 Tel.	26,	Samos. Refers to No. 273. British armed party should avoid coming into contact with Turkish troops. Their duties limited to protecting lives and property, and they must be re-embarked as soon as situation permits	175

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
282	To Sir F. Bertie ..	451 Tel.	Sept. 26, 1912	Samos. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 281	175
283	To Admiralty ..	..	26,	Samos. Refers to No. 277. Transmits No. 278. Dispatch of second ship seems no longer necessary	175
284	Admiralty	Confidential	26,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Refers to No. 227*. Admiralty attach much importance to maintenance of Persian oil-fields in hands of a British company. Danger of Anglo-Persian Oil Company falling into a combination which may work Turkish fields. Question of subsidy. Proposes inter-departmental committee	176
285	" "	Confidential	27,	Samos. Transmits telegrams from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reporting on armistice brought about through intervention of "Bruix"	177
286	Consul-General Wratislaw	135 Tel.	26,	Samos. Refers to No. 281. Will get information conveyed to "Medea." His Majesty's ship "Lancaster" expected at Canea to-morrow	177
287	Mr. Marling ..	400 Tel.	26,	Samos. Refers to No. 273. Has brought situation to notice of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Turkish battalion sent to reinforce garrison. Cable cut	177
288	Sir F. Bertie ..	137 Tel.	27,	Ægean islands. Refers to No. 269. Future régime must, in Minister for Foreign Affairs' opinion, be a European question ..	178
289	To Sir F. Bertie .. " Sir G. Buchanan ..	458 Tel. 921 Tel.	27,	Samos. Refers to No. 290. To ask for similar instructions to be sent to Constantinople	178
290	To Mr. Marling ..	671 Tel.	27,	Samos. Refers to No. 287. To concert with French and Russian colleagues warning to Porte that if further troops landed excesses (see No. 273) will be checked. To inform Porte of No. 281	178
291	Note by Sir E. Grey	..	27,	Lynch concessions. M. Sazonof accepts explanation of Bagdad Railway Transport contract. He admits Russia does not object to road concession in Northern Persia, but says question of motors must be discussed	178
292	India Office ..	Confidential	27,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 104. Provision of dioptric lanterns very essential addition to scheme. Proposes cost should be shared by Imperial and Indian Exchequers. Protests against negativing possibility of extension of scheme, implied in Treasury letter .	179
293	Mr. Marling ..	403 Tel.	28,	Samos. Vice-consul at Samos reports cable cut and heavy fighting proceeding. Blue-jackets landed to patrol town	179
294	" " ..	404 Tel.	28,	Facilities for His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah. Refers to No. 279. Objections to accepting Italian offer	179
295	Sir F. Bertie ..	138 Tel.	28,	Samos. Refers to No. 270. Similar instructions sent to French commander. Refers to No. 282. Supplementary instructions sent to "Bruix" with regard to protection of Vathy municipality	180

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
296	Consul-General Wratislaw	136 Tel.	Sept. 28, 1912	Samos. His Majesty's ship "Diana" sailed to relieve "Medea"	180
297	Sir F. Bertie ..	139 Tel.	28,	Samos. Communication made in sense of No. 289	180
298	Sir G. Buchanan ..	346 Tel.	28,	Samos. Refers to No. 289. Russian Ambassador at Constantinople will be instructed to discuss matter with His Majesty's Representative	180
299	Mr. Dering ..	115 Tel.	28,	Italian operations. Reasons for anticipating Italian *coup*	180
300	Mr. Beaumont ..	43 Tel.	28,	Samos. Greek Government propose sending man of war to, to protect Greek interests. Has strongly deprecated proposal. He proposes asking three Powers to urge withdrawal of garrison	181
300A	To Mr. Marling ..	672 Tel. Confidential	28,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Refers to No. 226. Admiralty attach much importance to maintenance of Persian fields in hands of British Company. Sir H. B. Smith informed that His Majesty's Government's support is pledged to D'Arcy	181*
300B	To Sir H. Babington Smith	Confidential	28,	Mesopotamian oil-fields. His Majesty's Government's support is pledged to D'Arcy, and they cannot therefore comply with request in No. 190*	181*
301	Mr. Marling ..	408 Tel.	28,	Samos. Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of incorrect attitude of British consul, and requests authorisation for consul-general at Smyrna to proceed to ..	181
302	Consul-General Wratislaw	137 Tel.	29,	Samos. Refers to No. 286. Repeats telegram from "Medea." In order to avoid collision with Turks it may be necessary to withdraw men landed. "Brnix" concurs	181
303	Mr. Marling ..	797	23,	Lawlessness at Adana. Refers to No. 258. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on cases of	181
304	" " ..	803	24,	History of Sporades Islands. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Rhodes giving, since the time of Sultan Suleiman	182
305	" " ..	808	24,	Armenian outrages. Refers to No. 260. Reports resignation of Armenian Patriarch, "Conseil Mixte," and National Assembly. Steps taken by Government ..	186
306	" " ..	811	25,	Samos. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on position of affairs in	187
307	Admiralty ..	..	30,	Shatt-el-Arab. Transmits copies of telegrams respecting dispatch of His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" to	189
308	" " ..	Confidential	30,	Samos. Turks and insurgents, both 1,000 strong, holding hills round Vathy. Situation may become more difficult when armistice expires	190
309	Mr. Marling ..	412 Tel.	30,	Samos. Refers to No. 260. Minister for Foreign Affairs undertakes to withdraw reinforcements only at end of war ..	190

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
310	Mr. Marling ..	413 Tel.	Sept. 30, 1912	Samos. Consul at Samos reports arrival of 300 Turkish troops	190
311	To Director of Military Operations	..	30,	Land routes between Bussorah and Fao. Transmits No. 261. Sir E. Grey has no objection to the journey being undertaken, subject to Mr. Marling's concurrence ..	190

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. November 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

Part VII.

[27720]

No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 532.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 22, 1912.*

FROM information recently received it would appear that the Bagdad Railway Company are meeting with some difficulty in connection with the purchase of land at Bussorah for accommodation of railway material and other similar purposes.

In the month of May His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reported to me that Meissner Pasha had bought a piece of land near Magil, of about 16 acres in extent, for storing Bagdad Railway material, and was endeavouring to have it registered in his own name. But the German consul at Bussorah now informs Mr. Crow that the Vali of Bussorah is contesting the German proprietary rights to the land, that difficulties have therefore been raised to its registration and that work on it has been stopped pending the receipt of instructions from Constantinople.

There has apparently been some idea of further land purchase by the German company along the river and of their hiring certain intervening river frontage ground. This has led the Turks to consider that they might possibly wish to build docks there eventually, and the vali has therefore made the acquisition of the land by the Germans conditional upon any subsequent naval arrangements of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[27725]

No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 537.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 23, 1912.*

ACCORDING to a report just received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, the chief engineer of the Bagdad Railway intends to proceed shortly to Khanikin, accompanied by the Turkish head of the Customs, in order to select a site for the custom-house, transit warehouses, and railway station there.

Mr. Lorimer understands that no details of survey have yet been made for the line to Khanikin, and no materials have yet reached Bagdad for this line; but he gathers that the present intention is that it should run on the west side of the Diyala from Sadiya to the immediate neighbourhood of Khanikin, thus saving the construction of an extra bridge.

Sir R. Crawford informs me that no report has yet been received here from the chief of the Bagdad Customs on the results of his journey to Khanikin.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[27728] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 540.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 301 of the 23rd ultimo and to my despatch No. 496 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a further telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, which confirms me in my view that it would be undesirable at the present juncture to approach the Sublime Porte on the subject of Messrs. Lynch's position as regards Mesopotamian navigation rights.

Mr. Crow points out that, as reported in my above-mentioned despatch, the permission granted to Messrs. Lynch to tow two barges has been extended, while their daily launch recently established between Mohammerah and Bussorah has so far been in no way interfered with by the Turkish authorities.

There is, moreover, some probability that, a British-Indian firm, Abdul-Ali of Bagdad, may shortly obtain permission to run a motor service from Bussorah to Mohammerah for passenger traffic; while the recent creation of a German depôt for material for the Bagdad railway, near Magi, which is four miles above Bussorah, will, presumably, *ipso facto* throw the river open to free navigation as far as that place.

Mr. Crow suggests, in view of the above considerations, that Messrs. Lynch can perfectly well make their trials of the "Bulbul" on the Karun, as they have hitherto done, without any inconvenience to themselves, or questions from the authorities, and he shares my view that any attempt at the present moment to draw the attention of the Turkish Government to Messrs. Lynch's position might lead to interference by them with the frequent visits of their steamers to Bussorah and with the working of the towing services to Mohammerah, and perhaps also be the cause of further complications.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[27734] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 546. Commercial.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Gazette financière," dealing with a visit recently paid to Constantinople by Mr. Carter, who was formerly American Minister at Bucharest and chargé d'affaires here last winter, in connection with an Anatolian railway scheme, to be financed by Mr. Pierpont Morgan somewhat on the lines of the old Chester project.

From what I gathered from Mr. Carter, whom I saw during his short stay here, the enclosed extract describes more or less correctly the scheme in which he is interested. The negotiations would appear to be only in their initial stages at present, but Mr. Carter appeared to be satisfied with the reception accorded by Djavid Bey to his initial proposals.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Extract from the "Gazette financière."

LES CHEMINS DE FER EN TURQUIE.

NOUS avons à signaler aujourd'hui un fait nouveau et qui paraît devoir entraîner des conséquences importantes au point de vue de l'avenir des chemins de fer de la Turquie d'Asie et notamment de l'Anatolie orientale.

Mr. Carter, qui fut chargé d'affaires des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à Constantinople, où il a laissé d'excellents souvenirs, aurait abandonné la carrière diplomatique pour

traiter avec le Gouvernement ottoman, au nom du milliardaire américain Pierpont Morgan, la réalisation d'un réseau de lignes ferrées, dont l'artère principale relierait la frontière turco-persane dans les environs du lac de Van à la Méditerranée en passant par Kharpout pour aboutir à Youmourtalik.

Les premières conversations qui ont eu lieu au sujet de cette affaire ne datent que de quelques jours; elles ont été tenues strictement confidentielles, mais nous croyons cependant pouvoir affirmer qu'elles ont pris rapidement une tournure favorable et que l'on ne serait pas très loin de conclusions concrètes.

L'étiquette américaine pourrait faire supposer qu'il s'agit simplement d'une reprise du projet désormais célèbre connu sous le nom de projet Chester, mais les noms aussi bien que la qualité et la puissance financière du demandeur et de son représentant permettent de comprendre qu'il n'est plus question aujourd'hui d'un bluff plus ou moins irréalisable, mais bien d'une affaire sérieuse et viable.

Sans entrer dans plus de détails, bornons-nous à signaler que si le principe de l'attribution au concessionnaire des richesses minières des régions desservies constitue encore le substratum de l'affaire, la nouvelle combinaison comporte des lignes à voie large au lieu d'être prévues à voie étroite et que le Gouvernement ottoman interviendrait directement dans la réalisation du réseau par la constitution d'une partie du capital de construction; c'est précisément cette participation du Gouvernement qui caractérise la nouvelle affaire et lui donne une base solide.

L'entrée en ligne de l'élément américain présente une importance qui n'échappera pas à nos lecteurs, du moins à ceux qui connaissent les ambitions et les susceptibilités diverses que suscite le développement des voies ferrées dans toute la péninsule anatolienne et le long de la frontière turco-persane; cette importance s'accroît encore si l'on tient compte de l'antagonisme qui s'est manifesté, non sans acuité depuis un certain temps, dans toutes les questions asiatiques, entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et une Grande Puissance européenne.

Il y a là, semble-t-il, un champ d'action nouveau pour la diplomatie des Puissances les plus intéressées aux lignes ferrées de l'Asie Mineure, et les problèmes divers qui vont se poser afin de concilier les intérêts des privilèges ou des droits acquis, peuvent conduire à des solutions bien inattendues.

Il est en tout cas prématuré de se hinger dans la voie des hypothèses dont le champ est presque illimité, et le plus sage est d'attendre que les positions de chacun se soient mieux définies.

Les négociations entamées entre le Gouvernement ottoman et les groupes français représentés par la Banque Impériale ottomane et la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer et Travaux publics pour le réseau Samsoun–Sivas–Kharpout–Erzeroum ont sensiblement avancé dans ces derniers jours: l'accord est définitif en ce qui concerne la construction, qui, comme nos lecteurs se le rappellent, sera effectuée pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman par la Régie générale de Chemins de Fer et Travaux publics, et d'autre part on espère arriver rapidement à une entente, dont les grandes bases sont déjà établies, pour l'affermage de l'exploitation des lignes en question.

Le Gouvernement ottoman a fait annoncer d'autre part qu'il poursuivait les conversations avec le Gouvernement russe au sujet de ce réseau; il n'est pas douteux que l'entente ne se fasse très rapidement, la Russie ayant un intérêt économique évident à faciliter le développement des riches régions qui seront mises en valeur par les lignes ferrées projetées.

[27739] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 551.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 25, 1912.*

SINCE the 18th May, the date on which Jacksons were declared "adjudicataires provisoires" for the Mesopotamian irrigation works, negotiations have been proceeding with their representatives and Djavid Bey on certain points on which they were not agreed. On some a solution was found, but others remained; for instance, the question as to what points should be submitted to arbitration, the non-liability of the National Bank to reimburse the Government for coupons on bonds in the event of work being delayed owing to *force-majeure*, and question of the amount of capital of the Ottoman Construction Company, which Sir J. Jacksons propose to form.

I understand that the question of reduction of the price offered was not discussed

Sir J. Jacksons were in a somewhat difficult position in being called upon to come forward with a lower price than that named in their recent tender.

A few days ago Djavid Bey intimated that he could give no further delay for acceptation by Sir J. Jacksons of the points in dispute, and informed them that fresh tenders could be put in on the 27th instant, Messrs. Pearsons being likewise allowed to tender.

It appears unlikely, although no final decision has been taken, that under the circumstances the former will tender, and I have been unable to ascertain whether Messrs. Pearsons will do so, but I have reason to believe that they will. Assim Bey, with whom I spoke to-day on the subject, said that Djavid Bey had found it impossible to postpone the matter any longer, as he was obliged to ask the Chamber for the necessary credits now. But his Excellency hoped that one or other would be able to tender within the sum named (£2,550,000), which, on the data in the hands of the Ottoman Government, they considered a fair price. His Excellency added that in any case, if he remained in the Cabinet, the work would be carried out by an English firm.

If the present adjudication produces no results it would seem to be the natural sequence that Sir J. Jacksons should proceed with the work which they are now carrying on for the account of the Ottoman Government on a 15 per cent. basis of profit; but I understand that the sums voted on this account are exhausted and the Turkish Government are indisposed to revert to a renewal of this system. But if this adjudication produces no competition and a fresh adjudication is offered, it will presumably be open to any firms to compete.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[27804] No. 6.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 175.)

Sir, *Rome, June 28, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 127 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that from enquiries which I have made at the Italian Foreign Office, the information given by Sir A. Biliotti in his despatch No. 41 of the 14th May to His Majesty's consul at Smyrna, to the effect that the Italian authorities had proclaimed the autonomy of Kalymnos, would appear to be based on some misunderstanding. In any case it is devoid of foundation. It is of course quite possible that the municipality which appears from Sir A. Biliotti's despatch to have been constituted by the Kalymniotes may have issued some declaration of autonomy, but nothing is known of it here.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[27923] No. 7.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, June 29, 1912.*

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 13th June, on the subject of the occupation by Italy of certain Turkish islands in the Ægean Sea.

2. In order to elucidate the question of the possible effect strategically on British interests of the permanent retention by Italy of any of the occupied islands, a memorandum has been prepared by the chief of the staff which sets forth the general issues involved.

3. My Lords agree with the conclusion arrived at that the maintenance of the *status quo ante* should be aimed at, and that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to associate the Powers who are co-signatories of the treaties governing the free navigation of the Dardanelles in protesting against any permanent occupation of the islands by Italy or any other of the principal naval Powers.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Italian Occupation of Ægean Islands and its Effect on Naval Policy.

(Secret.)

1. ADMIRALTY policy in the Mediterranean has for many years been based upon the condition that our interests in the eastern basin of that sea (viz., the Black Sea and Levant trade at its source—Egypt—and the Suez Canal route to the East) could only be threatened by hostile fleets operating from countries a thousand miles distant from the vital area in which those interests lie, which fleets could be observed, and their hostile movements controlled, by our fleets based upon Malta.

A cardinal factor of this condition has naturally been that no strong Naval Power should be in effective permanent occupation of any territory or harbour east of Malta, if such harbour be capable of transformation into a fortified Naval base.

Since the battle of Navarino in 1827, the Turkish fleet has been a negligible quantity, while the Greek navy has been maintained upon such a small scale as not to affect this general condition.

2. The maintenance of the *status quo* in the Ægean Sea has not only been British policy for a century, but may fairly be said to represent also the policy of Europe.

It is true that in order to bring pressure upon Turkey upon some definite point of difference, a temporary occupation of some island, by various Powers acting separately or in conjuction, has at various times taken place, but a restoration to the *status quo ante* has invariably followed the settlement of the dispute, in the interests, it is assumed, of all Europe.

Thus in 1887 the Austrians temporarily occupied Mersina in the Province of Adana in Asia Minor.

In 1901 the French temporarily occupied Mitylene.

In 1905 an international squadron of ships of Great Britain, France, Austria, Italy, and Russia occupied Lemnos and Mitylene.

The sole exception has been the British occupation of Cyprus, which was opposed by the naval authorities of the day, but was determined upon for military reasons connected with India. "In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian." (*Lord Beaconsfield*, 1878.)

The question of Crete would never be so acute, were it not that the possession of the fine harbour of Suda by any one Power is the subject of determined opposition by all others.

We are now confronted with the possibility of Italy retaining possession of certain of the Ægean Islands in full sovereignty.

Of these islands, some are more important than others. Some have fine harbours that could with ease be made into fortified naval bases. The importance of others is dependent upon their proximity to the Dardanelles.

But it should be understood that as a matter of principle these minor questions of convenience do not affect our policy as a whole, and it is not practical to differentiate between the islands.

None can foresee the developments of material in warfare, and the occupation of the apparently most useless island should be resisted equally with the occupation of the best.

The geographical situation of these islands enables the Sovereign Power, if enjoying the possession of a navy, to exercise a control over the Levant and Black Sea trade and to threaten our position in Egypt in an unprecedented degree.

A permanent menace to Turkey by the Sovereign Power would also be established, or, alternatively, greater facility would be given to the transport of Turkish troops to Egypt in the event of Turkey joining our enemies.

Also the fact that the Italian Tripoli frontier now marches with that of Egypt must not be left out of consideration.

3. Such a condition of affairs would have compelled an entire reconsideration of naval policy in the Mediterranean at a time when we maintained there a full squadron of battleships and a squadron of cruisers. It would have been necessary to detach sufficient ships to mask any force that might be present in the Ægean Sea or to invest the established naval base.

But at the present day, when our whole fleet is insufficient to provide for a sure preponderance in the North Sea coincidently with an effective protection of our Mediterranean interests, the situation would plainly be aggravated by the establishment of a hostile naval station in the Ægean.

Egypt and the Levant are still 1,000 miles from the territory of a potential enemy.

Hostile squadrons designed to operate in those waters must still leave their bases and supports far behind them and incur all the risks attendant upon so distant a venture, risks accentuated by the over-present possibility of our return in force following upon a decision in the North Sea.

Were, however, such squadrons able to count upon making use of adjacent fortified harbours, their risk would be much diminished and our difficulty proportionately increased.

Had Bruoys, after landing the French army in Egypt been able to take his fleet to an adjacent fortified harbour, the battle of the Nile and our consequent re-establishment in the Mediterranean might never have taken place.

From the above considerations it may be confidently asserted that the possession by Italy of naval bases in the Ægean Sea would imperil our position in Egypt, would cause us to lose our control over our Black Sea and Levant trade at its source, and would in war expose our route to the east viâ the Suez Canal to the operations of Italy and her allies.

4. The attitude of Europe towards this question has been briefly alluded to above.

It is, however, an important factor in the matter.

A fleet making use of the harbours of any of these islands can control the exit of the Black Sea trade through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

It would seem to have been always tacitly assumed in Europe that the international character which by various treaties has been given to these waterways should morally be extended to those islands which, if fortified and in the possession of a naval Power, would command this exit.

It would certainly be a legitimate claim that any transfer of sovereignty of the islands should be a subject of international consideration, if only on the grounds above mentioned, namely, that the possession of these islands by one of the Great Powers operates adversely to the freedom of the navigation of the Dardanelles by other European nations.

The two Powers principally concerned are Great Britain and Russia, and their historical attitude may be said to be fully expressed in the following quotations from despatches at the time of the San Stefano Treaty.

Lord Derby to Count Schouvaloff, May 6, 1877 :—

"The existing arrangements made under European sanction which regulate the "navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles appear to His Majesty's Government "wise and salutory, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their "alteration in any material particular."

Reply from Prince Gortchakof :—

"Quant aux Détroits, quoique les deux rives appartiennent au même souverain" (Türk), "ils forment le débouché exclusif de deux vastes mers où tout le monde a des "intérêts. Il importe donc à la paix et à l'équilibre général que cette question soit "réglée d'un commun accord sur des bases équitables et efficacement garanties."

It is, therefore, considered that not only should we ourselves most strenuously oppose the permanent occupation of any of the Ægean islands by Italy or any other naval Power, but we should be able to associate the co-signatories of all the treaties governing the navigation of the Dardanelles with us in our protest.

E. T. T.

Admiralty, June 20, 1912.

[28021] No. 8.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 555.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 551 of the 25th June, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of an *arrêt ministériel* which was issued to-day formulating fresh regulations for the adjudication of the Mesopotamian irrigation scheme.*

The cost of the work, which is now put up to competition between Messrs.

* Not printed.

Jacksons and Messrs. Pearsons, is not to exceed £T. 2,550,000, but it will be seen that the work now contemplated comprises only a part of the original scheme. The work for which tenders were originally invited was divided into two groups, and it is only the first of them which is comprised in the present scheme. The second group, which included the construction of the barrage of Feludja, a system of contributory canals on the right bank of the Tigris, certain similar canals on the left bank of the Euphrates, and other minor drainage works, does not appear at all in the new scheme.

Messrs. Pearsons' tender in April last for the work now contemplated was £T. 2,380,000, while Messrs. Jacksons' figure was £T. 2,735,000, so that in fixing a maximum of £T. 2,550,000 the Ottoman Government has compromised and taken a mean between the two offers.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[28093] No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

Sir, *India Office, July 1, 1912.*

WITH reference to my letters of the 21st May and 10th June, 1912, on the subject of participation in the Bagdad-Bussorah Railway, the Secretary of State for India understands that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has arrived, on full consideration, at the conclusion that no proposal for the participation of Great Britain on a basis of 50 per cent. would be accepted by the French and Russian Governments, and, consequently, that to press proposals to this effect would serve no useful purpose.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[28150] No. 10.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 237.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, July 2, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that Turkish Ambassador has made to him, under instructions, a verbal communication evidently drawn up in view of forthcoming meeting of Emperors. Porte declared they were fully disposed to consider question of peace subject to the condition that the "effective sovereignty" of the Sultan over Tripoli and Cyrenaica should be maintained. They asked that this requirement should be taken into account at the approaching meeting.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out to Turkish Ambassador that the reservation as to effective sovereignty deprived the Porte's communication of all practical meaning. He further impressed on him the danger arising from a prolonged occupation by Italy of the Ægean Islands. He stated that if peace were concluded now the islands would probably be restored to Turkey, Powers confining themselves to advising Turkey in a friendly way to refrain from reprisals against Greek inhabitants, but if the occupation continued for some time it would become absolutely unavoidable for the Powers to insist on effectual guarantees in favour of the islanders, which might take the form of autonomous institutions similar to those enjoyed by Samos.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is keenly alive to objections that exist to effecting any change in the islands.

[28142] No. 11.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 357 of 1st July: Turco-Persian frontier.

Yes (see protocol No. 5).

[26557] No. 12.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 13th ultimo relative to the provision of two dioptric lanterns for His Majesty's consulate-general at Bushire, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Treasury,* to which department he had caused a copy of your letter of the 28th ultimo to be communicated, making certain enquiries on the subject.

I am to state that, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, Sir E. Grey would propose, in reply, to call attention to the fact, stated in paragraph 2 of your letter above quoted, that sanction has been accorded to this expenditure on the understanding that it will be met by savings from the total cost of the complete scheme of lighting and buoyage in the Persian Gulf, and to point out that, as the Lords Commissioners have already assented to the charge to Imperial funds of half of this sum, no special sanction on their part in respect of present proposal is required.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27659] No. 13.

Foreign Office to India Office.†

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 17th ultimo relative to the effect of the Turco-Italian war on the pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome‡, conveying to him the expression by the Italian Government of a desire that His Majesty's Embassy should be kept informed in good time of the names and other indications of identity of ships engaged in this business.

I am to state that the wish of the Italian Government appears to Sir E. Grey to be reasonable, and that he considers it desirable to comply with it as far as possible, and I am accordingly to request that you will be so good as to move the Marquess of Crewe to make it known, if his Lordship has the means of doing so, to the shipping companies concerned.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27739] No. 14.

Foreign Office to Sir A. Jackson and Co.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that a report has reached him to the effect that, in view of the onerous conditions laid down by the Turkish Government, your company have submitted no tender for the proposed contract to carry out the Mesopotamian irrigation scheme in accordance with the latest specifications.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn whether this report is correct, and, if so, to which of the conditions exception is taken, with a view to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to make representations on behalf of the British firms interested in the event of these requirements appearing unreasonable.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part VI, No. 192. † Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*. ‡ Part VI, No. 216.

[28388] No. 15.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

Sir, *India Office, July 3, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 26th June, 1912, forwarding copies of proposed agreements for the transport of material for the Bagdad Railway Company, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that the documents appear to correspond to the description of them given by Messrs. Lynch in their letter, dated the 27th March last, and to be generally free from objection.

As regards the transport of merchandise and passengers, it is observed that the Société de Transports fluviaux has for one of its objects "de procurer, transporter ou acheter des marchandises et produits de quelque nature que ce soit à être transportés par ces bateaux et allèges" (statuts, article 3 *a*); that the société may also "s'occuper d'autres opérations non-énumérées dans le présent article" (*ib.*, article 3 *e*); that the parties contracting the convention for the formation of the Anglo-German-Turkish Company engage "à ce qu'il ne soit transporté ni marchandise de nature générale ni passagers par les vaisseaux de la société . . . ou par ceux de la compagnie . . . sans le consentement de toutes les parties contractantes et du Gouvernement turc" (convention, article 6); that the contract between the Bagdad Railway Company and the société (article 1) and that between the company and Messrs. Lynch (article 1) purport to be for the transport of railway material; and that the former contract contemplates the possibility of carrying "general merchandise" on the downward trips between Bagdad and Bussorah, with the consent of the Turkish Government (article 12), and, presumably, also of the parties to the convention above mentioned. It would thus appear that the limitation of the transport of general merchandise to the downward trips is by implication only.

It is noticed that Messrs. Lynch have not yet given the undertaking asked for in the last paragraph of your letter to them, dated the 6th May.

I am, &c.

E. RITCHIE.

[28329] No. 16.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 1st July, 1912, regarding the Bagdad Railway.

India Office, July 3, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 16.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July 1, 1912.*

NEGOTIATIONS regarding Bagdad Railway.

See your telegram dated 13th ultimo.

Please reply as soon as possible whether you consider it practicable to make Turkey the following concession:—

Recognition of autonomy of Koweit to be accorded as proposed in memorandum dated 29th July last, but to be limited, as Lord Lansdowne contemplated, to town, harbour, and immediate surroundings. (Reference is invited to my telegram dated 18th March, 1911.) Present *status quo* to be maintained in regard to wider limits mentioned in your telegram of 25th March, 1911, and clear intimation to be given to Turks that Sheikh is entitled to our good offices in event of unprovoked aggression within these limits. Please say how this would be regarded by Sheikh. It would really be a concession in appearance only *vis-à-vis* of Turkey, but would save face of Turks in regard to loss of large piece of territory. Removal of Turkish garrisons from Warba and Bubiyan would of course be involved.

Would it be possible, by means of a convention with Turkey confirming our agreements with Sheikh on analogy of Peking Convention of 1906, to get over difficulty in regard to those agreements, as to which see bottom of p. 5 of Turkish memorandum of 15th April? No doubt Turkish consent to waive right to send an agent to Koweit would be difficult to obtain; but, provided all Powers except ourselves were excluded, would it be necessary to insist on this, in the event of autonomy being guaranteed by convention?

(Repeated to Resident, Persian Gulf.)

[28393] No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the political resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, dated the 4th July, 1912, regarding the Turco-Persian frontier.

India Office, July 4, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Bushire, July 4, 1912.*

WILSON has just returned to Naseri, and his survey will be posted next week and reach London 27th July. Meanwhile, I have taken following résumé from him by telephone:—

Naseri was fixed astronomically and Hawizeh both astronomically and by triangulation. Position of Naseri is found to be several miles south of position hitherto assigned to it in Survey of India maps. Position of Hawizeh is found to coincide with position indicated in identic map of 1851, Southampton 1875.

Frontier north-west of Hawizeh and north of Shuaib was laid down by triangulation from Hawizeh. Western limits of Hawizeh district, as observed in practice for their own convenience by the Benitruf Arabs under Hawizeh, is the now dry branch of the River Douveyridge, called Ghor-ed-Douvil in identic map, at point where its course runs north and south, but the frontier claimed by Persia and locally observed on their side by the Turks is the channel 6 miles further west called Ghor-el-Monseycine. The intervening space is uninhabitable owing to absence of drinkable water. Whichever of the two alternative points be adopted the frontier from thence southwards runs across the Ghor-el-Azem, and eventually cuts the main channel of the marsh just west of Shuaib, as shown in my sketch map. Wilson states that above boundary has been accepted by the Turks, and at no time transgressed by them.

From Shuaib southwards frontier runs as shown in my sketch. Wilson had with him my native surveyor and latter's original survey, and, after applying further tests by the light of present observations, he is of opinion that the relative positions of Yefair Kishki, Hawizeh, and Kishki Basri in relation to one another and to Hawizeh town are correct as shown in my sketch as submitted to Government. He considers that discrepancy in the distances between Hawizeh and the Shatt-el-Arab indicated in surveyor's plane table survey as compared with those appearing in identic map must have occurred mainly in desert tract between Kishki Busri [? Basri] and Shatt-el-Arab, and is sufficiently explained by difficulty of satisfactory plane tabling in flat desert devoid of reliable land marks.

[28108] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 291.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.*

IN the course of a conversation with Sir A. Nicolson on the 28th ultimo the Turkish Ambassador, on his own behalf, as he said, alluded to the agitation in the

Ægean Islands and to the various rumours afloat as to annexation by Italy or to autonomy being granted to a confederation of the islands. Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that we might expect a crop of rumours of such a nature, but naturally nothing could be known till the termination of the war, and that His Majesty's Government were ignorant of the intentions of Italy. His Highness agreed.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[27632] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 293.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.*

ON the 26th June the Italian Ambassador drew Sir A. Nicolson's attention to a report originated by the "Frankfurter Zeitung" that your Excellency had given the Turkish Government reassuring statements as to the Sporades at present occupied by Italy, intimating that the islands would be restored intact, in status, &c., to Turkey. The Marquis Imperiali added that Mahmoud Shevket had also told a foreign representative that you had spoken in the above sense to him.

Sir A. Nicolson told the Italian Ambassador that he was quite sure that there was not a word of truth in these reports. The Marquis Imperiali asked if he could inform his Government that the report that we had made "reassuring statements" was entirely without foundation. Sir A. Nicolson replied, "Certainly."

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[29183] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Earl Granville.

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that he had reported to his Government what I had said about the Bagdad Railway. He felt sure that, if we were prepared to acquiesce in the railway stopping at Bussorah, an agreement could be come to. With regard to participation, of course the German stipulation would have to be considered.

I said that we were now drawing up our reply to the Turkish Government, and we hoped to send it to them early next week. I could not say how the question of participation might be arranged. We recognised that if we were to participate the question would have to be discussed with Germany, but acquiescence in the ending of the railway at Bussorah would be included in our reply to Turkey.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[28322] No. 21.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a memorandum respecting pending negotiations with the Turkish Government, which, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India and the Board of Trade, it is proposed to communicate to the Turkish Ambassador.

Sir E. Grey is desirous, for political reasons, that this memorandum should be communicated at the earliest possible moment.

I am to request that you will be so good as to move the Secretary of State to cause a memorandum, together with a marked map, showing the limits of Koweit, to be furnished to this department for communication to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[27659] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 364.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 5, 1912.*

SIR R. RODD'S telegram No. 77 of 30th June: Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea.

You should endeavour to obtain the information desired through Dr. Clemow, and telegraph it direct to Rome, repeating to Foreign Office.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 217.)

[27633] No. 23.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 6, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo respecting (*a*) the Bagdad Railway and (*b*) the draft convention for the Shatt-el-Arab Commission.

With regard to the specification, I am to say that Sir E. Grey considers it a matter of urgency that the reply to the Turkish Government should be settled and dispatched, and he would accordingly express the hope that the Government of India may be instructed to telegraph their views at once. Should there, however, be more than a few days' delay, he considers that the reply to the Turkish Government should be dispatched without awaiting any longer the views of the Government of India on this point. He understands that the Board of Trade will shortly furnish the proposed draft convention for the exclusion of differential treatment, and he would suggest, for the consideration of the Marquess of Crewe, that time might be gained if the expert department of your Office were to enter into direct communication with the Board of Trade respecting the draft convention.

As to the draft convention for the Shatt-el-Arab, Sir E. Grey will defer any observations until he is in possession of the revised draft and report which is in course of preparation.

As to the last sentence in your letter, he entirely agrees with the views of the Marquess of Crewe, though he considers that the precise moment of making our communication to Persia must be largely dependent upon developments in the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission now sitting at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[28393] No. 24.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, July 6, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, in which you enclose a copy of a telegram of the same date from the British resident in the Persian Gulf respecting the position of Hawizeh and the line of the Turco-Persian frontier, as locally observed, in that region.

I am to state that, in view of the great importance attached by the Russian Government to early progress in the work of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission at Constantinople, it is, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, impracticable to postpone further action until the receipt of Lieutenant Wilson's survey in London on the 27th July.

He has accordingly decided to present the Turkish Government with a map of the frontier claimed by His Majesty's Government on behalf of Persia at the earliest possible moment; and, on this map, the most westerly of the two lines indicated by Lieutenant Wilson (in the telegram of the 4th July from Sir P. Cox) will be marked, in order that, if necessary, His Majesty's Government may have something to concede to Turkey in the course of negotiations.

Sir E. Grey will be glad to learn if the Secretary of State for India concurs in this mode of procedure, and he would be glad to receive a reply at the earliest possible moment.

The draft of the memorandum about the Mohammerah frontier, which it is proposed, after consultation with the Russian Government, to communicate to Turkey, will be furnished to your department in the course of a few days.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[28866] No. 25.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Positano, June 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 77 of the 30th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the note from the Italian Government therein referred to, suggesting that the names of the British ships carrying pilgrims to and from Mecca and, if possible, other information which might facilitate their identification may be communicated by the companies interested to His Majesty's Embassy here through His Majesty's consular officers, in order to assist the Italian naval authorities in according all possible facilities to such ships.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 25

The Marquis di San Guiliano to Sir R. Rodd.

Sir, *June 28, 1912.*

I WRITE in continuation of my note dated the 12th instant relative to the facilities which the Royal Government is disposed to guarantee, within the limits indicated by the notification of blockade in the Red Sea, to ships engaged in the transport of pilgrims who are going to Mecca or returning thence.

To attain the end which the two Governments have in view, i.e., of removing every restriction within the above-mentioned limits on such shipping, it would, in the opinion of the Royal authorities, be of the greatest advantage that the companies interested should, through the British consular officers, always make known in due time to His Majesty's Embassy in Rome the names and, if possible, other indications which might facilitate the identification of the ships carrying such pilgrims.

Further, it would be specially useful that such notification should be furnished in this way for those ships which undertake journeys of this character before the true period for pilgrimages, as also for other ships which later will have to pick up belated pilgrims returning to their country in the months following the said period.

Indeed, in the event of this embassy being prepared to give such notifications to this Ministry, the task entrusted to the Royal forces in the Red Sea would be found to be much lightened, and ships thus notified either going to Jeddah or returning from that place would be freed from all unnecessary surveillance.

I should be grateful to your Excellency if you would, with all possible solicitude, convey the above to the knowledge of the British Government, and inform me as soon as you are in a position to do so of the reception the British Government accord to our suggestion.

I venture to add that it would be convenient if, from the time the proposed system of notification was put into practice, all the British consular authorities required to co-operate in it were, by the courtesy of this embassy, supplied, for their own information and for the information of the companies interested, with a translation of the text of the declaration issued by the Royal Government relative to the blockade of Kamaran, as well as with the text of the regulations which control access to that quarantine station.

I have, &c.
SAN GUILIANO.

[28725] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 502.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 524 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's consulate at Jeddah, reporting on two demonstrations by Bedouins outside the town of Jeddah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

Acting Consul Abdurrahman to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Jeddah, June 14, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 25 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that about 3 o'clock on the night of the 10th June, 1912, a party of armed Bedouins, believed to be of Bishr tribe, and about 120 in number, riding on camels, made a demonstration here outside the Medina gate close to the barracks.

A number of rifle shots was heard, and residents of the town were panic-struck, but the Bedouins retired, and nothing more is heard of them.

The pilgrim hospital is also said to have been bored by five bullets, some bullets also struck some of the houses in the town. No one was wounded or killed.

I understand that the Grand Shereef of Mecca had sent the information beforehand of this attack by the Bedouins to the local Turkish authorities, and so guards were appointed on different places around the town.

I am informed that in consequence of this demonstration two slaves belonging to this Bishr tribe, who were emancipated by the Turkish court about eleven months back, have been sent to Mecca, at the request of the Grand Shereef, and I am not in a position to say yet whether it is the intention of the Grand Shereef to restore these two slaves to their former owners or not.

I have, &c.
S. ABDURRAHMAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Jeddah, June 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to Mr. Abdurrahman's despatch No. 27 of the 14th June, I have the honour to report that a second attack on the barracks was made by a band of Bedouins, estimated at forty or fifty, on the night of Saturday, the 15th of this month.

The fusillade, which was brisk, lasted for some quarter of an hour. The greater part, however, of the firing was on the Turkish side, the soldiers continuing to let off their rifles long after the Bedouins had ceased.

One sentry was killed at the hospital.

The bullets were flying in not inconsiderable numbers over this consulate, and several fell in the stretch of sea water which partially separates the house from the scene of action.

The house next door to this, belonging to the British firm of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Co., was struck in several places. Both the latter and this consulate are only some 200 yards distant from the barracks, and there are no intervening houses.

My colleagues share the opinion held by Mr. Abdurrahman that these attacks on the barracks are of the nature of demonstration or retaliation for the liberation of some of their slaves.

My Dutch colleague informed me that in view of the fact that several among even the few slaves who had been freed were known to have been returned to bondage on the insistance of the Shereef, and that it was more than probable that a yet larger percentage had been returned without its becoming publicly known, he considered it scarcely worth while to expose the town to danger and make Government still more

difficult for the Turkish authorities by giving the Shereef a handle against it, merely for the sake of enforcing a principle.

That the Bedouins are glad enough for an excuse for these forays is probably true, but it is still more probable that if it were not the liberation of the slaves a really rare occurrence, it would be something else seized upon as a pretext for keeping before the eyes of the Turkish Government that they are masters of the situation.

The Shereef's three principal objects appear for the moment to be: the suppression of the civil court of law in Jeddah, as it was suppressed two or three months ago in Mecca; the suspension of the right of the authorities to liberate slaves; and the prevention of a further extension of the Hedjaz Railway to Mecca from either Medina or Jeddah.

I am informed that the two sheikhs, Dakhilalla Haj and Hamid Jabri, have guaranteed the safety of the road for the pilgrims. But, I gather, the guarantee does not cover the town or soldiers.

In the meantime, I venture to think that the Government, for its own sake, should take measures to stop a practice which, by endangering the lives of foreigners, may any day lead to a situation disagreeable to itself.

I have, &c.
AVALON SHIPLEY.

[29013] No. 27.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

Sir, *India Office, July 6, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter of the 2nd instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that he concurs in the answer which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to return to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury regarding the order of dioptric lanterns for His Majesty's consulate-general at Bushire.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[29190] No. 28.

Consul Shipley to Mr. Parker.—(Received July 9.)

(Private.)
Dear Parker, *Constantinople, July 3, 1912.*

IN my last letter to you of the 19th ultimo I referred to the line which, according to the information given me by Itila-el-Mulk, had been informally proposed by the Ottoman delegates to their Persian colleagues, adding that the line in question after Howeizeh adopted the Kebir Kuh generally as the eastern frontier of Turkey. From some further indications which have since been supplied to me by Itila, though unfortunately these also are in parts very vague, the line in question goes from Tehardowar, which may roughly be called the northern extremity of the Kebir Kuh (*vide* Maunsell's reduction, sheet 9), to Mount Kaladja (near Mount Katchal, *ibid.*, sheet 8), and from thence by Mount Nua to Sermil. From this latter place the line goes by the Kélé-Siah (Guilé Siar?) and Kiani Kelb Ali mountains (*vide* map of Zohab, attached to your memorandum of the 8th December, 1906) to Derteng, then by a mountain which Itila calls Krédaghi (Garée Mount, *ibidem?*) and the Benou range to the River Shirvan, which it follows up stream. Between this latter stream and Mount Takhti Abdalan (Red. Id. map, sheet 5, latitude 40° 50″, longitude 46° 15″) no indication whatever is given as to the direction of the line, but from the Takhti Abdalan it goes northwards through Pusht-i-Badenjan (which is apparently outside the neutral zone) until it reaches the Kelé-Khan Pass, through which we travelled on our way from Sakkiz to Bané last year. From thence, according to Itila, it goes by the Keupri Dagh, the Ester Dagh (for this latter mountain, *vide* Maunsell's reduction, sheet 6) to the Meidan Pass in the neighbourhood of Pasvé. From Pasvé northwards the Turkish delegates, I am informed by Itila, stated that the line as far as the Kotur district, would be that presented to the mediating delegates by Dervish Pasha in the commission of 1875. The only remark I think that I need make with regard to this latter part of the line is that, at any rate from Djildian northwards, it appears to adhere very closely to the eastern line of the neutral zone all the way up until it ends at the

so-called boundary mark near Raihané on the road from Khoi to Kotur. The Persian delegates, Itila tells me, declined to accept this line, i.e., from Mohammerah to Kotur, as proposed by the Turks, and as it was only put forward by the latter informally, and as I have not had an opportunity of ascertaining what the Russians think of it, I would only at present repeat what I said in my last letter, viz., that it shows at least some willingness on their part to bargain, especially as it will be noticed that by it they—the Turks—virtually declare their readiness to withdraw from the lake and the districts immediately thereto adjoining.

The one object of immediate interest to ourselves during the past fortnight has been the proposal by the Persians to declare their acceptance of the explanatory notes under certain conditions. We informed you of this fully in our telegram No. 197 of the 23rd ultimo, and I am glad to say that we have succeeded in making them see clearly that such acceptance, while it would be very damaging to their own position, would in no way provide a solution of the difficulty, the question to which a reply was demanded by the Turks being whether these notes were accepted or not—a simple yes or no, in fact. The amended draft of the reply which has been submitted to us by the Persians makes no mention at all of any acceptance of the notes, conditional or otherwise, and merely reiterates the assertion that the Persian Government has never accepted them nor authorised its plenipotentiary to sign anything but the text of the treaty, offering at the same time to produce authentic documents in support of these assertions if required. There is, I think, no objection to a reply of this kind, as the Persians tell me that they must make a rejoinder of some sort or other to the Turkish argument in *Procès-verbal* No. 5. A difficulty in connection with this question of the notes has been that the Russians are extremely anxious to get them out of the way so as to deal with article 3 and the northern part of the frontier. Minorsky especially has been pressing me on the matter for some time past, and it is for this reason that the latest telegrams from the Foreign Office—1st July, &c.,—have been a considerable relief to us, as we can now, at any rate, fully inform the Russian Embassy of the reasons we do not wish the Persians to accept, even conditionally, these notes.

In our despatch No. 520 the word used in connection with Dervish Pasha's book should have been "printed" and not "published." In the preface to the book in question it is stated that the book was founded on a report which he—Dervish Pasha—had presented to the Porte in 1269 (1861), *i.e.*, seven years before the book itself made its appearance. It is the translation from the book (not from the report of 1861 therein referred to, which is of course inaccessible) which forms the enclosure in our despatch above referred to. The report which Dervish Pasha presented to the mediating delegates in 1875 is a different document, though parts of his book may have been utilised by him in its compilation. The book of Khursbid Effendi is again another production, and, as you will see by the despatch which we are forwarding by to-day's bag, I have been and am endeavouring to get hold of a copy. In the meantime I forward to you herewith a translation of the index of Dervish Pasha's book of the contents from pp. 21 to 50. After p. 50, as you will see by the note I have added, the book deals with the old frontier from the Chigan (Chighan) Pass northwards, the part in fact apparently already translated by Minorsky. I will go on with the translation, but you might perhaps, after looking through the various headings, be able to give me some indication whether a translation of the whole, i.e., from p. 21 to p. 50, will be required.

Might I ask you to tell Parkes that I am compelled to withhold my reply to his letter of the 25th June until Wednesday's bag.

With kind regards, yours, &c.

H. S. SHIPLEY.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Translation of the Index relating to certain pages of Dervish Pasha's Book on the Turco-Persian Frontier subsequent to those of which a translation was sent to the Foreign Office in the Embassy's No. 520 of June 19, 1912.

Page 21.—Comments on how, when the old frontier passed through the localities previously mentioned, the Feili tribes, who now dwell on the nearer slopes of the mountains known as the Kebir Kuh, arrived at that place and penetrated into the vilayet of Bagdad; and on the counter-claim which, in view of the fact that the said tribe has lands and real property in Turkish territory, may be raised by the Persians if it becomes necessary to contest the point.

Page 24.—No one knows the frontier fixed between the two States in Bedra, Zorbatieh, and Mendeli.

Page 25.—Summarised translation (from the Arabic) of a report on the subject by the Council of Bedra.

Page 26.—Summarised translation of a report on the same subject by the Beni Lam tribe.

Page 27.—The two reports agree as to the present boundary, but neither side has any information with regard to the old frontier. So far as statements regarding Beyyat, Dihluran, and Beksayeh are concerned, the Beni Lam report is the stronger. Rumours, researches, and conjectures with regard to the old frontier from Milleh Panjom to Ser Meil. How the Persians stretched out their hand to certain places within [our] frontier, particularly to Gilau and Gelin. It is not known where the old frontier really ran. There are other places than the Dihbala district through which the frontier may have passed.

Page 30.—The frontier passes by the places mentioned, but the locality called Aivan [Ivan] remains on the Turkish side.

Page 30.—Rumours relating to the manner in which Aivan, which was deserted, has been settled, and to the manner of its being left on the Persian side. It must belong to Turkey. Description of the Sumar Plain, and of how the Persians encroached upon the places in the neighbourhood of Mindilmieh.

Page 34.—Takrir (report) of Aziz Bey, Bey of the Kara Ulouss tribe, showing how in former times taxes were paid by those of the Gelsihr (?) tribe dwelling in Aivan when they came to Gilan, Sumar, and the neighbourhood of Mindeli, and how these taxes are not paid now. How an Imperial firman has been found which supports the said Bey's statement.

Page 35.—How the Lek (?) and Gelsihr (?) tribes went over to the other side, although, according to the said firman, they were Ottoman subjects.

Page 36.—How the tribes who came to localities in the possession of the Ottoman Empire other than Gilan and Gelin pay no taxes of any kind. Where they winter.

Page 38.—How Direh and Kala Shahin, which are dependent on the sanjak of Zohab, were left on the Persian side.

Page 39.—How the old frontier extends from Ser Meil, in the sanjak of Zohab, to the neighbourhood of the town of Zor, which is in the sanjak of Sulaimanieh.

Page 40.—The proposal made by the Ottoman delegate in the discussion which took place between the representatives of the two States with regard to the partition of the sanjak of Zohab according to the last treaty, whereby the eastern, *i.e.*, the mountainous part, would be separated from the western or flat portion.

Page 41.—The Persian delegate's proposal on this point.

Page 42.—The joint proposal made by the mediating delegates.

Page 43.—How the mediating delegates were of the opinion that the Shemiran district, a dependency of Shehr-i-Zor should be left to Persia when the division of the said sanjak took place.

Page 43.—Objections to the acceptance of the dangerous proposals put forward by the mediating delegates with regard to the partition of the sanjak of Zohab.

Page 44.—Persian interference with a place called Kuratu, a dependency of Zohab, which had been desolate since the Persians usurped it, but was recently settled by Turkey.

Page 46.—Advantages resulting from the retention on this side of the Tak Kira and Kala Zinjir roads, which are in the sanjak of Zohab, and of the Aivan road.

Page 47.—Confusion arising from the old frontiers extending from the hill Kutieh to the Chighan Pass mentioned in the treaty of Murad IV.

Page 49.—Certificate relating to seventeen villages near the desert of Shehr-i-Zor which are in the possession of the Persians, and which, according to treaty, ought to be subject to Shehr-i-Zor.

Note.—Page 50 and onwards deals with the old frontier from the Chighan Pass to the Bughra Mountain between Lahidjan and Ushan, and has apparently been translated by M. Minorsky, *vide* Enclosure in No. 1, Sir G. Buchanan's despatch to Foreign Office, No. 111 of the 4th April, 1912.

H. S. S.

[29185] No. 29.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

(Urgent and Very Secret.)

Board of Trade, July 8, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th July, forwarding the draft of a memorandum respecting negotiations now pending with the Turkish Government, which Sir E. Grey proposes to communicate to the Turkish Ambassador, and to return the draft herewith with certain amendments, indicated in red ink,* which they desire to suggest for Sir E. Grey's consideration.

With regard to the several amendments, I am to point out that the words "from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*" have been deleted from (iii) of the third paragraph of the draft and from the heading to section (iii), since the effect of the proposal for the special treatment of British cotton manufactures, set out in the amended form of section (iii), will be to limit the rate of customs duty to something less than 15 per cent. in the case of an important item in the Turkish import trade.

The addition of certain words at the end of the fifth paragraph of the draft has been suggested with a view to emphasising the close relation between the withdrawal of the British claim to participate in the railway between Bagdad and Bussorah and the other proposals dealt with in the memorandum.

In view of the amended form of section (iii) now suggested, the words deleted from (*a*) of the sixth paragraph appear unnecessary.

The Board think it advisable to indicate in (*b*) of the same paragraph the necessity of the British representatives upon the board of the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah being approved by His Majesty's Government, and they are also disposed to suggest that, should Sir E. Grey see no objection, this opportunity should be taken to direct the attention of the Turkish Government to the desirability of British representation upon the board of the Bagdad Railway proper.

Finally, section (iii) of the draft has been amended so as to indicate more precisely the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the proposed increase of the Turkish customs tariff.

I am at the same time to forward to you herewith the draft of a railway convention for submission, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, to the Ottoman Government, and to state that the proposed schedule of cotton duties will be forwarded to you at the earliest possible date.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Draft of Memorandum to be communicated to Turkish Ambassador.

1. HIS Majesty's Government have not failed to examine with much care and attention the important proposals which are embodied in the memorandum communicated by the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 15th April last.

2. Throughout their deliberations, His Majesty's Government have been animated by the conviction that a complete agreement on outstanding questions is eminently to be desired in the larger interests of both countries. They are persuaded that such an agreement, to be justly appreciated, should be viewed not only in the measure of sacrifice or advantage which each individual clause may imply, but also in its cumulative and future effects upon Anglo-Turkish relations in general. His Majesty's Government therefore desire to lay before the Ottoman Government the following proposals and considerations:—

3. For convenience of reference the several proposals under consideration may be dealt with under three distinct headings:—

(i.) The Bagdad Railway question.
(ii.) The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the Persian Gulf.
(iii.) An increase ~~from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent.~~ *ad valorem* in the Turkish customs duties.

* Printed in erased type and Italics.

(i.) *The Bagdad Railway Question.*

4. The interest which Great Britain must take in a railway which is to traverse a region where British-Indian trade amounts to some 60 per cent. of the total exports and imports is indeed so obvious as to call for little comment. His Majesty's Government have on repeated occasions dwelt upon the importance of that trade and the manner in which it has been steadily consolidated since the foundation, upwards of two and a-half centuries ago, of the first English factory at Bussorah; they have recalled that no less than 96 per cent. of the steam tonnage entered at the port of Bussorah was British; and they have consistently maintained that a satisfactory settlement of the Bagdad Railway question was a necessary condition of their assent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties.

5. The magnitude of Great Britain's manifold interests clearly renders it desirable that some satisfactory agreement as to British participation in the southern section of the Bagdad Railway should, if possible, be reached. His Majesty's Government find, however, that the question of participation on terms acceptable to them is likely to cause the Ottoman Government some embarrassment, and that the views held on this point by the two contracting parties are difficult to reconcile. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government, anxious to prove to the Ottoman Government the sincerity of their desire to reach a comprehensive understanding without delay or controversy, are prepared to withdraw their request for British participation in the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah, *if a satisfactory agreement is arrived at on the other points enumerated in this memorandum.*

6. It would be impossible to reconcile British public opinion to such a step unless His Majesty's Government were at the same time able to show that British interests of whatever character were fully safeguarded. His Majesty's Government consequently feel bound, apart from the territorial arrangements proposed, to lay down the following conditions as essential to that end:—

(*a.*) An arrangement, as set forth in the accompanying draft convention, for the exclusion of differential treatment on all railways in Asiatic Turkey, as well as an undertaking explained in a separate paper as to the treatment of certain British imports. Draft Convention (Annex 2).

(*b.*) The admission of two British representatives, *approved by His Majesty's Government*, to the board of whatever company may undertake the administration *construction or working* of the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah. *In addition, His Majesty's Government consider it highly desirable in the interests of the smooth working of the arrangements that at least one British director, approved by them, should be admitted to the board of the Bagdad Railway Company.*

(*c.*) The terminus of the railway to be at Bussorah.

(*d.*) No railway to be continued beyond Bussorah in the direction of the Persian Gulf without prior agreement with His Majesty's Government, and on conditions acceptable to them.

(*e.*) A convention to be signed, on the basis of the accompanying draft, for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab. This convention must be read in conjunction with a memorandum—which, as stated below, will shortly be communicated to the Porte—on the subject of the frontier of Mohammerah. Draft Convention (Annex 3).

(*f.*) An undertaking that permission should be given for three British steamers to navigate between Bagdad and Bussorah in addition to the number already allowed.

(ii.) *The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the Persian Gulf.*

7. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the Turkish Government renounce their claims to Bahrein on conditions which there should be no difficulty in accepting, but they have learnt with disappointment the attitude of the Imperial Ottoman Government in regard to El Katr and Koweit; nevertheless they do not doubt that the Ottoman Government will appreciate the important sacrifice made by His Majesty's Government in the matter of British participation in the Bagdad Railway, and that they will meet that sacrifice by a corresponding modification of the views set forth in the Turkish memorandum of the 15th April.

8. His Majesty's Government must in the first instance protest against the contention that there is a misunderstanding with regard to the assurance given, and repeatedly given, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that

Turkey did not entertain any intention of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein, Muscat, or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.

9. The original despatches, duly signed and dated, in which these assurances were reported, have been carefully preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, and they can readily be produced for the inspection of the Turkish Embassy.

10. His Majesty's Government maintain that prior to Midhat Pasha's expedition there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no Turkish jurisdiction or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared to recognise Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits of Koweit (as hereinafter defined) and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments adduced in the Turkish memorandum in any way invalidates the statement that south of Ojeir, in the district of El Katif, there is no trace of Turkish power ever having been paramount; and they are fully persuaded that El Katr has never been locally regarded as forming part of, or indeed as being subject to the influence of, the Ottoman Empire.

Annex 4.

For themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish assurances mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly informed the Sublime Porte accordingly.

11. His Majesty's Government can only reiterate their opinion that any lasting settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by the Ottoman Empire of the whole of the peninsula of El Katr, including El Bidna. They have consistently opposed any consolidation of Turkish authority, which first attempted to assert itself so recently as 1870, and they are bound to continue that opposition.

12. The Turkish memorandum of the 15th April does not afford His Majesty's Government all the information which they consider essential to a due appreciation of the attitude of the Turkish Government respecting Koweit. His Majesty's Government are concerned to ensure the continuance of the local government of the Sheikh of Koweit, as defined in their memorandum of the 29th July, 1911, which incontestably forms part of the *status quo*. Further, His Majesty's Government would be fully prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Koweit and indeed to recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish kaimakam, but they attach cardinal importance to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan being admitted by Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, to the withdrawal of the Turkish military post from Bubiyan, and to a recognition of the limits of Koweit in accordance with the indications contained in the accompanying memorandum.

Memorandum (Annex 4).

13. His Majesty's Government regret that they would consider the introduction of divided responsibility for maritime police measures altogether incompatible with the principles and successful accomplishment of their policy in the Persian Gulf. This policy consists in the maintenance of the maritime peace, and has been successfully pursued, to the advantage of all concerned, for a century. To modify the system in these circumstances would be alike unnecessary and unjustifiable.

14. Indeed His Majesty's Government would go further. They consider that they have acquired by prescription not merely the right but the duty to maintain peace in the Persian Gulf; they have always been opposed to any proposal to trench upon their prerogative; and it was this attitude which led to the declaration made by the Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1903, that "His Majesty's Government would regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and they should certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal."

His Majesty's Government must therefore ask the Turkish Government to recognise in the Persian Gulf the right of Great Britain—(*a.*) To control surveying, lighting, buoying, and pilotage; (*b.*) To police its waters; and (*c.*) To conduct all quarantine arrangements.

15. In submitting these final proposals for the acceptance of the Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government are not seeking territorial aggrandisement, nor are they embarking upon any new developments of policy. Their desire is simply to secure the recognition and to ensure the continuance of an order of things which, in fact, grew up under their auspices and before the appearance of Turkish authority in the Persian Gulf, and which has been proved by experience to favour the development of trade and the maintenance of peace in a region which, but for long-sustained British intervention, would have remained the scene of continual piracy and bloodshed.

16. They feel persuaded that the Ottoman Government will not oppose the continuance of the political *status quo* of a hundred years, and they look forward

confidently to a complete adjustment of the questions enumerated, and to the improved relations which cannot fail to ensue.

17. As the Ottoman Government are aware, there is a question which has caused some concern to His Majesty's Government in recent months, that of the frontier between Turkey and Persia in the region of Mohammerah. When His Majesty's Government addressed their memorandum of July 1911 to the Ottoman Government that question had been dormant for sixty years, and His Majesty's Government had no desire to raise it. Now however that it has been raised, by circumstances beyond their control, they feel that no settlement in the Persian Gulf could be complete which did not provide for this question, and they regard a satisfactory adjustment of it as an essential part of the present negotiations. They have the honour to submit a separate memorandum on the subject for the consideration of the Ottoman Government.

Memorandum (Annex 5)

(iii.) *An increase from* ~~11 per cent. to 15 per cent. ad valorem~~ *in the Turkish customs duties.*

18. If the Ottoman Government are prepared to conclude an agreement in the sense of this memorandum, and to concur in the removal of the existing veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt, then, subject to the assent of the other Powers, His Majesty's Government will consent to the ~~further increase of the Turkish customs for a period of seven years from April 1913, and they will also agree to the continued levy of the existing 8 per cent. customs increase for a similar period.~~ *maintenance for a period of seven years, counting from six months after the date of such agreement, of the increase in the general rate of customs duty leviable on British goods on importation into the Ottoman Empire from 8 per cent. to 11 per cent. ad valorem which was agreed to in 1907, and also to the further increase of this general rate of customs duty from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. ad valorem for the same period.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

Draft Articles for a Convention between the British and Ottoman Governments in respect of Railways in Asiatic Turkey.

ARTICLE 1.

NO discrimination of any kind shall be exercised on any portion of the railways connecting Bagdad with other places in Asiatic Turkey, or on any of the branches thereof, in respect of traffic passing over the said railways, whatever may be its origin or destination.

The word "traffic" in this and the following articles shall apply to passengers and their luggage, goods, animals, and things conveyed on the railways, and carriages, waggons, and other vehicles adapted for running on the railways.

ARTICLE 2.

Equal expedition shall in all cases be afforded on the said railways to consignments of traffic of the same description and quantity.

ARTICLE 3.

All reasonable facilities shall be provided by the said railways for the interchange of traffic; and each railway shall afford all due and reasonable facilities and accommodation for exchanging, receiving, forwarding, and delivering such traffic without any unreasonable delay.

ARTICLE 4.

No special rates or facilities shall be accorded by any of the said railways in respect of any goods carried from or to any of the ports of Asiatic Turkey which shall not be accorded equally to all goods of a like character and carried in similar quantities on the same route, irrespective of the nationality or ownership of the vessels by which they are conveyed, or to be conveyed, to or from such ports; and no special arrangement in respect

of rates or facilities for traffic shall be made by any of the said railways with any shipping undertaking trading to or from any port of Asiatic Turkey which shall not equally, and under like conditions, extend to all other shipping undertakings so trading.

ARTICLE 5.

Any complaints which may be brought to the notice of the Imperial Ottoman Government by His Britannic Majesty's Government, in respect of the treatment of traffic of any kind under the provisions of the foregoing articles, shall immediately be communicated by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the railway administration or administrations concerned, and, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two Governments within three months, be forthwith referred to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which shall have power to determine the matter finally and to award damages. Any determination or award of the International Court of Arbitration shall be immediately enforced by the Imperial Ottoman Government, and any damages awarded shall be paid by the Imperial Ottoman Government to His Britannic Majesty's Government to be dealt with at their discretion

ARTICLE 6.

Any difference as to the interpretation or carrying out of this convention shall, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two Governments within three months, be referred for determination to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

[29140] No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July 9.*)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *India Office, July 8*, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 4th instant, forwarding the draft of a memorandum respecting the negotiations now in progress with the Turkish Government which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to communicate to the Turkish Ambassador.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the Marquess of Crewe holds the view that British participation in the Bagdad–Bussorah Railway is desirable in the political, strategical, and commercial interests of this country, provided that thereby British control, in whatever guise, of the construction and administration of the line can be effectively secured, but on that condition only. Understanding, therefore, that, for reasons which Sir E. Grey is satisfied are sufficient, it is no longer possible to obtain participation on that condition, his Lordship is disposed to think that it is preferable to withdraw opposition to the construction of the railway without British participation, and by making (under suitable safeguards) this valuable concession to the Turkish Government to establish a claim to the acceptance by them of our proposals regarding the Persian Gulf in their entirety. He therefore concurs generally in the terms of the draft, and is of opinion that the conditions therein laid down are such that Great Britain can safely stand aloof from the railway scheme.

A memorandum is enclosed containing a few suggestions on points of detail; also a marked map showing the approximate limits of Koweit, and a descriptive note.

Lord Crewe is inclined to doubt the advisability of appending to the memorandum a note on El Katr. It will not convince the Turks, and it may only provoke a reply. If, however, Sir E. Grey thinks that some rejoinder to the Turkish case is absolutely necessary, his Lordship concurs in the annex proposed, which (he understands) has already been communicated privately to the Turkish representatives.

He is not aware of the nature of the "separate paper as to the treatment of certain British imports" referred to in paragraph 6 (*a*), but he assumes that it relates entirely to the matter in hand. He would be strongly averse from extending the scope of the present negotiations to questions connected with tariffs in general or the treatment of British cotton goods in particular.

In conclusion, Lord Crewe would suggest that when this memorandum is communicated to the Turkish Government it should be made unmistakably plain that it represents in principle the last word of His Majesty's Government. He is aware that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it may be necessary to accept modifications in detail

But while it would, of course, be inadvisable to indicate even so much in advance, it is, in his view, essential that the Turkish Government should clearly understand from the first that the general framework of the proposals must be accepted or rejected as a whole.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Suggestions on Draft Note to Turkish Government.

[Amended Copy.]

Paragraph 4.—It seems undesirable to hint, as the words "up [? down] to a recent date" do, that British steam tonnage is declining. Would it not be better to give the actual figure for last year? The Board of Trade would furnish it exactly; it is apparently about 81 per cent.

Paragraph 5.—It is noted that only commercial interests are mentioned. In order to present the full magnitude of the sacrifice His Majesty's Government are making, it would be necessary to mention our political and even strategical interests. Possibly this is thought inexpedient. In that case the first two lines might run: "The magnitude of Great Britain's manifold interests clearly render it desirable." (The meaning of "also" in the text is obscure, and it might be omitted.)

Four lines from end of paragraph, omit "undue."

Paragraph 6 (e).—It might be well to add at the end: "This convention must be read in conjunction with a memorandum, which, as stated below, will shortly be communicated to the Porte, on the subject of the frontier of Mohammerah."

Paragraph 6 (f).—Is this sufficiently explicit; and may it any time be quoted against us as an admission? Does the word "navigating" include *cabotage fluviale?*

Paragraph 7.—Begin as follows: "His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the Turkish Government renounce their claims to Bahrein on conditions which there should be no difficulty in accepting. But they have learnt with disappointment the attitude," &c.

Paragraph 10.—If, as suggested in the letter, the annex about El Katr is omitted, this paragraph might begin: "His Majesty's Government maintain that prior to Midhat Pasha's expedition there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no Turkish jurisdiction or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared to recognise Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits of Koweit (as hereinafter defined) and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments," &c.

And the following sentence might be added at the end of the paragraph: "For themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish assurances mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly informed the Porte accordingly."

Paragraph 11, last three lines.—It seems unnecessary to say why we are bound to continue to oppose, and a statement of reasons may provoke a rejoinder or counter-proposals.

Paragraph 12, line 8.—After "Koweit" insert "(as defined in their memorandum of the 29th July, 1911)."

The views of the Government of India on the suggestion that our agreements with the sheikh should be confirmed by the Porte have not yet been received. It would be better if this could be held in reserve.

Paragraph 14.—After this insert: "His Majesty's Government must therefore ask the Turkish Government to recognise the right of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf (*a*) to control surveying, lighting, buoying, and pilotage; (*b*) to police its waters; and (*c*) to conduct all quarantine arrangements.

Paragraph 15 might begin: "In submitting these final proposals for the acceptance of the Turkish Government His Majesty's Government are not seeking territorial aggrandisement, nor are they embarking upon any new developments of policy. Their desire is simply to secure the recognition and to ensure the continuance of an order of things which has in fact grown up under their auspices and has been proved by experience," &c.

Paragraph 17.—For the last sentence substitute: "Now, however, that it has been

raised by circumstances beyond their control, they feel that no settlement in the Persian Gulf could be complete which did not provide for this question, and they regard a satisfactory adjustment of it as an essential part of the present negotiations. They will accordingly have the honour to submit forthwith a separate memorandum on the subject for the consideration of the Ottoman Government."

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

*Limits of Koweit: Descriptive Note to accompany Map.**

HIS Majesty's Government consider the frontier on the north to be a line running from Khor-as-Sabiyah so as to pass immediately south of Umm Kasr and Safwan to Jabal Sanam, and thence to the Batin. On the south his boundary is considered to run westwards from Jabal Manifah, on the coast, to the Na'airiyah Hill, at the north-western corner of Radaif. On the west the Sheikhdom is bounded between Jabal Sanam and Hafar by the Batin, and south of Hafar the border is the line dividing Summan from Dahanah as far south as the point where that line is intersected by the route from Wabrah to Riyadh.

Districts and Islands.—The Sheikhdom, considered from the physical point of view, falls naturally into two parts, one to the north and the other to the south of a line joining Koweit town and Rika'i. In the northern block lie the districts or tracts of Batin, Shikkak, Batin, Umm-al-Khilan, Yah, Kira-al-Marru, Zaklah, and Zor. The southern block comprises the three great divisions of Summan, Debdibah, and Umm-Jauaib; and the last, which lies along the coast to the south of Koweit Bay, is further sub-divided into districts named Shakk, Kra'ab Adan, Sulu, Hazain, and Sudah.

The maritime possessions of Koweit consist of the islands of Bubiyan, Warba, and Failakah, which, with its northern and southern outliers of Mashjan and Auhah, is situated at the mouth of Koweit Bay, and of the islets of Kubbar, Karn, and Umm-al-Maradim.

[29279] No. 31.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, July 9, 1912.

POUR régler l'administration des îles de l'archipel les anciens Sultans avaient émané des firmans conformes au système de gouvernement appliqué alors. Ces firmans se rapportent uniquement au mode de perception des impôts. La dîme, au lieu d'être directement perçue par des préposés du Gouvernement central sur chaque propriété, y était remplacée par un impôt global dont les habitants se répartissaient eux-mêmes la charge entre eux.

La raison en était bien simple: c'est que dans l'archipel, qui relevait alors de l'autorité du Capitan Pacha, c'est-à-dire de l'Administration de la Marine, il aurait été impossible, vu le nombre des îles et le peu d'importance de la plupart d'entre elles, de les faire parcourir simultanément par des percepteurs de la dîme au moment précis des récoltes. Avec les moyens de communication qui existaient alors, ces récoltes, qui, d'après la loi générale, n'auraient pu être rentrées qu'après la perception du dixième revenant au Gouvernement, auraient risqué de pourrir sur place bien avant l'arrivée du dîmeur.

Il était, d'autre part, impossible de soumettre ces îles loin d'un contrôle immédiat à des fermiers, qui auraient spolié les habitants sans merci.

On avait donc décidé d'évaluer la somme approximative que chaque île était susceptible de fournir par an, et les navires du Capitan Pacha, dans des tournées périodiques, allaient percevoir des mains des notables de l'île la somme fixée.

Par surcroît de précaution contre tout abus, les Sultans rendaient, à l'occasion, des décrets menaçant de peines graves ceux qui auraient tenté d'extorquer aux habitants plus que la somme légalement arrêtée d'avance.

Tel est l'esprit et le vrai sens des firmans des Sultans relatifs à ces îles, et l'on ne saurait, sans une mauvaise foi évidente, travestir ces facilités relatives aux impôts et nécessitées par la situation géographique de l'archipel en tribut de province autonome ni citer les firmans punissant les exactions comme une reconnaissance de cette prétendue autonomie.

* For map, see No. 61.

Il faut noter, du reste, que des firmans analogues conformes ainsi que nous l'avons dit au système administratif de cette époque étaient émanés pour beaucoup d'autres provinces de l'Empire. Les Gouverneurs généraux, dont les pouvoirs, vu les difficultés de communication et de correspondance, étaient très étendus, percevaient pour la plupart les impôts pour leur compte, sauf à fournir au Trésor une somme annuelle proportionnée à la valeur productive de leurs provinces respectives. Faudrait-il en conclure que chacune de ces provinces était autonome?

Ce système d'administration, différent d'après les régions, n'était pas à cette époque spécial à l'Empire. On pourrait citer plus d'un pays d'Europe—la France, notamment—où la plupart des provinces avaient des lois, des usages et même des privilèges particuliers, et cela non seulement en matière administrative, mais même en matière judiciaire et, sous certains points de vue, politique.

Le firman du Sultan Soliman émané en faveur des douze Sporades à la suite de la conquête de Rhodes n'avait pas d'autre portée que cette faculté donnée aux habitants de se répartir l'impôt sans intervention des agents du Fisc, et il est à noter que cette faculté, étendue gratuitement ensuite, vu son caractère pratique, aux autres îles de l'archipel, avait été octroyée en récompense de l'aide apportée par les habitants desdites Sporades à la flotte ottomane dans ses opérations contre les chevaliers de Rhodes.

Naturellement, au fur et à mesure des progrès administratifs, de l'établissement d'impôts et de monopoles institués d'après les principes de la vie publique moderne et les modifications apportées à l'état social par les nouveaux moyens de communication, ces usages surannés étaient destinés, en Turquie comme partout ailleurs, à disparaître comme ils l'ont en grande partie dans les îles de l'archipel. Il n'est resté que la forme particulière de la perception de l'impot foncier, faite cadastralement et non sous forme de dîme, mais cette perception se fait actuellement dans certaines grandes îles par les préposés directs du Fisc. Serait-il équitable de retourner contre le Gouvernement ottoman la sage mesure qu'il a prise de ne pas imposer le système de la dîme à une population qui n'y était pas habituée et pour laquelle, parsemée comme elle est dans un grand nombre d'îles, ledit système aurait encore aujourd'hui de sérieux inconvénients?

Il en est de même de la tolérance relative aux requêtes adressées en langue grecque par des chefs religieux dont la juridiction spirituelle, officiellement reconnue par le Gouvernement, n'a pas une portée ni une étendue autre ou plus grande que celles des chefs religieux de toute autre province. Il aurait été en effet difficile d'imposer à ces ecclésiastiques, ne pouvant disposer, dans une population entièrement grecque, de traducteurs en langue turque, de se servir d'une langue autre que la leur pour soumettre leurs propositions ou doléances.

Pourrait-on dénaturer cette tolérance au point d'en faire un signe de relâchement de l'autorité centrale, et serait-il logique d'en faire un argument contre le Gouvernement ottoman dans le temps où on lui porte l'accusation, non fondée du reste, d'interdire les caractères latins dans la langue albanaise?

Au surplus, l'usage de la langue locale dans certains actes officiels et même dans les tribunaux existent aussi bien en Turquie que dans d'autres États composés d'éléments hétérogènes, sans que cette tolérance, conforme d'ailleurs à tous les principes libéraux, puisse créer, en droit international, une base de discussion quelconque sur la situation politique de la région où elle existe.

En résumé, il est impossible de tirer de la situation administrative des îles de l'archipel un argument tant soit peu plausible pour étayer les sophismes avec lesquels les panhellénistes veulent tromper la bonne foi de l'opinion publique européenne en représentant cette situation comme une autonomie que le Gouvernement ottoman tiendrait à violer.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 9 juillet, 1912.

[29225] No. 32.

Joint Letter addressed to Sir Edward Grey, July 9, 1912.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1912.*

WE have the honour to submit the accompanying amended draft of an Anglo-Turkish convention for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab.

We have, besides various other points, taken into careful consideration the several comments made by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf and by the Government of India upon the original draft; but, in revising the convention, we have introduced amendments only in so far as they are consistent with the recognition of Turkish rights over the whole waterway.

We understand that it is a primary object of His Majesty's Government and of the Turkish Government to exclude other Powers from representation on the commission, and that the objection of His Majesty's Government to such representation is partly based upon the belief that it might be pleaded by the Powers who enjoyed it as a ground for intervention on their part in the control of police, and other matters of administration, in the Persian Gulf.

The principal difficulty which presents itself undoubtedly lies in the possibility that foreign Powers, if not represented, may decline to allow dues, which will be necessary to meet the expenses of the commission, to be levied on their shipping.

This difficulty is inevitable in the case of a country which is subject to the capitulations, and so long as Turkey desires to preserve the commission as a purely Turkish institution there must be some risk that foreign ships may escape payment of the dues.

Nevertheless, we think an effort should be made to levy dues, and to provide by this means a revenue for the commission, and to do this in such manner as shall give least ground for foreign objection.

The difficulty arises from the absence of any method by which payment of the dues by ships can be enforced by judicial procedure. We do not think that Turkey's right to improve the navigation of her internal waterways or to charge reasonable dues on shipping in return can be doubted, but so long as the payment of such dues could only be enforced by proceedings in the consular court of the Power whose flag the ship flies there is no certainty that such proceedings would be effective.

The risk can, in our opinion, be considerably reduced by the plan of levying one consolidated due to cover all heads of service rendered—lighting, buoying, dredging, pilotage, wharves, &c., because ships would in almost all cases require the services of a pilot, and it would be possible to insist on payment of the consolidated due before the pilotage service was rendered. We cannot report that in our opinion this would enable dues to be levied in *every* case, because it is conceivable that a ship might refuse to employ a pilot in the service of the commission or give any other opportunity for obtaining the payment of the due in advance.

If the ships were left alone, it is not likely that they would take this course, because it would not be worth their while. It is possible, however, that some foreign Power might encourage a hostile attitude on the part of its shipping for the purpose of forcing the Turkish Government to admit it to representation on the commission to the same extent as Great Britain.

We do not think that this risk is very serious, and we recommend that it should be faced. We think it is improbable that any Power would consider that sufficient political advantage was to be obtained from adopting this course. It would certainly irritate the Porte, and it could not be carried out without injuring the commerce of its subjects and its shipping.

The long period during which Great Britain has provided and maintained buoys, &c., at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and the many services which she has rendered to the cause of navigation in that district provide the Porte with a pertectly good answer to any claim to equal participation which other Powers may put forward, because Turkey can say, and say with truth, that owing to the multifarious services rendered by Great Britain, she (Turkey) had ceased to be master on her own river, and that the only way in which to secure the cessation of the existing state of things and the transfer of those services to the commission was by appointing a British subject as a member of the commission.

The only other policy would be for no dues to be levied at all, and for the entire expenses of the commission to be borne either by the Porte alone or by the Porte and Great Britain jointly. Either proposal would, in our opinion, be open to objection, nor would either be likely to meet with favour from the Ottoman Government. Although we are reluctant to recommend a departure from established British policy in respect of financial aid to works in foreign territory, we yet venture to think that, if it should appear that the imposition of dues is impracticable, the importance of maintaining the Shatt-el-Arab and its approaches in good navigable condition is so great that, if the Porte could be induced to accept an arrangement under which the expenses of the commission would be borne by the two Powers jointly, the policy of an annual grant

for this purpose from the British and Indian Exchequers merits the careful consideration of the Cabinet.

On one point we think it is desirable that matters should be left open for an understanding with Germany. Under the original Bagdad Railway concession, the railway company have the right to construct wharves, &c., at Bussorah. It may eventually turn out to be better for the commission not to attempt to construct wharves at that port, so as to leave the field clear for the new railway company to be formed for the Bagdad–Gulf section. It would be an advantage to the commission financially, as it will have plenty of work elsewhere for all the funds at its disposal, and it might form the basis of an understanding under which Germany would not oppose the work of the commission.

Dealing now with the changes made in the original draft, in the order of the several articles, we have the honour to submit the following observations:—

Article 1.—The word "remain" has been substituted for "be" to emphasise the claim that the river is open already.

Article 5.—The words "and the surveyor" have been added to meet the wish expressed by the Admiralty that a British naval officer should be associated with the commission.

Article 6 (*a*).—The words "and as the funds at its disposal will allow" have been struck out, as it is feared that they might be made a pretext for the commission to evade carrying out necessary works.

Article 6 (*d*).—Difficulties may occur as to the control of pilotage by the commission, but in practice we do not think they should be insurmountable.

Article 6 (*e*).—We consider it advisable to lay down precisely the lights and buoys which are handed over to the commission, and that a schedule should be prepared.

Article 6 (*f*).—We considered whether the insertion of the word "Turkish" before "banks" would be expedient; but the convention can only apply to places under Turkish jurisdiction, and the limitation therefore seems unnecessary. We have used "banks" in the plural because on the higher reaches of the river both banks are Turkish.

Articles 8, 9, 10 are a re-arrangement and expansion of the original articles 8 and 9, the changes having been made especially with a view to strengthening the provisions against discrimination.

Article 11.—We consider it inadvisable that the commission should have the option of borrowing from any Power other than Great Britain or Turkey, since foreign Powers might make the advance of capital a pretext for claiming representation on the commission.

Article 15.—We do not consider it imperative to insist upon the umpire being nominated by the British Institute of Civil Engineers, and we suggest that we might, if advisable, concede this point in the course of negotiation.

Article 18.—Understanding that the frontier between Turkey and Mohammerah is to be laid down in some other document, we have inserted a saving clause which will preclude the commission from exercising any jurisdiction on the Persian bank, or in Persian waters, without the consent of Persia or the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Article 19.—This is taken, with a few slight modifications, from the model commercial treaty. We have suggested twenty-one years as the period of the agreement, on the ground that it may be advantageous that the question of its renewal should coincide with that of a possible renewal of the customs increase, which we understand His Majesty's Government intend to agree to only in the first instance for a period of seven years.

We have omitted the original article 18, which was as follows:—

"The Imperial Ottoman Government will offer no objection to the continuance "of the custom whereby the war-ships of His Britannic Majesty freely ascend the "Shatt-el-Arab as far as Kurna,"

on the ground that it may be awkward to raise discussion respecting a custom which has been acquiesced in, if not explicitly recognised, for a great many years, and which His Majesty's Government could in no case abandon.

We feel that there is some risk that Turkey will claim that the present anchorage of Mohammerah, which is on the Shatt-el-Arab, is within the limits of Turkish sovereignty, though outside the Turkish frontier as loosely observed. It would be desirable, therefore, that the agreement in which the Mohammerah frontier is laid down should specifically recognise that the Mohammerah *anchorage* is within the Persian sphere.

We have not inserted a clause to the effect that the British member of the commission should represent the Sheikh of Mohammerah's interests, since it appears more suitable to provide for this in some covering document at the time when the draft Convention is transmitted to the Turkish representatives.

We have, &c.

EDMOND J. W. SLADE.
A. HIRTZEL.
GEO. J. STANLEY.
A. G. DALLAS.
C. J. B. HURST.
PERCY ASHLEY.
ALWYN PARKER.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Revised Draft Convention for the Establishment of a Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission.

THE Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, being desirous on account of the magnitude of their interests in the trade on the Shatt-el-Arab to improve the navigation of that river, and to diminish the risks to which commerce therein is exposed, have agreed as follows:—

1. The navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab shall remain open to the ships of all nations.

2. The Imperial Ottoman Government will establish a Commission in which shall be vested the control of the Shatt-el-Arab from Kurna to the sea.

3. The Commission shall consist of two members only, to be appointed by the Imperial Ottoman Government. One of these two members shall be of British nationality, and shall be selected from candidates suggested by the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

4. Each of the Commissioners shall receive annually a salary of £T. 2,000 free of all deductions. These salaries shall be paid by the Commission.

5. The Commission shall appoint such officers and employés as may be necessary, but the Chief Engineer and the Surveyor shall be of British nationality. The salaries of such officers and employés shall be fixed and paid by the Commission.

6. The Commission shall be charged with the following duties:—

(*a.*) The execution of such works as may be necessary for the improvement of the channel of the river and of the approaches thereto on the seaward side.

(*b.*) The maintenance of the channel of the river free from obstructions of all sorts, so as to keep it in the best possible state for navigation.

(*c.*) The preparation, issue, and enforcement of regulations for the navigation of the river and for the policing of the river and the land and buildings held by the Commission.

(*d.*) The control of pilotage.

(*e.*) The buoying and lighting of the channel, and the maintenance and control of the lights and buoys in the approaches to the river specified in the Schedule to this Convention.

(*f.*) The supervision, so far as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this convention, and subject to the treaty rights of foreign Powers, of the wharves, quays, docks, and jetties belonging to private persons in or on the banks of the river, and the provision of such additional accommodation and facilities as the Commission may deem necessary.

7. The Imperial Ottoman Government undertakes to facilitate the acquisition by the Commission of such land as the Commission shall consider necessary to enable it to carry out effectually the duties assigned to it. The cost of such land shall be paid by the Commission.

In cases where land to which fishing rights are attached is required by the Commission, no unnecessary interference with such fishing rights shall take place.

8. No dues, taxes, or charges shall be levied either by the Porte or by the

Commission on ships or goods on the Shatt-el-Arab based on the mere fact of navigation.

9. The Commission shall have the sole right to levy any dues or charges that may be found necessary to cover the expenses of works undertaken and services maintained by it. In the event of such dues being found necessary they shall not exceed the amount reasonably required for the above purposes, including the administration of the Commission, and their produce shall be exclusively applied thereto, any surplus being devoted to the reduction of dues. In no case shall the rate of dues exceed 1 fr. per net registered ton of shipping.

10. Any dues or charges levied by the Commission shall be levied impartially and equitably in respect of all vessels, whatever be the places from or to which they arrive or depart, or the nations or persons to which the vessels or their cargoes belong. Similarly there shall be no differentiation in the matter of facilities between vessels or goods of different nations or persons, or between vessels arriving from or departing to different places.

11. Any sums which it may become necessary for the Commission to borrow for the purpose of carrying out the duties imposed upon it shall be advanced by the high contracting parties at a rate of interest not exceeding 5 per cent. per annum, in such proportions and upon such terms as to repayment as they may arrange.

12. The control of all funds raised and expended by the Commission shall be vested exclusively in the Commission.

13. The Commission shall publish annually complete and accurate accounts, showing the amounts received and expended by it.

14. If the receipts of the Commission are insufficient to cover its ordinary expenditure the deficit shall be made good by the Imperial Ottoman Government.

15. In the event of the members of the Commission being unable to agree as to whether any particular works are or are not necessary for the improvement of the Shatt-el-Arab, or as to the way in which particular works should be carried out, the question shall be referred by them to an engineer of repute, to be agreed upon by the commissioners, or, failing agreement, to be nominated by the president of the Institute of Civil Engineers in London, and the decision of such engineer shall be adopted by the Commission.

16. The Commission shall correspond upon all matters connected with the duties entrusted to it with the Sublime Porte direct, and not through the local authorities.

17. The local authorities shall not interfere in any way with the houses, buildings, land, or other property of the Commission, or with its funds, or with the discharge of their duties by the officers of the police, pilotage, or other services maintained by the Commission, or with wharves, jetties, docks, or quays in or on the banks of the river belonging to private persons.

18. The transfer to the Commission of any buoys or lights in the approaches to the Shatt-el-Arab shall not be deemed to affect the territorial jurisdiction in the waters where such buoys or lights are placed, or be made a ground on the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government for claiming that such waters are within its territorial jurisdiction, nor shall anything in this Convention be deemed to give the Commission power to exercise jurisdiction or to carry out duties or to hold land outside the limits of the Ottoman Empire without the consent of the territorial Power, or to affect the operation or the interpretation of the provisions of any treaty or arrangement prescribing or defining the limits of the said Empire.

19. This agreement shall be binding during twenty-one years from the day of its signature. In case neither of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other, twelve months before the expiration of the said period of twenty-one years, of the intention to terminate the agreement, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the contracting parties shall have denounced it.

[20218] No. 33.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 8, 1912.*

LEBANON.

Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 192 of 17th June.

[? Governor] [group undecipherable] term of office expired to-day, but, except for some informal conversations, Porte has, in spite of pressure from the three

embassies, evaded discussions of proposed modifications of "règlement"; this is due partly to their preoccupation with internal affairs, but still more to their desire to avoid committing themselves to anything confirmatory of, or emphasising, the privileged position of the Lebanon. Only point on which they profess readiness to yield is establishment of commercial courts; on most of remainder they are simply obstructive, while they categorically decline to agree to opening of the four ports. To this last point their objections are almost all frivolous, and the French Ambassador therefore desires to take a strong stand, and hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Embassy will support him. Russian Ambassador seems disposed to do so. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he will be able to give us a definite reply on Wednesday, and intimates that Porte will propose that modification of "règlement" should be deferred till selection of governor, a procedure from which we have strongly dissented.

Meanwhile, Lebanon is legally without a governor, and French Ambassador is warning his consulate to act accordingly.

[20119] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1912.*

I HAVE received Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 394 of the 6th May relative to the steps which it behoves His Majesty's Government to take in the matter of the claims of the Western Assurance Company in respect of the Adana incidents.

I note that Messrs. Waugh and Ryan view with favour the proposal that the Turkish Government should be asked to refer to a tribunal of neutral jurists the question of the interpretation of the word "émeute," though the latter deprecates the use, in order to induce them to accept that suggestion that there is no appeal from the judgment of the Tijaret Court in mixed cases, and both recommend that this request should not be made till the point is raised in some further case brought against the company.

The reason for the view expressed in my despatch No. 122 of the 27th March, that it would be preferable to present the question to the Turkish Government as an abstract one, was, besides those already given, that, if the proposal is made after the point has arisen in a case actually before the courts, the Turkish Government will be able to reply, with considerable force, that it is impossible for the executive to interfere with a matter which is in the hands of the judiciary, and I still adhere to the view that the course in question is the more prudent one to follow.

I have, therefore, to request you to make the proposal to the Sublime Porte, and to support it by the second of the two arguments contained in my despatch above referred, if you concur with Mr. Ryan as to the inadvisability of employing the first also.

I concur in the view expressed in the last paragraph of your despatch, that, in the circumstances of the case and in view of the attitude adopted by other foreign missions at Constantinople, it is undesirable for His Majesty's Government at this juncture to put forward claims for compensation on account of losses suffered by British subjects during the disturbances at Adana.

As regards the passage in Mr. Ryan's memorandum, beginning, "The question thus arises . . . ," and ending, ". . . . whose property was destroyed," I should explain that the practice of His Majesty's Government in such cases is to abstain from supporting any claim which is not in its inception British, and this principle has only lately been most definitely reaffirmed in connection with another question.

I have to request you, in conclusion, to express to Messrs. Waugh and Ryan my thanks for their able contribution to this discussion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27314] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 303.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 207 of the 21st ultimo relative to the proposed construction of a railway from Yumurtalyk to Suleimanin by way of Lake

[29218] No. 36*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 217 of 8th July: Lebanon reforms.

You may support French Ambassador if Russian Ambassador is similarly authorised, and if you (as I gather) see no objection.

You may send to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout instructions similar to those sent to his French colleague.

Van, I transmit to you herewith, for your observations, copy of a further letter from Mr. F. L. Lightfoot on the subject.*

Before replying to this communication it will be necessary to decide how far His Majesty's Government can commit themselves to the support of, or at least to abstention from, opposition to a scheme which, as it contemplates the acquisition of a concession for the exploitation of minerals in the region traversed by the proposed line, seems at first sight to conflict with the interests in the same regions of Mr. D'Arcy and his group.

It appears from statements made by Mr. Justice in the course of a visit to this Office, that the so-called "Chester" group have completely abandoned their project, and that he and his associates have therefore no competition to fear from that quarter.

It is not impossible that the scheme now under discussion, which, as your Excellency will have observed, is likely to involve the employment of American capital, may be the same as that which forms the subject of your despatch No. 546 of the 25th ultimo.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29225] No. 36.

Foreign Office to India Office.†

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 9th July, from the Interdepartmental Committee which recently revised the draft convention for the Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission.‡

I am to enquire whether the Secretary of State for India concurs in the terms of the draft convention and in the recommendations embodied in the covering letter.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[29505] No. 37.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, dated the 10th July, 1912, regarding the Turco-Persian frontier.

India Office, July 11, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, July* 10, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 3rd instant.

1. The following islands are claimed by Sheikh of Mohammerah, on behalf of Persian Government, as belonging to Persia:—

(1.) Bahriyeh and Muhalleh, the former being an adjunct to the latter.
(2.) Four islands referred to in sub-enclosure of my despatch to Foreign Office, dated the 4th May last, which lie between Muawiyeh and Shatait.
(3.) Two islands, to which various names are assigned, lying off Munquhi, and joined at low water to mainland.

It is claimed that Turks have never at any time possessed any of the above. Persian Government are actually in possession of them all. Sheikh of Mohammerah contends, in regard to all these islands, and to Muhalleh in particular, that they must

* Part VI, No. 207. † Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*. ‡ No. 32.

be regarded as forming part of left bank of Shatt, as being part and parcel of Al Khidhar Island (see part 3 of papers regarding Turco-Persian boundary, p. 122).

2. It is claimed by the sheikh on Persian Government's behalf that on Persian side of mid-channel line, i.e., line which steamers follow, all accretions to existing islands as above stated, and all islands which may be formed subsequently shall, for reasons given in sub-enclosure to my above-mentioned despatch, and in accordance with ancient custom, be recognised *ipso facto* as belonging to Persia. Please see map quoted in sub-enclosure to my despatch, in which the above islands are shown.

[29592] No. 38.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 12.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, July 11, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 2nd July transmitting a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, conveying to him the expression by the Italian Government of a desire that His Majesty's Embassy should be kept informed in good time of the names and other indications of identity of ships engaged in pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea.

In reply, I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Constantinople Board of Health, and perhaps the Egyptian Board of Health, may be in possession of the required information, and that it may be desirable, in order to ensure accuracy and expedition in the transmission of the information, to request the British representatives of those boards to communicate direct with the embassy at Rome, giving the names and other indications of identity of ships licensed to carry pilgrims to and from ports in the Red Sea.

I am, &c.
W. F. MARWOOD.

[29632] No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th July, 1912, relative to Koweit and the Bagdad Railway.

India Office, July 12, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 11, 1912.*

TELEGRAM, dated the 10th instant, to following effect received from resident, Persian Gulf:—

"Following is reported by political agent, Koweit:—

"'A certain Alexander Forage, a Bagdad Christian in Messrs. Wönckhaus's employment, recently approached the Sheikh of Koweit, and, after reverting to request previously made that European agent should be appointed, referred to the Bagdad Railway, and asked to whom sheikh considered that Um Kasr (which he said would probably become terminus) belonged.

"'Sheikh in reply claimed, on grounds previously advanced, that Um Kasr belonged to himself'; he also said that he should at once take forcible steps to assert his right, if there was any idea of the place being used without his consent for the important purpose mentioned. Sheikh claimed that Jabal Sanam, Safwan, Um Kasr, and thence to the sea were included in his boundary. To this Forage replied that possession of Um Kasr, Bubiyan, and Safwan could easily be assured to shiekh, if he would lease or sell any part of his territory to German railway company, as evacuation of those

places by Turks would soon be arranged by German Emperor, who was much interested in the matter. Forage went on to say that sheikh would be given his own price for sale or lease of site on seaboard, which was what railway company wanted. The sheikh claims that he brought the conversation to an end by remarking that business of Forage seemed to be not so much that of a plain merchant desiring to open a trade agency as that of a diplomatic envoy.

"'Political agent in conclusion expresses the view that sheikh has undoubtedly been approached more or less openly in interests of Germany, though story may have been somewhat embellished by him with a view to enhancing his own importance.

"'In view of the above incident, and of references that have recently appeared in Arabic newspapers, sheikh is now anxious to be furnished with news, if there is any, as to developments of railway question. He has repeatedly said that he relies on us to keep him informed on this subject.'"

[29520] No. 40.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 364 of 5th July.

I presume that information required is as to British ships only. Clemow will obtain information as to ships from here, but has no means of obtaining it from other ports. He points out that traffic from the East is chiefly affected, and suggests:—

(*a.*) That Governors of Bombay and Singapore be asked to furnish information as to sailings from Bombay, Kurrachee, and Singapore.

(*b.*) That consular officers at Smyrna, Salonica, Beirout, and Jaffa be instructed similarly.

(*c.*) That consular officers at ports on both sides of Red Sea be instructed to furnish information as to ships returning with pilgrims.

He asks whether "indications of identity" means more than name, inventor, ship and owner, flag, tonnage, and colour of funnel.

Shall I instruct consular officers as suggested?

[29013] No. 41.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 12, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st ultimo relative to the provision of two dioptric lanterns for His Majesty's consulate-general at Bushire.

In reply, I am to request you to draw the attention of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to the fact, stated in paragraph 2 of the India Office letter of the 13th ultimo, copy of which was enclosed in the letter from this Office of the 13th ultimo, that sanction has been accorded to this expenditure on the understanding that it will be used by savings from the total cost of the complete scheme of lighting and buoyage in the Persian Gulf, and to point out that, as their Lordships have already assented to the charge to Imperial funds of half this sum, no special sanction on their part in respect of the present proposal is required.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[29769] No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 13.)

Sir, *India Office, July 12, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter of the 6th instant on the subject of the Bagdad Railway negotiations, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the

information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the "cahier des charges" attached to the Bagdad Railway Convention.

The Marquess of Crewe is advised that, inasmuch as it is no longer proposed by His Majesty's Government to participate in the Bagdad–Bussorah section, if constructed, it is not necessary to insist on the amendments suggested by the Government of India. While, therefore, he is inclined to agree with the Government of India that the amendments are desirable in themselves, he will not press them if Sir E. Grey prefers not to take them up at this late stage.

I am to add that he concurs in the draft articles for a convention in respect of railways in Asiatic Turkey prepared by the Board of Trade.

With reference to the draft annex on the subject of cotton goods, I am to call attention to paragraph 5 of my letter of the 8th instant, and to say that Lord Crewe regards the proposed addition with grave misgiving, not only as tending to overcharge negotiations which he understands Sir E. Grey to think sufficiently charged already, but also as likely to bring other Powers into the field with claims for tariff concessions in favour of their own special interests. In this way the scope of the negotiations may, he fears, be dangerously enlarged, with serious risks to the prospects of securing the objects for which alone they were initiated. While, therefore, he is unable to object to the inclusion of a proposal regarding cotton in the indeterminate form now suggested, he desires to state at once in unequivocal terms his view that it will be impossible to place it on the same level as the political conditions, or to sacrifice any of them to it. Those conditions have been advanced, and can, in his opinion, be fully justified on grounds of Imperial no less than of Indian interests. The broad answer to the criticism that the tangible commercial advantage secured is disproportionate to the cash price paid (so far as that criticism is well-founded) is to be found in the very consideration which it is proposed to urge upon the Turkish Government, viz., that the agreement "to be justly appreciated should be viewed not only in the measure of sacrifice or advantage which each individual clause may imply, but also in its cumulative and future effects upon Anglo-Turkish relations in general." The general result of the agreement (above and beyond particular commercial advantages) will be the secure establishment in the Persian Gulf of the political position of Great Britain under the shadow of which alone British commerce can flourish; while the loss of that position cannot fail to react seriously upon the prestige and, *pro tanto*, the commercial interests of this country not only in those regions, but throughout the East.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Board of Trade.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 5, 1912.

EXAMINATION of specification attached to Bagdad Railway Convention. Please see your telegram dated the 15th May and my telegram dated the 21st ultimo.

Subject to the conditions set forth below, we consider that Indian trade will not be prejudiced by the proposed tariff rate:—

Condition No. 1.—That total charges, not less than those levied for same articles and for same distance booked from Bussorah and viâ and in the direction of Konia, should be levied for carriage of any article for any particular distance in the direction of Bussorah and booked from Konia and viâ and from any port served by Bagdad Railway in the Mediterranean.

Condition No. 2.—That, since manipulation of rates as against Bussorah may result from power of reducing rates on three days' notice, both the increase and the reduction of a rate should require a month's notice.

[29805] No. 43.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 572.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the administrative measures taken by the Italians at Rhodes and in other occupied islands.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July* 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that about two weeks ago the demogherontes, or mayors, of the islands now in Italian occupation were summoned to Rhodes for the purpose of receiving instructions as to the administration of their islands.

They were informed that a duty of 11 per cent. would be levied on imports, of which 8 per cent. would go to the Italian Government and 3 per cent. be devoted to local requirements, while food-stuffs and articles of necessity would be admitted duty free.

The export duty would as before be 1 per cent., and would be reserved for the benefit of the island. Courts of first instance would be appointed at each island with an appeal court at Rhodes, while special officials would be delegated as soon as possible to establish the various branches of the civil service.

General Ameglio informed Sir A. Biliotti that all judicial cases would be dealt with by Italian law, but that the principle of the Capitulations would be maintained in so far as the inviolability of domicile was concerned. Packages addressed to consuls are allowed to enter free of duty.

Sir A. Biliotti reports the receipt of a circular, dated the 19th June, stating that Consul-General Macchioro Vivalba, having been charged with the civil administration of Rhodes, all administrative and civil questions should in future be addressed to him.

Sir A. Biliotti does not say whether this appointment involves the abrogation of martial law, of which he wrote two days earlier that it caused much needless suffering, and was the offspring of the unaccountable distrust and animosity which the Italians continue to display towards the Turkish population.

The administrative changes foreshadowed by General Ameglio would seem to carry with them the abrogation of martial law.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[29806] No. 44.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 573.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 5, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 482 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on the progress of the Bagdad Railway line on the section Ulu Kishla–Bozanti–Dorak.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Adana, June* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that since my arrival at Adana I have been making enquiries respecting the progress made in the construction of the Bagdad Railway.

What I have been able to learn confirms the information contained in Mr. Monck-Mason's despatch No. 2 of the 24th ultimo.

As your Excellency is aware, trains now run from Haidar Pasha to Ulu Kishla, viâ Eskishehr, Konia, and Eregli. After leaving Ulu Kishla, the line follows the course of the Tarbaz Chai, which at Bozanti is known as the Bozanti River. A tunnel has been made at Chifteh Han, and the line from Ulu Kishla has been laid for a little way beyond that point, *i.e.*, rather more than half the distance between Ulu Kishla and Bozanti. At Ak Kienpru there is a construction camp; further on at Bozanti levelling operations are in progress, and a large railway station is being built. A German engineer with whom I had a conversation at Bozanti informed me that it would require three years to construct the tunnel which would enable the line to be laid connecting Bozanti with Dorak.

I am informed that the goods traffic on the recently opened section, Dorak–Mamoureh, is very small, transport by road being found cheaper.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[29807] No. 45.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 574.)
Sir,

Constantinople, July 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting the meeting of delegates from the islands of the Sporades at present occupied by the Italians, at the island of Patmos.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 83.)
Sir,

Smyrna, July 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Sir Alfred Biliotti, reporting the meeting of delegates from the islands of the Sporades at present occupied by the Italians, at the island of Patmos.

The object of the meeting appears to have been to obtain, through the Italian Government, a guarantee from the European Powers that the islands shall not revert to Ottoman rule.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir,

Rhodes, June 19, 1912.

ABOUT a month ago M. Liapis was attached to the consulate-general of Greece here as vice-consul, and three or four days after his arrival left for the Sporades on a special mission, the object of which was not made public.

While the dimogherontes of these islands were here in conference with General Ameglio, a rumour was spread that delegates of influential men from the same isles were holding a general meeting at Patmos.

The rumour has since been confirmed, and we now know that there has been a conference of native delegates, two from each isle, held at the island of Patmos some time within the last five or six days, in which the Samian leader, Sofoulis, is said to have taken part.

The Greek consul-general denies all knowledge of these proceedings, although a strong belief prevails that M. Liapis is not foreign to the meeting, while others attribute it to General Ameglio's initiative.

It is, however, certain that a few days before the presumed date of the meeting,

M. Constandinidis, deputy for Rhodes at the last Ottoman Parliament, and M. G. Drakides, a lawyer, departed from this town, together with M. Liapis, for Patmos or Athens, or both.

It was only yesterday that the result of the meeting at Patmos became known here, and it is to the effect that the islanders wish to remain permanently under Italian rule; but that if this may not be, they beg for full autonomy for all the islands of the Sporades, because, if it were decided to give them back to Turkey, there would be a wholesale emigration of the Christian population.

It was reported that these wishes were to be embodied in a petition to General Ameglio, copies of which were to be handed over to the representatives of other European Powers at Rhodes.

On hearing these rumours, General Ameglio last night sent Sava Effendi Pavlides, the mayor of Rhodes, to Patmos with orders (it is said) to prevent the signature of such a collective petition, which would not have failed to be ascribed to his influence.

There would, however, be no objection, if such were the real feelings of the inhabitants, to their sending separate petitions from each island.

Of course the Greek consul-general here can only repeat, as regards the Patmos meeting, what his Government stated with regard to the Greek committee in Egypt concerning the annexation of the islands to Greece. There can, however, be no doubt that at the bottom of their hearts all people in Greece, without exception, ardently desire the accomplishment of that cherished hope. Yet I would not venture to vouch for the same unanimity among natives of these isles, although there can be no doubt as to their patriotic feelings towards Greece. In the feeling exhibited towards the Italians there is certainly deep sympathy and real gratitude for the opportunity presented of obtaining autonomy, but I hardly think that they are powerful enough to supersede their national and natural patriotism. There might perhaps be a little hesitation between autonomy and annexation if the latter is absolutely followed by military service and complete assimilation in the taxes levied in Greece, which are beyond their power to pay.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[29809] No. 46.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 576.)
Sir,

Constantinople, July 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch form His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, transmitting a report by His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes, showing the disadvantages of the present position of the inhabitants of the occupied islands, due to the severing of their connection with the mainland.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Gerard Lowther.

(No. 85.)
Sir,

Smyrna, July 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Sir Alfred Biliotti describing the economic effect upon the like of the inhabitants of the islands caused by their being cut off from communications with Anatolia.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 46.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Rhodes, June 22, 1912.*

WHATEVER there may be in store in the future for the islands of Rhodes and the Sporades, their present situation consequent on the occupation by the Italians is as follows :—

Commercially and financially all these islands were so intimately connected with the mainland, that the breaking off of all relations between them has forcibly created a perturbation with the most disastrous consequences for the islanders.

They derive from the coast of Anatolia most of their necessaries such as wheat, flour, barley, olive oil, fire wood, charcoal, &c., and in case of Symi, even drinking water, whenever the rainfall was not sufficient to fill up their water tanks.

In exchange they sent European, colonial, and other goods which created a brisk traffic, especially for the isles situated near the mainland. Not only this, but some islanders own extensive landed property in Anatolia; others have important interests in mines, and many more are engaged in different undertakings, so that the least thing that might happen to them would be the necessity to suspend their operations, thus being deprived for an indefinite period of the income they derive therefrom.

The situation in Rhodes is perhaps still worse, inasmuch as besides breadstuffs, lumber planks, butter, and other agricultural produce, the island depends entirely upon Anatolia for live stock and even poultry, and as there are in the island no remunerative callings such as sponge fishing, &c., both natives and foreigners depend entirely for their livelihood on commercial transactions and transit trade between Rhodes and the mainland, a good part of which is carried on in sailing boats belonging to Mussulmans. As these boats cannot navigate now with the same freedom as before, it is probable that the Ottoman flag will be gradually superseded by the Greek to the advantage not only of their trade, but also of their national aspirations. Steam navigation is also likely to pass from one flag to another.

In the course of the present month, presumably in consequence of additional Bill of Health fees, of police and other regulations, Russian and British steamers have suspended their communications with this island, and the last steamer of the French Messageries maritimes proceeded on her voyage without landing or embarking mails, pratique having been refused after sunset. If this state of things continues for some time, it may be expected that foreign flags will be superseded by the Italian, and that the wants of the island will be provided from other sources to the detriment of those now in use.

The average trade and transit of Rhodes for the last few years is as follows :—

		£.
Exportation—		
Produces of the island		75,000
Produces of Anatolia		25,000
	Total	100,000
Great Britain's share		nil.
Importations—		£.
In local consumption		170,000
In transit		50,000
	Total	220,000
Great Britain's share		28,000

Besides the foregoing general drawbacks part of the population of Rhodes has been, and is, subject to very great hardships. As regards native Mussulmans, a great number of them have been sent as prisoners to Italy, or expelled from Rhodes for one reason or another. Some are emigrating, while others are deprived of their usual means of subsistence. Nearly all the families remaining here are more or less in reduced circumstances. The Italians have occasionally given to some of them flour, rice, &c., and the cadi in consequence of orders from Constantinople is now daily distributing 1,000 loaves of bread to those in great distress.

With regard to Christians, a number of 2,000 to 3,000 and more used to emigrate for several months in the year to Anatolia, where they earned more than by cultivating their fields in Rhodes. In fact, without the resource of the annual emigration to

Anatolia, their condition here would have been most miserable. Now, in consequence no doubt of the enthusiasm with which the Italians were received here by their coreligionists, all natives of this island are called traitors, and boycotted by the Mussulmans wherever they may happen to be found in Anatolia.

Fearing to face perhaps worse, some of them have already come back from Aleppo where they were working on the Bagdad Railway, and others from different places in Asia Minor viâ Smyrna. They say that they were not allowed in that town to go out of the hans they were living in, until they were sent on board steamers bound to this island, where their arrival cannot fail to be a fresh cause of distress.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[29810] No. 47.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 577.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 574 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, covering one from Sir A. Biliotti reporting General Ameglio's own version of the recent meeting at Patmos of representatives of the occupied islands, and also the general's projects for the improvement of Rhodes.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 87.)

Sir, *Smyrna, July 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Sir A. Biliotti, giving General Ameglio's personal account of the circumstances under which a meeting of islanders was recently held at Patmos, and of his own action in the matter; with other interesting statements of General Ameglio respecting projected improvements in the island.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Rhodes, June 26, 1912.*

IN his interview with me on the 24th instant, after having spoken of the assassination plot, General Ameglio entered on the following subjects :—

Meeting at Patmos.—He stated that the ten individuals who were present were neither Dimogherontes nor special delegates from the different isles, but simply natives who put forward certain pretentions of the native islanders.

The instigator of this meeting was M. Liapis, a Greek vice-consul, who has been going from island to island within the last few weeks.

M. Pappadakis, Greek consul-general, to whom General Ameglio complained of these facts, promised to refer the matter to his Government.

The self-styled delegates having come to Rhodes, General Ameglio not only refused to admit them to his presence, but let them know through the Civil Royal Commissioner that in war-time individuals who take part in meetings like the one just held at Patmos, which might lead to complications, are liable to be shot, but that he disdained to attach importance to their proceedings. The Italian Government knew perfectly well what they had to do, and did not expect to be shown the way by such foolish demonstrations.

The general went on to say that as I must know better than anyone else, in

consequence of my experience in Crete, autonomy was a very delicate question to deal with, there being conflicting views, interests, and aspirations among the different Powers. It had never been promised to the natives of these islands, though something ought certainly to be done for them, but whether it should be in the form of autonomy or a protectorate under one or more Powers, or some other form or administration, it was not for him to know or say, the final decision depending probably on the turn of events in the future.

He then spoke of the notorious Samian leader, Sofoulis, who he said was a man of quite a different stamp than the natives of the other islands. He had held a long interview with him during which Sofoulis stated that he had explained matters to the individuals at Patmos exactly in the same sense as that just mentioned by the general, and this appears to have most favourably impressed him.

Sofoulis, however, submitted to his Excellency that the Italian Government ought to do something on behalf of his native island. To this request General Ameglio replied that Samos being under the special protection of Great Britain, a great friend of Italy, and of other friendly Powers she could not take the slightest step with regard to that island, and so ended their interview.

After having exhausted the subject of the Sporades Isles, General Ameglio could not fail to mention Rhodes. He said that everything was here in a lamentable condition, that two most essential public works had been taken in hand, namely, the roads and the water-supply.

Within the last fortnight the Alpine battalion has repaired and completed the road to the village of Calithies which is to be continued to Afandos, and when that is completed, a road will be undertaken on the western coast of the island.

As regards the canalisation of the water supply, for which a credit of 30,000 fr. has been effected, if there is any truth in the reports concerning the stupendous Hellenic subterranean galleries leading to the main spring, I should say that the only indispensable work just now appears to be to clean out the existing water courses which are cut in the solid rock. Whatever amelioration may be required for the other aqueducts there is no doubt that their being cleaned out will temporarily provide with water the suburb in which I and other consuls have been living without a drop for several weeks.

The general said that the other requirements in course of time were telephone communications, the widening and lighting of streets, and a circular railway.

Another project of General Ameglio is to reclaim the extensive cemetery in which were buried the warriors of Sultan Suleiman's army during the last seige of Rhodes in 1522, where natives are still buried. The remains of the Moslems buried there might be collected in a select spot over which should be erected a fitting memorial, and a new Mussulman cemetery laid out there while on the ground thus reclaimed, which is in the best part of Rhodes, a new quarter could be erected with commodious dwellings and fine shops.

With its exceptional climate and situation and the foregoing improvements, Rhodes would certainly attain a high degree of commercial and industrial prosperity.

General Ameglio added that all these would require much time and much more money, and of course what is in store for the islands is quite uncertain.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[29811] No. 48.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)

(No. 578.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna in regard to an alleged plot to assassinate General Ameglio and certain other Italian officers.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[29520] No. 48A.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 15, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 223 of 11th July: Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea.

Instruct consuls as suggested.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 225.)

[29520] No. 48B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 15, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 223 of 11th July: Pilgrim traffic in Red Sea.

Ask Italian Government whether they wish information to be furnished as to British ships only, or as to all ships, and obtain from them details of indications required.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 374.)

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a confidential despatch from Sir A. Biliotti reporting an alleged plot by emissaries of the Young Turk party to assassinate General Ameglio and other officers.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 77. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rhodes, June 26, 1912.*

HAVING heard that General Ameglio had been warned from Rome that a plot had been formed for his assassination, I called on him on the 24th instant to ascertain how far this rumour was founded.

The following is the substance of the answer of the general:—

"I have indeed been informed from Rome that Young Turks have plotted to assassinate me, as well as the two admirals in the Ægean Sea. The would-be assassins are not Young Turks, but others paid by them. They are not in Rhodes, but are coming here for the purpose. As a plot for my assassination had been formed in Africa, I attach only a relative importance to this news, but it is as well to take precautions in order to keep the wolves from the sheepfold, and this compels me to take measures which may appear strange and incomprehensible when the reason calling for them is not known."

It so happened that, by the strangest and most unexpected coincidence a few hours after my interview with General Ameglio, I received a private letter, dated the 14th instant, from a most trustworthy source, confirming in every point the information he had imparted to me. It was stated to me that a number of Moslems speaking Greek had assumed Christian names and been provided with false papers, with which they hoped to find their way to these islands as Greek peasants for the purpose of assassinating the leading Italian generals or commanding officers.

My correspondent having been requested to communicate the foregoing details *à qui de droit*, and having left it to me to make use or not of the information he was conveying, I considered it my duty to communicate the details I had received to General Ameglio, who warmly thanked me for them, although he still appears to think that the whole thing may be rather a scare than a real plot.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[30071] No. 49.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 181.)
Sir, *Posillipo, June 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 133 of the 20th instant I have the honour to report that I took an opportunity of saying to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, premising that I was speaking unofficially, that should the Italian Government contemplate the occupation of other islands in the Ægean, it would be of great value to the neutral Powers if they were, at the moment such operations were undertaken, to receive an announcement from them that they were not going to attack the Straits. Such knowledge would greatly strengthen their position in resisting any attempt to close the Straits to commercial shipping.

The Marquis di San Giuliano received this suggestion in very good part, and, without giving a definite engagement, said he would think over the question of the

form which such a communication might take should the necessity arise. At the same time he gave me to understand that at the present moment no further action in the Ægean was contemplated.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[30074] No. 50.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 187.)

Sir, *Posillipo, July 6, 1912.*

IN spite of a rather strong tendency of public opinion echoed in certain organs of the press in favour of the retention of some at any rate of the Ægean Islands, I have received the impression which I find is shared by my German colleague, that the Italian Government have satisfied themselves that the Powers would not tolerate such annexations, and that, at the present moment, if the question were raised little more would be sought by them than some guarantee that the islanders should not be made to suffer for their attitude of sympathy towards the occupying belligerent.

Evidence of this attitude may be found in the fact that the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have refused to see, or in any way countenance, a delegate from the islands, M. Roussos, who is actually now in Rome.

Mr. Lister met this gentleman recently in the house of Mr. Miller, who acts as correspondent of the "Morning Post," and is well known for his historical studies on mediæval and Byzantine Greece. He has drawn up a memorandum of the observations made by M. Roussos on this occasion, of which I have the honour to forward a copy herewith.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Memorandum.

I HAVE just met M. Roussos, the delegate from the islands. He is in Rome till the end of the week.

From his account of recent events in the islands, it appears that the original attitude of the Italian naval and military authorities was, as soon as they occupied an island, to say in as many words, "We have got rid of the Turks; run your show for yourselves."

Recent policy culminating in the speech of General Ameglio to the local authorities at Rhodes is a complete reversal of this earlier policy. The Italians are now giving the islanders to understand that they are under Italian rule, and that it is to Italy that they must look to save them from going back to Turkish rule. M. Roussos does not take the official *démentis* of press statements as to the action of the Italian admirals in the earlier stages of the occupation very seriously.

In M. Roussos' view this is virtually an intimation to the effect that Italy, when the question of a settlement with Turkey arises, will demand "autonomy" for the islands guaranteed by herself.

What the islands want is "autonomy" guaranteed by all the Powers, "without prejudice to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire."

M. Roussos is prepared to accept Ottoman "sovereignty" or "suzerainty"—he did not seem inclined to boggle over words—provided the real control was in the hands of a Christian Prince appointed by the Powers guaranteeing the autonomy of the islands as opposed to a Prince appointed by Turkey as had been the case in Samos, and provided that the islanders enjoyed under international guarantee the privileges they had under Turkish rule prior to the law of the vilayets. Under this law valis were appointed to the islands with the result that, though old-time privileges were not revoked, the islanders had far less control over their internal affairs than before. It would be a definite step in advance for the islanders to see these privileges, which included certain exemptions from customs duties, &c., in addition to certain concessions as to local autonomy, guaranteed not only by Turkey but by the Powers as well.

The islanders would not ask for annexation to Greece at the present time, though this was their ultimate ideal.

The question of the islands had been raised in a definite form, and could only be solved by reference to a European conference. A return to the *status quo ante* would be difficult. Italy had undertaken a civilising war, and it would be difficult for the Italian Government in their negotiations with the Turks for peace to use the islands simply as objects of barter in their own interests. Italian public opinion would be opposed to such a course of action. The islanders enjoyed what privileges they had under Turkish rule on the condition that they remained quiet. If the islands were simply handed back to the Turks, the enthusiasm with which the island populations had received the Italians might afford a pretext for putting them on the same footing as other Turkish subjects and rescinding all their privileges.

As far as he could ascertain, Italian public opinion was on the whole favourable to the solution proposed by the islanders. Italian public opinion would favour a demand of the retention by right of conquest of Stampalia rather than Rhodes. Rhodes had a purely historical interest. Stampalia was a very good harbour.

The present revolutions in Albania and the Yemen would not hurry the Turks into making peace. Revolution had long been endemic in those parts of the Empire. Neutral commerce was suffering considerably in Asia Minor from the fact that the mainland was practically cut off from the islands, thanks to Italian naval action. This might be an inducement to the Powers interested to put pressure on to the Turks to make peace. The Italian papers greatly exaggerated the agitation in Albania, and were in the habit of reporting the same incident three times under different forms.

I gathered that in his view the question of the northern islands would also be raised in so far as they too were a part of the Ægean archipelago, but not in so marked a manner as in the case of the islands where the Italians had by their occupation put an end to Turkish rule. Russia with her interest in the Dardanelles would be at pains to prevent any of the northern islands falling into the hands of a strong naval Power.

Both M. Roussos and the Greek chargé d'affaires, who was also present, seemed to prefer that the southern islands under any scheme for their autonomy should form one governmental unit. The latter repudiated with indignation the idea of "faire une dizaine de petites Crètes" in the Ægean. Everybody, he said, including M. Poincaré, whom he had seen in Paris, was under the impression that that was the aim of Greece and her protégés.

Both Signor Giolitti and the Marquis de San Giuliano have refused to see M. Roussos, so he is now engaged in sampling Italian public opinion.

Rome, July 2, 1912.

[30157] No. 51.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the political resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, dated the 15th July, 1912, regarding the Shatt-el-Arab.

India Office, July 16, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 15, 1912.*

REFERENCE is invited to your telegram dated the 10th instant :-

1. It is believed that ever since ocean-going steamers began to frequent Mohammerah the present anchorage in Shatt-el-Arab has been used. Sea-going cargo vessels cannot enter Karun.

2. All ships could be berthed on Persian side of mid-stream channel line if mooring buoys were provided, though present anchorage is in mid-stream for about 2,000 yards up-stream from mouth of Karun. As many as ten ships at a time may

already be seen occasionally lying at anchor at Mohammerah; and anchorage must be considered to run 4,000 yards up-stream as double berthing is not practicable, and as it is necessary to make allowance for increase in size of ships in future. Below junction of rivers—where ships anchor occasionally—anchorage may be said to extend 1,000 yards.

3. Landing place at present is within Karun on either bank between Mohammerah town and custom-house; but it is almost certain that, immediately on commencement of railway, its main wharves will be between Failelch and Karun on banks of Shatt-el-Arab (see enclosure in my letter, dated the 2nd October, 1910, to Government of India, and my letter, dated the 8th October, 1910, to Tehran Legation). Karun foreshore between Mohammerah town and custom-house [?] is not now likely to be available, as almost the whole of it has since been taken on lease by commercial firms, and is being built on.

4. We should, of course, preserve to the sheikh the anchorage of his boats which is within mid-channel line opposite his Failelch palace or down-stream at the village itself.

[30306] No. 52.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 17.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, July 16, 1912.

Sir,

BAGDAD–KHANIKIN Railway.

I enclose copy of a letter just received from Mr. E. B. Soane, our representative at Kasr-i-Shirin, containing some information which will doubtless be of interest to you.

I am, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Mr. Soane to Mr. Greenway.

Dear Mr. Greenway, *Bagdad, June 14, 1912.*

I THOUGHT it might interest you to hear the result of a confidential talk I have been enabled to have with his Excellency Meissner Pasha, director-in-chief of the Bagdad Railway.

In return for certain information I was able to afford him regarding the country of Irak and prospects, he was good enough to tell me that as the main section of the line is being delayed, partly over some question concerning the kilometric guarantee and partly over that of the Bagdad–Bussorah section, he was anxious to construct such branches as, not being included under the kilometric guarantee, are not liable to the causes of delay suffered on the parts thereto subject.

He looks first to the Khanikin line as being easy, offering a quick return, and one which will keep his highly paid staff employed in the interval. He informed me that the line would probably pass north of Bakuba, Shahraban, and Kizil Rubat, crossing the Diala river between the last place and Khanikin, and that if he finally decides to go ahead he would not take more than eight months to get trains running, as the route is very simple.

He will be visiting Khanikin with the chief of customs in a few days (to decide upon a site for the station and customs house) and asked me to meet him there, and also for permission to come to Chia Surkh. I gave him an invitation to do so, as there is nothing there with which he is not familiar, and he is a man whose great influence in the affairs of the Bagdad and Mosul vilayets renders his friendship very desirable. He knows very well that the oil found on the Turkish side (at Mandali, Gil, Khurmati, Dwazda Imam, and Kirkuk), quite apart from the fact that it is so impregnated with sulphur as to be refined only under great expense and difficulties, is not exploited, and has very little chance of being exploited for a long time to come. (All these places are far beyond the zone of 20 kilom. beside the line which they may exploit themselves.)

In that case, if we have sufficient oil, we might be able to sell fuel oil to the Khanikin branch, the better prospect of such being afforded by the fact that Meissner

Pasha, being notably engineer first and politician after, looks only to the satisfactory consummation of his technical aims, and utilises what suits him in its attainment, regardless of the questions of nationality, which present obstacles where other foreigners are concerned.

The characteristic is witnessed by his attitude towards and assistance to another British concern here, solely because they can further the progress of his work.

Yours sincerely,
E. B. SOANE.

[30385] No. 53.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 17, 1912.*

TRIPOLI.

I asked Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he thought there was any truth in the news repeatedly published of late in the newspapers that the Italian Government are meditating the seizure of Chios.

He replied that he felt pretty sure that they had no such intention, and he said this so confidently that I suspect that the Italian Ambassador, who had just seen him, had given him assurances in this sense.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that it would be deplorable if the Italians seized that island, as it would entail immediate closing of the Dardanelles, and this might seriously complicate (by bringing the weak Turkish Government into conflict with the Powers) the already difficult situation in the Near East.

[30379] No. 54.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 215.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency copies of a memorandum which I am about to communicate to the Turkish Ambassador to this Court on the subject of the frontier in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah.

I have to request your Excellency to communicate two copies to the Russian Government for their confidential information. Your Excellency should add that copies of the maps referred to will be furnished to the Russian Government very shortly.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Memorandum respecting the Mohammerah Frontier.

HIS Majesty's Government have already informed the Imperial Ottoman Government of the great importance which they attach to the maintenance of the frontier *status quo*, as locally observed, in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah.

His Majesty's Government now have the honour to explain their views in greater detail, and they would preface their statement by observing that they have not only re-examined all the evidence, both oral and documentary, which was laid before the conference of Erzeroum, but they have also had recourse to the great store of information collected by the well-known savant Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Rawlinson, who was well acquainted with the country, and made a profound study of the territorial position in the Mohammerah region, based upon historical facts and the deeds of title relating to each particular plot of land. Moreover, much information, which was not at the disposal of the Commissioners at Erzeroum, has been traced in the voluminous records of the East India Company, who carried on direct trade with Bussorah from the year 1635. These records are especially illuminating in regard to the conditions which actually prevailed on the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab during the 17th and 18th centuries.

The accompanying maps indicate the line of the frontier as it has been locally

observed for a century or more. For facility of reference, the line may be followed, firstly, from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where it strikes the Shatt-el-Arab, and, secondly, along the course of that river until it reaches the sea.

By reference to the accompanying map No. 1, the village of Shu'aib will be observed at a point 15¾ miles on a bearing of 8 degrees north of west from Hawizeh: it is a settled village of the Beni Salih, containing some 500 inhabitants living in permanent dwellings. The whole country, comprised approximately in a triangle formed by lines joining Hawizeh, Shu'aib, and Kuskh-i-Basri, is regularly occupied and cultivated by the tribes of Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, who are not nomadic, in the ordinary sense of the term, but are settled inhabitants.

These tribes, who exclusively inhabit, and where possible cultivate, the triangular tract above referred to, have belonged from time immemorial to Hawizeh, which has been a recognised district of the Persian province of Khuzistan or Arabistan for, at any rate, four centuries. They pay revenue to their tribal sheikhs, who formerly passed it on in tribute to the "Maula" ruler of Hawizeh, who in turn paid it to the Persian Government, but, since 1902, this tribute has been collected through the agency of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

To the eastward of the marsh on which the village of Shu'aib is situated, and southwards, as far as human occupation prevails or is possible, there is not the slightest sign of Turkish influence or jurisdiction, nor of Turkish status.

The British Resident in the Persian Gulf has recently visited the Hawizeh district, and his investigations have served to confirm the information which His Majesty's Government already possessed. Apart from the sheikhs and tribesmen of the Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, Sir Percy Cox came in contact with many old inhabitants who could speak with long experience in regard to the territorial *status quo*. The view universally expressed as to the frontier was as follows:—

1. That whatever is the western boundary of the Hawizeh is, *ipso facto*, the frontier of Persia; in other words, that the Hawizeh district is included within the confines of Persia.

2. That the "Hawizeh district" comprises those lands which are regularly occupied and cultivated by tribes belonging to it, and paying revenue to Persia.

3. That, on the above premises, the boundary locally recognised is that shown by a green line on map No. 1. It will be noticed that the line (which is formed by the edge of the marsh, and is thus a natural frontier), after crossing the Ghor-el-Azem, eventually cuts the main channel of the marsh just west of Shu'aib, continues in a southerly direction until it reaches a point due west of Kuskh-i Basri, whence it breaks back to that place, and then proceeds direct to the Shatt-el-Arab at Di'aiji. The reason why Kuskh-i-Basri is recognised as an angle of the boundary is referable to the existence of a winter lake of rain water at Yafair; the limit of cultivation and occupation by tribesmen under Hawizeh in this direction is regulated by the distance from their water supply (Yafair), at which they can safely dwell and keep their flocks, and this limit is considered to be reached at Kuskh-i-Basri, where the ruins of an extensive building of great age form a convenient landmark.

His Majesty's Government, being in possession of precise and trustworthy information regarding the frontier of Hawizeh, have no occasion to appeal to more uncertain authorities, but they think it is not without interest to recall to the Imperial Ottoman Government that Dervish Pasha, whose estimates of Turkish claims were not usually marked by excessive moderation, admits in Chapter XIII of his book (printed in Constantinople in 1868), "that it would be hardly right" for the Ottoman Government to lay claim to the country of Hawizeh, though, in the subsequent chapter, his Excellency expresses the view that it "might be useful" for Turkey to claim it as a pretext for proposing something else, viz., that the Kerkha should be adopted as the boundary above Sheria.

Coming now to the neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab, the frontier as locally observed enters the Khaiyin Canal (which is the name of the channel running from the Turkish Customs Post at Di'aiji, between the islands of Kharnubiyah, Bowarin, and Aqwat, to the junction of the Nahr Nazaileh with the main stream) at a point between the Nahr Di'aiji and the Nahr Abul Arabid; it follows the middle of the Nahr Khaiyin until it reaches the point where the Nahr Khaiyin and the Nahr Nazaileh meet the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab. (See map No. 2.)

It then proceeds, as shown by the broken black line (see accompanying maps Nos. 3 and 4), along the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, in mid-stream, until that river reaches the Persian Gulf.

The claim made by Persia rests on continued and undisturbed possession for over a century, and on the recognition of Persian sovereignty by local representatives of the Turkish Government in many ways and on many different occasions. Thus there is unanimity of evidence amongst the local tribesmen that the boundary as locally observed has not been questioned by the Turkish authorities, who, on the contrary, many years ago had actually buried some coal in a pit as a permanent boundary mark; and it further appears that the periodical cleaning of the Nahr Khaiyin has always been undertaken by Persian subjects under the orders of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, whilst the cleaning of the Di'aiji Canal has been carried out exclusively under the orders of the Turkish mudirs.

The local inhabitants moreover draw a very clear line of distinction between the position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in, for instance, the islands of Akawat, Barin or Bowarin, Shamshamiyah, and Umm-ut-Tuwaifeh, of the greater part of which he is merely proprietor, and his position on the Persian side of the locally recognised boundary.

From the point where the locally observed frontier leaves the Khaiyin Canal and, opposite the Nahr Nazaileh, enters the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, it follows the *medium filum aquæ* of the Shatt-el-Arab down to the Persian Gulf. (See maps Nos. 3 and 4.)

This line of demarcation is in accordance with the general presumption that, where a navigable river forms the boundary of conterminous States, the middle of the channel or "thalweg" is the actual line of separation between those two States.

Such a presumption may, however, be swept away, either by proof of prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession on the part of one of the two States, or by express treaty stipulation.

The records of the past 300 years, as contained in the official archives of the East India Company and of His Majesty's Government, are far from supporting any claim on the part of Turkey to "prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession" of the Shatt-el-Arab; while no express stipulation is contained in the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) as to the ownership of the river.

If, therefore, His Majesty's Government had strict regard either to purely local considerations or to the letter of the treaties, they would not hesitate to press for the frontier as locally recognised along its whole length from Hawizeh to the Persian Gulf. But they prefer to look at the negotiations in which they are now engaged as a whole, and are sincerely anxious to arrive at an arrangement which both parties can accept *ex animo*, and which, by removing all points of grievance and friction not only between themselves, but also between the Sublime Porte and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, will place the relations of all concerned on a thoroughly satisfactory footing. Provided, therefore, the Turkish Government will accept the frontier *status quo* as already indicated from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where the Khaiyin Canal and the Nahr Nazaileh enter the Shatt-el-Arab, then His Majesty's Government are prepared to use their influence with the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah to induce them to recognise Turkish sovereignty over the whole waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, subject to the following conditions:—

(i.) The following islands to be recognised as within the territorial limits of Persia:—

(*a.*) Muhalleh and its adjunct Bahriyeh, the four islands situated between Shatait and Ma'awiyeh, and the two islands off Manquhi. These islands are in fact parts of the island of Abadan, and must be so regarded.

(*b.*) Any islands now in existence, or which may hereafter be formed, and which may be connected at low water either with Abadan Island or with the Persian bank below the Nahr Nazaileh.

(ii.) The arrangements proposed by His Majesty's Government for maintaining full freedom of navigation on the river, and for its conservancy, to be accepted by the Ottoman Government.

(iii.) The modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah, which is in the main stream of the Shatt-el-Arab above and below its junction with the Karun, to be recognised as within Persian jurisdiction. (See Map No. 2.)

(iv.) No interference to take place with existing fishing rights and usages on or from the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, that phrase being understood to comprise all land on the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab or on the Persian islands therein which is uncovered at normal low tide.

(v.) Turkish jurisdiction not to extend to land on the Persian bank, defined as

above, which is only temporarily covered with water in time of flood or from any accidental cause, and Persian jurisdiction not to extend to land which is temporarily or accidentally uncovered below normal low-water mark.

(vi.) The Sheikh of Mohammerah to continue in full enjoyment of his existing *proprietary* rights in lands situated in Turkish territory.

[30379] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 248.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 245 of to-day's date, I now transmit to your Excellency copies of four maps for communication to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[28866] No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 223 of the 11th instant, relative to the pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome showing the measures which the Italian Government suggest His Majesty's Government should take with a view to assist the Italian naval authorities in facilitating the business of pilgrim ships.*

I also enclose copies of a summary in translation of the documents mentioned in the last paragraph of the note of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have to request you to distribute them to such of His Majesty's consular officers in the Ottoman Empire as have received instructions in accordance with my telegram No. 375 of the 15th instant, as well as to those residing on the Arab coast of the Red Sea.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[28322] No. 57.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying draft of a memorandum respecting the Mohammerah frontier, which it is proposed to communicate to the Turkish Ambassador.† Sir E. Grey proposes to add this document as an annex (No. 5) to the memorandum respecting the general negotiations with the Turkish Government.

He would be glad to be furnished with the observations of the Secretary of State for India on this document at the earliest possible moment.

The maps are in course of preparation. Beyond the indications contained in the draft memorandum, it is only necessary to observe that the proposed line, after leaving the Nahr Khaiyin, follows the mid-stream of the Shatt-el-Arab to a point some 1,000 yards below the junction of that river and the River Karun; it then follows the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, including within Persian territory the islands specified by Sir P. Cox (see his telegram of the 10th July, 1912).

Sir E. Grey does not consider it would be prudent to raise the question of the status of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and his tribesmen on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab; and he is disposed to think that the stipulation that "the Sheikh of Mohammerah is to continue in full enjoyment of his existing proprietary rights in lands situated in Turkish territory" represents the maximum which His Majesty's Government could expediently or legitimately claim in this respect.

I am also to enclose a copy of the covering note which Sir E. Grey is addressing

* No. 25.

† See Enclosure in No. 61.

to the Turkish Ambassador with the memorandum concerning the general negotiations,* and I am also to furnish you with the accompanying copy of that memorandum, which, except for the proposed additional annex respecting Mohammerah, is in its final form.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[28869] No. 58.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 5th instant relative to the pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of further correspondence on the subject,† and to suggest that, if the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, the Government of Bombay should be instructed to furnish direct to His Majesty's Embassy at Rome the information mentioned under (*a*) in Mr. Marling's telegram No. 223 of the 11th instant, unless this has already been done in pursuance of the request contained in the communication above alluded to.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

[30395] No. 59.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 195.)

Sir, *Rome, July 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to your despatch No. 153 of the 5th instant, that I have handed in to the Italian Foreign Office an extensive memorandum setting forth the situation created at Camaran by the measures taken to enforce the blockade, and representing the special interests of His Majesty's Government in the pilgrim traffic, and the preponderating number of non-Ottoman pilgrims arriving at Camaran from beyond Bab-el-Mandeb. The Dutch chargé d'affaires will this afternoon support my representations. The Secretary-General observed that the special circumstances which have occasioned me anxiety with regard to the Camaran lazaret dated back to the months of March and April—before, in fact, special attention had been directed to the exigencies of the pilgrim traffic. He knew that steps were being taken to secure the efficient victualling of Camaran, and could assure me that the President of the Council was taking a personal interest in the question, and he had reason to hope that we should not have further grounds for complaint.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[30388] No. 60.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

Sir, *India Office, July 17, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant on the subject of the Mohammerah frontier, and to say that he concurs in the terms of the memorandum and covering letter which it is proposed to address to the Turkish Ambassador.

As regard the status of the sheikh and his tribesmen on the Turkish bank of the river, the Marquess of Crewe recognises that the language of the Treaty of Erzeroum and of the explanatory notes make it difficult now to claim more for him than the enjoyment of his existing proprietary rights. He trusts, however, that such cases as

* No. 61.

† Nos. 25 and 40; and to Sir R. Rodd (No. 224, Telegraphic), July 15, and to Mr. Marling (No. 375), July 15, 1912.

may arise between the Turkish Government and the sheikh will be considered on their merits, and that his Excellency may continue to count upon the full diplomatic support of His Majesty's Government for the avoidance of friction with the Porte and its officials.

Lord Crewe further concurs in the terms of the memorandum and its other enclosures regarding the Bagdad Railway negotiations.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[28322] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

(Confidential.)

Your Highness, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Highness herewith a memorandum embodying the reply of His Majesty's Government to the memorandum communicated by the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 15th April last, relating to questions connected with the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf.

In communicating this document to your Highness I desire to call your attention to two additional points which are not dealt with in the memorandum or its annexes.

In the first place His Majesty's Government consider it highly desirable, in order to secure the smooth working of the arrangements proposed in regard to the Bagdad Railway, that at least one British director, approved by His Majesty's Government, should be admitted to the board of the Bagdad Railway Company. Such an arrangement would of course require the consent of the German Government.

Secondly, as the Turkish Government are aware, certain rights are secured to Persia under the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), and the geographical position of Mohammerah is such that the sheikh cannot fail to be brought into contact with the Riverain Commission; and unless provision is made for these facts there is a risk of the friction arising which it is the object of the two Governments to avoid. There would have been much to be said for an International Riverain Commission on which Persia, equally with Great Britain and Turkey, should be represented. But as His Majesty's Government, appreciating the objections entertained by the Porte, have not pressed for this, it is necessary to provide in some other way for the representation of Persia in such matters as may touch her rights whether under the Treaty of Erzeroum or under this new agreement. His Majesty's Government therefore propose that the commissioner who is a British subject should be charged with the duty of making to the commission such representations as may at any time be necessary upon any question affecting those rights, and they will be willing to use their good offices with the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah to induce them to agree to this arrangement.

These two points come, perhaps, outside the scope of the matters dealt with in the memorandum which are confined to subjects of negotiation between Great Britain and Turkey alone, but His Majesty's Government attach great importance to them and trust that they will receive the favourable consideration of the Imperial Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Memorandum.

1. HIS Majesty's Government have not failed to examine with much care and attention the important proposals which are embodied in the memorandum communicated by the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 15th April last.

2. Throughout their deliberations, His Majesty's Government have been animated by the conviction that a complete agreement on outstanding questions is eminently to be desired in the larger interests of both countries. They are persuaded that such an agreement, to be justly appreciated, should be viewed not only in the measure of sacrifice or advantage which each individual clause may imply, but also in its cumulative and future effects upon Anglo-Turkish relations in general. His Majesty's Government therefore desire to lay before the Ottoman Government the following proposals and considerations:—

3. For convenience of reference the several proposals under consideration may be dealt with under three distinct headings:—

(i.) The Bagdad Railway question.
(ii.) The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the Persian Gulf.
(iii.) An increase in the Turkish customs duties.

(i.) *The Bagdad Railway Question.*

4. The interest which Great Britain must take in a railway which is to traverse a region where British-Indian trade amounts to some 60 per cent. of the total exports and imports is indeed so obvious as to call for little comment. His Majesty's Government have on repeated occasions dwelt upon the importance of that trade and the manner in which it has been steadily consolidated since the foundation, upwards of two and a-half centuries ago, of the first English factory at Bussorah; they have recalled that no less than 96 per cent. of the steam tonnage entered at the port of Bussorah was British; and they have consistently maintained that a satisfactory settlement of the Bagdad Railway question was a necessary condition of their assent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties.

5. The magnitude of Great Britain's manifold interests clearly renders it desirable that some satisfactory agreement as to British participation in the southern section of the Bagdad Railway should, if possible, be reached. His Majesty's Government find, however, that the question of participation on terms acceptable to them is likely to cause the Ottoman Government some embarrassment, and that the views held on this point by the two contracting parties are difficult to reconcile. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government, anxious to prove to the Ottoman Government the sincerity of their desire to reach a comprehensive understanding without delay or controversy, are prepared to withdraw their request for British participation in the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah, if a satisfactory agreement is arrived at on the other points enumerated in this memorandum.

6. It would be impossible to reconcile British public opinion to such a step unless His Majesty's Government were at the same time able to show that British interests of whatever character were fully safe-guarded. His Majesty's Government consequently feel bound, apart from the territorial arrangements proposed, to lay down the following conditions as essential to that end:—

(*a.*) An arrangement, as set forth in the accompanying draft convention, for the exclusion of differential treatment on all railways in Asiatic Turkey — Draft Convention (Annex 2).

(*b.*) The admission of two British representatives, approved by His Majesty's Government, to the board of whatever company may undertake the construction or working of the railway from Bagdad to Bussorah.

(*c.*) The terminus of the railway to be at Bussorah.

(*d.*) No railway to be continued beyond Bussorah in the direction of the Persian Gulf without prior agreement with His Majesty's Government, and on conditions acceptable to them.

(*e.*) A convention to be signed, on the basis of the accompanying draft, for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab. This convention must be read in conjunction with the accompanying memorandum (Annex No. 5) on the subject of the frontier of Mohammerah. — Draft Convention (Annex 3).

(*f.*) Permission to be given for three British steamers to navigate between Bagdad and Bussorah in addition to the number already allowed.

(ii.) *The respective interests of Great Britain and Turkey in the region of the Persian Gulf.*

7. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the Turkish Government renounce their claims to Bahrein on conditions which there should be no difficulty in accepting, but they have learnt with disappointment the attitude of the Imperial Ottoman Government in regard to El Katr and Koweit; nevertheless they do not doubt that the Ottoman Government will appreciate the important sacrifice made by

His Majesty's Government in the matter of British participation in the Bagdad Railway, and that they will meet that sacrifice by a corresponding modification of the views set forth in the Turkish memorandum of the 15th April.

8. His Majesty's Government must in the first instance protest against the contention that there is a misunderstanding with regard to the assurance given, and repeatedly given, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that Turkey did not entertain any intention of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein, Muscat, or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.

9. The original despatches, duly signed and dated, in which these assurances were reported, have been carefully preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, and they can readily be produced for the inspection of the Turkish Embassy.

10. His Majesty's Government maintain that prior to Midhat Pasha's expedition there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no Turkish jurisdiction Annex 3. or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared to recognise Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits of Koweit (as hereinafter defined) and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments adduced in the Turkish memorandum in any way invalidates the statement that south of Ojeir, in the district of El Katif, there is no trace of Turkish power ever having been paramount; and they are fully persuaded that El Katr has never been locally regarded as forming part of, or indeed as being subject to the influence of, the Ottoman Empire.

For themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish assurances mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly informed the Sublime Porte accordingly.

11. His Majesty's Government can only reiterate their opinion that any lasting settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by the Ottoman Empire of the whole of the peninsula of El Katr, including El Bidaa. They have consistently opposed any consolidation of Turkish authority, which first attempted to assert itself so recently as 1870, and they are bound to continue that opposition.

12. The Turkish memorandum of the 15th April does not afford His Majesty's Government all the information which they consider essential to a due appreciation of the attitude of the Turkish Government respecting Koweit. His Majesty's Government are concerned to ensure the continuance of the local government of the Sheikh of Koweit, as defined in their memorandum of the 29th July, 1911. Further, His Majesty's Government would be fully prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Koweit and indeed to recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish kaimakam, but they attach cardinal importance to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan being admitted by Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, to the withdrawal of the Turkish military Memo- randum (Annex 4). post from Bubiyan, and to a recognition of the limits of Koweit in accordance with the indications contained in the accompanying memorandum.

13. His Majesty's Government regret that they would consider the introduction of divided responsibility for maritime police measures altogether incompatible with the principles and successful accomplishment of their policy in the Persian Gulf. This policy consists in the maintenance of the maritime peace, and has been successfully pursued, to the advantage of all concerned, for a century. To modify the system in these circumstances would be alike unnecessary and unjustifiable.

14. Indeed His Majesty's Government would go further. They consider that they have acquired by prescription not merely the right but the duty to maintain peace in the Persian Gulf; they have always been opposed to any proposal to trench upon their prerogative; and it was this attitude which led to the declaration made by the Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1903, that "His Majesty's Government would regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and they should certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal."

His Majesty's Government must therefore ask the Turkish Government to recognise in the Persian Gulf the right of Great Britain—(*a.*) To control surveying, lighting, buoying, and pilotage; (*b.*) To police its waters; and (*c.*) To conduct all quarantine arrangements.

15. In submitting these final proposals for the acceptance of the Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government are not seeking territorial aggrandisement, nor are they embarking upon any new developments of policy. Their desire is simply to secure the recognition and to ensure the continuance of an order of things which, in fact, grew up under their auspices and before the appearance of Turkish authority in the Persian Gulf, and which has been proved by experience to favour the development

of trade and the maintenance of peace in a region which, but for long-sustained British intervention, would have remained the scene of continual piracy and bloodshed.

16. They feel persuaded that the Ottoman Government will not oppose the continuance of the political *status quo* of a hundred years, and they look forward confidently to a complete adjustment of the questions enumerated, and to the improved relations which cannot fail to ensue.

17. As the Ottoman Government are aware, there is a question which has caused some concern to His Majesty's Government in recent months, that of the frontier between Turkey and Persia in the region of Mohammerah. When His Majesty's Government addressed their memorandum of July 1911 to the Ottoman Government that question had been dormant for sixty years, and His Majesty's Government had no desire to raise it. Now however that it has been raised, by circumstances beyond their control, they feel that no settlement in the Persian Gulf could be complete which did not provide for this question, and they regard a satisfactory adjustment of it as an essential part of the present negotiations. They have the honour to submit a separate memorandum on the subject for the consideration of the Ottoman Government. Memo- randum (Annex 5)

(iii.) *An increase in the Turkish customs duties.*

18. If the Ottoman Government are prepared to conclude an agreement in the sense of this memorandum, and to concur in the removal of the existing veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt, then, subject to the assent of the other Powers, His Majesty's Government will consent to the maintenance for a period of seven years, counting from six months after the date of such agreement, of the increase in the general rate of customs duty leviable on British goods on importation into the Ottoman Empire from 8 per cent. to 11 per cent. *ad valorem* which was agreed to in 1907, and also to the further increase of this general rate of customs duty from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. *ad valorem* for the same period.

Foreign Office, July 18, 1912.

ANNEX 1.

HIS Majesty's Government wish to mention a question to which they attach great importance, but to which they have not referred in this memorandum.

His Majesty's Government desire to secure that the duties leviable upon certain classes of cotton yarns and manufactures shall in no case exceed certain rates to be agreed upon.

His Majesty's Government will furnish the Ottoman Government, with the least possible delay, with a schedule specifying these classes of goods and the duties to be applied to them.

Foreign Office.

ANNEX 2.

Draft Articles for a Convention between the British and Ottoman Governments in respect of Railways in Asiatic Turkey.

Article 1.

NO discrimination of any kind shall be exercised on any portion of the railways connecting Bagdad with other places in Asiatic Turkey, or on any of the branches thereof, in respect of traffic passing over the said railways, whatever may be its origin or destination.

The word "traffic" in this and the following articles shall apply to passengers and their luggage, goods, animals, and things conveyed on the railways, and carriages, waggons, and other vehicles adapted for running on the railways.

ARTICLE 2.

Equal expedition shall in all cases be afforded on the said railways to consignments of traffic of the same description and quantity.

ARTICLE 3.

All reasonable facilities shall be provided by the said railways for the interchange of traffic; and each railway shall afford all due and reasonable facilities and accommodation for exchanging, receiving, forwarding, and delivering such traffic without any unreasonable delay.

ARTICLE 4.

No special rates or facilities shall be accorded by any of the said railways in respect of any goods carried from or to any of the ports of Asiatic Turkey which shall not be accorded equally to all goods of a like character and carried in similar quantities on the same route, irrespective of the nationality or ownership of the vessels by which they are conveyed, or to be conveyed, to or from such ports; and no special arrangement in respect of rates or facilities for traffic shall be made by any of the said railways with any shipping undertaking trading to or from any port of Asiatic Turkey which shall not equally, and under like conditions, extend to all other shipping undertakings so trading.

ARTICLE 5.

Any complaints which may be brought to the notice of the Imperial Ottoman Government by His Britannic Majesty's Government, in respect of the treatment of traffic of any kind under the provisions of the foregoing articles, shall immediately be communicated by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the railway administration or administrations concerned, and, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two Governments within three months, be forthwith referred to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which shall have power to determine the matter finally and to award damages. Any determination or award of the International Court of Arbitration shall be immediately enforced by the Imperial Ottoman Government, and any damages awarded shall be paid by the Imperial Ottoman Government to His Britannic Majesty's Government to be dealt with at their discretion.

ARTICLE 6.

Any difference as to the interpretation or carrying out of this convention shall, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two Governments within three months, be referred for determination to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

ANNEX 3.

Draft Convention for the Establishment of a Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission.

THE Government of His Britannic Majesty and the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, being desirous on account of the magnitude of their interests in the trade on the Shatt-el-Arab to improve the navigation of that river, and to diminish the risks to which commerce thereon is exposed, have agreed as follows:—

1. The navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab shall remain open to the ships of all nations.

2. The Imperial Ottoman Government will establish a Commission in which shall be vested the control of the Shatt-el-Arab from Kurna to the sea.

3. The Commission shall consist of two members only, to be appointed by the Imperial Ottoman Government. One of these two members shall be of British nationality, and shall be selected from candidates suggested by the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

4. Each of the Commissioners shall receive annually a salary of £T. 2,000 free of all deductions. These salaries shall be paid by the Commission.

5. The Commission shall appoint such officers and employés as may be necessary, but the Chief Engineer and the Surveyor shall be of British nationality. The salaries of such officers and employés shall be fixed and paid by the Commission.

6. The Commission shall be charged with the following duties:—

(*a.*) The execution of such works as may be necessary for the improvement of the channel of the river and of the approaches thereto on the seaward side.

(*b.*) The maintenance of the channel of the river free from obstructions of all sorts, so as to keep it in the best possible state for navigation.

(*c.*) The preparation, issue, and enforcement of regulations for the navigation of the river and for the policing of the river and the land and buildings held by the Commission.

(*d.*) The control of pilotage.

(*e.*) The buoying and lighting of the channel, and the maintenance and control of the lights and buoys in the approaches to the river specified in the Schedule to this Convention.

(*f.*) The supervision, so far as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this convention, and subject to the treaty rights of foreign Powers, of the wharves, quays, docks, and jetties belonging to private persons in or on the banks of the river, and the provision of such additional accommodation and facilities as the Commission may deem necessary.

7. The Imperial Ottoman Government undertakes to facilitate the acquisition by the Commission of such land as the Commission shall consider necessary to enable it to carry out effectually the duties assigned to it. The cost of such land shall be paid by the Commission.

In cases where land to which fishing rights are attached is required by the Commission, no unnecessary interference with such fishing rights shall take place.

8. No dues, taxes, or charges shall be levied either by the Porte or by the Commission on ships or goods on the Shatt-el-Arab based on the mere fact of navigation.

9. The Commission shall have the sole right to levy any dues or charges that may be found necessary to cover the expenses of works undertaken and services maintained by it. In the event of such dues being found necessary they shall not exceed the amount reasonably required for the above purposes, including the administration of the Commission, and their produce shall be exclusively applied thereto, any surplus being devoted to the reduction of dues. In no case shall the rate of dues exceed 1 fr. per net registered ton of shipping.

10. Any dues or charges levied by the Commission shall be levied impartially and equitably in respect of all vessels, whatever be the places from or to which they arrive or depart, or the nations or persons to which the vessels or their cargoes belong. Similarly there shall be no differentiation in the matter of facilities between vessels or goods of different nations or persons, or between vessels arriving from or departing to different places.

11. Any sums which it may become necessary for the Commission to borrow for the purpose of carrying out the duties imposed upon it shall be advanced by the high contracting parties at a rate of interest not exceeding 5 per cent. per annum, in such proportions and upon such terms as to repayment as they may arrange.

12. The control of all funds raised and expended by the Commission shall be vested exclusively in the Commission.

13. The Commission shall publish annually complete and accurate accounts, showing the amounts received and expended by it.

14. If the receipts of the Commission are insufficient to cover its ordinary expenditure the deficit shall be made good by the Imperial Ottoman Government.

15. In the event of the members of the Commission being unable to agree as to whether any particular works are or are not necessary for the improvement of the Shatt-el-Arab, or as to the way in which particular works should be carried out, the question shall be referred by them to an engineer of repute, to be agreed upon by the commissioners, or, failing agreement, to be nominated by the president of the Institute of Civil Engineers in London, and the decision of such engineer shall be adopted by the Commission.

16. The Commission shall correspond upon all matters connected with the duties entrusted to it with the Sublime Porte direct, and not through the local authorities.

17. The local authorities shall not interfere in any way with the houses, buildings, land, or other property of the Commission, or with its funds, or with the discharge of their duties by the officers of the police, pilotage, or other services maintained by the Commission, or with wharves, jetties, docks, or quays in or on the banks of the river belonging to private persons.

18. The transfer to the Commission of any buoys or lights in the approaches to the Shatt-el-Arab shall not be deemed to affect the territorial jurisdiction in the waters where such buoys or lights are placed, or be made a ground on the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government for claiming that such waters are within its territorial jurisdiction, nor shall anything in this Convention be deemed to give the Commission power to exercise jurisdiction or to carry out duties or to hold land outside the limits of the Ottoman Empire without the consent of the territorial Power, or to affect the operation or the interpretation of the provisions of any treaty or arrangement prescribing or defining the limits of the said Empire.

19. This agreement shall be binding during twenty-one years from the day of its signature. In case neither of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other, twelve months before the expiration of the said period of twenty-one years, of the intention to terminate the agreement, it shall remain in force until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the contracting parties shall have denounced it.

ANNEX 4.

Kuweit.

HIS Majesty's Government consider the frontier on the north to be a line running from Khor-as-Subiyah so as to pass immediately south of Umm Qasr and Safwan to Jabal Sanam and thence to the Batin. On the south his boundary is considered to run eastwards from Jabal Manifah on the coast to the Na'airiyah hill at the north-western corner of Radaif. On the west the Shaikhdom is bounded between Jabal Sanam and Hafar by the Batin, and south of Hafar the border is the line dividing Summan from Dahanah as far south as the point where that line is intersected by the route from Wabrah to Riyadh.

Districts and Islands.—The Shaikhdom, considered from the physical point of view, falls naturally into two parts, one to the north and the other to the south of a line joining Kuweit town and Riqa'i. In the northern block lie the districts or tracts of Batin, Shiqqaq, Butih, Umm-al-Khilan, Yah, Qira-al-Marru, Zaqlah, and Zor. The southern block comprises the three great divisions of Summan, Dibdibah, and Umm Jmaih; and the last, which lies along the coast to the south of Kuweit Bay, is further subdivided into districts named Shaqq, Qra'ah Adan, Sahu, Hazaim, and Sudah.

The maritime possessions of Kuweit consist of the islands of Bubiyan, Warba, and Failakah, which, with its northern and southern outliers of Mashjan and 'Auhah, is situated at the mouth of Kuweit Bay, and of the islets of Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-al-Maradim.

A map is enclosed showing the limits of Kuweit.

ANNEX 5.

Mohammerah Frontier.

HIS Majesty's Government have already informed the Imperial Ottoman Government of the great importance which they attach to the maintenance of the frontier *status quo*, as locally observed, in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah.

His Majesty's Government now have the honour to explain their views in greater detail, and they would preface their statement by observing that they have not only re-examined all the evidence, both oral and documentary, which was laid before the

MAP TO ACCOMPANY COUNTRY.

43



MAP TO SHOW THE LIMITS OF KOWEIT AND ADJACENT COUNTRY.

Scale 1 inch = 48 miles.



conference of Erzeroum, but they have also had recourse to the great store of information collected by the well-known *savant* Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Rawlinson, who was well acquainted with the country, and made a profound study of the territorial position in the Mohammerah region, based upon historical facts and the deeds of title relating to each particular plot of land. Moreover, much information, which was not at the disposal of the Commissioners at Erzeroum, has been traced in the voluminous records of the East India Company, who carried on direct trade with Bussorah from the year 1635. These records are especially illuminating in regard to the conditions which actually prevailed on the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab during the 17th and 18th centuries.

The accompanying maps indicate the line of the frontier as it has been locally observed for a century or more. For facility of reference, the line may be followed, firstly, from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where it strikes the Shatt-el-Arab, and, secondly, along the course of that river until it reaches the sea.

By reference to the accompanying map No. 1, the village of Shu'aib will be observed at a point $15\frac{3}{4}$ miles on a bearing of 8 degrees north of west from Hawizeh: it is a settled village of the Beni Salih, containing some 500 inhabitants living in permanent dwellings. The whole country, comprised approximately in a triangle formed by lines joining Hawizeh, Shu'aib, and Kuskh-i-Basri, is regularly occupied and cultivated by the tribes of Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, who are not nomadic, in the ordinary sense of the term, but are settled inhabitants.

These tribes, who exclusively inhabit, and where possible cultivate, the triangular tract above referred to, have belonged from time immemorial to Hawizeh, which has been a recognised district of the Persian province of Khuzistan or Arabistan for, at any rate, four centuries. They pay revenue to their tribal sheikhs, who formerly passed it on in tribute to the "Maula" ruler of Hawizeh, who in turn paid it to the Persian Government, but, since 1902, this tribute has been collected through the agency of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

To the eastward of the marsh on which the village of Shu'aib is situated, and southwards, as far as human occupation prevails or is possible, there is not the slightest sign of Turkish influence or jurisdiction, nor of Turkish status.

The British Resident in the Persian Gulf has recently visited the Hawizeh district, and his investigations have served to confirm the information which His Majesty's Government already possessed. Apart from the sheikhs and tribesmen of the Beni Salih and Beni Sakain, Sir Percy Cox came in contact with many old inhabitants who could speak with long experience in regard to the territorial *status quo*. The view universally expressed as to the frontier was as follows:—

1. That whatever is the western boundary of the Hawizeh is, *ipso facto*, the frontier of Persia: in other words, that the Hawizeh district is included within the confines of Persia.

2. That the "Hawizeh district" comprises those lands which are regularly occupied and cultivated by tribes belonging to it, and paying revenue to Persia.

3. That, on the above premises, the boundary locally recognised is that shown by a green line on map No. 1. It will be noticed that the line (which is formed by the edge of the marsh, and is thus a natural frontier), after crossing the Ghor-el-Azem, eventually cuts the main channel of the marsh just west of Shu'aib, continues in a southerly direction until it reaches a point due west of Kuskh-i-Basri, whence it breaks back to that place, and then proceeds direct to the Shatt-el-Arab at Di'aiji. The reason why Kuskh-i-Basri is recognised as an angle of the boundary is referable to the existence of a winter lake of rain water at Yafair; the limit of cultivation and occupation by tribesmen under Hawizeh in this direction is regulated by the distance from their water supply (Yafair), at which they can safely dwell and keep their flocks, and this limit is considered to be reached at Kuskh-i-Basri, where the ruins of an extensive building of great age form a convenient landmark.

His Majesty's Government, being in possession of precise and trustworthy information regarding the frontier of Hawizeh, have no occasion to appeal to more uncertain authorities, but they think it is not without interest to recall to the Imperial Ottoman Government that Dervish Pasha, whose estimates of Turkish claims were not usually marked by excessive moderation, admits in Chapter XIII of his book (printed in Constantinople in 1868), "that it would be hardly right" for the Ottoman Government to lay claim to the country of Hawizeh, though, in the subsequent chapter, his Excellency expresses the view that it "might be useful" for Turkey to claim it as

a pretext for proposing something else, viz., that the Kerkha should be adopted as the boundary above Sheria.

Coming now to the neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab, the frontier as locally observed enters the Khaiyin Canal (which is the name of the channel running from the Turkish Customs Post at Di'aiji, between the islands of Kharnubiyah, Bowarin, and Aqawat, to the junction of the Nahr Nazaileh with the main stream) at a point between the Nahr Di'aiji and the Nahr Abul Arabid; it follows the middle of the Nahr Khaiyin until it reaches the point where the Nahr Khaiyin and the Nahr Nazaileh meet the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab. (See map No. 2.)

It then proceeds, as shown by the broken black line (see accompanying maps Nos. 3 and 4), along the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, in mid-stream, until that river reaches the Persian Gulf.

The claim made by Persia rests on continued and undisturbed possession for over a century, and on the recognition of Persian sovereignty by local representatives of the Turkish Government in many ways and on many different occasions. Thus there is unanimity of evidence amongst the local tribesmen that the boundary as locally observed has not been questioned by the Turkish authorities, who, on the contrary, many years ago had actually buried some coal in a pit as a permanent boundary mark; and it further appears that the periodical cleaning of the Nahr Khaiyin has always been undertaken by Persian subjects under the orders of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, whilst the cleaning of the Di'aiji Canal has been carried out exclusively under the orders of the Turkish mudirs.

The local inhabitants moreover draw a very clear line of distinction between the position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in, for instance, the islands of Akawat, Barin or Bowarin, Shamshamiyah, and Umm-ut-Tuwaileh, of the greater part of which he is merely proprietor, and his position on the Persian side of the locally recognised boundary.

From the point where the locally observed frontier leaves the Khaiyin Canal and, opposite the Nahr Nazaileh, enters the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, it follows the *medium filum aquæ* of the Shatt-el-Arab down to the Persian Gulf. (See maps Nos. 3 and 4.)

This line of demarcation is in accordance with the general presumption that, where a navigable river forms the boundary of conterminous States, the middle of the channel or "thalweg" is the actual line of separation between those two States.

Such a presumption may, however, be swept away, either by proof of prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession on the part of one of the two States, or by express treaty stipulation.

The records of the past 300 years, as contained in the official archives of the East India Company and of His Majesty's Government, are far from supporting any claim on the part of Turkey to "prior occupancy and long undisturbed possession" of the Shatt-el-Arab; while no express stipulation is contained in the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) as to the ownership of the river.

If, therefore, His Majesty's Government had strict regard either to purely local considerations or to the letter of the treaties, they would not hesitate to press for the frontier as locally recognised along its whole length from Hawizeh to the Persian Gulf. But they prefer to look at the negotiations in which they are now engaged as a whole, and are sincerely anxious to arrive at an arrangement which both parties can accept *ex animo*, and which, by removing all points of grievance and friction not only between themselves, but also between the Sublime Porte and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, will place the relations of all concerned on a thoroughly satisfactory footing. Provided, therefore, the Turkish Government will accept the frontier *status quo* as already indicated from the neighbourhood of Hawizeh to the point where the Khaiyin Canal and the Nahr Nazaileh enter the Shatt-el-Arab, then His Majesty's Government are prepared to use their influence with the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah to induce them to recognise Turkish sovereignty over the whole waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, subject to the following conditions:—

(i.) The following islands to be recognised as within the territorial limits of Persia:—

(*a.*) Muhalleh and its adjunct Bahriyeh, the four islands situated between Shatait and Ma'awiyeh, and the two islands off Manquhi. These islands are in fact parts of the island of Abadan, and must be so regarded.

(*b.*) Any islands now in existence, or which may hereafter be formed, and which may be connected at low water either with Abadan Island or with the Persian bank below the Nahr Nazaileh.

MAP Nº I


SKETCH MAP
SHOWING
TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER
AS OCCUPIED BY PERSIA
WEST AND SOUTH OF HAWIZEH
Scale 1/250,000
Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 Miles
Persian Frontier as locally observed
Ghor el Azem
Nahr Lawi
SHUAIB
BENI SALEH
HAWIZEH
Cultivation
River Kerkheh (?) From Kute Nahr Hasham
PLAIN
Cultivated in patches
THAKKAB
KAROOG
SHALWEH
HOR
OR
MARSH
YAFAIR OR JEFAIR
Cultivation
KISHK-I-HAWIZEH
KISHK-I-BASRI
UMMUT-TUMAIR
KAROON RIVER
QURNA
Swaib
Nashweh
From Nashweh
To Hawizeh
End of Cultivation
Tents of Beni Sakain
Imam Sahib Zaman or Abu Dthiab
Zain-ul Abidin
Imam Ali Abu Ibra
Imam Fadthl or Amir-ul-Mouminin
Imam Ibrahim Khalil
Imam Khizro
Imam Ali
Khizr Mohamad
Ali Musa Raza
Ibn Hussain
Hujreh Saad
Imam Abu Aggar or Sahib Zaman
Arab Huts
Arab Camp
Camels and Tents of Beni Sakain
Tents of Beni Sakain
Tents
Bush
Tree
Sidreh (tree)
Hamzah



Compiled from Plane-table Survey from Hawizeh via Shoaib to Diaiji April 1912, and Existing Maps by Surveyor S. Firoz Bakht. Under supervision of Lieut-Colonel Sir Percy Cox. Resident Persian Gulf.

G.S.G.S. No 2641

War Office, July 1912

SKETCH MAP
of
MUHAMMAREH
AND LANDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE
TURCO PERSIAN BOUNDARY
AS LOCALLY RECOGNIZED

Scale 2" to 1 Mile

Yards 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 Yards

Locally recognised boundary shewn thus _____

Boundary proposed by His Majesty's Govt shewn thus _____

D I A L A J J

Turkish Custom House

Shatt-el-Arab

Khamubiyah

Boat Channel

Umm - ut Towaiah

S H A T T - A L - A R A B (MAIN CHANNEL)

Turkish Bank (Date groves)

S A Y Y I D G H A L I B T A M A R

Bowarin or Barin

TAMAR BIN HAMDAN

KHUMAISEH

Sheikh's Palace

Jaziret-al-Barin

(Sheikh Khazal's port)

Sabeh Gasab

Agawat

(Waqf property, cultivators tenants of Sheikh)

Shemshamiyeh

(Private property of Sheikh Khazal)

Umm-ut-Khassasif

(Private property of Sheikh Khazal)

Rumailah

Umm-ut-Tabbul

Haiffi

(Khazal owner)

BALYANIYEH

DABBEH

(Plank blockade)

From observ

Abu Abul Hassanah

KUT NAWASIR

(Ruined date gardens)

Ruins

MANDUWAH

Ruins

Ruins

Ruins

SKETCH MAP of MUHAMMAREH LANDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE O PERSIAN BOUNDARY AS LOCALLY RECOGNIZED

MAP No 2

Scale 2" to 1 Mile

Agreed boundary shewn thus
Proposed by His Majesty's Govt shewn thus

A Karguzars house
1 Telegraph Office
2 Post Office
3 Lynch Brothers Office
4 Haji Rais's house
5 Wheat Market
7 Consulate
8 Dwelling house
9 Lynch Brothers warehouse
10
11
12
13 Quarantine M. dc' house

TAMĀR BIN
H. HAMDĀN
AHMAD-AL
GHANIM

TAMĀR

KHUMAISEH

Agawi

Shamshamiyeh

Umm-ul-Khassásif
(Private property of Shaikh Khazal)

Rumaish

Naufi
(Khazal owner)

Umm-ul-Tebr

MUHAMMAREH

DURRAND

SHATT AL ARAB

Umm-ul-Rassas
(Property of Shaikh Khazal)

SAHILIYEH

MANDUVAN

KUT NAIVADIH
(Ruined mud-walled)

Sarkal

Sarkal

Sarkal

Sheet No. I
MAP OF
SHATT-AL-'ARAB & BAHMANSHIR.
INCLUDING MUHAMMARAH & 'ABBADAN I.
SHARHEN
BANNEH
SAMIL
GATEH
SAMAN
SANIYEH
LIMEADRIYEH
ARGSIYEH
KHARKAREH
B
B
A
D

Sheet No. II

MAP OF
SHATT-AL-'ARAB & BAHMANSHĪR.
INCLUDING MUHAMMAREH & 'ABBĀDĀN I.

Compiled under supervision of Lieut. A. T. Wilson I. A. from plane table surveys by Surveyors Ali Ahmed, Survey of India Dept. & Mohd. Zaman Khān 94th Poona Horse, June-August 1909.

Scale 1 inch = 2 miles

Furlongs 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

N.B.:—Turkish territory has not been surveyed accurately.

Conventional signs:—

Limit of date groves
Limit of cultivation
Telegraph Line
Boundary proposed by His Majesty's Gov^t

Muhammarah (Consulate flagstaff) Lat. 30° 29' 27" Long. 48° 10' 38" — Naval determination. (Beauchamp 1909)

Magnetic Var.) (mean of day) 1° 37' E. — acc. to Mr. J. C. Pearson, Carnegie Research Institute, Dept. of Terrestrial Magnetism (March 1909)

FADDAGHIYEH

GUREH

MANAWI

MUAMMAREH

GUSBEH

CHUAIBDEH

HANGEH

SHATT AL 'ARAB

MUHAMMAREH

'ABBĀDĀN I.

BAHMANSHIR R.

PERSIAN GULF

Persian land ground

Persian land ground

Reeds

Low ground covered with Jungle and intersected by streams

H.W. Marks

L.W. Marks

Ottoman Telegraph Line

Ottoman Telegraph Line to Fao

Fao

Fort

Custom House

Hāji Mukhayyar

Hāji Abbās

Zair Wāhid

Chāmān

Hulaibardāp

Sabad

Hāji Sālih

Manawiyah

Manawiyah II

'Ali Zāhir Kubba

G.S.G.S. No 2640b

War Office Jul. 1912

(ii.) The arrangements proposed by His Majesty's Government for maintaining full freedom of navigation on the river, and for its conservancy, to be accepted by the Ottoman Government.

(iii.) The modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah, which is in the main stream of the Shatt-el-Arab above and below its junction with the Karun, to be recognised as within Persian jurisdiction. (See Map No. 2.)

(iv.) No interference to take place with existing fishing rights and usages on or from the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, that phrase being understood to comprise all land on the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab or on the Persian islands therein which is uncovered at normal low tide.

(v.) Turkish jurisdiction not to extend to land on the Persian bank, defined as above, which is only temporarily covered with water in time of flood or from any accidental cause, and Persian jurisdiction not to extend to land which is temporarily or accidentally uncovered below normal low-water mark.

(vi.) The Sheikh of Mohammerah to continue in full enjoyment of his existing *proprietary* rights in lands situated in Turkish territory.

[31253] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 333.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1912.

IN an interview which Sir Arthur Nicolson and I had with the Turkish Ambassador to-day, we handed to him our reply about the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf negotiations and the annexed memoranda,* with certain maps. We especially drew Tewfik Pasha's attention to the memorandum asking for specific rates on cotton goods when the Turkish customs dues were increased. We said that we attached great importance to this. We had not put it into the reply about the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf because it introduced entirely new matter which was not germane to this subject, but as, in our reply, we proposed to abandon all participation in the Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to Bussorah, we felt it essential to have something which would be a security for British trade. To give what we asked about cotton goods would not entail any sacrifice upon the Turkish Government, it would not diminish their revenue, and it would be no burden to them, though it would give security to an important branch of British trade that the duties on it would be adjusted so as not to press unfairly on particular articles.

The Turkish Ambassador seemed quite satisfied with what we told him, and made no objection. With regard to participation in the Bagdad Railway, he said that if we did not participate, as his country was free to give the concession for making the railway to anyone it liked, a British company might be employed.

We said that this would be very satisfactory to us, but we had, of course, not thought it fair to stipulate for it as a condition.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[30586] No. 63.

Trans-Atlantic Trust Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July 19.)

Sir, 550, *Salisbury House, London, July* 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in reply to your communication with reference to the proposed construction of a railway from Yumurtalyk to Suleymania by way of Lake Van, that our project is, in the main, identical in its object with that upon which Mr. J. R. Carter has approached the Turkish Government.

We are, however, advised by Emin Bey that he has recently learned from an influential source in Constantinople that, after twice interviewing the authorities, Mr. Carter has been unsuccessful in his application.

On the other hand, he assures us that there is no local opposition in the way of our application, and that it receives great favour from influential members of the

* See Enclosure in No. 61.

Young Turkish party, who much prefer the introduction of British capital to that of any other foreign country.

I am, &c.
F. L. LIGHTFOOT.

[30654] No. 64.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 741.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, July 18, 1912.*

IN connection with current negotiations and Blue prints received from Foreign Office, it may be convenient to His Majesty's Government to know position in which Sheikh of Mohammerah at present finds himself in regard to frontier question, and his personal attitude, as recently expressed.

From telegrams which he has lately received from them it has become apparent to him that both Central Government and Persian representative at Constantinople are extremely ill informed regarding local position and geographical details, and quite incapable of looking after their interests effectively. He thus feels that those interests, which are mainly his own, are in very bad hands, and he even fears that the present régime at Tehran, with its strong Bakhtiari element, would probably sacrifice them with little compunction in exchange for advantage elsewhere. In the above connection he remarked that were it not that he relied on our community of interests and effective support he would now have to be taking active measures to make his position safe, but that, things being as they were, he was doing no more than prepare himself to act on the frontier in case any of the aggressive intentions with which rumour credits Turks should take shape.

(Addressed to Minister; repeated to Foreign Office.)

[30652] No. 65.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 19, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 575 of 17th July to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Ambassador points out that course proposed still involves undesirable delay, first, by reference to Tehran and by submission of text to you, and, secondly, because Turkish delegates could not, without instructions from their Government, assent to condition it is desired to attach to Persian acceptance of explanatory notes, and at present there is no Government to give such assent.

On the other hand, if Persian delegates are allowed to accept notes without condition, treaty of 1847 will be accepted by both parties, and discussion respecting north part of frontier can begin.

I venture to suggest that our position as regards Mohammerah and Hawisa line is much strengthened since Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to us map enclosed in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 516. Line therein indicated does not give all that we require, but it does show readiness of the Turkish Government to renounce claim based on note.

[30388] No. 66.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 19, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant on the subject of the memoranda for the Turkish Ambassador.

I am to inform you that all the documents in question were communicated to his Highness on the 18th instant.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey concurs in the last sentence of the second paragraph

[30763] No. 66*.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

(Confidential.)

Board of Trade, July 19, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th June, transmitting copies of proposed agreements for the transport of material for the Bagdad Railway Company.

The Board do not see anything in the terms of these agreements to which in their opinion His Majesty's Government need take exception. In this connection, however, I am to say that they are at present uncertain how far the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch) are entitled to put forward a claim for the working of the three additional British boats on the Tigris, the concession for which it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to ask the Turkish Government to grant.

They would therefore be glad if they could be informed confidentially as to the nature of the understanding which exists between your department and Messrs. Lynch, and as to the rights which Messrs. Lynch may have secured in respect of the navigation of both rivers.

So far as is consistent with existing rights and obligations, the Board are disposed to suggest that the additional boats to be put on the Tigris should not necessarily be placed under Messrs. Lynch's control.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

of your letter, subject to the important reservation that His Majesty's Government shall not be called upon in any case to oppose the exercise of sovereign rights by the Turkish authorities on the Turkish bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, or indeed in any portion of Turkish territory, so long as the exercise of such rights does not arbitrarily conflict with the strictly proprietary rights of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[30833] No. 67.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 244.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July 20, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Hodeidah, dated to-day:—

"British subjects at Loheia report that [group undecypherable] Seyyid Idrisi [? is] organising raid on that town by land and by sea from Midi. Expected that rebels will be disembarked from dhows under protection of Italian war-ships.

"'Governolo' shelled Public Debt station south of Hodeidah on 11th July, having bombarded [name undecypherable] on 30th June. Officially confirmed that about 27th May Seyyid Idrisi, with assistance of Italians, captured Farsan. Garrison and officials [group undecypherable] at Midi."

[30840] No. 68.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, July 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 575 of 17th July.

Russian Government have sent me a memorandum stating that they cannot relinquish their opinion that it is of the highest importance that Persia should promptly accept explanatory note, and that Ottoman Government should be induced to recognise *status quo* of the present frontier line near Mohammerah by direct pressure, which His Majesty's Government have decided to exercise on them.

Russian Government consider it very doubtful whether Ottoman Government would accept condition suggested in your telegram under reply, namely, that they should recognise locally observed boundary in Mohammerah and Hawiza region if such a condition were put forward by Persia. If, however, Persian Government accepted explanatory note without this reservation, they could in exchange insist that Turkey should recognise other suggestions made at various times by mediating Powers, and especially identic map of 1870, which would be of great importance.

If explanatory note be only accepted by Persia after Ottoman Government have given way to demands of His Majesty's Government in regard to frontier near Mohammerah, Persia's concession would no longer have any value in the eyes of the Porte, and there would no longer be any chance of the identic map and of other questions advantageous to Persia receiving a favourable solution. If, on the contrary, Persia accepts the explanatory note before an arrangement be come to between Ottoman Government and His Majesty's Government in regard to Mohammerah frontier, Persia would probably be able to obtain certain concessions. Furthermore, Persia's refusal to recognise validity of such an important document as identic note signed by representatives of the two mediating Powers is calculated to discredit generally the suggestions made at various times by those Powers to disputants.

Russian Government therefore think it very desirable that Persia's adherence to explanatory note should not be postponed. They have, however, instructed their representative at Constantinople to consider question carefully in concert with His Majesty's Ambassador, with a view to finding a solution as far as possible in accordance with respective interests of the two Powers.

[30857] No. 69.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 594.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 11, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 577 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna on the subject of the meeting of delegates from the Ægean Islands at Patmos on the 17th June last.

The resolution of the delegates is fully summarised in the enclosed despatch from Acting Vice-Consul Sir Alfred Biliotti, so that I have not thought it necessary to forward the one copy in the original Greek which was sent to the embassy.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 69.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Gerard Lowther.

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch received from Sir A. Biliotti, enclosing copy of the decision taken by the delegates at Patmos, and giving a summary of its contents.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 69.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 97.)
Sir, *Rhodes, June 30, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 78 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy, as published in the Greek paper "Patris," but which M. Papadaki says can be relied upon of the decision written in Greek, taken by the delegates from the islands of the Archipelago, Rhodes, and Cos included, in the meeting held in the monastery of St. John in Patmos on the 4th (17th) instant.

In the paper in question the meeting express their immense gratitude towards the King, Parliament, and Government of Italy for having rescued them from the Turkish yoke. They further state that the natives are resolved to submit to anything rather than to accept again the hated Turkish rule, and their most ardent desire is to be united with motherland Greece.

They finally express the conviction that they will be treated in conformity with the principle acted upon in precedent cases that no Christians who have succeeded in liberating themselves from the Turks have never been placed again under them. They therefore proclaim a full autonomy for their islands under the name of Ægean confederation, with power to fly a blue flag with a white cross and an emblem—Apollo (the Sun). The mode of election of the head of this confederation and of the legislative body to be fixed in due time, and a deputation consisting of Messrs. Drakidi (Rhodes), Petrides (Symi), and Olympitis (Calymnos), is appointed to convey this resolution of the meeting to General Ameglio and to cause it to be transmitted to the other European Powers.

It is to the bearers of this paper that General Ameglio let know through the civil commissioner that the persons who had taken part in the meeting at Patmos might have been visited with so severe a punishment as *être fusillés*.

It being rumoured that General Ameglio had asked for Vice-Consul Limpis's recall, the Greek consul-general told me that his presence in Patmos was quite fortuitous, and that his mission in the Sporades, where Greek subjects had important interests, being at an end, he was returning to Greece.

Mr. Dimadi (a Greek), dragoman to the Italian Legation in Athens, who came here

with the expeditionary force on the 4th ultimo, was suddenly recalled and returned to his post, owing, it is rumoured, to too much intimacy with the Greek consul-general.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[30860] No. 70.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 599.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on a tribal fight between Ibn Rashid and the Ruwela.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Damascus, July 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 39 and to the paragraph stating that there had been an allegation that Ibn Rashid had recently inflicted a severe defeat upon the Ruwela tribe, involving the death of 700 tribesmen and certain relations of Sheikh Nouri Shaalan.

Further enquiry having been made into this matter, I am now informed that there really was a battle between the above parties on the 5th ultimo in the Jauf district, and the Ruwela lost 200 killed (including some ten persons connected with Sheikh Nouri) and 1,000 camels, whilst the loss on Ibn Rashid's side was fifty men only. The Ruwela were led by two sons of Sheikh Nouri named Naif and Shaalan, who appear to have escaped.

I am further told that two brothers of Sheikh Nouri were living some years ago. The one named Fattam died awhile ago, leaving three surviving sons—Shaalan, Sayah, and Nawaf. The other was named Fahd, and Sheikh Nouri, believing that he was intriguing in the hope of getting the sheikhship from him, caused him to be assassinated, according to popular suspicion. Fahd left two sons named Faris and Shajaan.

For the time being the sheikh of the Ruwela, as recognised by local authorities, is Faris, son of Fahd, but the sheikh who has most power and influence over the tribe is Nawaf, son of Fattam.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[30866] No. 71.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 605.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 16, 1912.*

UP to the time of his departure about a fortnight ago, M. Revoil, the Director-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, was very actively engaged in endeavouring to secure the signature of the definitive concession for the Samsun-Sivas Railway, the conclusion for the preliminary agreement for which was reported in His Majesty's Ambassador's despatch No. 548 of the 2nd August, 1911. The pressure which M. Revoil was able to bring to bear on Javid Bey was effective; for the latter invited M. Dehaunay, the representative of the Régie Générale, which is to construct and work the railway, to sign the concession on the 11th instant; but in the meantime, the Russian Embassy had addressed a strong note of protest to the Imperial Government, to the effect that, in carrying on these negotiations, the Ottoman Government was contravening the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1902 Agreement with Russia regarding railway construction, and the result was that when M. Dehaunay presented himself at the Ministry of Public Works in response to Javid Bey's invitation, he was informed simply that the signature could not take place.

These negotiations have been conducted with great secrecy, but I believe that the foregoing represents the present state of affairs. I am told that one of the arguments used by M. Revoil in urging immediate signature was that he wished that M. Poincaré should be in a position when he went to St. Petersburgh to be able to confront Russian expostulations with the *fait accompli*. In any case, it seems that his action is calculated to cause considerable irritation in Russia.

The prospect of the construction of the line being delayed affects the interests of the National Bank, as the value of the option which it holds for the concession of the construction and working of the port at Samsun must be depreciated thereby.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[30867] No. 72.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 606.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 573 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo reporting on the progress of the Bagdad Railway.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Consul Fontana to Sir Gerard Lowther.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Aleppo, July 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report on the progress made in the construction of the Bagdad Railway line in this district.

The station at Aleppo is now nearing completion. Strong iron sleepers, imported from Germany, are being used throughout the permanent way. The rails have been laid from Aleppo to Muslemieh, the junction, and thence north-eastwards as far as the Sajur. A temporary wooden bridge is being built over the Sajur. Work has begun upon a temporary wooden bridge to span the Euphrates near Jerablus, which should be completed by the end of October next. Fears are expressed as to the stability of this temporary bridge in flood time. It is said that the line from the Sajur to the Euphrates will be finished by the end of September. I understand that the various pieces required to construct the Euphrates permanent steel bridge have not yet been purchased owing to the high prices now ruling in Germany. Difficulties are, moreover, foreseen as to the construction of an embankment near Jerablus village. The station at Muslemieh is nearly completed. The stations between there and Jerablus will be Akterin, Chorban Bey, Sajur, and Helman.

From Muslemieh westwards the line has been laid up to some little way beyond Catma, a distance of over 40 kilom. in all.

The expulsion of over 500 Italian engineers and workmen seems to have seriously affected the construction of the line. Some Greek engineers and mechanics were afterwards brought over to carry on the work, which has been rapidly pushed forward. Most of the manual labour, however, since the expulsion of the Italians, appears to have been performed by native gangs of labourers, and the rails in various places between Muslemieh and the Sajur have been unevenly laid, viz., one rail higher or lower than the other. This may prove a serious drawback to heavy trains travelling at any speed.

I understand that no money has been paid for the expropriation of the lands in the Sajur–Jerablus region, saving, perhaps, certain of those which are actually under cultivation. Much dissatisfaction has been caused at Aleppo by the low prices paid by the company, backed by the Government, for the expropriation of private property, and at Alexandretta it is said that much real injustice has been done to landowners in this way.

The company began, and have carried on the work regardless, apparently, of expense, and huge sums have been expended in connection with the work. An enormous quantity of costly material has been imported, a large staff of highly paid German engineers, craftsmen, officials, and native clerks are employed, and the wages

paid to the labourers on the line have been quite abnormal. The company, nevertheless, have acquired an unenviable reputation through all this district. Various contractors for the construction of sections of the line have abandoned their contracts with great pecuniary loss. A French contractor, who had invested his whole capital in the work, died recently at Aleppo, leaving a widow nearly penniless with a claim of over 2,000*l.* against the company. Another French subject, an engineer, who threw up work in the Far East to obtain employment on the Bagdad Railway, spent his entire capital of 1,000*l.* in attempting to fulfil a contract with the company, but owing to a rise in labourers' wages, and to other causes he did not succeed, and is now prosecuting the company in the Ottoman law court for the recovery of the 1,000*l.* The company have hitherto refused to modify any contract entered into, whatever might be the circumstances tending to render its fulfilment difficult or impossible. Contractors have, on more than one occasion, tried to make their losses good by paying their native labourers less than the daily wage agreed upon, thus provoking tumult and outcry. Some time ago three Kurdish labourers were wounded at Aleppo by Circassian guards in the company's employ, and two others were injured at Jerablus by guards in a scuffle arising from the Kurds attempting to mob the paymaster, who paid them less than their stipulated wage. The native workmen in the company's employ at Jerablus show themselves eager to find employment with the Englishmen now carrying on excavations on the Jerablus mound, who employ several hundred men, and are greatly respected by the natives for their fair dealing and tact. The Germans, unfortunately, have incurred the distrust and dislike of the natives, whom they treat with no very rigid justice and with scant consideration. Many of the Italian workmen and mechanics, on the eve of their departure from Aleppo, openly expressed their relief at being compelled to sever connection with the Bagdad Railway Company.

The inauguration of the construction of the port at Alexandretta took place on the 10th ultimo, the local authorities, civil and military, being present at the ceremony.

I have, &c.
R. A. FONTANA.

[30868] No. 73.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 607.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on the events in his district for the past quarter.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Damascus, July 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the usual quarterly general report for the past three months.

The most important event locally was the resignation of the vali, Nazim Pasha, on the 11th ultimo, which, however, was eventually withdrawn some ten or twelve days later, to the public satisfaction.

Nouri Shaalan, the Ruwela sheikh, whose sentence to imprisonment had been the cause of this, was pardoned only a few days ago, according to a rumour which has reached me, but the truth of which has not yet been ascertained.

Military activity in training and drilling the ihtiyat and redif troops that were summoned to arms, besides recruits, is very much to be remarked. The conduct of these troops is satisfactory, and fairly severe discipline is maintained.

As soon as the call to arms was published the non-Moslem elements of the population began to leave the country in greater numbers than ever before, and the exodus which was noted in my despatch No. 18 of the 1st April is continuous and increasing. The Syrian Patriarch recently told me that five years ago his community numbered about 350 families, and to-day about 270 only, and added that the ratio of decrease is

increasing, as in the last five months alone the depletion had been fourteen families. The departure of whole families must be a very serious drain upon the population and resources of the province.

Further, the serious fire at the end of the month of April has inflicted great loss, reckoned at little less than 1,000,000*l.*, upon the trade of Damascus, which already was at a low ebb due indirectly to the war, and general political insecurity and want of confidence.

It is presently reported that verghu and temettu taxes have been largely augmented (25 per cent.), and a committee for the purpose is now operating and investigating house property, while the military exemption fee is raised from £T. 50 to £T. 60, and from £T. 30 to £T. 40 on ihtiyats, and all functionaries are to be mulcted of 3 per cent. upon their salaries, with possibly also the loss of one month's pay.

To complete the doleful tale, the crop of apricots and other fruits injured by late frosts have been 50 per cent. below that of last year and 30 per cent. below an average year. This season's cereals are in general some 25 per cent. below the average, while the vintage prospects are worst of all, and only about half or even less) of the usual produce will be gathered.

The election of members for the Medjliss umumi (or vilayet general council) are now proceeding, and it is expected that the powers of this assembly will be increased. The term of office, instead of being annual, will be henceforth for four years.

The dilatoriness and ineptitude of judicial proceedings have formed the subject of complaints from this consulate during the past quarter on more than one heading.

In respect of public works, it seems that the construction of roads is receiving attention in various quarters. In the neighbourhood of Damascus 150 kilom. have been undertaken, of which 50 kilom. are completed. In the Hauran the new and spacious Government House was recently finished, as also have been the numerous gendarmerie guard-houses which were designed in accordance with Sami Pasha's projects; but the railway track—a branch Hejaz Railway line—from Deraa to Bussorah-Eski-Shan (eventually to go on to Salkhad) makes slow progress.

The local Education Department have now also completed very nearly the Dar-el-Muallemin, *i.e.*, institute for instructors, where 300 students may pass a course of training in order to obtain diplomas as schoolmasters.

Practically local newspapers have ceased to be of any account since the "Muktabas" editor fled and his journal expired. A month ago it was reported that the writer of a poem, Ibrahim Ceskubi (*vide* my despatch No. 21), with Mahommed-el-Bekr, the publisher of "El-Balagh," had been acquitted in Constantinople, but within the last few days I hear that local courts have passed a sentence of life imprisonment upon Fehmi Effendi Ghazzi, editor of the comic paper "Baruda," for having imputed bribery and corruption to higher officials of this vilayet several months ago; this would appear ultra-severe.

The police and gendarmerie both appear to have improved of late, but if they were allowed rather greater discretionary powers in hearing or settling or dismissing petty cases and disputes instead of having to pass everything as to the Adliyye (Judicial Department) it would be far better for the country.

Scarcely anything has been heard during the last few months of any advance in Zionist schemes of colonisation within this vilayet.

Among the chief changes of local officials are:—

Veli Effendi is appointed kaimakam to Mismiyeh instead of Rashid Bey Talil, who is now a deputy.

Abdul Fettah Effendi is appointed kaimakam to Ezrau.

Asaad Bey, kaimakam to Houa.

Ali Wafa Bey, kaimakam to Salt.

Seyyid Ahmed Effendi, kaimakam to Tafileh.

Rufi Bey, kaimakam to Douma.

Refhat Effendi Ayoubi, kaimakam to Zebdani.

Zeki Bey, kaimakam to Hasbeya.

Amin Effendi Husheini, kaimakam to Kuneitra.

Jamal Bey has been appointed president of the Istiinaf Jeza Court in Damascus; he was occupying the same position in Kuswa.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[30840] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 388.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 22, 1912.*

YOU may concert with your Russian colleague in advising Persian delegates to accept "explanatory note."

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 433, and St. Petersburgh, No. 590.)

[30840] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 589.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 252 of 21st July: Turco-Persian frontier.

In deference to views of Russian Government, I am instructing His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople to concert with his Russian colleague in advising Persian delegates to accept "explanatory note." I am, however, somewhat doubtful of wisdom of Persia insisting in exchange for such acceptance on Turkey recognising other suggestions made at various times by mediating Powers, as such suggestions include the mediating commissioners' line of 1850, which we wish to supersede. In these circumstances Persia might merely insist on recognition by Turkey of frontier zone as shown in "identic map" of 1870.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 432, and Constantinople, No. 387.)

[31280] No. 76.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Posillipo, July 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 224 of 24th July.

As Netherlands Government have also been asked to furnish similar information, Italian Government consider that it will suffice for us to report British pilgrim-ships.

Name, owner, flag, tonnage, and funnel markings of ships will suffice for purpose in view.

[28093] No. 77.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 23, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant on the subject of British participation in the Bagdad-Bussorah railway.

In reply I am to state that a British participation of 50 per cent. has virtually been refused by the Ottoman Government, and I am to add that it would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, cause umbrage to the French and Russian Governments if His Majesty's Government, after having informed them that their participation would be welcomed, were now to endeavour to induce the Ottoman Government to accept an Anglo-German co-operation to the exclusion of France and Russia.

The Secretary of State accordingly considers that it would be diplomatically impossible to obtain a British participation of 50 per cent.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[29520] No. 78.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Foreign Office, July 24, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has been in communication with the Italian Government with a view to minimise as far as possible the interference by Italian war-ships, due to the existence of a state of war between Italy and Turkey, with the pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea.

I am to transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence on the subject,* and to ask that, if Mr. Secretary Harcourt sees no objection, instructions may be sent to the Governor of Singapore to furnish the information mentioned in the telegram from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, No. 223 of the 11th instant, under the heading (*a*).

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[31714] No. 79.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 26.)

(Secret.)

Board of Trade, July 26, 1912.

Sir,

ADVERTING to previous communications with reference to the negotiations now pending with the Turkish Government, I am directed by the Board of Trade to forward to you the accompanying note in amplification of the annex to the memorandum which the Board understand was handed to the Turkish Ambassador on the 18th July. It will be recollected that the annex in question related to the desires of His Majesty's Government with regard to the customs duties to be levied in the Ottoman dominions upon certain classes of cotton yarns and manufactures, and the note now enclosed sets out the views of the Board as to the modification of the general rate at 15 per cent. *ad valorem* to be asked for in respect of these classes of goods.

The Board would suggest, subject to Sir E. Grey's approval, that a copy of this note should be sent to the Turkish Ambassador as containing the information promised in the final paragraph of the annex above alluded to.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Note communicated by Board of Trade.

IN an annex to the memorandum handed to the Turkish Ambassador on the 18th July, it was indicated that a further memorandum would shortly be presented embodying the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the customs treatment of certain classes of cotton yarns and manufactures on importation into Turkey, a matter to which they attach great importance in connection with any arrangement between the two Governments for the increase of the present rate of the Turkish customs duties.

His Majesty's Government understand that the Turkish Government propose a general increase from 11 to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, and that this is desired not as a measure of protection for native industry, but solely as a means of increasing the Turkish revenue. His Majesty's Government therefore think it right to point out that the great bulk of the present trade between the two countries in cotton yarns and piece-goods is a trade in articles of a cheap description suited to the needs of a large body of consumers of limited means, and that, after careful enquiry, they are advised that an increase of duty from 11 to 15 per cent. on these articles would certainly cause either a diminution in the volume of the trade on account of the increase of price or a deterioration in the quality of the goods in order to retain the market, and that most probably it would have both these effects in varying degrees according to the class of

* No. 25, and to Sir R. Rodd, No. 224, Telegraphic, July 5; Sir R. Rodd, No. 83, Telegraphic, July 21; Mr. Marling, No. 223, Telegraphic, July 11; to Mr. Marling, No. 375, Telegraphic, July 15, 1912.

goods. This being so, the Ottoman Government will realise that the proposed increase of duty must fail to yield a corresponding increase of revenue, since it will be levied on a smaller volume of goods of lower average value.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government suggest that the interests both of the Turkish revenue, of the consuming population in Turkey, and of British manufacturers would be best met by limiting the increase of duty on cotton yarns and piece-goods to 2 per cent., viz., from 11 to 13 per cent. *ad valorem*. In making this proposal, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to call attention to the fact that British trade with Turkey is considerably greater than that of any other country, with the result that the burden inflicted by the proposed increase of Turkish duties will fall much more heavily on British manufacturers and traders than on those of any other nationality. His Majesty's Government do not of course suggest that any special treatment should be accorded to British goods which is not at the same time extended to similar goods of all nationalities, but they urge that the facts to which they have called attention justify the most favourable treatment by Turkey of the classes of goods in which British trade is predominantly interested, especially since there is ground for believing that the interests of British trade are in this matter in accordance with those of the Turkish Government and people.

[31838] No. 80.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 27.)

Downing Street, July 26, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Harcourt to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th July, and to request you to lay before Secretary Sir Edward Grey the accompanying copy of a telegram which has been sent to the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

2. Mr. Harcourt would be glad to be informed in due course when the necessity for reporting the movements of pilgrim-ships ceases to exist.

I am, &c.
H. J. READ.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Mr. Harcourt to the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

(Telegraphic.) *Downing Street, July 26, 1912.*

UNTIL further notice telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador, Rome, whenever a pilgrim-ship from Singapore leaves for Mecca. Date of departure, name, flag, owner, tonnage, and funnel markings should be given.

[31714] No. 81.

Memorandum communicated to Tewfik Pasha.

IN an annex to the memorandum handed to the Turkish Ambassador on the 18th July, it was indicated that a further memorandum would shortly be presented embodying the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the customs treatment of certain classes of cotton yarns and manufactures on importation into Turkey, a matter to which they attach great importance in connection with any arrangement between the two Governments for the increase of the present rate of the Turkish customs duties.

His Majesty's Government understand that the Turkish Government propose a general increase from 11 to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, and that this is desired not as a measure of protection for native industry, but solely as a means of increasing the Turkish revenue. His Majesty's Government therefore think it right to point out that the great bulk of the present trade between the two countries in cotton yarns and piece-goods is a trade in articles of a cheap description suited to the needs of a large body of consumers of limited means, and that, after careful enquiry, they are advised that an increase of duty from 11 to 15 per cent. on these articles would certainly cause either a diminution in the volume of the trade on account of the increase of price or a

deterioration in the quality of the goods in order to retain the market, and that most probably it would have both these effects in varying degrees according to the class of goods. This being so, the Ottoman Government will realise that the proposed increase of duty must fail to yield a corresponding increase of revenue, since it will be levied on a smaller volume of goods of lower average value.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government suggest that the interests both of the Turkish revenue, of the consuming population in Turkey, and of British manufacturers would be best met by limiting the increase of duty on cotton yarns and piece-goods to 2 per cent., viz., from 11 to 13 per cent. *ad valorem*. In making this proposal His Majesty's Government think it desirable to call attention to the fact that British trade with Turkey is considerably greater than that of any other country, with the result that the burden inflicted by the proposed increase of Turkish duties will fall much more heavily on British manufacturers and traders than on those of any other nationality. His Majesty's Government do not of course suggest that any special treatment should be accorded to British goods which is not at the same time extended to similar goods of all nationalities, but they urge that the facts to which they have called attention justify the most favourable treatment by Turkey of the classes of goods in which British trade is predominantly interested, especially since there is ground for believing that the interests of British trade are in this matter in accordance with those of the Turkish Government and people.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1912.

[31976] No. 82.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 620.)

Constantinople, July 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van reporting on the condition of affairs in the Van Vilayet during the past quarter.

It will be noticed that in his report on the state of affairs on the Persian frontier Captain Seel appears to share the suspicions entertained locally as to the activity of Russian agents in those regions.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 13.)

Van, July 10, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following quarterly report on the affairs of the vilayet :—

General Condition.

The condition of the vilayet during the past three months as regards general security has remained much as usual. The plunder of caravans and travellers continues on the usual scale and the gendarmerie still accomplish nothing. The murder of four Armenians by Kurds in the vicinity of Arjish has been reported, and that of several others in the districts of Kachigan and Gargar. A somewhat serious conflict took place recently between the Armenians of Voizim, a district on the borders of the vilayet of Bitlis, and the neighbouring Kurds of the Meuks district. These Armenians are all Taschnakists and all well-armed, and it is probable that in this case they were the aggressors. A state of war existed for about two days, during which period a vast amount of ammunition was expended and three Kurds killed and several wounded. An end was put to this state of affairs by the arrival of a company of soldiers from Norduz, but the Kurds will no doubt avail themselves of the first opportunity of taking their revenge.

The Kurds of Beit-ul-Shebab and the Ashirets of Jeriki and Goyan remain in their lawless condition. They have plundered several thousand sheep from the Rayah

Kurds and have refused to pay their taxes. A battalion of infantry has been sent from Van and other troops, it is said, from Mosul to remedy this state of affairs and to collect the taxes. A section of the Nestorians who have never paid taxes will probably also be dealt with by the troops.

The district of Shamdinan appears to have become quite tranquil since the deportation of Sheikh Taha. The brigand Said Bey with thirty followers, having left Naku and reappeared at Archag, is causing some anxiety. Mir Mehe, the other principal brigand, has been active of late in the neighbourhoods of Shattakh and Norduz, and the Government have been endeavouring to obtain his surrender by negotiation. Mir Mehe, besides the royal pardon, insists on being given a grant of land and money. The Government are quite ready to accept the shame and the danger of the encouragement to other Kurds involved in the granting to him of a free pardon but insist that the money he requires should be subscribed by his friends and relatives.

The following incident illustrates the lawlessness of the Kurds under the very nose of the Government. A young German naturalist, at present visiting Van, recently went to Keshish Geul (a district three hours from Van and administered directly by the vilayet) for the purpose of collecting insects. Arrived there, he was surrounded by Kurd brigands, beaten, stripped of all his clothes and possessions, and left to find his way to the nearest village. The vali promptly paid on his own initiative the losses incurred by the German—a matter of about 9*l.*—but all efforts to trace and capture the brigands proved unavailing.

The Kurds.

The general situation as regards the Kurds gives no special cause for uneasiness. Though day by day they undoubtedly regard the so-called constitution with increased contempt and disfavour, there seems little danger of their being able to manifest this otherwise than by increased lawlessness and disregard for authority. There seems to be no cause for fear of any combined action of the Kurds against the Government.

Elections.

Though the result of the elections in the sanjak of Hakkiari has not been officially announced, it is known that a Kurd, Sheikh Hamid, has been elected. The representation of the vilayet thus remains the same as last year, viz., three deputies, one being a Kurd, one a Turk, and one an Armenian (Taschnakist). The Christian population of the vilayet numbers approximately 235,000 and the Moslems 80,000. The Christians thus bear a proportion to the Moslems of roughly two to one, whereas the representation in parliament is two Moslem and one Christian deputy. However, the Christian sections of the population have only themselves to blame for this state of affairs as it has been brought about by their own internal dissensions and their refusal to register themselves on the Government rolls in order to avoid the liability to military service and to escape taxation.

The Persian Frontier.

The recent tour of inspection of Ali Seidi Bey and Jabir Pasha in the Nevahi-i-Sharkie and their interviews with the Russian authorities at Khoi and Urmi do not appear to have produced the good effects anticipated. The Russian authorities, in spite of the conciliatory action of the Turks, appear to still doubt the good faith of Turkey and to mistrust all her movements. The first instance of this was the Kotur affair. In this affair, as far as can be judged here, the Turks were entirely innocent of aggressive intentions.

I have just been informed that the Russians have now formulated the following further complaints with regard to which an explanation has been asked from the commandant of this army corps. First, an orthodox priest is said to have been beaten in the Nevahi-i-Sharkie; second, that Turkish troops at Urmi have instigated the Persians to assault the students of the French missionary school at Urmi; and third, that Turkish machine-guns have secretly been sent to Urmi. All these accusations are indignantly denied. The second accusation certainly strikes one as in the highest degree improbable; and the third is without doubt false. The only machine-guns belonging to this army corps are at present at Van. The military authorities here

are much incensed at these accusations which they consider Russia, knowing them to be false, intentionally brings forward in the desire for her own purposes to seek a cause of quarrel. Judging only from the one-sided information which can be obtained here it is impossible not to share this opinion.

According to Turkish reports, a number of Russian engineers have arrived in the districts between Khoi and Urmi, and are, it is thought, engaged in the survey of a projected railway line between those two towns. Needless to say, such a line connected with Julfa would be regarded with great disfavour by the Turks as furnishing a starting point for a Russian advance into Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.
J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[31981] No. 83.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 625.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 24, 1912.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 389, repeating Sir Ronnell Rodd's telegram No. 83 of the 23rd July, I sent telegraphic instructions to His Majesty's consular officers at Smyrna, Beirout, Jaffa, Salonica, and Hodeidah to furnish direct to His Majesty's Embassy at Rome, by telegraph, and to repeat to you, the indications as to foreign pilgrim-vessels desired by the Italian Government.

With regard to Jeddah, which is the most important port for the returning pilgrim traffic, I have the honour to point out that this embassy, in its despatches Nos. 265 of the 29th March and 590 of the 10th July, has already drawn attention to the fact that all telegraphic communication with that place is interrupted owing to the breaking of the Jeddah–Suakin cable.

In these circumstances I have forwarded the instructions to His Majesty's consul there by post in a cypher despatch. It is obvious, however, that postal communication of the particulars required by the Italian Government will be of little use, and I venture to suggest whether it would not be possible to take advantage of this opportunity to represent to the Italian Government the grave inconvenience caused by the interruption of the cable, and to urge them to give the assurances required by the Eastern Telegraph Company as a preliminary condition to effecting its repair.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[32465] No. 84.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, July 30, 1912.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 12th instant further respecting the proposed provision of two dioptric lanterns for His Majesty's Consulate-General at Bushire.

In reply, I am to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that my Lords apprehend that some misapprehension exists as to the effect of the sanction which they have given for expenditure on purposes of lighting and buoyage in the Persian Gulf. In the India Office letter of the 28th May, forwarded in Foreign Office letter of the 13th instant, reference is made to a total capital expenditure of 102,400*l.* with annual recurring charges of 7,700*l.*, and it appears to be assumed that the sanction of this board has been given for these amounts. I am, however, to point out that these amounts were subsequently modified (1) by the estimate for the provision of a depôt being reduced by 9,500*l.*; and (2) by the substitution of a lighted buoy for a lightship at Bushire, which resulted in a saving on capital expenditure of 8,900*l.*, and on recurrent charges of 610*l.* a year. A sum therefore of 18,400*l.* must be deducted from the original estimate of capital expenditure, and of 610*l.* from recurrent charges.

Accordingly the maximum expenditure in respect of which their Lordships have agreed that a moiety should fall on the British Exchequer, stands at 88,000*l.* for capital disbursements, and 7,090*l.* for annual charges, and their Lordships cannot entertain proposals for an increase on these sums. Indeed, as Sir E. Grey is aware, their agreement to bear a moiety of the reduced provision was only given on the

understanding that every endeavour would be made to spend less than these sums. In these circumstances, they are unable to accept the view that, if economies are effected within the maximum provision of 88,000*l.*, these may be utilised for the purpose of carrying out schemes which have not received their approval.

As regards the particular proposal for the provision of dioptric lanterns at Bushire, I am to say that, although my Lords fail to understand why specific reference was not made to this service when the proposal for lighting, &c., of the Persian Gulf was originally submitted, they will be prepared to accept a moiety of the cost, as specified in Foreign Office letter of the 13th ultimo, as a charge on the Exchequer, provided no addition is involved thereby on the maximum provision for capital and recurrent charges, which has been authorised by them.

Sir E. Grey will doubtless consider it desirable to advise the India Office of the terms of this letter, in order to prevent misconception in the future as to the limits within which expenditure is permissible.

I am, &c.
T. L. HEATH.

[32550] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)

Sir, *India Office, July 31, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 9th instant, and, in reply, to say that he concurs in the terms of the revised draft convention regarding the proposed Shatt-el-Arab navigation commission, and in the recommendations made by the interdepartmental committee in the joint letter of the same date.

I am, &c.
ED. MONTAGU.

[32572] No. 86.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)

(Secret.)
Sir, *Board of Trade, July 31, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th July, forwarding copy of a letter from the inter-departmental committee which recently revised the draft convention for the Shatt-el-Arab Navigation Commission.

The Board concur in the terms of the draft convention and in the recommendations embodied in the covering letter. They assume, at the same time, that Sir E. Grey will consult the Treasury in due course, especially with regard to article 11 of the draft and the observations, contained in the letter, relating to possible grants from the British Exchequer.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[32552] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 1.)

Sir, *India Office, July 31, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that he has received from the Government of India regarding an attempt on the part of the Vali of Bussorah to interfere in the affairs of Bahrein.

In view of the negotiations now taking place, the Marquess of Crewe is not inclined to suggest that a protest should be made at Constantinople, unless the reply of the

Turkish Government to the British memorandum of the 18th July, or more active interference on the part of the vali, should indicate that a warning is necessary.

I am, &c,
ED. S. MONTAGU.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

July 28, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

RESIDENT, Persian Gulf, telegraphs to following effect:—

"There is a troublesome person called Sheikh Hamid-bin-Mohammed-bin-Khalifa a first cousin of the Sheikh of Bahrein, who is always disaffected against the sheikh and discontented with his allowances. Vali of Bussorah wrote to Sheikh of Bahrein last April, stating that appeal had been made to Turkish Government by Hamid, now in Bussorah, for restitution to him of his patrimony, which he alleged that Sheikh Esa had usurped. Sheikh's compliance was requested by vali. Political agent advised sheikh to refer to me before replying, but sheikh declined to wait, and wrote a letter informing vali that Hamid's statements were untrue. Further letter in peremptory terms has now been received by sheikh from vali saying that latter has no doubt that claims of Hamid are just, and that Abdur Rahim is being sent to negotiate with Sheikh Esa for a settlement. (Abdur Rahim is the person who acts as agent for the Hasa post at Bahrein.) Vali's letter was accepted by sheikh from Abdur Rahim's hand, but he has sent no reply to it, and refused to discuss question. Request is now made by sheikh that necessary action may be taken by us. Sir C. Lowther may, I trust, be authorised to take exception to action of vali in using as political medium the so-called postal agent and in taking up intriguer's case, and to request that instructions to desist may be sent to vali by telegraph."

We trust that representations may be made to Turkish Government, unless it is inconvenient in view of present negotiations that question of Bahrein should be dragged into prominence over this petty matter. We propose to instruct political agent at the same time that a warning should be conveyed to sheikh of impropriety of his action in replying to vali and that further correspondence on his part in contravention of his agreement of 1892 should be strictly forbidden.

[32590] No. 88.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 2.)

(No. 215.)

Posillipo, July 28, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 155 of the 11th instant and to previous correspondence regarding the Red Sea pilgrim traffic, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note which I have received on the subject from the Italian Government and copy of the reply I have returned thereto.

It would seem to have escaped the notice of the Minister of Marine that I had already, on the receipt of your telegram No. 113 of the 9th March, informed the Italian Government of the precautions which Lord Kitchener is taking with a view to preventing Turkish or Arab reinforcements for Tripoli landing at Suakin in the disguise of pilgrims. I may, I presume, inform his Excellency that the same vigilance will be exercised as to Port Soudan.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir R. Rodd.

(Translation.)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer in the last instance to the note which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 15th instant regarding the transport in the Red Sea of pilgrims for Mecca.

In regard to this important question my colleague, the Minister of Marine, particularly insists on the danger which the traffic of Egyptian and Soudanese pilgrims between Suakin, Port Soudan, and Jeddah presents for Italy; in so far as, on the return of the pilgrims to the ports of Suakin and Soudan, Arab-Turkish contingents might easily mingle among the pilgrims, and, having disembarked on the opposite shore of the Red Sea, would be in a position to reach the Ottoman camp in Cyrenaica without any further difficulty.

As I have had the honour to inform your Excellency, the Royal naval authorities will be instructed to abstain as far as possible from any acts that might hinder the free traffic of these pilgrims.

But, on the other hand, it would be of assistance to the Royal Government if they could be perfectly confident that this danger would not arise.

And it does not seem that its avoidance should present any difficulty to the British Government once the British authorities would agree to ascertain the identity of the returning pilgrims by submitting them to a careful visit before their disembarkation, which might easily and effectively be carried out at the time of the examination by the sanitary authorities.

With a view to settling in the common interest and in every particular the question of the pilgrimages so as to eliminate beforehand the possibility of uncertainties and difficulties, I should be most grateful if your Excellency would be so good as to bring the above to the knowledge of your Government, and in invoking your Excellency's usual courtesy to inform me, as soon as you are in a position to do so, if the British Government is disposed to issue instructions in the above sense to the Suakin and Port Soudan authorities.

A. DI SAN GIULIANO.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Posillipo, July 28, 1912.

M. le Ministre,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 26th instant on the subject of the Red Sea transport of pilgrims from Mecca.

It will be within your Excellency's memory that the question of the danger of Turkish or Arab military elements landing disguised as pilgrims making their way viâ Egyptian ports to Tripoli or Cyrenaica, was already raised some months ago, and that in my note of the 10th March last, I had the honour to inform you that Lord Kitchener had duly warned the Suakin authorities to exercise their vigilance in this respect. The orders given at Suakin would, I have no doubt, also extend to Port Soudan.

I am, however, forwarding without delay to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the contents of your note of the 26th instant, once more insisting on the importance which the Italian Government attach to a careful investigation of the status of the returning pilgrims.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[32592] No. 89.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 2.)

(No. 217.)

Posillipo, July 29, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following semi-official communiqué has appeared in the "Popolo Romano" of yesterday's date on the subject of the Turkish islands in Italian occupation:—

"The 'Times' publishes information from Athens to the effect that General Ameglio, commanding troops at Rhodes, is reported to have stated in a speech at Calimnos that Italy would not restore the islands occupied to Turkey.

"The text of the speech which was published shows that General Ameglio made no statement in the sense referred to in the 'Times.'

"That General Ameglio may have at some reception or in private conversation expressed sentiments of strong sympathy for the Hellenic populations is very possible

and should occasion no surprise in view of the cordial feelings of friendship, which do not date from to-day, between the Italian and the Hellenic people. But to attach to such a manifestation a special political signification bearing on the solution of the problem of the Ægean islands would be an exaggeration not justified by facts.

"The Italian Government has certainly not omitted to give its consideration to the question of the Ægean islands, which presents many complications. But it is certain that up to the present time, and there is no reason it should be otherwise, no decision has been come to, both for other reasons, and because as things now stand, in view of events still in progress, a definite solution would be, to say the least of it, premature."

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[32703] No. 90.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 2.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, August 1, 1912.*

WITH reference to your communications of the 18th and 27th ultimo, relating to the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Convention, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that the words "the chief engineer and surveyor" in clause 5 of the draft convention do not appear to them to indicate sufficiently clearly that it is desired to appoint a naval officer with independent status on the staff of the commission. The precise nature of the appointments referred to would no doubt have to be determined at a later stage, but it appears to my Lords that the words "the captain of the port and the chief engineer" might with advantage be substituted.

They are aware that the draft convention has already been transmitted to the Turkish Government, but opportunities of revising the wording will presumably occur at a later stage of the negotiations, and they would be glad if Sir E. Grey could secure the amendment of the convention in this particular. It does not appear that the Turkish Government would be likely to demur to the alteration.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[32590] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 3, 1912.*

RED Sea pilgrim traffic.

I presume same precautions are being taken at Port Soudan as at Suakin.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 237.)

[32665] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 17th July.

Sir R. Rodd reports that rumours of impending occupation of Chios persist.

Has the Austrian Government any information?

[32871] No. 93.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 267.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 5, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Hodeidah reports by telegram, via Port Soudan, that town is in state of panic consequent on bombardment by Italian ships "Piemonte" and "Arcousa" on 27th July of barracks, old forts, and magazines outside town. He asks to be informed of whereabouts of His Majesty's ships, and to be authorised, in view of defective telegraphic communications, to communicate direct with them in case of urgency.

He adds that villages south of Hodeidah have been three times shelled by Italians in the past week.

[32925] No. 94.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 630.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 24, 1912.*

THE crisis through which Turkey is now passing has already delayed the election of the new Governor of the Lebanon and the settlement of the question of the modification of the existing règlement dependent thereon long beyond the expiration of Yussuf Pasha Franco's term of office, and the prospects of a settlement still appear so comparatively remote that I think it as well to place on record the various phases through which the question has passed up till now.

Practically, negotiations with the Porte began shortly after the arrival here of the French and Russian consuls-general at Beirout, who, as reported by Sir Gerard Lowther in his telegram No. 192 of the 17th June, had been called to Constantinople by their respective Ambassadors to assist with their local knowledge. Acting on instructions from His Majesty's Ambassador, I discussed with these gentlemen not only the programme of reforms prepared by M. Couget, but practically all suggestions that had reached us from whatever source and that seemed to possess any practical utility. Both M. Couget and M. Bationshkof were at pains to explain the reasons for which they were averse to the reappointment of Yussuf Pasha; but I must confess that, while they succeeded in showing that he had not been an ideal governor, it appeared to me that their main objection to his Excellency was that he had been too much under the influence of their British colleague. On all other points, however, their views appeared to me to be inspired only by consideration for the interests of the Lebanon, quite free from a desire to forward any political designs. As it was found that we were in practical agreement on all essential points, it was then arranged by the French Ambassador, with the concurrence of Sir Gerard Lowther and M. de Giers, that we should break ground with the Sublime Porte by informal conversations between M. Couget, M. Bationshkof, and myself and the "conseillers légistes" of the Porte. Accordingly, about the 17th June, M. Couget had an interview with Harant Effendi Abro and Reshid Bey (who was recently in London in connection with the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf questions), in the course of which all the points raised were discussed at length. M. Bationshkof and I had very similar interviews with Reshid Bey on the following days, and it was then understood that the report which the latter was to draw up for the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be examined by the latter and submitted by him to the Council of Ministers on the 27th, with a view to preparing a commission to the three Ambassadors on the following day.

The result of our interviews with the "conseillers légistes" had been on the whole hopeful; Reshid Bey gave us all to understand that except on two or three points (he would only specify those relating to the cession of the postal, telegraphs, and customs revenues, the opening of the ports, and the recognition of the status of Lebanese outside the limits of the mountain) he thought an agreement could be easily reached, and even on the last-mentioned point he volunteered to me the suggestion that for this purpose the town of Beirout would have to be considered as being within the limits of the Lebanon, a proposal which seemed evidence of an accommodating spirit.

However, when M. Bompard asked Assim Bey what the views of the Government were, he was informed that, while the Cabinet had not had time to examine Reshid Bey's report in detail, they felt that no concession could be made on the points which

Reshid Bey had told us would be inacceptable, and that, as regards most of the others, the Government must have time to consult. Meanwhile, it was hoped to consult the Government of the Lebanon, and that the Powers would agree to the nomination of a governor and leave the questions of reform for later deliberate discussion. Assim Bey also intimated that, while the Sublime Porte was quite willing to come to an agreement with the Powers and to record formally such agreement by means of an exchange of notes or otherwise, it was desired that the actual application of the amended "règlement" should be enacted by means of an Imperial decree. It was clear that there was an intention on the part of the majority of the Ministers not only to be obstructive, but to give such a shape to whatever reforms might eventually be agreed on as would derogate from the special position of the Lebanon. M. Bompard replied at once that he saw no reason for and could not assent to any such alterations in the procedure hitherto generally observed, by which any alteration of the "règlement" had been incorporated into the protocol of the nomination of the governor, and he gave Assim Bey to understand that he was prepared to leave the Lebanon without a governor rather than give way to the Turkish view. Sir Gerard Lowther and M. de Giers intimated to Assim Bey their agreement with their French colleague, and under the pressure of the three Ambassadors Assim Bey's attitude modified somewhat, for when I saw him on the 8th instant he no longer spoke of putting the contemplated modifications into force by Imperial decree, but suggested that they should be embodied in a separate protocol. I replied that, provided this instrument was signed simultaneously with the protocol of nomination, the suggestion might serve as a basis for discussion, but I personally could see no object in departing from the recognised practice. Since then the Government have been too occupied, first with the situation in Albania and later with their own situation, to give their attention to such minor questions as that of the Lebanon, and thus the 8th July passed without a new mutessarif having been found. I must confess that when I reminded Assim Bey of the fact his Excellency seemed quite unmoved.

M. Bompard, however, took the matter more seriously. He at once instructed the French acting consul-general at Beirout not to recognise Yussuf Pasha since the expiry of his term on the 8th; and on the 11th instant, acting on your instructions, I took the same step, as did also M. de Giers. Three days later M. Bompard learnt that Yussuf Pasha had not laid down his office, and, in informing me of the fact, added that according to a report received by the Russian Embassy he was acting on the advice of Mr. Consul-General Cumberbatch. This latter statement proved to be inaccurate, as I had told M. Bompard I was sure it must be, and that the mutessarif was acting on his own interpretation of his firman of appointment, in which no limit was set to its term. I at once telegraphed to Mr. Cumberbatch in reply that the term of the governor's office was fixed by international agreement, and that he should make an intimation to Yussuf Pasha in that sense. M. Bompard also made energetic representations to Assim Bey insisting that Yussuf Pasha should be instructed to cease to act as governor, but, having received no satisfactory reply by the 15th, he asked me if I would join him in an identic protest in writing to the Sublime Porte. I agreed to do so, as did also M. de Giers; but on the next day we were relieved from taking any further action by learning that the requisite instructions had been sent and that the administration had been handed over to the senior member of the Medjliss in the absence of the vice-president, who was, and still is, in Constantinople in connection with a charge, said to be malicious, of having spoken in insulting language of the Sultan.

We propose to take the earliest possible opportunity of pressing these questions on the attention of the new Cabinet, but I apprehend that, even though there is reason to hope that our proposals will be received in a less obstructive spirit, there will still be considerable delay before the new mutessarif is appointed.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[32931] No. 95.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 636. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 202 of the 28th June, I have the honour to report that I have good reason to believe that when Messrs. Jackson and

Messrs. Pearsons declined to tender for the definite concession for the first section of the Mesopotamian irrigation works, the two firms were acting in agreement. Be that as it may, Mr. Hugo Baring, who has come out to Constantinople to take over the management of the National Bank for two months during Mr. Kingham's absence on leave, has informed me that the two firms have come to an understanding as regards the concession. He added that while the fact of the conclusion of the arrangement had not been made public, the National Bank had no intention of denying that it existed.

Mr. Baring gave me no information as to the terms of the agreement, but I gathered that Messrs. Pearsons are to have no share in the profits of Messrs. Jackson's contract *en régie* that is still running.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[32932] No. 96.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 637.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 27, 1912.*

MR. HUGO BARING, the acting manager of the National Bank of Turkey, has informed me that his bank is seeking to arrange with the Deutsche Bank for the acquisition of a concession from the Ottoman Government for the working of the petroleum deposits in the vilayet of Mosul and the adjoining districts.

Mr. Baring appeared to make no secret of the prospective transaction, and I therefore conclude that Sir H. Babington Smith, who is conducting the negotiations with M. Gwinner, has kept you informed of them.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[32964] No. 97.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Ramleh, July 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note on the rebellion in Asir, which has appeared in the Soudan Intelligence Report for the month of June.

The note describes the growth of the influence of the Emir Idris since 1906, and the course of the operations which he has carried on uninterruptedly against the Turks since 1909.

The main conclusions drawn are that the position of the numerous Turkish forces in Asir is much less favourable than is admitted at Constantinople, and that the assistance rendered by the Italians, in virtue of their command of the sea, in the present year has been most effective. Meanwhile the Imam Yehia of Yemen, though at peace with the Central Government, is watching events, and may be ready, if the rebellion in Asir is successful, to cast in his lot with Idris, with whose cause many of his followers sympathise.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 97.

Memorandum respecting Rebellion in Asir.

THE most serious rebellion with which the Turks have had to contend since their conquest of southern Arabia in 1520, broke out in the Yemen in 1905 under the leadership of the Imam Yehia.

During *1908* the situation was further aggravated by a rising in Asir (a sanjak of the vilayet of El Yemen, having a population of some 2,000,000, mostly followers of the Shafia Tarika of the Sunni Sect), whereas other districts are mostly Zaidis of the Shia Sect), under the leadership of El Said Mohammed Ibn Ali Ibn Idris, son of Said

Ahmed Idris, a descendant of the prophet's grandson Hassan, and commonly known as "the Idrisi."

This remarkable man is now about 36 years of age, thick set, and of medium stature, with the dark complexion derived from his Moorish origin—the family having come originally from Fez.

A religious zealot, he has travelled and studied in Arabia, Tripoli, Egypt, and the Soudan, and adds a knowledge of the world much superior to that of his compatriots to a natural force of character, intelligence, and courage.

He has been married to both Egyptian and Soudan women, but divorced the former and left the latter and her daughter with his cousin, Abd El Mutaal, in Dongola. His uncles and cousins possess considerable property both in that province of the Soudan and near Luxor in Egypt.

Though popularly known as the "Mahdi" of Asir, he absolutely disclaims all divine origin, and professes to be nothing more than a patriot and a reformer, having at heart the two great objects of reforming the abuses of modern Islam and establishing an Arabian Caliphate at Mecca in place of the corrupt and oppressive Turkish yoke.

He first declared himself at Sabia on the first day of Ramadan, 1906, and by his sincerity and personal magnetism speedily gained the support of thousands of his Arab fellow-countrymen; and threatened to eclipse his then rival insurgent, Yehia of the Yemen.

1909: Though originally commencing with the idea of employing none but peaceful methods of reform, he soon came in conflict with Boni Pasha—the nominee of the Ottoman Government as head sheikh of the Arabs—and defeated him on several occasions during 1909, capturing large stores of arms and ammunition.

The Turkish commander-in-chief in Arabia Said Pasha—finding himself fully occupied in dealing with the situation in the Yemen, towards the end of 1909 concluded a treaty of peace with Idris, under which the internal administration of the province was virtually left to him, while Turkish interests were to be safeguarded by the appointment of a mutesserif and the control of railways, telegraphs, and schools.

1910: As far as can be gathered Idris loyally carried out his side of the bargain, but Said Pasha was transferred, and his successor failed to continue his policy, with the result that, during 1910, a rupture took place, culminating in Idris leading an army of 20,000 men to besiege Abha, the real capital of Asir, which was fortunately well garrisoned by six battalions with sufficient artillery, under the command of Suleiman Pasha, who had repaired the fortifications, and laid in a large stock of ammunition and supplies.

Idris had, on the rupture of relations, dispatched an embassy, composed of Seyyid Saleh and Ahmed Ibn Mohammed El Mujahid, to Constantinople, with the conditions which he was prepared to accept from the Sublime Porte. The chief of these were: the universal enforcement of the Sharia Law, administered by judges of his own choice; the replacement of all the old and corrupt officials; public security to be in his own hands; garrisons to be confined to the capital and certain coastal towns; taxes to be collected by local commissioners and paid into the local treasuries; and certain other administrative reforms of which the net result would have been to establish his independence.

The Porte replied by appointing Said Pasha, who had been so successful in ending the previous revolt, as vali. He arrived at Kunfuda in the middle of January and opened negotiations, but the attitude assumed by Khoja Tewfik, who was delegated by Idris to conduct the negotiations, was such as to preclude any hope of a peaceful settlement.

The large majority of the tribes sided with Idris, but some of these within the immediate reach of the Turks remained faithful to them.

Information coming from either side has been so prejudiced that it has not been easy to arrive at the actual progress of events; but the following, so far as it goes, is believed to be an approximately correct narrative of the principal operations.

1911: The year opened with Abha in a state of passive blockade, and the small Turkish garrisons at the coast ports of Lohaiya, Gizan, and Kunfuda unable to stir beyond their lines.

Idris had some 40,000 armed men in the field, and the Turks were so occupied with their operations in the Yemen and events in Europe as to be unable to spare sufficient troops to take the initiative anywhere in Asir for several months.

When Abha was first invested Suleiman Pasha made several sorties, during the chief of which, in December 1910, he inflicted a loss of 280 men on the rebels near Malag.

Meanwhile Idris sent forces to hold the roads leading from the ports of Kunfuda, Gizan, Midi, and Lohaiya, to prevent supplies being conveyed from them by the local Wadaid to Abha and to loyal tribes in the interior.

When at length the Turks were able to take the initiative their plan of operations was to relieve Abha by the co-operation of two forces based on Kunfuda and Gizan or Lohaiya respectively.

The northern force, composed of 5,000 well-armed Arabs (horse, foot, and camel) under the command of the Shereef of Mecca, Hussein Pasha, with his two sons, Abdulla and Faisal Beys, and a renowned Arab leader, Ibn-el-Haj, left Mecca on the 15th April, 1911, to effect a junction with three battalions of Turkish regulars with artillery at Kunfuda.

Six gun-boats were detailed to co-operate with this army by sea. These were almost immediately employed in bombarding the ports of El Wasm, El Burak and El Shegig, which had been used by the rebels as landing-places for arms and supplies.

A number of the shereef's irregulars melted away during the march from Mecca, and probably not more than 2,000 arrived near Kunfuda about the 29th April.

On the 1st May Mukhail, a fortified post some three days north-east of Kunfuda, capitulated to the rebels after a siege of many months, and 250 Turkish prisoners, 500 rifles, ninety-five boxes of ammunition, and two mountain guns fell into their hands.

News received at this time from Abha showed that town to be in great straits, and unlikely to hold out for more than a month.

Accordingly a relief column composed of the three regular battalions under Bimbashi Zeki, with 100 Arab cavalry under Abdulla Bey (son of the Shereef of Mecca) started from Kunfuda about the 3rd May, and encountered a force of some 600 rebels under Ibn Karshan, near the village of Goz-el-Shahib [? Causa] six hours inland. The Mecca Arabs became panic-stricken and bolted, throwing the Turks into confusion, with the result that the column was completely routed, leaving four officers and 100 men dead on the field of battle, while many more died of thirst on the retreat to Kunfuda.

Strong reinforcements arrived shortly after, and on the 10th May the reported strength at Kunfuda included nine regular and redif battalions, with two indifferent camel batteries.

Towards the end of May the Shereef, in order to avenge his defeat of the 3rd May, dispatched a force consisting of three regular battalions, 400 Arab cavalry, and 1,100 camel-men, under his son, Faisal Bey, to make a surprise attack on a rebel force occupying an entrenched position at El Goz [? Causa]. After a night march of six hours they reached their objective at dawn, and after a stiff fight of nine hours' duration put the rebels to flight. The latter numbered some 5,000 men under Ibn Kharshan and Mustafa.

The Turks lost twenty-eight regulars and two irregulars killed (of whom twenty died of sunstroke) and the rebels about 150. Much loot in the shape of cattle, transport animals and supplies was taken.

Meanwhile the southern force under Said Pasha was not sufficiently strong to leave Gizan, where it was hemmed in.

Idris himself was either at his capital, Sabia, or in the impregnable mountain fastness of Abu Safian.

On the 1st June rumours (subsequently proved to be untrue) of the fall of Abha were received.

The Turks having had their hands freed by their successes in the Yemen, now commenced to act with more vigour. Said Pasha assumed the direction of operations, and appointed Nashat Pasha to command the northern force at Kunfuda, and Mohammed Ali Pasha to command the southern force at Gizan; he himself left Hodeidah for Lohaiya on the 14th June.

Four regular battalions, comprising 3,000 men, with six mountain guns and two maxims, were concentrated at Gizan, and on the 13th June moved out to Hafayir, under Ragob Bey, to seize the wells of Hali, on which the water supply of Gizan was dependent, apparently with the intention of covering the advance of a force from the direction of Lohaiya.

During the morning they had no difficulty in brushing aside the 500 or so rebels who were normally in the vicinity, and halted near the wells in entire ignorance of the immediate proximity of some 10,000 or 12,000 Arabs, who, partially surrounding them

without being perceived, attacked and threw the totally unprepared Turks into immediate confusion and rout.

During the retreat on Gizan, between 1,000 and 1,600 Turks were killed (probably nearer the latter figure), and the shattered remnant of the force was only saved from annihilation by the fire of two gun-boats. Although the latter killed a considerable number of Turks, who were mixed up with the Arabs, they succeeded in driving off the latter and inflicting upon them the greater part of the 1,000 casualties which they suffered during the day. Only 400 Turkish wounded remained, as the rebels finished off all they found with daggers.

Upon the news of this disaster reaching Hodeidah, reinforcements were hurried on, and in spite of incredible difficulties occasioned by the outbreak of cholera among the troops, and the absolute lack of water at Gizan, where the wells had been lost, and which necessitated condensed water being brought by ship from Perim and Aden, Mohammed Ali Pasha was able to start the Abha relief force before the end of the month.

It advanced from Kunfuda in two columns by different routes, under Aziz Bey and the Shereef respectively. The former composed of 5,000 Turkish troops, and the latter of about 1,500 Arabs, with fourteen light guns between them.

The rebels, under Seyyid Mustafa, were defeated at Goz, and very little resistance was encountered on the road, as the Arabs could not stand up to the artillery fire. Abha was relieved on the 16th July.

The losses occasioned by the enemy on the march were trifling, but those from sickness were enormous; the Turks admitting over 800 deaths from cholera or dysentery.

After the relief of Abha the Shereef of Mecca separated from the army and went to Taif, while Mohammed Ali Pasha was organising a force of twelve battalions with which it was intended to pursue Idris to Sabia as soon as the wet weather was over.

Meanwhile, the rebels had taken the initiative on the coast, and early in June a force of 5,000 or 6,000 mostly of the Beni Abs tribes under Sherif Mansur, seized the water supply of Lohaiya, situated some 7 miles inland from the town, which was garrisoned by only two and a-half weak battalions. Dissensions, however, broke out among the rebels, and on the arrival of Hamdi Bey with reinforcements from Hodeidah they retired. Hamdi established an entrenched post there and left two companies with one gun to protect the wells.

Lohaiya itself is a walled town with several detached forts on commanding hills outside, and much better adapted for defence than Gizan.

1912: At this stage a new and important factor was introduced, namely the offensive action of the Italian fleet against the Turks in the Red Sea, which immediately destroyed the latter's command of the sea and directly aided the insurgents by the co-operation of Italian ships with the insurgent land attacks on the fortified ports.

The first instance of this combined action occurred at Midi where, after a close siege, involving much desultory fighting, the naval bombardment brought about an unconditional surrender on the 29th February.

Early in April the Italians extended their zone of investment to include Lohaiya and the Kamaran Islands which latter had previously been exempted so as not to interfere with the important pilgrim quarantine station thereon.

After the success at Midi the investing force was divided, a portion being dispatched to Muhail to contain Suleiman Pasha at Abha, and the remainder under Seyyid Mustafa, to the fort of Kunfuda, where the co-operation of the Italian fleet was expected.

The effect of the latter did not apparently reach their expectations, and the siege was raised.

At about the same time, the investment of the port of Lohaiya was commenced, and towards the end of April 1912 the situation was as follows:—

The Turkish forces, commanded by Suleiman Pasha and Shereef Faisal (son of the Shereef of Mecca), number in all about 15,200 regulars with 6,500 Arab auxiliaries, were distributed as under:—

6,000 regulars and 2,000 Arabs, of Asir and Zahran, under Suleiman Pasha at Abha.
4,500 regulars and 200 Arabs, of Harb and Zebid, at Kunfuda.
3,000 regulars and 3,000 Arabs, of Wadiat and Abs, at Lohaiya.
1,600 regulars and 400 Arabs, of Mecca, under Shereef Faisal at Dogar.
50 regulars and 500 Arabs, of Shemlan, in Leyt.

The force in Lohaiya was strictly invested by four columns of Idris's army by land, and blockaded by the Italian fleet by sea. Provisions were said to be running short.

The Shereef Faisal (son of the Shereef of Mecca) on his march southwards was held up at Dogar by the intervening hostile tribes.

Suleiman Pasha at Abha, though not closely besieged, was being watched by a small rebel-containing force and appears powerless to move.

The Imam Yehia of El Yemen, who concluded peace with the Turks towards the end of 1911, finds himself in a difficult position.

Bound by his conditions of peace to help the Turks, he is not at all certain that he is on the winning side, and many of his followers openly sympathise with the Idrisi.

The pretext that the latter has accepted help from the Christians has been sufficient to enable him to get together a small contingent of some 300 men who are with the Turks in Lohaiya. This is hardly sufficient to prejudice him in the eyes of Idris should the latter eventually succeed.

The Idrisi has assembled under arms some 46,000 of the 200,000 fighting men who are reported to be at his call in case of need.

Of these he retains 25,000 (of whom 500 are cavalry) with him at Harad, where he has established his head-quarters.

Six thousand, divided into four columns, respectively under the command of the following emirs of the Beni Mirwan tribe:—

Mohammed Bakri,
Tahor Ali,
Mohammed Yehia Ma'wiz,
Haidar Mohammed Mohajab,

are investing Lohaiya; the first and second columns being stationed at Wadi-el-Fajj on the south, the third column at Wadi Hiran on the north, and the fourth on the east.

The remaining 15,000 are distributed at Muheil (near Abha watching Suleiman Pasha) and amongst the coast towns of Shekeik, El Wasin, El Berk, and Halli.

The Idrisi is said to have seventy guns of sorts, some of which were taken from the Turks at Gizan and Midi, whilst twelve field and eight mountain guns were recently acquired from the Italians, in addition to an ample supply of rifles and ammunition.

His rifles are of four kinds, known as—

1. Ann Nabbut. A good weapon of Italian origin.
2. Abu Isban. A French rifle from Jibuti. Probably the "Gras."
3. Mausers of old pattern.
4. Mausers captured from the Turks, which constitute their best weapon.

He has a fleet of sailing-boats ("sambuks"), which are available for his coastal communications, since the Italians have assured him the command of the sea.

The large majority of the tribes have declared for the Idrisi, only those in immediate contact with the Turks rendering them any assistance. Amongst the most important insurgent tribes may be mentioned—

The Bani Marwan.
The Ghamed Zahran.
The Harb tribe from between Kunfuda and Leyt.
Some of the Zind from the Yemen.
Some of the Abs.

Kadis of good repute who preside at courts of justice proceeding strictly on the lines of the Sheri law have been appointed to every tribe.

The most important wazirs are—

Mohammed Yehia-el-Hadrami, a rich merchant.
Yehia Zakari-el-Hadrami, who acts as Director-General of Finance.
Mohammed Taher, who led the assault at Gizan.
El Seyyid Mustafa, who distinguished himself at the last siege of Abha.

All are notables of Sabia.

The Idrisi accepts aid from Italy as a common enemy of the Turk, in spite of much criticism against incurring obligations to a Christian Power.

In his army are to be found a miscellany of Turks, Abyssinians, Sudanese, &c., who perform most of the technical duties, but no European officers.

He now claims as his own the district bounded, on the north by Leyt, on the south by the Wadi Hiram, on the east by the Yam and Zind countries, on the west by the Red Sea, and, in fact, effectively occupies the whole of this country with the exceptions of the invested Turkish garrisons of Abha, Leyt, Kunfuda, and Lohaiya.

It includes the following ports commencing from the north :—

Halli.
El Berk.
El Wasm.
El Shekeik.
El Goz, about three hours north of Gizan.
Gizan, the port of Sabia and Abu Arish.
El Wahsla, the port of Madaya, about half-way been Gizan and Midi.
Midi, about half-way between Gizan and Lohaiya.
Habl, about half-way beween Midi and Lohaiya.

His capital is Sabia, a large well-built town some 20 miles north-east of Gizan and 12 miles east of El Goz.

Such is the enthusiasm for his cause amongst his followers that it is said that mothers do not lament their sons who die fighting for him.

From the above it is evident that the Turkish position in Asir is not nearly so favourable as they see fit to represent it.

Cairo, June 27, 1912.

[32935] No. 98.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 640.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 30, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copies of the correspondence which has passed between this embassy and His Majesty's consulate-general at Smyrna in regard to the regulations promulgated by the Italian military authorities at Rhodes relative to the local judicial administration.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Smyrna, July* 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch received from Sir A. Biliotti, forwarding a printed copy of the regulations promulgated at Rhodes with regard to judicial administration, and drawing attention to those calling for special notice.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Rhodes, June* 30, 1912.

OUT of a rather lengthy regulation published yesterday, of which I transmit herewith a printed copy,* and concerning judicial administration, the following articles are worthy of special notice :—

Article 1. The cases hitherto referred to the religious tribunals of the respective communities and those concerning the Vakoufs will continue to be submitted to the same tribunals.

* Not printed.

Article 2. Civil and penal cases exclusively concerning foreign subjects will continue to be heard as before by their respective consular authorities.

Article 3. Soldiers will be subject to the Italian Military Code, as well as anyone amenable to the military tribunal for infractions of that code.

Article 4. Contraventions punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two months or 500 lire fine, or both at the same time, excepting the cases mentioned in article 2, are to be submitted to and decided by the military attorney.

Article 5. The military tribunal is empowered to investigate and decide all other cases stated in the Italian Military Code, even those concerning foreigners, with the exception of those mentioned in article 2.

Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 exclusively concern military tribunals.

Article 11. Civil and commercial suits up to the value of 500 lire shall be heard and decided by an Italian effective judge, appointed by the Minister of Justice in Italy, and whose decrees will be final.

Article 12. Civil and commercial suits exceeding 500 lire will be heard and decided by the above-mentioned judge sitting as president of the tribunal, assisted by two assessors appointed by the governor. In urgent cases the president may judge without assessors.

Article 13. The proceedings will be in conformity with the Italian Consular Law as far as applicable.

Article 14. In all these proceedings the magistrate is not obliged to admit exceptions claimed on the ground of error in the formalities, nor can these be taken advantage of in order to invalidate the decree.

Article 15. A legal clerk, to be appointed by the governor, will assist in all proceedings.

Article 16. No one will be allowed to assist as legal advisor in civil and commercial tribunals without the governor's previous authorisation.

Article 17. The Government of the occupied islands reserves to itself to inform by ulterior decree as regards the judicial administration in the smaller isles and the establishment of a tribunal of the second degree.

I have, &c.
A. BILIOTTI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 98.

Mr. Marling to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 29, 1912.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 89 of the 6th July, forwarding Sir A. Biliotti's No. 80 of the 30th June, 1912, on the subject of the judicial procedure established by the Italian *corps d'occupation* in the Island of Rhodes.

You should inform Sir A. Biliotti that the main principle by which he should be guided under the circumstances is to avoid sanctioning any violation in principle of the judicial *status quo ante* the Italian occupation.

Article 2 of General Ameglio's proclamation admits the principle of the existence of the Capitulations, though it omits mention of the case of an Italian plaintiff against a non-Italian defendant, and should such case arise it should not be allowed to pass without bringing the matter in a friendly way to the notice of the *de facto* Italian authorities, who could probably arrange in most cases to settle the matter out of court.

No objection can be raised to article 3, which seems to contemplate offences by foreigners in matters affecting the safety of the *corps d'occupation*.

I am, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[33256] No. 99.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 649.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond a telegram, dated the 30th July, in which he states that he had heard on reliable

authority that the local partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress had telegriphed to the new Grand Vizier urging him not to dissolve the Chamber, and promising that they would raise a force of 10,000 volunteers to protect that Assembly.

Mr. Alvarez adds that the vali had been irritated by the tactless behaviour of the local leaders of the Liberal party, that the military commandant had guaranteed that public tranquillity will be maintained, and that patrols were circulating in the town day and night.

In view of the very chilling reception which Javid and Talaat Beys met with at Trebizond during their electioneering tour before the last elections, it seems to me very unlikely that the Committee of Union and Progress would be able to put up any fight there, and I think that the threat of their partisans need not be taken very seriously, the more so as in a despatch which reached me subsequently to the receipt of this telegram Mr. Alvarez reports that the news of the formation of the new Cabinet was well received at Trebizond, and that the announcement that fresh elections would be held met with special approval. In any case, the local authorities seem to be doing their best to preserve order.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[33361] No. 100.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 271.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 375 of 15th July.

Consuls at Jeddah and Hodeidah find great difficulty in complying with Italian requirements owing to interruption of cables between Jeddah and Suakin and Colnaran and mainland. As scheme originated with Italian Government, would not this be a good opportunity to urge upon them the reparation of cables (see Constantinople telegram No. 78 of 3rd April and the despatch No. 590 of 10th July ?)

[33328] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 669.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 424 of 27th July and Bushire telegram of 6th August.

Copies of the maps of the Mohammerah frontier which we have proposed to Turkish Government were posted to Tehran and Bushire on 19th July.

The line which we have proposed to Turkey is more advantageous to Persia than that which was proposed by mediating commissioners in 1850 and then accepted by Persia, so that Persia should be satisfied if Turkey accedes to our present proposal.

It seems to me that the most expedient course now would be for you to communicate a copy of the map confidentially to the Persian Government, for Sir P. Cox to do likewise to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and for Mr. Marling to do likewise to the Persian delegates at Constantinople; at the same time it might be explained that, while we hope to secure the frontier we have proposed, we are not satisfied, in view of the wording of article 2 of the Treaty of Erzeroum, that Turkey is legally bound to recognise the modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah in so far as it is in the main stream of the Shatt-el-Arab and not in the Karun, and on this point it may be impossible to maintain the line we have proposed to Turkey; but we will do our best, and in any case we should provide against any arbitrary interference with the commercial interests of the port of Mohammerah.

Before deciding on this course I should like your observations and those of Sir P. Cox, and I am asking Mr. Marling to furnish me with his views.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 411, and St. Petersburgh, No. 621.)

[33361] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.*

MR MARLING'S telegram No. 271.

I agree with his view, and your Excellency should address note to Italian Government accordingly.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 414.)

[30379] No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 269.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.*

I HAVE to request your Excellency to communicate to the Russian Government forthwith a copy of annex No. 3 in my memorandum of the 18th July, 1912 (see "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Confidential Print, 18th July, Section 1).

In communicating this document, which is for the strictly confidential information of the Russian Government, your Excellency should make special reference to condition No. 2 in the enclosure in my despatch No. 245 of the 17th July, 1912.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32465] No. 104.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you a copy of a letter from the Treasury respecting the allocation of funds for buoyage and lighting in the Persian Gulf.

An important question of policy is involved in the matter under discussion, and Sir E. Grey fails, moreover, to appreciate how the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, in the absence of expert and local knowledge, can form any sound opinion as to the technical arrangements of detail which are necessary to attain the object in view; but he will not cause a reply to be sent to the Lords Commissioners until he is furnished with the observations of the Secretary of State for India upon the several points raised.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[32871] No. 105.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople,† relative to the desire of His Majesty's consul at Hodeidah to be authorised to communicate, if necessary, direct with such of His Majesty's ships as are in the neighbourhood of that port, in view of the state of panic prevailing there in consequence of the recent bombardment by Italian ships.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn as soon as possible which of His Majesty's ships are now near Hodeidah and where they are to be found, with a view to be in a position to convey the information to the consul, together with the authority which he desires.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* No. 84. † No. 93

[33469] No. 106.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August 7, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo on the subject of the arrangements between this company and the Construction Company of the Bagdad Railway for the purpose of conveyance of the material of the Bagdad Railway Company on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

In reply I am to state that my board are prepared, as a matter of courtesy, to give six months' notice to His Majesty's Government in the improbable event of their desiring to transfer to others the whole or any part of their interests in the new company or in the proposed Anglo-German-Turkish company.

I am to add that my board hopes soon to be in a position to send you the various agreements in their completed forms for your strictly confidential information.

I have, &c.
FRED. W. PARRY, *Secretary.*

[33328] No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 469 of 7th August to Tehran: Turco-Persian frontier.
Please furnish me with your views as to procedure proposed.

[33424] No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 184.)

Foreign Office, August 8, 1912.

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir L. Mallet on the 7th instant that a story copied from the "Neue Freie Presse" was being circulated in Italy that it was owing to an agreement come to between France and England respecting the Ægean Sea and islands that Italy had refrained from any further acts of annexation.

His Excellency enquired if it was true that His Majesty's Government had made an agreement with France.

Sir L. Mallet said that it was not true, but that His Majesty's Government did not want Italy to annex any more islands or do anything which might give the Turks a pretext for closing the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32703] No. 109.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, August 8, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to India Office letter of the 11th July, relative to the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Convention, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Admiralty,* advocating the substitution, in clause 5 of that instrument, of the words "the captain of the port and the chief engineer" for the words "the chief engineer and the surveyor."

I am to state that, as Sir E. Grey understood, the Admiralty were represented on the recent committee which revised the draft convention by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, and that it appears to Sir E. Grey to be altogether impracticable and inconsistent

* No. 90.

[33426] No. 106 A.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to Trinity House, dated the 6th August, as to the establishment of a lighthouse depôt on Abadan Island.

India Office, August 7, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 106 A.

India Office to Trinity House.

India Office, August 6, 1912.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of the 10th July, as to the establishment of a lighthouse depôt on the island of Abadan in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose herewith, for the information of the Elder Brethren, copy of a communication from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dealing with the points raised in your letter of the 25th April last.*

The Marquess of Crewe is consulting the Government of India by telegraph on the question of accepting the oil company's offer. But in the meantime I am to request that, with the Elder Brethren's permission, his Lordship may be furnished, for communication to the company, with plans and specifications of the works referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your letter cited above.

As regards the supply of oil, the Secretary of State is advised that it would be desirable, before placing any order with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to obtain samples of the oil which they propose to supply. I am to enquire whether the Elder Brethren concur in this view, and, if so, whether they would be prepared to make the necessary arrangements for testing the company's samples.

I am, &c.
L. ABRAHAMS.

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* Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office, July 19, 1912.

with Turkish sovereignty in the Shatt to stipulate for the appointment of "a naval officer with independent status on the staff of the commission."

Such an officer would have to be subordinate to the commissioners, one of whom, according to the proposed draft, is to be a British subject, and the Turkish Government would, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, be most unlikely to agree to the post of captain of the port being held by a British subject.

Sir E. Grey is disposed, with the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to reply to the Admiralty letter in this sense.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey is not prepared to assent to the proposed commissioner of British nationality being a naval officer.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[33552] No. 110.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 9.)

Admiralty, August 8, 1912.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 7th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's ship "Fox" is now at Aden, and that His Majesty's ship "Challenger" will be passing through Aden homeward bound shortly.

2. With regard, however, to the request of the consul at Hodeidah to be allowed to communicate direct with His Majesty's ships, I am to call attention to the correspondence which took place in regard to the consul's request for the presence of a British man-of-war in October last; also to Foreign Office letter of the 10th February last and Admiralty reply of the 12th idem, in consequence of which a telegram was sent to Sir G. Lowther (No. 7, Treaty) on the 14th idem, stating that requests for the presence of a ship at Hodeidah should come through the embassy at Constantinople and the Foreign Office. My Lords see no reason why this procedure should now be departed from.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[33766] No. 111.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, August 9, 1912.

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence que, le 23 juillet dernier, les navires de guerre italiens bombardèrent la localité de Manzariyé, sise à une heure de distance au sud de Hodeïdah.

Manzariyé étant totalement dépourvue de fortifications et n'ayant même pas de garnison, Tevfik Pacha, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, croit devoir attirer, comme il l'a déjà fait précédemment, l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique sur ces infractions continues, par les navires de guerre italiens, aux règles du droit des gens.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 9 août, 1912.

[33565] No. 112.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 8, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 469 to Tehran: Turco-Persian frontier.

I am very much in favour of communicating map at once to Persian delegates.

Unless we can let them know what has been done to further the interests of Persia, it will not be an easy matter to press them to accept explanatory notes.

The Turks will in all probability, if it has not already been done, render our position with regard to Persia very difficult by bringing to the knowledge of the Persian delegates our note of 18th July to Tewfik Pasha.

[33601] No. 113.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 8, 1912.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 274 of 4th August and your telegram No. 611 of 6th August to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Ambassador considers Russian interpretation of article 3 of the 1847 treaty unassailable, and that joint note of August 1849, so far from upholding Turkish contention, confirms his view. He says that his interpretation is also borne out by protocols of negotiations antecedent to that treaty.

He admits justice of your view that question of Turkish rights on the Shatt-el-Arab should not be for the present raised by Persian delegates.

[33639] No. 114.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 8, 1912.

I HAVE received the following confidential information from the Russian Ambassador with regard to the Turco-Persian frontier :—

"His Excellency is," he says, "proposing to Russian Government that, as regards northern part of frontier, they should adopt a procedure similar to that adopted by His Majesty's Government with regard to the southern part—that is to say, that a note should be presented to Turkish Ambassador in St. Petersburgh indicating line as desired by Russia. After doing this his Excellency gave me his opinion that simultaneous pressure should be brought to bear on the Turkish Government by the two Powers to accept their respective proposals, and eventually the question of what concessions Persia can make to Turkey in return for advantageous frontier secured to her by the two Powers should form the subject of an understanding between the two Powers in conjunction with Persia. With regard to possible concessions by Persia in Zohab, M. Giers is not prepared to make any suggestion for the present."

[33522] No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 422.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 267 of 5th August: Panic at Hodeidah.

Admiralty strongly object to departure from usual procedure (see my telegram No. 7, Treaty, of 14th February).

"Fox" is now at Aden, and "Challenger" will shortly pass through there homeward bound.

[34096] No. 116.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Mr. Parker.—(Received August 12.)

(Confidential.)
My dear Parker, *Bushire, July* 16, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 710, dated the 10th July, 1912, to the India Office, with reference to the islands in the Shatt-el-Arab which are claimed by the Sheikh of Mohammerah as Persian territory.

[33565] No. 114 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 479.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1912.

IN view of Mr. Marling's telegram No. 273 of 8th August: Turco-Persian frontier, I consider communications mentioned in my telegram No. 469 of 7th August should be made as soon as possible.

You should therefore instruct Sir P. Cox to proceed to Mohammerah with copies of the maps, and, on his arrival there, full instructions will be telegraphed to him. No communication should, however, be made either at Tehran or Mohammerah until action has been taken at Constantinople.

You should repeat to Sir P. Cox all telegrams about frontier.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 419, and St. Petersburgh, No. 629.)

[33565] No. 114 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 418.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 273 of 8th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

In view of what you say, I agree to immediate communication of map to Persian delegates. You should make a joint communication with your Russian colleague, and you should accompany it by the necessary explanations, oral or written, as you may deem most expedient.

I have instructed Sir G. Buchanan to furnish to Russian Government, for their strictly confidential information, a copy of draft Shatt-el-Arab Convention, and you may do likewise to your Russian colleague. It does not seem necessary or advisable, as regards Persian delegates, to communicate draft convention at this stage.

I shall instruct Sir P. Cox to make communication to Sheikh of Mohammerah as soon as possible. Please, therefore, report immediately you have made communication to Persian delegates.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 478, and St. Petersburgh, No. 628.)

The only island of any size in the river below Mohammerah is Muhalleh, and it seems from the record that the Turks are more likely to contest its ownership than that of the other islands, which are relatively of little importance to them. This being the case, I venture to direct attention to one or two points which favour possession by Persia; you have probably already taken note of them.

Item 7, p. 33, Turco-Persian Frontier Negotiations, Part I (Foreign Office Print): Ramliyeh Island is identical with the modern Muhalleh, and the north end of the latter is still so called. The documents put forward by the Turks show it to be dependent on Mahallat Maharzi, which was then the chief place on the island of Jazirat-al-Khidhar (it is situated on the north-west corner; see map). Jazirat-al-Khidhar having been allocated to Persia by the treaty of Erzeroum, it follows that the islands dependent on it likewise fall to Persia in the absence of any special stipulation.

The statement of the commissioners in February, 1850 (p. 75, Part III, *idem*), that they had carefully abstained from admitting the pretensions of Persia to the island of the Shatt-al-Arab, all of which lay to the west of Mohammerah and Jazirat-al-Khidhar, must, as far as the island of Muhalleh is concerned, be qualified by the fact that in November 1851, when the question of Muhalleh was raised in concrete form, they abstained from recording any opinion on the subject, and insisted on the maintenance of the *status quo* on the island (which was then admittedly in Persian hands) and in the town of Mohammerah (*vide* p. 111 *et seq.*). This plainly shows that they did not consider that the boundary line they had adumbrated in the previous year was a final settlement of the question.

Yours faithfully,
P. Z. COX.

[34108] No. 117.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to India Office.—(*Communicated by Sir A. Hirtzel August* 12.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, July* 19, 1912.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 3rd July, 1912, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of a letter which I have addressed to the Government of India, transmitting a report by Lieutenant Wilson regarding the position of Hawizeh and of the Turco-Persian frontier west and north-west of that place.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 117.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, July* 19, 1912.

IN continuation of my telegram dated the 3rd July, 1912, to the India Office, a copy of which was forwarded to you under my letter dated the 13th July, 1912, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter received from Lieutenant Wilson, with enclosures, regarding the position of Hawizeh and of the Turco-Persian frontier as locally observed west and north-west of Hawizeh.

2. Lieutenant Wilson's report speaks for itself, and does not seem to call for special comment; it is of interest, however, to note that the boundary indicated in his map corresponds closely with that shown, although only approximately, in the latest War Office maps of this region.*

3. It will be noticed that Lieutenant Wilson's enquiries lead him to the spelling "Shwaiyib" and mine to "Shu'aib." The former is certainly a diminutive of "Shwaib" or "Swaib," and is the alternative spelling given by Mr. J. G. Lorimer at pp. 95 and 98 of the "Gazetteer" for the embouchure of the stream on the Shatt-el-Arab. The pronunciation "Shu'aib" (or "Shuwaib") which I got may be another local diminutive

* South-Eastern Turkey in Asia 1/250,000, August 1906; South-Eastern Turkey in Asia 1/1,000,000, November 1907, with corrections to June 1911.

form. It is very difficult to dogmatise in these cases, and all that can be said with confidence is that the village west of Hawizeh is habitually pronounced by the local Arabs in two syllables, while they invariably pronounce the name of the stream at its junction with the Shatt-el-Arab in one syllable, doubtless for purposes of distinction.

4. I have sent a copy of this letter, with enclosures, to the India Office in continuation of previous correspondence.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 117.

Lieutenant Wilson to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

Ahwaz, July 5, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram dated the 12th May, 1912, to the India Office, and subsequent correspondence, I have the honour to report as follows upon my enquiries as to the precise position of Hawizeh and of the Turco-Persian frontier to the north-west of that place.

2. I submit as enclosures to this report:—

(1.) A diary, including a description of the country traversed.

(2.) A note by Lieutenant H. Digby Beste on the astronomical observations taken by him at Hawizeh and elsewhere.

(3.) A sketch map of the 1 mile—1 inch scale of part of the Hawizeh district.

(4.) A sketch map on the 4 mile—1 inch scale of part of the Hawizeh district, showing the Turco-Persian frontier as locally observed by the Arab tribes and claimed by Persia.

Route reports for the use of the Chief of the General Staff are being submitted separately.

3. It will be seen from Lieutenant Digby Beste's notes that his observations confirm those recently taken by Mr. G. B. Scott, Survey of India, retired, which place Nasiri in latitude 31° 19′ 24·5″ north, longitude 48° 40′ 29″ east, which is about 6 miles south-west of the position (latitude 31° 21′ 27″, longitude 48° 40′ 47″) assigned to it by the latest Survey of India maps, thus altering considerably its position relative to Hawizeh.

The result of the triangulation by plane table, and of the astronomical observations, was to confirm the accuracy of the commissioners' determination of the position of Hawizeh. This being the case, there seems no doubt that the adjustment made in the plane table sketch enclosed in your letter dated the 6th May was necessary, the difficulties of triangulation between Shwaiyib and Kishk-i-Busri being, in the opinion of the surveyor, sufficient to account for the discrepancy in latitudinal distance. I had hoped to be able to visit Jufair to confirm its position, but was not able to do so owing to lack of water and of facilities for transporting it there.

4. To turn to the question of the frontier north-west of Hawizeh with a view to fixing accurately the position of Bisaitin, on the Kharkeh, as well as Hawizeh, by triangulation, I found it best to proceed thither direct from Nasiri, extending in a north-westerly direction the triangulation which had been carried out in 1910 as far as Kut Hashim under my supervision. Bisaitin is some 18 miles north-north-west of Hawizeh, and is the last inhabited place in this direction until Pusht-i-Kuh is reached, the low hills north of the Karkheh being uninhabited, except for occasional incursions of nomads, such as the Khasrij, on their way to commit depredations in the neighbourhood of Dizful, or of the Beni Lam when seeking in Persian territory a safe refuge from the importunities of the Turkish tax-gatherer. Bisaitin is therefore popularly spoken of as the limit of the Hawizeh district to the north-west.

5. When questioning the sheikhs of the Bani Turuf, who exclusively inhabit this corner of the district, regarding the Turco-Persian frontier in their neighbourhood, I found a disposition among them to distinguish between the boundary of Persia and their own tribal limits, though they themselves are the sole wardens of the marches in this direction. The frontier of Persia, they said, was the main stream of the Dawairij River from the point where it left Pusht-i-Kuh, past the Turkish frontier fort on the Amrah-

WILSON'S LETTER OF 5TH JULY, 1912.

69



Abstract of Astronomical Observations taken by Lieut. H. Digby Beste, R.I.M.

Nasiri	Lat. 31°-10'-24·5"	Long. 46°-40'-29"
Hawizeh	" 31°-28'-2·2"	" 46°-6'-20·8"
Bisaitin	" 31°-43'-28"	
Khafajiyeh	" 31°-38'-00"	

Sketch showing
TURKO-PERSIAN FRONTIER.

As occupied and claimed by Persia West and North West of Hawizeh

According to Statements of Persian Tribesmen, June, 1912.

Scale 4 miles to 1 inch.

Miles 0 5 10 15 20 30 Miles

Jabal Kukkudrū (Extensive ruins reported here)

Jabal Sheikeh

Jabal Sheikhū

Jabal Ribaibū

Jabal Lughum

Karkhah River

Old bed of Karkhah River

Marshes

Bisaitin

'Aziam

Khazineh

Jama'ni

Khafajiyeh

Shwaiyib

Hawizeh

Nasiri

Imam Fādhil

Explanations.

Course followed by Lieut. Wilson and Overseer.

Turko-Persian Frontier as locally claimed for Persia and observed by Turkey.

Frontier as locally observed by Persian Tribes.

Running Water.

Compiled from plane-table Survey from Kut. Hawashim to Bisaitin and Hawizeh by Overseer Firuz Bakht under the supervision of Lieut. A. T. Wilson, Political Dept.

M.P.K.K. 10
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Sandy Hillocks
Desert
Umm Ukir (Ostracky)
Desert
Marshes
Um Fradlo
Rice Fields
Rice Fields
Marshes
Sadkaniah
Khalig Khabir
Rice Fields
Marshes
Abu Dawud
Rice Fields
Marshes
Rice Fields
Rice Fields
Marshes
Rice Fields
Rice Fields
Rice Fields

Enclosure with Lieut. Wilson's Letter of 6th July, 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Sketch Map of Country in Neighbourhood of

HAWIZEH,

Executed by Overseer Firuz Bakht
Under the Supervision of Lieut. A. T. Wilson.
C.M.G. Political Dept.

Scale 1 English Mile = 1 Inch.

Furlongs 0 2 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Miles

N.

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Reference :—
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

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Dizful track (on the west bank of the stream), and past a locality called Khaiyit-us-Sultan, and then along the old main channel (now dry) called "Shatt-el-Amia" and "Ghor Muhaisin" on the map of the commissioners; thence to the Azaim or Azam, a small sheet of open water in the middle of the marsh some distance west of Shwaiyib, down the Suwaib stream, until the boundary line turned off, at some indefinite point, to Kishk-i-Basri.

6. I then pressed the sheikhs to give me details of the frontier as actually observed and occupied by their tribesmen; this they willingly consented to do, and arranged for me to visit it by boat. It turned out to be the dry bed of a stream, some 8 miles north-west of Bisaitin, marked Ghor-ed-Douvil (Hor-at-Tawil?) on the commissioners' map. This stream they said had formerly carried the bulk of the waters of the Dawairij, but had now been dry for many years; it was known locally as the Dawairij Maiyit (the dead Dawairij) or as Umm Chir. Herds of buffaloes and tracks worn by flocks over the barren plain showed that up to this point they were undoubtedly in actual occupation of the land, the actual owners of the buffaloes being seyyids of the Bani Turuf. When asked why they did not occupy the lands between Umm Chir and the frontier which they claimed for Persia, some 7 miles distant, they replied that the lands in question were barren, and liable to raids by Turkish and Persian nomads, that they were waterless, the marsh water being quite undrinkable even by cattle, and that they feared that were they to go farther westwards trouble would result. I was, in fact, unable to induce them to take me to the Turco-Persian boundary at Ghor Muhaisin, which they said was beyond their limits, and to visit which might involve them in all sorts of calamities. They insisted so strongly on this as to raise some doubt in my mind as to whether the real boundary was not Umm Chir, but they protested that as the limit of cultivation extended westwards in the marshes, so also would they push forward their grazing limits along the edge of the marsh.

7. It will be seen from the foregoing that there is a patch of territory some 7 miles broad, bounded to the north by the "Ghor Muhaisin" and the "Ghor-ed-Douvil," and on the south by the marsh, which is not occupied (nor, as far as I know, claimed) by Turkey, and not occupied by Persia, though claimed locally as Persian territory. Documentary evidence on the subject of this section of the frontier seems to be entirely lacking,* but we know that the engineers of the mediating commissioners in 1851 were not accompanied here by the Turkish commissioner. Discussion with the sheikhs elicited the following arguments in support of the frontier which they claimed for Persia as distinct from their own tribal limits:—

(1.) That the Turks have never advanced beyond the line of the Dawairij, and have been careful to build their fort, referred to above, on the west bank, and that their proposals to strengthen the frontier posts do not include the establishment of any posts beyond this line.

(2). That the lands of the Dawairij main stream have never been cultivated by Turkish tribes, except for a brief period many years ago, when the Bani Lam fled from Turkish territory and camped there.

(3.) I was informed by one Mulla Alwan, clerk of Sheikh Asi of the Bani Turuf, and formerly a writer on the head office of the Turkish district of Dawairij, that he himself had seen the official Turkish kharita which gave the Dawairij as the boundary between Turkey and Persia.

(4.) I was informed by the sheikhs that since the breaking of the dam on the Karkheh at Kut Hawashim (in 1837?) the silt of the river, which had previously been spread over the lands in the neighbourhood of Hawizeh, had been deposited very rapidly on either side of the river and in the marshes which the Bani Turuf inhabit, with the result that their rice-fields have extended considerably westwards, and continue to do so every year. They urged that in order to retain for Persia the natural accretions of land, and to avoid a land frontier with Turkey, to which they had the strongest practical objections, it was essential that the frontier should run through the middle of the marsh to the old main stream of the Dawairij; the portion of the frontier immediately north of the marsh was, they said, practically uninhabitable, and therefore unlikely to be a cause of friction with the Turkish authorities.

Observations on the spot, a comparison of the present state of things with that shown on the commissioners' map of 1851, and my previous enquiries in 1909 and 1910 into the question of irrigation from the Karkheh tend to confirm the correctness of the above view. The Karkheh is heavily laden with silt, more so, I believe, than

* *Vide* p. 80, "Turco-Persian Boundary Negotiations," Part III, Foreign Office Print 10011.

any other river in Arabistan, and since the dam has been broken has deposited all its silt in the marshes instead of spreading it over the broad plains around Hawizeh.

8. The position, therefore, would appear to be that whilst for the purposes of the present time the adoption of the frontier as locally observed by Persian tribes (Umm Chir) would cause no great inconvenience to the Persian Government or to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, a permanently satisfactory settlement can only be arrived at by the adoption of the boundary as locally observed by Turkey (Ghor Muhaisin and the Dhwairij), which has the advantage of being a natural frontier-line, not liable to disturbance by silt or otherwise, and passing for practically the whole of its length from the Shatt-el-Arab to Pusht-i-Kuh, whether through uninhabitable marshes or uninhabitable deserts, thus rendering collisions between the tribes on either side of the border unlikely; this, in view of the religious hostility that exists between them, is of considerable importance.

The adoption of any frontier east of that locally recognised by Persian tribes would appear to be unjustified by anything in the present condition or past history of the frontier, and to be most strongly to be deprecated.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON (on special duty).

Enclosure 3 in No. 117.

Diary from June 21 to July 3, 1912.

ON the 21st June I left Mohammerah *en route* for Ahwaz in company with Lieutenant H. Digby Beste, R.I.M., after waiting six days for the steam-ship "Mulamir," which had been under repair at Bussorah. We arrived at Ahwaz on the 22nd June and left for the Turco-Persian frontier on the 24th at 9 P.M., a dust-storm having prevented our crossing the river earlier.

The Karkheh was struck at Kut Hawashim Atik at daybreak the next day, and a halt made till the afternoon, when we moved on to Kut Seyyid Ali, some 6 miles down-stream, a start being made at this point with plane table triangulation. Kut Seyyid Ali is a community of seyyids living on the north bank of the Karkheh practically independent of the Bani Turuf, and subject to the rule of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

On the 26th at daybreak we left for Khafajieh, the head-quarters of Sheikh Asi, chief of the Bani Turuf; the track lay parallel with the Karkheh, across low-lying ground intersected with canals, some of them 4 feet deep, watering extensive rice-fields and finally emptying into the belt of marshes which lies some miles south of the river. Sheikh Asi was very friendly, put me up in a mat hut, and proffered me every assistance. He has been nominated this year as chief of the tribe, and has accepted responsibility to Sheikh Khazal for the revenue of the tribe, which amounts to about 40,000 tomans, or nearly 8,000*l*.

We left at daybreak next day for Bisaitin, some 18 miles distant; I rode, the rest of the party going by bellam. The ground on both sides of the river was very marshy, and the land route crossed the river at Khafajieh and kept some miles north of it, only touching it again opposite Bisaitin. Sheikh Salih and Sheikh Anfi of the Bani Turuf rode with me, as well as Sheikh Asi.

Bisaitin is a long straggling settlement of Bani Turuf, covering 3 miles or so along the southern bank of the Karkheh; the huts are well built of reeds, and are airy and roomy, whilst the marshes all round keep the temperature down by day and night, even in the height of summer. Mosquitoes, strange to say, were conspicuous by their absence, and the inhabitants, a fine healthy-looking race, declared that they were seldom troubled with fever. At this point the existence of the Karkheh as a single stream practically ends, and it divides up into a multitude of small channels, which serve to water the rice-fields and finally discharge their waters into the marshes, which are penetrated only by narrow channels just broad enough to allow a canoe to pass between the banks of almost impenetrable reeds growing generally in about 4 feet of water and about 9 feet high. The rice-fields end some 8 miles west of Bisaitin, and the marshes commence, to continue unbrokenly till the Shatt-el-Arab is reached above Bussorah. There is no main channel through the marsh north of Shwaiyib. The Arabs of Bisaitin depend mainly upon boats to move about the country, and can in this way reach Shwaiyib direct by a canal running across country without going through the main marsh; they can often get to Hawizeh in the same way. I was housed, rather grudgingly, at Bisaitin by Sheikh Ali, the brother of Sheikh Asi, and next day by the

latter's orders he arranged for me to go by bellam to the locally observed frontier described elsewhere; I was unable, however, to get him to make arrangements for me to see the frontier as locally observed by the Turks, which he and his associates somewhat half-heartedly claimed as the true frontier.

On the 29th I left Bisaitin for Hawizeh, horses and mules being sent without loads or saddles over a reed causeway through the marsh for the first 6 miles, whilst the baggage was sent by bellam. I halted during the heat of the day at the house of Sheikh Mahaji of the Shurufa tribe, subject to Sheikh Khazal, and went on in the afternoon to Hawizeh, where our triangles joined up with those in the direction of Shwaiyib which formed part of the survey made under the supervision of the political resident by the same surveyor earlier in the year. I was accommodated in a cool house in the village by Jamal, the local agent of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who told me that the revenue of the village of Hawizeh was about 500*l*.

We spent the 30th in taking astronomical observations, leaving in the afternoon for Kut Hawashim, instead of Nasiri direct, in order to enable the surveyor to join up his triangles with his starting-point on the Karkheh. We halted during the heat of the day at Kut Hawashim, and reached Nasiri before midnight on the 1st July.

I may conclude by mentioning that I endeavoured to ascertain during my journey how far smuggling was indulged in by the tribes on this border. I came to the conclusion that the difficulties of communication with Amara are so great that very little smuggling indeed is done, except to some small extent in arms and ammunition for the Dizful market. I was assured and was satisfied that the Hawizeh market was supplied almost solely from Nasiri, a little produce coming from Mohammerah in winter, brought back by the large camel caravans which go there direct with rice.

A. T. WILSON, *Lieutenant, I.A.* (on special duty).

Enclosure 4 in No. 117.

Results of Observations taken from June 15 to July 2, 1912.

THE instruments used were as follows:—

One sextant by Heath and Co., Crayford, London. Kew certificate, class B of 6¼ inches radius, the inverting telescope being used for stellar as well as solar observations.

One sextant stand.

One horizontal horizon (mercury).

One chronometer, fifty-six hours, No. 5709, by Johannsen, of 5 inches diameter.

One hack watch by Webb and Co., No. 44, 2⅛ inches diameter.

Artificial sights were taken at Mohammerah consulate on the 15th and 20th June by means of equal altitudes of the sun, and the error and daily rate were determined, using the position of Mohammerah F.S. as given by Commander Beauchamp, R.I.M., *i.e.*, latitude 30° 26′ 27″ north, longitude 48° 10′ 35″ east. The chronometer was found to be but 2–3 seconds different from the accumulated error reckoned from artificial sights taken at Muscat seventeen days previous, and the daily rate of the chronometer between the 15th and 20th June was found to be 1·167 seconds losing, as against 1·022 seconds between Muscat on the 29th May and Mohammerah on the 15th June. The former daily rate of the chronometer during May 1912 was 0·89 seconds losing.

The daily rate of the hack watch was 0·59 seconds losing between the 15th and 20th June.

Arrived at Nasiri on the 23rd June, and observations were taken on the tennis court with the following results:—

Latitude 31° 19′ 31·9″. This was determined by reduction to meridian of ♉ Antares when both east and west of the meridian, the result being meaned with latitude by Pole-star.

Longitude 48° 40′ 52″ was determined by equal altitude of the sun meaned with stellar observations.

This result tallied so closely with the position determined by Mr. G. B. Scott (Survey of India, retired) that I did not consider it advisable to alter the error and rate of the chronometer.

Resultant position Nasiri tennis court:—

Latitude, 31° 19′ 31·9″ north; longitude, 48° 40′ 52″ east.

Position of Nasiri by Mr. G. B. Scott (400 yards south of tennis court):—

Latitude, 31° 19′ 24·5″ north; longitude, 48° 40′ 29″ east.

On the 24th June proceeded towards Hawizeh viâ Khafajieh and Bisaitin. The chronometer and hack watch were both packed in a padded box which was slung on to a rigid bamboo by means of four rubber bands about 1 inch wide and ¼ inch thick. This was carried all the way between two coolies except from Kut Seyyid Ali to Khafajieh and from Bisaitin to Jamani, where it was placed in a bellam. It was soon evident, however, by the daily comparisons of the hack watch with the chronometer (marginally noted)* that both were varying to such an extent as to make any further observation for longitude unreliable.

I beg to submit that, in my opinion, the varying of the daily rate of the chronometer and hack watch was as much due to the great and sudden variations of temperature as to any unavoidable jolting it may have received owing to its having to be carried over extremely rough ground and many deep canals having to be crossed where the chronometer box had to be placed on the coolie's head. The temperature at night time fell to 67° Fahrenheit, whilst during the day inside the tent the temperature rose to over 110°, a difference of 43° within a few hours, and this recurring for nine days in succession. The greatest possible care was taken, either Overseer Feroz Bakht or myself riding by the coolies, who carried it all the way. The observations for latitude at Khafajieh taken by the shaikh's house by meaning sets of ✻ Antares both east and west of the meridian resulted in latitude 31° 33′ 48·46″ north. The longitude used for reckoning the hour angle was 48° 10′ 45″ east.

The observations for latitude at Bisaitin (centre of village) taken by meaning sets of ✻ Antares both east and west of meridian with Pole star resulted in latitude 31° 43′ 29·1″ north. The longitude used for reckoning the hour angle was 48° east.

The observations for latitude at Hawizeh (eastern end of town), taken by meaning sets of ✻ Antares both east and west of meridian with the Pole star, resulted in latitude 31° 28′ 2·2″ north.

Equal altitudes of the sun's upper and lower limb four sets were taken, and a meridian distance was run thus from Hawizeh to Nasiri, the interval being two days. Allowing the old rate of 1·167 losing daily, the results place Hawizeh 34′ 8·7″ west of Nasiri, which result tallied so closely with the result of Lieutenant Wilson's plane table survey that in my opinion it may be assumed that the chronometer (by which the meridian distance was run) kept good time during these two days, and the difference shown during these two days between the comparisons was result of the hack watch going badly and not the chronometer.

I.e., resultant position Hawizeh:—

Latitude 31° 28′ 2·2″ north; longitude 48° 6′ 20·3″ east (?).

On return to Nasiri on the 2nd July, my observations resulted in showing the chronometer to have lost 3 minutes 10·96 seconds over and above its accumulated error, and the hack watch to have gained 35·66 seconds over its accumulated error.

H. DIGBY BESTE, *Lieutenant, R.I.M.*

Nasiri, July 3, 1912.

		Difference.	
		Min.	Sec.
* June 20	.. ..	0	1·0
,, 21	.. ..	0	1·5
,, 22	.. ..	0	2·0
,, 23	.. ..	0	4·0
,, 24	.. ..	0	3·0
,, 25	.. ..	0	5·0
,, 26	.. ..	0	10·0
,, 27	.. ..	0	4·5
,, 28	.. ..	0	3·0
,, 29	.. ..	0	7·0
,, 30	.. ..	3	24·0
July 1	.. ..	0	9·5
,, 2	.. ..	0	22·0

[33856] No. 118.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 650.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on the celebration of Constitution Day in that town, and drawing attention to the pan-Islamic nature of speeches delivered by local hodjas on that occasion.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Adana, July 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Turkish National Festival was celebrated here yesterday by a review of the gendarmes and soldiers in the morning and a reception at the Konak at noon. The review was preceded by speeches. The first speaker was the vali, who dwelt upon the need of unity among the different sections of the population. His Excellency referred to the unexpectedly prolonged resistance of the Turkish forces to the Italian advance in Tripoli, and said that another glorious page had been added to the Ottoman annals. Mustapha Nedim Bey stated that foreign assistance was still required to develop the country. In conclusion he read a telegram giving the names of the members of the new Cabinet, who, he said, were a guarantee that the best would be done at the present crisis.

Following the vali came two hodjas, uneducated men, but enjoying great influence over the common people. The first of these, Hodja Kiazim Mus, represented the Ittihad, the other the Itilaf. Their speeches breathed a strong pan-Islamic spirit, and might both have been delivered by the same speaker. A reference was made by the Itilaf orator to the occupation of Cyprus and Egypt, for which the vali, who was sitting next me, apologised, explaining that the speech submitted to the municipality had contained no such reference. The reference fitted in naturally with the exhortation for Moslems to rely upon themselves, and I told the vali that I was unwilling to think that he had had any previous knowledge of what the speaker intended to say, and that had I known I should have refused to attend the celebration. The speech-making was concluded by a short speech from a representative Tashnak, who ascribed the country's troubles to lack of money.

The situation here is calm. Events in the capital are followed with interest, but of local initiative there seems to be none. It is felt that the Committee of Union and Progress has failed, and there is a feeling of disappointment among the Moslems that a European war has so far been avoided.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[33858] No. 119.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 652.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches No. 267 of the 21st ultimo and No. 303 of the 9th instant, both having reference to a scheme for the construction of a railway from the port of Yumurtalik to Suleimanieh, the concession of which a certain Mr. Lightfoot is desirous to obtain from the Turkish Government.

Mr. Lightfoot's second letter, to which reference is made in your despatch No. 303, was not enclosed therein, and only reached me in the confidential print on the 27th ultimo.

With regard to the questions on which Mr. Lightfoot has touched in his letter of the 6th June, I would point out that the clause in the Bagdad Railway Convention referred to, forms part of article 12 of the convention. This article has not been

annulled, and concedes to the Bagdad Railway the exclusive right to build any branch railways which the Government may consider necessary in order to connect the main trunk line with a point to be determined between Mersina on the north and Tripoli-in-Syria on the south. Secondly, a right of preference on equal terms for the construction of seven branch lines, &c., towards Marash, Aintab, Biredjik, Mardin, Erbil, Sulaimieh, and Touzkourmatli, and from El Baj to Hitt. The negotiations conducted by the American syndicate were based on the understanding that the Government had a free hand to grant a concession for the construction of an independent line starting from any point on the coast between Mersina and Tripoli, and that the Government were not bound by the stipulations of article 12 further than in the matter of the construction of branch lines from the main Bagdad artery to the coast. This seems to have been the view held by the Public Works Department and also of the Turkish Government, and although many points were raised by the opponents of the Chester scheme in Parliament, the right of the Government to permit the building of a railway from Yumurtalik was not questioned. I am further given to understand that whilst the Bagdad Railway Company objected to an independent line having its sea terminus at the port of Swadieh (north of Tripoli) they did not oppose the choice of Yumurtalik.

The difficulty raised with regard to the crossing of the Bagdad railway system at any point inland by an independent line coming from Yumurtalik was met by an undertaking given by the American syndicate that no stations would be established within the zone officially recognised as belonging to the Bagdad railway and traversed by the crossing line, viz., within a radius of 20 kilom on either side of the Bagdad line, unless specially asked to do so by the Turkish Government, and, further, that no mining rights would be claimed within that zone.

As Mr. Lightfoot has been informed, the concession he has in view was applied for on behalf of an American syndicate, and was the subject of negotiations during the year 1910 and part of 1911 between Mr. Chester, the representative of the syndicate, and the Ministry of Public Works. The project originally submitted by Mr. Chester was considerably altered during the course of these negotiations, but the final modifications introduced in the draft convention by the Public Works Department rendered the scheme so unattractive that Mr. Chester and his group have not apparently considered it worth while pursuing the matter any further.

From the attitude of the late Ministry, after the last discussion of the Chester project in Parliament, it was apparent that the Government had no intention of abandoning the scheme, and hopes seem to have been entertained that a modification of the Government terms might, perhaps, induce Mr. Chester to reconsider the matter or attract other financial groups. It was understood that this attitude was partly the result of certain influences which had been brought to bear on some members of the late Cabinet, and was also possibly due to the representations which were reported to have been made by the Government of the United States. (See Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 60, Confidential, of the 18th January).

In his despatch No. 516 of the 25th June last, Sir G. Lowther reported the visit of Mr. Ridgeley Carter to Constantinople in connection with a railway scheme in Asia Minor, which was understood to be similar to the one in which Mr. Chester had been interested. He seemed satisfied with the result of his interviews with the Minister of Public Works, Djavid Bey, and it was supposed that Mr. Pierpont Morgan, on whose behalf Mr. Carter was acting, had taken the place of the American group which had been represented by Chester. Under these circumstances it would seem that even if, as stated by Mr. Justice the "Chester" group have abandoned their project, an application by Mr. Lightfoot for the same concession could only obtain favourable consideration in the event of the definite withdrawal of Mr. Carter. I would mention that I have only recently been informed that Mr. Carter, after his return to London, took steps to inform Djavid Bey that he was unable to take any further interest in the Yumurtalik-Sulaimanieh railway scheme. Whilst the reasons which led Mr. Carter to this decision are not given, it is possible that the uncertainty of the political situation in Turkey may have been a determining factor, but the principal reason may quite possibly lie in the fact that Mr. Carter and his friends have come to the conclusion that an application for the concession made under British auspices would be likely to receive greater consideration at the hands of the Turkish Government, and in consequence he has retired in order that the concession may be applied for by Mr. Lightfoot, who may be acting on behalf of an Anglo-American syndicate formed by Mr. Pierpont Morgan.

The scheme ever since it was first proposed by Dr. Glasgow, and approved of in

principle by a decree of the Senate, has come into conflict with Mr. D'Arcy's interests, and has been the cause of the suspension of negotiations. In 1909 Mr. D'Arcy was offered the concession of the railway and with it all the mining rights claimed by Glasgow, but the offer was declined, and it would seem that Mr. D'Arcy may, perhaps, be now able to come to an arrangement with the Lightfoot group for taking a share in the mining part of the scheme, a prospect which would be impossible if the concession were granted to a purely American syndicate.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[33862] No. 120.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 656.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith, for transmission to the War Office, copy of a despatch which I have received from the military attaché to His Majesty's embassy reporting on the attitude of the Smyrna Army.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 120.

Major Tyrrell to Mr. Marling.

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have this day returned from Smyrna, where I visited several of the camps of the army now assembled there, met many previous acquaintances among the officers, and had opportunities of conversation on the political situation.

It will be remembered from my previous despatches on the subject that the army recently collected in the neighbourhood of Smyrna consists of six divisions, about 60,000 men, under the command of Birinji Ferik Abdullah Pasha. Also that the attitude of this army was said to have been an important cause of Mahmud Shevket Pasha's resignation.

As I have not yet had time to prepare a military report on the distribution of this army (which, besides does not differ materially from that indicated in my previous reports), I propose to confine myself in this despatch to political questions.

Before going into these, I may state that the rumours as to the discontent of the troops and their inferior moral, as to the lack of equipment, and to the want of adequate arrangements, appear to have been very much exaggerated, if not wholly unwarranted. I found the men healthy and well fed and cared for. The camping-grounds were well selected, and the camps well laid out, while the supply arrangements appeared to be working smoothly. It is true that most of the redif units had only winter clothing, but tents and all kinds of equipment were complete.

So far from their presence causing any inconvenience to the local population, the army appeared to be very popular and to have earned general encomiums by its good behaviour. In fact, I heard nothing but praise on this head, both in Smyrna and in the outlying villages near which camps are situated.

It goes without saying that the redifs are anxious to return to their homes and their crops, and would welcome dismissal, but no expression of a nature incompatible with military discipline had been given to this desire. The officers also were anxious for the dismissal of the redifs, and Abdullah Pasha told me that he had recommended this course to Constantinople on the grounds that the collection and maintenance of so large a force were quite unnecessary from a military point of view. His idea was to retain the two Nizam divisions only. If any attack were made, or if the Italians attempted a disembarkation, the redif division could be re-assembled again in four or five days—in ample time to deal with any situation that might arise. I think this is the right view, and that the Government would be well advised to fall in with his suggestions.

Though opportunity had been taken to train the redifs, and though time was usefully employed in musketry and field exercises, the position was felt to be irksome

and unsatisfactory as the general opinion was that the Italians would not dare to make any attempt. The hope that they might do so was genuine, and the issue of any such attempt was regarded with the greatest confidence.

The fall of Said Pasha's Cabinet was welcomed, and the feeling was exactly that which I have formerly reported as general in the army, viz., that things had got so bad that something had to be done, though the open rebellion of the officers at Monastir who started the movement was deprecated in principle. I was told clearly over and over again that if it had not been for the war the late Cabinet would have fallen, and a clean sweep of the Committee of Union and Progress Government would have been made six months ago.

Abdullah Pasha denied that he had refused to send a division to Monastir, or that he had at any time been ordered to do so, but said, in a way implying that he was conveying a piece of information, "I hear that in Constantinople they say that the final kick to Mahmud Shevket Pasha came from Smyrna." Another General told me that proclamations from the military league (probably that the translation of which was forwarded in my despatch No. 55) were distributed among the various divisions; that an order had come from Constantinople regarding the method of dealing with these; that Abdullah Pasha had thereupon assembled the divisional commanders; and that, as a result of their conference, a long telegram had been sent to the Grand Vizier setting forth the reasons of the discontent of the army with Mahmud Shevket Pasha and with the clique by which he was surrounded, and demanding his immediate dismissal as the only possible solution. Though the generals regretted the spirit of insubordination evinced in the proclamation, they could not but admit that its statements were correct, and its demands justifiable under the circumstances.

The collective opinion of Abdullah and his generals is that enough has now been done by the army; that it should henceforth cease to throw its weight into the political balance; and that the officers should now withdraw from politics, while they hold that, for the sake of discipline, the Monastir mutineers must be punished.

For the moment the Smyrna army seems well in hand and willing to acquiesce in the opinions of its chiefs, but I doubt if this acquiescence is more than skin deep, and I think that the present pose of moderation and detachment is only contingent on the Cabinet carrying out the full programme of the military league. This was the impression I gathered among the junior officers, and if the dissolution of the Chamber is carried out by unconstitutional means, and if the Monastir officers participate in the general amnesty, I do not anticipate any protest on the part of the Smyrna army, in spite of the openly expressed objections of its leaders to both of these procedures.

Abdullah Pasha is a frank, outspoken man, and very popular in the army. He has the reputation of being straight, with no political axe to grind, and his honesty is the less doubted as he has ample private means. But I do not think he has much force of character, nor any very decided views beyond a personal enmity to Mahmud Shevket Pasha and the directors of the Committee of Union and Progress, which is principally due to his having been passed over in the redistribution of commands after the army reorganisation introduced last year.

His chief of the staff, Mir Alai Pertev Bey, is one of the best officers in the Turkish army. He also is very popular, and it is admitted that his professional attainments are of the highest. But he is not unsympathetic to the Committee of Union and Progress, and his enthusiasm over their downfall is further moderated by his dislike of the methods by which it has been achieved, methods which are contrary to his military instincts and to his ideas of discipline, formed as these are in the German school of thought.

The man to be reckoned with in this army is the Circassian, Ali Pasha, a retired officer who was quite lately placed by Mahmud Shevket Pasha in command of the Smyrna redif division. He is far more likely than any other of the senior officers to influence at any moment the action of the Smyrna army as a whole. It is due to him, I think that the proclamations of the military league were collected and burned, and that the army has adopted a position of detachment from the strife of parties at Constantinople while awaiting orders from superior military authority. Ali Pasha is, however, convinced that the policy of the late Government was ruining the country, and that Mahmud Shevket Pasha had ruined the army, and the decisive tone of the telegram referred to earlier in this despatch was his.

I heard many interesting but relatively unimportant items of news while in Smyrna. There is no doubt that the culminating point of the discontent against the Committee of Union and Progress was the method of conducting the last elections. Over and over again I was assured that these were made by the gendarmerie and police, assisted by the

stick if necessary, and that the vali, Jellal Bey, had come there expressly to conduct them on these lines.

Shortly before the fall of Said Pasha's Cabinet, Jellal Bey had reported that a secret association existed among the officers, and he had named those implicated in it, among others, Ali Pasha. This has aroused considerable resentment against him, especially as he had been misinformed as to the real culprits, and it is expected that he will soon be removed. For the moment he possesses no power, and is of no importance.

The open way in which secret service money was distributed, not only for the elections, but even in normal times, in order to strengthen the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress, also appears to have excited disgust, and it was said that the money came from the national subscription for the fleet, from that subscribed for the sufferers by the fires in Stamboul, &c. I was told that the funds of the Ministry of War had been employed in the same way (probably one of the reasons of Mahmud Shevket Pasha's obstinate refusal to allow his accounts to be controlled by civilian officials of the Finance Department), and Ismail Fazil Pasha (for whose appointment to Smyrna and subsequent transfer to Uskub, see previous despatches) had an allowance of 100*l.* per month from the Minister of War's secret service fund, which he drew openly through the military accountant in Smyrna.

I had a conversation with the Greek Metropolitan, Chrystomos, whom I had previously known in Macedonia. He is a dangerous man, and, wherever he goes, is the centre of a political propaganda against the Turkish Government. He talked about the iniquities of the recruiting law, and the hardships and insults to which Christian soldiers were exposed. It is the men in his position who do all they can to prevent Christians from entering the army, who urge them to emigrate rather than serve, and to whose interest it is to prevent that fusion which naturally follows a period of service in the ranks, and to propagate the idea, erroneously held in Europe, that it is impossible for the Christians of this country to serve with the Turks. The enlistment of Christians is one of the few measures, since the revolution of 1908, which has been a success, but it is not given a fair chance by the heads of the Christian communities.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Major*,
Military Attaché.

[33866] No. 121.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 12.)

(No. 660.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah reporting on a severe fight at Zuhra, between Turkish troops and Seyyid Idriss.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Jeddah, July* 20, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that according to information which has reached this town a severe fight took place some twenty days ago at Zuhra, in Wadi Mour, four days distant from Sabia, between the Turkish troops under Hamid Pasha, assisted by the Arab Sheikh Ahmed Hej, of the Wataya tribe, and Seyyid Idriss.

The troops are said to have been defeated and Sheikh Ahmed Hej to be besieged in a stronghold.

I have &c.
AVALON SHIPLEY.

[33867] No. 122.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 661.)
Constantinople, August 6, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting on recent measures taken by Italians at Rhodes, and on their treatment of Mahommedan population.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 97.)
Smyrna, August 1, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report the following items of news received from the vice-consulate at Rhodes:—

1. The complete embarkation on the 26th ultimo of the 5,000 troops whose intended departure Sir A. Biliotti, I believe, telegraphed to you on the 20th ultimo. Nothing definite is known as to their destination.

2. Sir Alfred Biliotti reports the erection of sheds for aeroplanes at Patmos, Stampalia, Cos, and probably Rhodes.

3. He reports the arrest of many of the Moslem Cretans as a preliminary to their expulsion, but has not been able to ascertain for what reason.

4. Sir Alfred Biliotti has referred more than once to the fact that whenever Moslem women present themselves at Government House with petitions they are always made to unveil.

The Italian officials explain this as a measure of precaution against assassination by Turks disguised as women, but it is bitterly resented by the Mahommedans.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[34125] No. 123.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.)
Tehran, August 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 469 of 7th August.
Following from consul at Bushire, 11th August:—

"With reference to Foreign Office telegram of 7th August, repeated to me under legation No. 165.

"Subject to any other view which the Government of India may wish to express, course proposed by Russian Foreign Office seems to me to meet the case, except that, as copy of the map is being given to the Persian Government and Persian Ambassador, it seems unnecessary to give one to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and he will probably be content with verbal explanation and the knowledge that it has been [group undecypherable] at Tehran and at Constantinople.

"These Arab sheikhs are apt to interpret term 'confidential' somewhat liberally, and the map might become a somewhat inconvenient source of gossip.

"(Repeated to India.)"

Presumably your telegram No. 479 of 9th August obviates the necessity of my expressing an opinion on previous telegram quoted. I would, however, venture to state that, from remarks that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and others have made incidentally, I am of opinion that the Persian Government would consider territorial advantages gained in the Mohammerah region a poor equivalent for territory ceded in the Zohab district. Minister for Foreign Affairs made an especially wry face when saying the other day that he gathered that British good offices in the south would mean loss of Kasr-i-Shirin to Persia.

[32932] No. 124.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Babington Smith.

(Confidential.)
Foreign Office, August 12, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that according to a despatch from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, the acting manager of the National Bank of Turkey has informed him that the bank is seeking to arrange with the Deutsche Bank for the acquisition of a concession from the Ottoman Government for the working of the petroleum deposits in the vilayet of Mosul and the adjoining districts.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any more definite information as to this project which you may be in a position to supply.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[34319] No. 125.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, August 13, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul at Bussorah:—

Following remarks submitted for your consideration in connection with articles 6 (c), 16, and 17 of proposed Conservancy Convention, Shatt-el-Arab:—

"If police clauses are intended to cover [? safety] of river craft and prevent river piracy they do not appear to me, viewed locally, to be of practical utility.

"Devolution by local authorities to commission of policing of river, or maintenance by commission of sufficient police force independent of local authorities for necessary patrol of Shatt-el-Arab, where disturbance and robbery are notoriously frequent, does not seem to me feasible. If undertaken, direct communication and association with the local authorities would appear indispensable. Devolution of such powers might form dangerous pretext for relieving local authorities of responsibility for public safety, and will certainly lead to friction.

"Present quarantine police arrangements, such as they are, are run by local authorities, and not by local representative of Sanitary Board.

"I should prefer to see hands of local authorities strengthened in matter of river police rather than devolution of those duties to commission."

[34125] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 488.)
(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, August 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 449 of 12th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

As Sir P. Cox deprecates communicating copy of map to sheikh, I approve proposal for giving oral explanation only.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 426, and St. Petersburgh, No. 646.)

[34312] No. 127.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 25th August, 1912, relative to navigation of rivers of Mesopotamia.

India Office, August 13, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, July* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the communication received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah on the subject of Turkish action in objecting to the entry of foreign vessels into the rivers of Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bussorah, July* 1, 1912.

I AM informed by my Russian colleague that a French subject who wanted to send his launch up the Euphrates, as he has often done before, was refused permission by the vali of Bussorah, who stated that he had received recent instructions from the Sublime Porte forbidding foreign vessels to enter the rivers of Mesopotamia with the exception of Lynch, who had special limited privileges. The launch of an American citizen was treated in the same way. In conversation the vali also told the Russian consul that the Ottoman Government possessed the indisputable right of closing the Shatt-el-Arab to all foreign ships from the junction of the Turco-Persian frontier with the Shatt-el-Arab (Mohammerah) upwards, and also both Tigris and Euphrates, but his Excellency stated that they did not intend to avail themselves of the right, for purely commercial reasons, below Bussorah, and, perhaps, even below Maghil.

My Russian colleague also discussed this matter with the commodore, who told him that the local authorities were quite justified in stopping the "Azizeh" from plying to Mohammerah and back, but for the sake of public utility they refrained from doing so. At the instance of the Russian consul, so the latter informed me, the vali consented to ask Constantinople for more ample instructions in respect to the free navigation of foreign steam launches and motor boats above Bussorah, and his Excellency agreed with the Russian consul that such launches should be allowed to navigate the rivers freely provided they did not carry cargo. His Excellency suggested that they might carry the Turkish flag.

The above conversations would appear to indicate the views of the local authorities at Bussorah in respect to the navigation of Mesopotamian waters by foreign ships.

[33766] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 371.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a note, dated the 9th August, from the Turkish Ambassador respecting the bombardment of Manzariyé.*

I have to request you to furnish me with a report on this subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 111.

[34449] No. 129.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 14, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 418 of 9th August.

Mr. Shipley and M. Minorski to-day verbally advised Persian delegates as to the acceptance of the explanatory notes, and handed them a draft declaration which they might make to Turkish delegates at the next sitting. Acceptance is unconditional. Persian delegates agreed to draft declaration, and are to present it without modification. Shipley also gave map to Persian delegates, and accompanied it by a verbal explanation.

[34689] No. 130.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, August* 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 479 of 9th August to Tehran; Turco-Persian frontier.

If further instructions are coming it would seem better for me to await them here, as I am not on the telegraph when at Mohammerah. Am ready to proceed immediately on receipt of instructions.

[30652] No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and has the honour to inform his Highness that the British and Russian representatives at Constantinople are advising the Persian delegates to accept the "explanatory note" relative to the Turco-Persian frontier.

Sir E. Grey would add that His Majesty's Government have decided to take this step in full confidence that the Imperial Ottoman Government will meet their wishes in regard to the maintenance of the frontier *status quo* in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah, and they also feel assured that the Ottoman Government will use every effort in order to avoid any incident on this portion of the frontier through the increase of frontier guards or other causes.

Foreign Office, August 15, 1912.

[34739] No. 132.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments au Principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté aux Affaires Étrangères, et pour faire suite aux communications qu'il a eu l'honneur d'adresser à son Excellence au sujet du bombardement répété de la part des navires de guerre italiens des ports non fortifiés de la Mer Rouge, s'empresse, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, d'attirer de nouveau l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique sur la récente attaque contre Hodeïdah qui a eu lieu le 3 août.

Malgré l'absence de fortifications de ce port, les navires ennemis ont bombardé la ville et détruit la mosquée, en occasionnant la mort d'une femme et en blessant d'autres.

La petite garnison qui est postée au sud de la ville pour maintenir l'ordre public ne peut justifier une action aussi inattendue, vu que les projectiles étaient lancés à une distance de 400 mètres du lieu qu'elle occupe. L'effroi causé parmi la population fut tel que le poste militaire eut grande peine à calmer leur effervescence et à empêcher une agression contre les étrangers.

Tevfik Pacha a déjà eu l'honneur à plusieurs occasions de signaler à son Excellence Sir Edward Grey combien cet objectif de l'Italie est injustifiable en droit et dangereux dans ses effets, puisqu'il tend à surexciter les sentiments des populations musulmans, ce qui, malgré tous les efforts déployés par les autorités militaires locales, pourrait, à un moment donné, mettre en danger la sécurité des sujets étrangers y résidant, par suite de la panique provoquée par des actes d'hostilité dirigés contre la population non combattante et jusque dans ses édifices de culte.

C'est pour ces considérations d'ordre supérieur et fondées sur la non-observation de la part d'un belligérant des règles et usages du droit de la guerre, que Tevfik Pacha, se faisant l'interprète du vœu de son Gouvernement, prie instamment le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de bien vouloir y attirer l'attention du Cabinet de Rome sur ces infractions répétées aux principes de la civilisation moderne et de l'humanité.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 15 août, 1912.

[34758] No. 133.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 27th June, 1912, relative to Turkish intrigues in Aden protectorate.

India Office, August 16, 1912.

Enclosure 1 in No. 133.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Bombay Castle, May 17, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed to state that the political resident, Aden, has from time to time brought to notice the activities of the Imam of Sanaa and the intrigues which he is carrying on with the tribes in our protectorate. He now reports that evidence is daily increasing to show that he has designs of securing control over tribes which formerly owed allegiance to the Imam of Sanaa and which extend from our undelimited frontier in Upper Yafai down to the Hadramaut. From letters received by the political resident from the Yafai sheikhs there appears to be great excitement in that part of the country, and the Abdali Sultan has informed Major-General Bell that the imam has sent an expeditionary force to Marib with orders to hold itself in readiness to advance on Yafa where the sheikhs appear to be determined to fight

2. The Imam of Sanaa has not, it is stated, been given sovereign powers by the Ottoman Government, and the political resident proposes to address a letter, a draft of which is enclosed, to the Governor-General of Yemen requesting that the imam may be restrained from corresponding or in any way intriguing with the tribes in our protectorate. Under the orders contained in paragraph 3 of Lord Morley's despatch No. 20, dated the 4th May, 1906, protests regarding Turkish aggressions should be made by way of Constantinople, but in view of the fact that the authorities at Constantinople are at present fully occupied with other matters and the fear that owing to religious differences between the imam's people and our tribes a quarrel may be precipitated, from which it will be impossible for Government to stand aloof, I am to state that his Excellency the Governor in Council recommends that the political resident may be authorised to address the Turkish Governor-General of Yemen direct.

I have, &c.

C. A. KINCAID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 133.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Governor-General of Yemen, Sanáa.

Your Excellency,

WE have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Imam Seyyid Yahya bin Hamid-un-din and his emissaries are busy intriguing with the tribes within our protectorate. Having first informed the most important chiefs of the settlement he had made with the Turkish Government, he then invited those who held documents from his ancestors to come and see him. We have also received information from a variety of sources that several of our Yafai sheikhs have received letters from the imam exhorting them to refrain from having any intercourse with infidels and asking them to pay tithes. The Yafai sheikhs, who are very much excited by these letters, are shortly coming down to Aden to report the situation to me personally and concert measures for self-defence.

2. We are not sure to what extent their alarms are well founded, but we have no doubt from the papers in our possession that the imam has been busy corresponding with our tribes. Such action tends to disturb our protectorate and must result in placing the Turkish Government in a very difficult position. To avoid these mischievous results and complications we address your Excellency with the request that the imam may be told that he cannot be permitted to correspond, or tamper, with the tribes in our protectorate without our knowledge and consent, and that the intrigues he has started in this direction must cease immediately. We would point out to your Excellency that he is relying on his agreement with the Turkish Government to aid him in this matter, and begins his letters to the chiefs in our protectorate by emphasising that agreement, and hence the responsibility of the Turkish Government in the matter, as your Excellency will see.

Assuring your Excellency of our continued good wishes and awaiting the favour of a very early reply, we have, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 133.

Extract from 21st Weekly Letter.

Acting Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, May 25, 1912.

THE Amir of Dthala writes that, as he believed we are interested to know the imam's intentions with regard to our protectorate, and as he could not find them out by other means, he had to send for one of the imam's emissaries, who is a friend of his (amir's) house and a confidant of the imam. The emissary, who is now in Dthala, told the amir that the imam intends to make a strong movement towards Yafa, Marib, and its suburbs; that he was now writing openly, as well as secretly, in all directions, and that he had 40,000 soldiers ready, and is collecting more and the necessary provisions for them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 133.

Extract from 22nd Weekly Letter.

Acting Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, June 1, 1912.

THE Rubeaten sheikhs have forwarded a letter they have received from the imam in which, among other things, they are asked to submit to him. The sheikhs ask me for my advice as to the terms in which they should reply to him. I am telling them not to send any reply at all, unless they are pressed for it, in which case they should inform him that they are under the protection of the British Government.

2. Sheikh Muhammad Ali Mohsin Askar of Mausatta writes that he met the imam's emissary, who is now at Dthala. The latter told him that, with the exception

of the Mausatta, the Mafiahi and Dthubi sections and Sultan Kahtan, all the Yafais had sent replies to the imam, and he wished to know the reason why the former did not do so. Sheikh Muhammad Ali replied that Yafa was governed by Ahl Ash Sheikh Bubaker-bin-Salim of Ainat (a family of Seyyids in Hadthramaut), and that the Yafai sheikhs could do nothing without their orders.

Sheikh Muhammad Ali adds that the emissary intends to go to Yafa positively to recover tribute, but that the Yafais will never yield to such demands.

3. Our news correspondent in Upper Yafa reports that the sheikhs of Mausatta (a section of Upper Yafa) wrote letters to the imam to the effect they were friendly to the British Government, but that they would also like to be his friends, provided the latter granted them regular stipends and sent them monetary assistance on receipt of their letters. The imam replied that both he and they were Mahommedans; that his Government desired to maintain peace throughout the country which was formerly ruled by his ancestors; and that if the Yafais wished to make his friendship only for such considerations as stipend, monetary assistance, &c., he would not give them anything, but that when he comes to Yafa, if they desired, he would nominate chiefs over each section who would be responsible for the collection of tithes. He would then make agreements with them under which they would be entitled to shares in the collection. The news correspondent says that this reply has caused a split among the Yafais, and that consequently the people of Yafa are so excited that they say they will kill any one who corresponds with the imam.

3. The news correspondent further reports a rumour that some of the imam's messengers are expected shortly to arrive at Damit (Turkish) en route to Yafa. Letters are said to have been sent to the Yafais about their coming.

[34722] No. 134.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 294.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING [? from] consul at [? Hodeidah]:—

Please [? request that] Italian Government authorise the passage of boats flying the consular flag between Hodeidah and Camaran and *vice versâ* during pilgrimage, as necessity of frequent communication urgent.

[34828] No. 135.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 458.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August 17, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 291 of 14th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Should I now make communication sketched in your telegram No. 469 of 7th August to the Persian Government, or should it be made jointly with the Russian Minister as would appear indicated in your telegram No. 418 of 9th August to Constantinople? Russian Minister had no instructions yesterday.

[34859] No. 136.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 146. Commercial.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by the British delegate on the Board of Health, forwarding copies of a communication made to the board by the German delegate as to the measures taken by the Italian authorites to mitigate the restrictions of the blockade in the Red Sea in favour of the pilgrim traffic.

I am sending copies of this communication direct to Singapore, Bombay, Aden,

and Cairo, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Jeddah, Hodeidah, Beirout, Jaffa, Salonica, and Smyrna.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

Dr. Clemow to Mr. Marling.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a communication made to the Board of Health on Tuesday by the German delegate, respecting the Italian promises not to interfere with the pilgrim traffic at Camaran.

It will be seen that the undertaking not to interfere in any way with the quarantine service of the Camaran lazaret is renewed; that communication between Camaran and Hodeidah is forbidden, but that between Camaran and Aden is, it is stated, left free.

Ships going to or leaving Camaran must do so only by the southern channel. (This, it should be stated, is the channel they invariably pass through, the northern channel being dangerous and almost unnavigable.) They will be kept under watch and eventually escorted by Italian ships of war, and they will not be permitted for any reason to communicate with the shores other than those of Camaran, where the lazarette is.

I have, &c.
E. G. CLEMOW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

Note addressed to Board of Health by German Delegate, July 30, 1912.

DANS le but d'éliminer l'inconvénient que le blocus puisse empêcher le trafic des pèlerins musulmans qui se rendent à La Mecque, on a admis quelques exceptions aux défenses dérivant de l'état de blocus:—

1. Le service quarantenaire de la station sanitaire de Camaran ne sera empêché d'aucune manière.

2. Les navires qui doivent se rendre à Camaran pour y subir la quarantaine ou qui, après s'être soumis à cette obligation, doivent en repartir, pourront traverser la ligne du blocus en passant exclusivement, soit à l'aller, soit au retour, par l'embouchure sud de ladite rade de Camaran. Le passage par l'embouchure nord de la même rade est, par conséquent, interdit. Les navires qui se rendent à la station sanitaire de Camaran ou qui la quittent, seront surveillés et éventuellement escortés par les navires de guerre qui appliquent le blocus, et ne pourront, pour aucune raison, communiquer avec des points de la côte, en dehors de ceux de la station sanitaire.

Ainsi qu'il appert de ce qui précède, la communication de Camaran avec Hodeïdah est interdite, tandis que celle avec Aden est absolument libre, chose qui nous a déjà été confirmée par un rapport du directeur *ad interim* de la station de Camaran.

L'approvisionnement de notre station par voie d'Aden ne se trouve donc aucunement empêché. Dans le cas, toutefois, où des cas de ce genre se produiraient, je prierais l'administration de vouloir bien m'en faire communication pour que je puisse les signaler à qui de droit.

Constantinople, le 31 juillet, 1912.

[34839] No. 137.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 671.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a report drawn up by His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul on the political and administrative aspects of the districts in Kurdistan and Northern Mesopotamia recently visited by him.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Vice-Consul Hony to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.) *Mosul, July 7, 1912.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following observations on the districts through which I passed on my recent tour. I have embodied commercial and military remarks in separate despatches.

Erbil.—The Kaimakam of Erbil seemed an intelligent and energetic official. When Mr. Young made his big tour four years ago, this man was Kaimakam of Rania, and Mr. Young wrote of him as being the only satisfactory official he had met in the course of his tour. He is very anxious to introduce European methods of agriculture, and he has since written to me for catalogues of British machinery.

Altun Kiupru.—The Mudir is a member of one of the leading families of Kerkuk, and holds the post more for that reason than any other. He is a typical old régime official, corrupt, lazy, and stupid. No place could make much headway with such a man to govern it.

Kerkuk.—Kerkuk presents a great contrast to the other towns of this district. I have dwelt elsewhere on the brightness of its commercial prospects. Administratively, it was evidently in the hands of a strong and capable official. This Mutessarif, Avni Ullah Bey, was seven years in prison under the old régime; he is naturally an enthusiast for the new order of things, and he is doing his best to show that the Young Turks are better than the old ones. Decent roads are being built, a technical school has been opened, in which 100 orphans are taught trades, and there is a municipal hospital. Agricultural machinery has been bought, and more has been ordered, and a printing press has been ordered. Everything shows real signs of progress, and Kerkuk is an object lesson to show how much everything in a Turkish town depends upon the personality of the leading official. It is worthy of notice that three years ago, when His Majesty's consul-general went from Kerkuk to Erbil, it was thought necessary to send some 250 men to escort him in safety; I came through with two gendarmes, and should have been perfectly safe with none. In the same way the road from Kerkuk to Suleimanie was generally closed owing to the violence of the Hamawand Kurds; to-day it is probably as safe as any road in provincial Turkey. This result has been attained by a few bold measures on the part of the authorities, and the summary arrest and imprisonment of some of the leading Agas. Many of the most redoubtable of Hamawand brigands are now making excellent zaptiehs in the Government service.

Suleimanie.—Although an important place from its position, remains a dirty mud village. I did not see the Mutessarif, who was ill with fever, but I was told he spent most of his time in quarrelling with the other officials. There are few signs of progress in Suleimanie. The Kurdish Agas and Seyyids rule the roost, as of old; a few of these gentlemen called on me, but it was evidently a great condescension on their part. The people of Suleimanie are very fanatical; there are only one or two Christian families, and these live unhappy lives. The representative of the Public Debt, a Christian from Mosul, had the misfortune to offend one of the leading notables; shortly afterwards he was accused of having flown the Italian flag on his house at Bairam; he was only acquitted on the court eliciting the fact that no one in Suleimanie knew what the Italian flag was like.

From Suleimanie I crossed over the Azmir Range into the Shehr Bazar district. Here there is a kaimakam of the old sort. He was just about to start on a tax collecting tour, and I followed in his wake through several villages. I understood from various villagers that a judicious present from the mukhtar of a village to the kaimakam would sometimes persuade the latter to make a detour so as to avoid that village.

Leaving the watershed of the Karacholan River, I came into another big valley, unknown in the War Office map; and I judge from this, and from the behaviour of the inhabitants, that few Europeans have ever penetrated into this part. I had the misfortune to arrive on a Friday at a village called Halladin, which belongs to a member of the Sheikh Seid clan. On seeing that some of us were Christians, and learning that we came from Mosul, where Sheikh Seid was murdered in 1908, the villagers displayed the utmost hostility; in the evening they held a service, at which many of them worked themselves into a frenzy, and, foaming at the mouth, came to our

camp, and abused the gendarmes for escorting these "pigs." One of these frenzied men, armed with a large stone, came through the camp shouting, "Chinour! Din-i-Mohammed!" and altogether we passed an anxious night.

Next morning we crossed over another range, and came into more beaten tracks again. Here, by contrast, at the first village we came to, we were invited to rest in the mosque, and the Imam himself kept the flies off while I slept.

At *Kent Sanjak* the kaimakam seemed a little superior to the ordinary class, and the gendarmerie commandant is a most capable man, who has risen from the ranks.

At *Rowanduz* there is a weak and very ignorant kaimakam, who is completely in the hands of Seid Bey, the leading notable. A few years ago a redif officer at Rowanduz offended this Seid Bey by conscripting men from one of his villages. Seid Bey sent some of his men to the officer's house, where they stabbed to death his wife and children. Seid Bey was sent to prison at Diarbekir, but escaped, or was acquitted, within six weeks. Such is the man who virtually rules Rowanduz.

From Rowanduz I went into the country of the Sheikh of Barzan, and spent three days as his guest. Here every man and most boys carried a rifle and wore two or three bandoliers full of cartridges. Many of these rifles are army Mausers, bought from deserters; they fetch from 40 to 50 liras each.

The Sheikh of Barzan is in a most difficult position. His country is included in the caza of Acra. The people of Acra have always been his hereditary enemies, and they seem to influence the Turkish officials against him. It will be remembered that four years ago a military expedition under Mohammed Fazil Pasha was sent against the sheikh, who easily defeated the Turkish forces, although they burnt a great number of his villages. Nazim Pasha ordered an enquiry into the affair, as the result of which the Kaimakam of Acra was dismissed and £T. 1,000 indemnity was paid to the sheikh.

The sheikh says he tries to get on with the Turks as best he can, but finds it difficult owing to the hostility of Acra. Last year he went to Acra several times to ask them to send the tax-gatherer during the summer when his people had sold their sheep and had money, and when money could be collected. But the tax-gatherer arrived in mid-winter and demanded £T. 500 on the spot. The sheikh protested that he could not collect such a sum at once: the people had spent most of their money, and the collection of it would take some time, as the country was under snow; but he promised to pay £T. 100 on the spot and £T. 200 two months afterwards. The tax-gatherer refused to agree to this, and, returning to Acra, reported that the sheikh was again rebellious and refused to pay his taxes. The sheikh also asked the military authorities to send a battalion of troops to collect men for military service, but they did not do so, but reported that the sheikh refused to allow his men to be conscripted.

Apart from these questions, he was also worried in various small ways. He has to pay £T. 2, and each of his agas one mejidie, yearly "newspaper money"; this is for the official "Mosul" newspaper, which is probably never sent the sheikh, and which neither he nor his agas could understand if it were.

Every year the Heriki Kurds move southward in the winter to pasture their flocks, returning north in the summer; they have to pass through the sheikh's country and over two bridges of the Zab, which can easily be held by a few men against hundreds. On these occasions the sheikh is accustomed to hold the bridges until the Ottoman officials arrive for the collection of the sheep-tax from the Heriki, which generally amounts to some £T. 700 or £T. 800. This year the sheikh held the bridges as usual; but when the Kaimakam of Acra arrived he accepted a bribe of £T. 100 from the Heriki, and reported that the sheikh had refused to help this year, and consequently the Heriki had escaped. At the present moment there is a pretty quarrel going on at Acra because the Mal Mudir is threatening to report the true state of affairs unless he receives a share of the £T. 100.

The sheikh is very fond of the English, and his great influence has been very useful in securing respect for the mission school at Bibaydi. He said that if 1,000 English came into his country he would fear nothing, but that if four Russians came he would fight them. Later on, he told me that the Russians had been making overtures to him through the medium of the Shemsdinan Sheikh; they offered him a salary and protection if he would become a Russian subject. Up till now he had made no reply, but he begged for my advice on the subject. I advised him to have absolutely nothing to do with the Russians, but to try and get on with the Turks as well as he could, but at the same time to avoid any incident that would annoy the Russians. He seemed very anxious about this question, and is evidently very afraid of the Russians, as indeed every one is in these parts. I told the sheikh that I should

ask your Excellency whether you approved of the advice I had given, and that I would tell him of your Excellency's reply.

He said that the whole country from Van to Rowandúz would be ready to go over to the Russians on a very small pretext, for they were sick of the Turks. He gave the following chiefs as being already in league with the Russians: Abdullah Bey, Berasor; Pivot Aga, Heriki; Fattah Bey, Shomsdinan; Cazi Fattah, Soujboulak.

It seems improbable that Russia would ever attempt to invade this country, but she is doubtless anxious to have friends and not foes on her flank when she continues her advance through Persia. If Turkey attempts to apply her policy of suppressing all semi-independent peoples to the Kurds, she will give Russia a good chance of increasing her influence in these parts.

I have, &c.
HENRY C. HONY.

[34841] No. 138.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 675.)

Constantinople, August 8, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 153 of the 17th April last, I have the honour to transmit herewith extracts from the "Gazette financière" of the 16th and 30th July last relating to the formation in Belgium of a syndicate to purchase steamers and barges for the transport to Bagdad of the material required for the Bagdad Railway.

From enquiries made here I learn that the information contained in these articles, including the text of the statutes of the Belgian company, appeared in the Brussels paper the "Echo de la Bourse."

It will be noticed that in his speech in the Chamber of the 9th July Djavid Bey is reported to have stated that on the conclusion of the railway work the new steamers would be handed over to the Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

Extract from the "Gazette financière" of July 16, 1912.

SUITE DE LA DISCUSSION DU BUDGET DU MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES.

A LA suite de certaines critiques formulées contre la convention sexennale intervenue au mois de février 1911 entre le Gouvernement et la Banque Impériale ottomane, Djavid Boy fournit les précisions nécessaires et indique les avantages qui en résultent pour le Gouvernement: ouverture d'un crédit en compte courant de £T. 1,500,000 à 5½ pour cent intérêt sans garantie, réduction de la commission allouée à la banque de £T. 50,000 à £T. 40,000, réduction des allocations pour les succursales de £T. 32,000 à £T. 20,000, création de douze nouvelles agences sans subvention, intérêt servi par la banque sur les comptes courants du Trésor en province.

A un député qui exprime l'opinion que cette convention comportant des engagements financiers aurait dû être soumise à l'approbation du Parlement, Djavid Bey répond que la convention, loin d'imposer au Trésor des charges nouvelles, ne fait que réduire les charges qui lui incombaient du chef des conventions antérieures.

La Navigation sur le Tigre et l'Euphrate.

Cette question qui fit tant de bruit au cours de la première session parlementaire, a été l'occasion de déclarations intéressantes de la part de Djavid Boy.

Il rappelle que le projet d'augmenter la flotte de l'Administration ottomane de Navigation sur le Tigre et l'Euphrate n'avait pu être réalisé et que sur ces entrefaites une entente était intervenue entre la Compagnie Lynch et la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad pour le transport du matériel de celle-ci, l'administration ottomane n'étant

pas en mesure d'assurer ce transport. D'après cette entente, les deux contractants devaient procéder à l'achat de nouveaux bateaux. Le Ministre des Travaux publics protesta auprès du la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad et lui objecta que celle-ci devait soit s'entendre avec l'Administration ottomane, soit acheter des bateaux pour son propre compte et les retirer du fleuve les transports une fois effectués. C'est alors que fut proposée une nouvelle combinaison ou entente à trois entre la Compagnie Lynch, l'Administration ottomane et la Société du Bagdad, combinaison d'après laquelle le transport du matériel devait être effectué en commun et les nouveaux bateaux à acheter cédés ensuite au Gouvernement. Les choses en sont restées là et rien de définitif n'a été encore conclu.

Une augmentation de crédit de £T.28,000 proposée par Ismail Hakki Babanzadé et appuyée par le Ministre est accordée: cette somme servira à l'achat de trois nouveaux remorqueurs et de six pontons-allèges.

On accorde également un crédit de 778,555 piastres pour la création d'un atelier de réparations à Bagdad.

Enclosure 2 in No. 138.

Extract from the "Gazette financière" of July 30, 1912.

SOCIÉTÉ DE TRANSPORTS FLUVIAUX EN ORIENT.

PAR-DEVANT Me Auguste Scheyven, notaire à Bruxelles, a été constitué, le 3 juillet, 1911, sous cette dénomination, une société anonyme ayant pour objet:—

(*a.*) De construire, d'acheter ou de procurer des bateaux à vapeur et allèges pour le transport de matériel roulant de chemin de fer sur le Tigre, l'Euphrate, le Chatt-el-Arab et leurs affluents dans l'Arabie turque, ainsi que de procurer, transporter ou acheter des marchandises et produits, de quelque nature que ce soit, destinés à être transportés par ces bateaux et allèges;

(*b.*) De louer ou de donner à bail des bateaux à vapeur et allèges pour le transport de tel matériel roulant sur le Tigre, l'Euphrate, le Chatt-el-Arab et leurs affluents dans l'Arabie turque;

(*c.*) D'entrer en négociations avec le Gouvernement ottoman en vue d'un arrangement ayant pour objet la formation d'une société anglo-germano-turque, qui assumerait l'actif et le passif, ainsi que les contrats de la société formant l'objet des présents statuts;

(*d.*) De vendre, transférer, louer, échanger, tout ou partie d'entreprises, biens ou propriétés quelconques ou droits de quelque nature que ce soit, appartenant, à n'importe quelle époque, à la société, d'en céder ou concéder l'usage ou l'exploitation, et ce, de telle manière et à tels termes et conditions et pour tel effet et pour tel équivalent que la société jugera opportun;

(*e.*) De faire, enfin, tout ce qui est nécessaire ou se rapporte aux fins précités.

La société pourra également s'occuper d'autres opérations non énumérées ci-dessus, pourvu que les décisions y relatives soient prises à l'unanimité des actionnaires réunis en assemblée générale.

Le capital social est fixé à 2,500,000 fr. représenté par 5,000 actions de 500 fr.

Les 5,000 actions sont souscrites et libérées de 10 pour cent par les comparants suivants:—

Deutsche Bank	2,497
M. N. Charles Helfferich	1
Otto Riese	1
Conrad-Auguste Bischoff	1
Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	2,497
Mr. Henry Finnis Blosse Lynch	1
Mr. Frederick William Parry	1
Sir Charles Archibald Nicholson	1

Le premier bilan sera arrêté au 31 décembre, 1913, et la première assemblée générale annuelle aura lieu le troisième mardi de juin 1914.

La répartition du bénéfice net annuel est arrêtée comme suit par les statuts:—

1. 5 pour cent pour la réserve légale;
2. La somme nécessaire pour attribuer à chaque action un premier dividende de

5 pour cent l'an, prorata *temporis*, sur le montant dont elle se trouve libérée par un versement appelé.

Le solde est réparti comme suit :—

10 pour cent au conseil d'administration et au collège des commissaires ;
90 pour cent aux actions.

Toutefois, déduction faite des montants revenant respectivement au conseil d'administration et au collège des commissaires, le conseil d'administration peut proposer à l'assemblée générale d'affecter tout ou partie de ce solde, soit à un report à nouveau, soit à la formation d'un fonds spécial de réserve ou de prévision.

Les administrateurs sont : MM. le Conseiller intime Dr. Charles Helfferich, directeur de la Deutsche Bank, à Berlin ; Henry Finnis Blosse Lynch, à Londres ; Frederick William Parry, directeur général de la Société Lynch Brothers, à Londres ; Conseiller intime Dr. Otto Riese, de la Société Philopp-Holzmann, à Francfort-sur-le-Mein.

M. Théodore-Marie Hegener, docteur en droit, à Bruxelles, et Mr. Georges Clarke, expert-comptable, à Londres, sont nommés commissaires.

La constitution de cette société appelle quelques explications.

On se rappelle qu'à la séance du 9 juillet (N.S.) de la Chambre des Députés, Djavid Boy, ex-Ministre intérimaire des Finances, avait été amené, au cours de la discussion du budget de ce département, à faire quelques déclarations fort intéressantes relativement à la navigation sur le Tigre et l'Euphrate. Résumons en quelques mots ces déclarations : la Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad a le droit d'après l'article 9 de son acte de concession de faire transporter les matériaux de construction et autres, nécessaires pour la construction et l'exploitation de la ligne, ainsi que les agents et ouvriers, sur le Chatt-el-Arab, le Tigre et l'Euphrate, avec des navires à vapeur ou à voiles ou autres embarcations qui seront procurées ou louées par la société, mais ce, pendant la durée de la construction seulement.

On sait que la navigation fluviale en Mésopotamie est assurée aujourd'hui par l'Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company ou Compagnie Lynch et par l'Administration ottomane, mais les moyens de transport dont disposent l'une et l'autre se trouvent limités pour la Compagnie Lynch par son acte de concession, pour l'Administration ottomane par le manque de crédits, en même temps que par une organisation défectueuse. La Société du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, peu désireuse d'entreprendre elle-même le transport de ses matériaux et matériel, ne pouvait dans ces conditions qu'arriver à une entente avec la Compagnie Lynch ; c'est ce qui fut fait, les deux contractants devant acheter conjointement de nouveaux bateaux. C'était la base de la future Société de Transports fluviaux en Orient. Mais le Gouvernement ottoman protesta, se basant tant sur les termes de la concession Lynch que sur ceux de l'acte de concession du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, et c'est alors que fut proposée une nouvelle combinaison, d'après laquelle l'accord à deux devait devenir un accord à trois, comprenant l'Administration ottomane, la compagnie anglaise et le groupe allemand.

Cette combinaison n'est pas encore devenue définitive, mais elle est prévue de façon précise dans l'acte constitutif de la Société des Transports fluviaux en Orient, dont nous avons indiqué l'objet ci-dessus.

Il y est dit en effet que la société poursuivra des négociations avec le Gouvernement ottoman en vue d'un arrangement ayant pour objet la formation d'une société anglo-germano-turque qui assumerait l'actif et le passif, ainsi que les contrats de la société qui vient d'être constituée. Ainsi donc, la Société des Transports fluviaux en Orient n'a qu'un caractère transitoire et est destinée à être remplacée par une société nouvelle, dès qu'un accord sera intervenu avec le Gouvernement ottoman.

[34849] **No. 139.**

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 685.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on the disturbed state of the tribes in the district of Montific.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 139.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Bussorah, July* 5, 1912.

REPORTS from Montifie state that the Mutessarif of Nasrieh has destroyed all the mud forts of the tribes near Suk-es-Shiyukh and Nasrieh. It is also reported that most of the Montifie tribes have joined in a refusal to pay Government taxes or the proprietary shares of the lands which they cultivate.

It appears that the troops now in Montifie are too few to keep the tribes in order.

I am also informed that, about ten days ago, the El Ibrahim tribes fought with other tribes above Nasrieh. Soldiers were dispatched to the scene of the conflict by steamer, and killed, so it is said, fifty men of the El Ibrahim tribes, and two soldiers were wounded.

Orders have been received from the Ministry of Finance for a new cadastre of the date gardens from Kurna to Fao. The vilayet has allocated the sum of £ T. 3,000 for the purpose, and the work is to begin on the 1st October, 1328.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[34850] **No. 140.**

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 686.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting on the recent Italian naval operations in Yemen waters and the blockade of the Yemen coast.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, June* 22, 1912.

DURING the past quarter, besides extending the blockade of the Yemen coast some 30 miles to the north of Ras Isa, so as to include the ports of Salif and Lohoia and the island of Camaran, the Italian squadron stationed in these waters has not shown any very great activity against the Yemen littoral.

The Italian policy has been to play the rebellious tribes in this province, more especially those professing allegiance to the Pretender Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee, against the Turks, rather than that of assuming the offensive.

This has been effected by stationing a naval force along the littoral within the sphere of the Pretender's influence, and thus compelling restriction of the Turkish military operations against the latter to the interior only ; also by supplying the Pretender referred to above with guns, rifles, ammunition, stores, and even money, to enable him to hold his own against the strong force concentrated to the east of Lohoia, whose object is to crush him.

It is believed that two six-gun mountain batteries, some old brass pieces of artillery, a few thousand rifles, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores, have been landed at Ghezan, Midi, and other places from Italian war-ships, and removed inland for the use of the Idrisee rebels against the Turks.

Recently, according to reports to hand, two big field guns were disembarked from an Italian cruiser at the ports of Ghezan and Midi respectively for the same purpose.

It is estimated that during the months of March, April, and May, over 100,000 Maria Theresa dollars have been supplied by the Italians to Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee to meet the expenses of the operations of his followers in the revolt raised by him.

The above facts, that are known to and admitted by the local authorities, have received confirmation from a reliable Italian source.

Early in March two Italian war-ships bombarded the port of Midi, where an old fort accommodated the garrison of sixty or eighty men. The bombardment was accompanied by a simultaneous attack by the insurgents on land, who found no difficulty in overwhelming the small Turkish force and capturing it. The fort was razed to the ground.

Shortly afterwards the Italian ships conducted a desultory and ineffective bombardment of the military outpost at Loheia.

The presence of the big expeditionary army in the vicinity, and the loyalty of the neighbouring tribes that had previously been bought off, kept the partisans of Seyyid Idriseo at bay.

The object of the Italians was to bring about the fall of Loheia by a land attack, and thereby pave the way to and facilitate an onslaught by the Idrisee hordes ultimately on Hodeidah.

On the 27th March, as has already been reported, the British steam-ship "Woodcock" was captured by the Italian cruiser "Elba" off Loheia, on suspicion of being engaged in transporting specie for the use of the Yemen administration. She was taken to Massawa, detained for a fortnight, and subsequently released, but only after the formal blockade of Salif had been announced, where she was expected to operate.

Prior to the extension of the blockade Italian war-ships cut the telegraph cable between the Island of Camaran and the Arabian mainland opposite, viz., at Salif.

The above cable, it might be mentioned, was laid down some fifteen years ago solely for the convenience of the important pilgrim traffic to the Hedjaz passing through the lazaretto established at Camaran.

The extent of the utility of this cable otherwise, i.e., for administrative, military, or commercial purposes, is most insignificant.

It is anticipated that serious inconvenience will result to British shipping and pilgrims at Camaran during the approaching season owing to interruption of telegraphic communication with the outer world.

I would suggest that His Majesty's Government will make friendly representations to the Italian Government on the subject with a view to obtaining their consent to re-establish telegraphic communication between Camaran and Salif.

The Farsan Islands, where two companies of Turkish infantry and a detachment of gunners with two guns are stationed, have been practically blockaded for some time past by Italian war-ships, which have at the same time, however, indirectly assisted raids undertaken in dhows by Arabs from the mainland opposite on the civil officials and the garrison there.

Yesterday it was rumoured that the rebels had actually succeeded in capturing those islands, and that the garrison and Turkish officials had been made prisoners and removed to Midi.

This report needs confirmation.

Italian ships of war have been conspicuous by their absence of late from the blockaded port of Hodeidah. The greater part of their time has been spent further south, where they have been busy with their intrigues with the Zereneck tribesmen.

They found at Taif, a small anchorage about 15 miles to the south of Hodeidah, a certain Sheikh Ahmed Fatini, one of the numerous petty chieftains of the Zereneck clans, a willing listener to their overtures. The above-mentioned sheikh boarded the Italian war-ships lying off Taif on several occasions, during which he concluded an agreement with the Italians.

As one result of the arrangement arrived at, trading dhows and sambuks were thereafter permitted to discharge and load cargoes at Taif, notwithstanding the state of blockade prevailing, in return for facilities accorded by the sheikh for the export through the latter outlet of Yemen dhurra (a kind of millet) to Eritrean ports, where there was a pressing demand for same.

It was also understood that arms and ammunition would be imported through this medium for the use of the rebellious Arabs against the Turks.

An interpreter was disembarked from one of the ships of war and remained on shore at Taif to watch the dhow traffic.

During the months of April and May over fifty sailing craft arrived at the above place with cargoes of flour, rice, sugar, and general merchandise consigned to merchants at Hodeidah, Beit-el-Fakih, and Zebeed.

About 12,000 sacks in all of flour, rice, &c., reached this town through Taif during the above period for the use of the troops in this district.

It would appear, however, and naturally so, that the Italians in their agreement

with the Sheikh Ahmed Fatini, strictly debarred the introduction of food-stuffs likely to be applied for the use of the military authorities, but that personage had in the meantime played them false, in collusion with the supervising interpreter.

I am informed by a local trader that every dhow that called at Taif had at least sixty to eighty bags of flour hidden underneath the general cargo that alone was visible on inspection.

Freights ranging between 3 and 5 dollars, Maria Theresa (i.e., from 6s. to 10s.), per sack of flour, and rice weighing about 2 or 2½ cwts. were paid on shipments of these articles from Aden to Taif, where they were debarked under the guarantee of the sheikh and thence transported by camel to Hodeidah and other places.

In spite of the blockade a brisk illicit traffic thus sprung up under the eyes of the Blockading ships, and the import trade in flour, rice, sugar, and other commodities that is almost solely in the hands of British Indian merchants at Hodeidah passed in this manner, thanks to the Italians and their foresight, into the hands of contraband Arab traders, who assiduously responded to the demands of the military department for supplies for the big force stationed in this province.

The local authorities intimated to the customs during the conduct of the illicit traffic at Taif that it was not desirable to collect duty on goods debarked at Taif, which therefore entered duty free. This gave the Arabs an additional stimulus to introduce merchandise, chiefly flour and rice, especially as a very favourable market offered for them at Hodeidah.

General Seyyed Pasha, commanding the troops in the Tehema, in a conversation mentioned to me the fact that he had received six months' supplies for the expeditionary army concentrated near Zahra, owing to the ill-advised arrangement between the Italians and the Sheikh Ahmed Fatini.

Shipments of coffee, hides, and skins were also permitted to leave the country in sailing craft through Taif, and even passengers found the latter port a convenient medium of exit from the area under blockade.

An Arab merchant who sailed from Taif in a dhow with a cargo for Aden some little time ago, informed me that the vessel was stopped and examined by an Italian man-of-war lying off Taif, but was permitted to continue her voyage.

It has now transpired that the Italian war-ships have at last been made acquainted, through the instrumentality of the counter-intrigues of one Mahomed Yahya, the chief of all the Zereneck clans, with the fact of their ally and protégé Ahmed Fatini playing them false by assisting in the importation of food-stuffs for the Turkish garrisons in the Yemen.

A few days ago a fleet of fourteen or fifteen sailing craft laden with merchandise appeared as usual off Taif, but were fired on by the Italian guardship that succeeded in sinking two vessels and capturing two or three others, the remainder making good their escape southwards.

On the 18th April, the cruiser "Piemonte" that had arranged to convey the wife of the American consular agent to Massawa, embarked other foreign subjects who desired to leave Hodeidah, five of whom were British.

Similarly, the cruiser "Puglia" that, on the 5th May, under arrangements made at Aden, called to embark a Swiss gentleman, granted passages to some eleven British Indians to Massawa.

During the night of the 11th May, the local guardship arrested a vessel (nationality not known) passing the port, but released her after a detention of two days.

Towards the end of April, reports were received here of an Italian bombardment of Cunfuda, combined with an attack on land by the Idrisee rebels.

While details are lacking, it is clear that very little damage was done to the town through the bombardment, and that the insurgents on land were repulsed with heavy losses.

On the 27th May, a boat from one of the Italian ships of war, while coming on shore at Khoka, was fired on by the Arabs and compelled to return after it had a few casualties.

The cruiser present then shelled the port and the village. Three sambuks are reported to have been sunk.

The bombardment of Khoka was repeated a few days later for some reason or other.

In conclusion, it will be seen from my survey of the Italian naval operations in these waters during the past few months, that while a blockade of the Yemen coast between well-defined limits was declared in January last and notified officially to the

Powers by the Italian Government, vessels of war belonging to that Government have, in virtue of some secret arrangement concluded with the local sheikhs, during two months, and contrary to international law and usage, connived at the dhow traffic at a port well within the blockade zone, to the detriment chiefly of British shipping and commercial interests in this quarter.

There is strong evidence locally in support of the allegation made above, and persons who have left from, and arrived at, Taif have declared that they were stopped and examined by ships of the blockading squadron lying off Taif, but allowed to pass.

I am of opinion that serious grounds exist for a protest on the part of His Majesty's Government in view of the facts furnished in this report, that tend to nullify the legality of the blockade proclaimed by the Italians.

I further venture to observe that the latter measure which Italy has thought fit to impose only against this outlying part of the Ottoman dominions, where British interests predominate if they cannot be said to be exclusive, however consistent with her belligerent rights, while it cannot influence the course of the war, and can but strike her enemy in a very ineffective manner, reacts in a manner strongly prejudicial to British commerce and navigation.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[34855] No. 141.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 691.)
Constantinople, August 14, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 532 of the 22nd June last, respecting the difficulties experienced by the Bagdad Railway Company in connection with land purchase for their depôt at Bussorah, I have the honour to report that I learn from Mr. Consul Crow that he has heard from the German consul that the question of the registration of their land has now been settled, and that it will be registered in the name of an Ottoman subject who is employed as an engineer by the company. As regards the river frontage, a small portion of it has been reserved by the local authorities to their own use, but the company are to have the use of the remainder.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[33027] No. 142.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 19.)

India Office, August 17, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter dated the 8th August, 1912, regarding the proposed Shatt-el-Arab conservancy commission, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to say that clause 5 of the draft convention appears to him to be satisfactory as it stands, since it secures that two of the principal officials of the commission shall be British subjects. Whether one of them shall be an officer of the Royal Navy is a matter for arrangement, but it might be well to add, should opportunity offer, "and shall be selected from candidates suggested by the Government of His Britannic Majesty," as in clause 3. This amendment seems preferable to that proposed by the Admiralty, since the latter does not make it clear what port is intended, and it seems, moreover, less likely that the Turkish Government would agree to it.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[35223] No. 143.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, August 19, 1912.

FAISANT suite à la note du 15 de ce mois, l'Ambassade Impériale ottomane attire l'attention du Foreign Office sur un nouveau bombardement de la ville de Hodeidah par les navires de guerre italiens le 15 courant, au cours duquel des projectiles tombèrent près de l'hôpital et cinq personnes furent blessées.

L'Ambassade Impériale, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, proteste contre cette nouvelle infraction aux règles internationales établies interdisant le bombardement de places non fortifiées.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 19 *août*, 1912.

[34828] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 497.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1912.

MY telegram No. 675 of 19th August to St. Petersburgh: Turco-Persian frontier.

There is no need to defer proposed action at Mohammerah pending joint communication at Tehran.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 676, and Constantinople, No. 451.)

[34828] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 675.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram No. 458 of 17th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Joint communication of Mohammerah maps was made to Persian Ambassador at Constantinople by Mr. Shipley and M. Minorsky on 14th August. At the same time they urged unconditional Persian acceptance of explanatory note without further delay.

Please suggest to Russian Government that British and Russian Ministers should take similar action at Tehran immediately.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 496, and Constantinople, No. 450.)

[35123] No. 146.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 363. Confidential.)
Paris, August 16, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to your despatch No. 380 of the 12th instant, that I, to-day, informed the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the observations made by you to the Italian Ambassador in London in regard to the future disposal of the islands in the Ægean Sea which have been occupied by the Italian forces during the present war, as recorded in your despatch No. 178 of the 6th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

M. Paléologue undertook at my request to take note of what was said, for the information of M. Briand and M. Poincaré. He promised that a reply would be sent in a few days, after he had seen M. Briand, but said that he was able to state at once that the French Government was in complete accord with the views expressed by you, and he was sure they would consider it most opportune that you had held such language to the Marquis Imperiali.

Speaking personally, he said that France was absolutely opposed to the annexation of any island by Italy, and though he did not credit the Italian Government with any such intention, he thought it well that the Italian Government should be aware of the views held by other Powers, as he feared that public opinion in Italy might come

to favour the retention of the islands and bring pressure to bear on the Italian Government.

As regards handing back the Christian populations of the islands to Turkish rule, he was of opinion that the Powers, if they wished to avoid the creation of new Cretes, would have to be satisfied with promises from the Turkish Government to refrain from reprisals, and he considered any change in the status of islands under Turkey as out of the question.

M. Paléologue added, for my confidential information, that the French Government had very good ground for believing that the German Government, as long as a month ago, had made known at Rome in unmistakable terms the dissatisfaction with which they would view the annexation of any of the islands, and had at the same time warned the King of Greece not to cherish any false hopes of Greece deriving benefit from the Italian occupation, stating in each case that Germany regarded the question of the islands as an European one, and their restoration to Turkey as necessary.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[35246] No. 147.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 19, 1912.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 403 of 6th August.

My very scanty knowledge of conditions on frontier makes me hesitate to make any suggestion as to what cession is now practicable, and I am therefore consulting His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad.

Mr. Shipley, however, points out that valleys of Kileh, Shahine, and Dereh were awarded by mediating commissioners to Persia as compensation for cession to be made by her to Turkey under the commissioners' line at Mohammerah. As the latter cession was never made, the valleys might revert to Turkey (see Colonel Williams's No. 2 of 21st January, 1852).

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 504, andSt. Petersburgh, No. 698.)

[35417] No. 148.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 675 of 19th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs raised no objection as to communication of maps, but said that he understood that Persian delegates had already accepted explanatory note unconditionally. Before, therefore, giving me definite answer, he would like to know your reason for wishing now to urge its acceptance at Tehran.

[34319] No. 149.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram, dated the 13th August, from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, furnishing the views of His Majesty's consul at Bussorah on articles 6, 16, and 17 of the draft convention for the establishment of a Shatt-el-Arab navigation commission.

Sir E. Grey is at a loss to understand why Mr. Crow, to whom, according to the records of this department, a copy of the original draft was sent in May, has deferred his comments until the middle of August.

It will be observed that Mr. Crow does not consider the "police clauses" (articles 6 A and 17) to be of practical utility; and that he would prefer to see the hands of the local authorities strengthened rather than devolution of those duties to the

proposed commission; while he would apparently prefer that the commission should correspond, in regard to such duties as may be entrusted to it, through the local authorities and not direct with the Central Government.

Sir E. Grey is fully prepared to attach due weight to the views of those who have local experience, but he understands that the clauses in question were inserted on the strong recommendation of Rear-Admiral Sir E. Slade, who also has local experience, and he does not consider that the attitude of the Turkish local authorities during the past century has been indicative of a desire to encourage freedom of navigation or to promote the general interests of trade.

Moreover, if article 16 is to be modified, and if the commission has to correspond through the local authorities, the latter may attempt to control the funds of the commission and to divert them to unauthorised purposes.

While Mr. Crow urges that the police arrangements should not be entrusted to the commission in order that they may be performed by the Turkish local authorities, it will be recollected that Sir P. Cox, in his telegrams of the 4th April and the 23rd May, has also urged that they should not be entrusted to the commission, his object being to secure the continuance of the police jurisdiction at present exercised on the river by the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Sir E. Grey considers that it would be difficult in practice to induce the Sheikh of Mohammerah to abandon to the Turkish local authorities that police jurisdiction on the river which he at present exercises *de facto*, and that the devolution of the jurisdiction to the commission is likely to prove a more workable compromise.

He would be glad to be furnished with the views of the Secretary of State for India on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35430] No. 150.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Athens, August 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in original, a communication addressed to His Majesty's Legation by the "Administrative Committee of the Free Island of Icaria," dated the 20th July (2nd August).*

It states that the inhabitants of the island, numbering 18,000, together with the adjoining island of Fournoi, all Greeks, on the 30th and 31st ultimo ejected the Turkish garrison and officials, and deported them to Asia Minor.

The committee further declare that the one desire of the people of Icaria is to be united to Greece, and implore the Great Powers, if they are not at present disposed to grant this, at least not to allow the island to be reoccupied by Turkey.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[35518] No. 151.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 321.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 22, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Hodeidah, dated 20th August:—

"Italian ship yesterday shelled military posts. Town, also old northern fort, slightly damaged; few casualties among Arabs.

"Great uneasiness prevails, as Italian action is inciting Arabs in vicinity to take reprisals against Europeans and Christians generally.

"Strongly recommend that one of His Majesty's ships be stationed at Camaran for protection of British life and property at Hodeidah, especially as great delay will be experienced in summoning it from elsewhere, owing to interruption of telegraphic communication.

"Local authorities are doing their utmost, but I am afraid they are not now in a position to afford the required protection."

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* Not printed.

[35417] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 706.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 297 of 21st August: Turco-Persian frontier.

My proposal respecting communication at Tehran was based on your Excellency's telegrams Nos. 259 and 262 of 27th and 28th July. If, however, the Russian Government consider it unnecessary to make any communication respecting "explanatory note" at Tehran, I have no desire to press the point. I assume, however, that Russian Government are satisfied that acceptance by Persian delegates at Constantinople fully covers acceptance by the Persian Government, and that latter will not subsequently disavow action of their delegates on the ground that it was *ultra vires*, thus following precedent of 1848.

I think that maps of Mohammerah frontier might be communicated to the Persian Government by the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 467, and Tehran, No. 510.)

[32552] No. 153.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo on the subject of an attempt on the part of the Vali of Bussorah to interfere in the affairs of Bahrein.

I am to state, in reply, that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view of the Secretary of State for India that a protest need not be made at Constantinople unless future developments indicate that it would be advisable.

Sir E. Grey also considers that the action proposed by the Government of India, in the last sentence of their telegram of the 28th July, would be expedient.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35922] No. 154.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 239. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, August* 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires has informed me that the Italian chargé d'affaires in Paris had, under instructions from the Marquis di San Giuliano, enquired of the political director at the Quai d'Orsay whether a denial might be given to a rumour to the effect that Great Britain and France had come to an agreement regarding common naval action with a view to preventing further Italian operations in the Ægean. M. Paléologue replied that Great Britain and France had not contemplated putting any check on Italian operations in the Ægean, but that their views were in such close agreement that they would take common action to defend their interests in the Near East in the event of these being endangered.

The French chargé d'affaires further informed me that the German and Austro-Hungarian chargés d'affaires had semi-officially asked M. Paléologue whether there were any truth in a report that Great Britain, France, and Russia had come to a formal agreement regarding the protection of their interests in the Near East. The political director did not affirm or deny the existence of such an agreement, but observed that recent events had tended to modify the condition of things in the Mediterranean and Near East, and that the three Powers had taken counsel with one another as to how their political and naval interests might be best defended by a common naval policy.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[35533] No. 155.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 240.)
Sir, *Posillipo, August* 19, 1912.

I DULY communicated to the Italian Government the contents of Mr. Cheetham's telegram No. 44 of the 5th instant with regard to the inspection of pilgrims returning to the Soudan from the Hedjaz. In acknowledging the receipt of my note, the Minister for Foreign Affairs renews the request that every precaution may be taken to prevent reinforcements, disguised as pilgrims, being conveyed to the Yemen in British ships, and refers to the recent sale at Beirout to the Ottoman Government of a British steamship, which, it is alleged, will sail under the British flag with troops for the Yemen disguised as pilgrims.

Translation of his Excellency's note is enclosed herewith.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 155.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir R. Rodd.

(Translation.)
Sir, *August* 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 7th instant, in which you were good enough to inform me that all pilgrims, without distinction, shall on their return from Mecca have to present themselves at Suakin to undergo the prescribed inspection.

Seeing that in this note your Excellency has mentioned in particular pilgrims returning from Mecca, I beg to urge once more that it should also be made impossible to embark on ships flying the British flag, among the pilgrims bound for Mecca, Ottoman combatants in disguise destined to reinforce the Turkish troops in the Yemen.

In this connection I may add that, according to recent information, the British steam-ship "Alexander" has within the last few days been sold at Beirout to the Ottoman Government by the firm Rini, and is shortly to change its name but not its flag. On this ship, moreover, Turkish troops bound for the Yemen are to be embarked under the disguise of pilgrims.

I have already instructed the Royal Ambassador in London to bring this information to the knowledge of the British Government, and at the same time to express to it the confidence of the Royal Government that, to give effect to existing agreements, the British authorities will be at pains, should the necessity arise, to prevent the accomplishment of this and all similar projects.

I have, &c.
A. DI SAN GIULIANO.

[35650] No. 156.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 23, 1912.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 675 of 19th August and 706 of 22nd August.

Russian Minister at Tehran has been instructed to concert with Sir W. Townley as to proposed communication to Persian Government. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs considers this step all the more opportune in view of fact that Persian Government have instructed delegates not to accept explanatory note.

[35252] No. 157.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 23, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your recent interview with Mr. Parker, of the Eastern Department of this Office, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for the confidential information of your board and of Mr. D'Arcy, the accompanying copy of the convention concluded in July 1904 by the Anatolian Railway Company with the Civil List at Constantinople.[a]

Sir E. Grey understands that a group, composed of the Deutsche Bank, the National Bank of Turkey, and the Shell Transport Company is now engaged in seeking to bring about the confirmation by the Turkish Government of the concession contained in the above convention, with a view to exploiting the oil deposits of the vilayet of Mesopotamia. It is not clear whether the convention conferred a monopoly to work all the oil deposits of the two vilayets.

I am to enquire whether the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Mr. D'Arcy would welcome their association with the above group. Sir E. Grey is by no means sure that such association would be feasible, but, in the event of its being desired by your friends, it might be possible for this department to approach the National Bank of Turkey unofficially on the subject, and to offer the promoters diplomatic support at Constantinople in the event of British interests being adequately represented in the syndicate.

I am to add that this proposal has no direct relation to the rights of your company in the vicinity of Kasr-i-Shirin.

I am to ask for an early reply.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35733] No. 158.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, August 23, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of to-day, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams which have been sent to the Commanders-in-chief, East Indies and Mediterranean, respecting affairs at Hodeidah.

I have, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 158.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

Admiralty, August 23, 1912.

OWING to request from consul at Hodeidah, Fox has been dispatched from Aden to Camaran with orders to report on situation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 158.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

Admiralty, August 23, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

CONSUL, Hodeidah, asks for ship to be stationed outside limit of blockade, at Camaran in case Arabs should make reprisals on Christians for Italian bombardment Hodeidah.

Send "Fox," as requested, to report on situation, but not to remain. Unless services urgently and clearly required, she is not to enter area of blockade.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, informed.

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[a] Convention of July, 1904.

[35806] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 304.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August* 24, 1912

YOUR telegram No. 609 of 6th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

I have received *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government in reply to my representations based on your instructions in above telegram. *Aide-mémoire* states that Russian Ambassador at Constantinople maintains the justice of Persian interpretation of article 3 of Treaty of Erzeroum, and is of opinion that Anglo-Russian joint note of 10th August, 1849, which specially concerns the question of Kotur, cannot be considered as supporting the Turkish view.

As regards Persian concessions in Zohab, Russian Ambassador considers that it would be premature to discuss either this question at present or that of the cession of territory in Russian sphere of influence. Russian Government concur, more especially in view of alarm of the Persian Government at the rumour of such concessions. *Aide-mémoire* encloses copy of note presented to Porte by Russian Ambassador (see Mr. Marling's telegram No. 323 of 23rd August), and concludes by expressing the hope that His Majesty's Government will give support to his action.

Copy of *aide-mémoire* follows by post.

[35813] No. 160.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, August* 24, 1912.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 321 of 22nd August.

Secretary-general assures me that no operations against Dardanelles are contemplated.

[35733] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 491.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 321 of 22nd August: Hodeidah.

Please inform consul that His Majesty's ship "Fox" has been ordered to Camaran to report on situation, but not to remain there or enter blockaded area unless satisfied that services are urgently required.

[35518] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1912.

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 321 of 22nd August: Hodeidah.

Your Excellency should make friendly representations to the Italian Government and point out the great danger to Europeans and Christians which these incidents involve. From the last sentence of telegram they will see that the danger is a real one, and that the local authorities are practically powerless.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 489.)

[35027] No. 163.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 26th June and of the 1st August, respecting the draft convention for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab.

As regards your earlier letter, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the commissioner who is, according to the draft convention, to be a British subject, should be an officer of political and consular experience, as his most important duties will concern diplomatic questions of much delicacy.

With regard to your letter of the 1st August, I am to state that Sir E. Grey was under the impression that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had been represented by Rear-Admiral Sir E. Slade on the recent interdepartmental committee which revised the draft convention, and he is accordingly disappointed to learn that the addition made to article 5 of the draft convention does not meet with their Lordships' approval. I am, however, to point out that it would be altogether impracticable, and, indeed, inconsistent with Turkish sovereignty on the Shatt-el-Arab, to stipulate for the appointment of "a naval officer with independent status on the staff of the commission." Such an officer, if appointed, would have to be subordinate to the commissioners.

I am to add that, after consultation with the Secretary of State for India, clause 5 of the draft convention appears to Sir E. Grey to be satisfactory as it stands, since it secures that two of the principal officials under the commissioners shall be British subjects; though he is prepared, should opportunity offer, to add the words "and shall be selected from candidates suggested by the Government of His Britannic Majesty." This amendment would appear preferable to that suggested in your letter, since the latter does not make it clear what port is intended; and it seems, moreover, less likely that the Turkish Government would agree to it.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[35808] No. 164.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, August 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 303 of 23rd August: Concessions in disputed territory on Turco-Persian frontier.

Aide-mémoire from Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that, while adhering in principle to views expressed in your telegram No. 696 of 21st August, Russian Government consider that it would not be advisable to make proposed declaration at present, as it has been agreed to insist, as far as possible, on maintenance of *status quo* of 1848 along the whole of the Turco-Persian frontier, and that a communication in sense suggested might weaken effect of line thus taken in holding out to Porte hope of possible concession in its favour.

[35873] No. 165.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 258.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 19, 1912.*

IN accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your despatch No. 274 of the 12th instant, I informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th instant of the language which you had held to the Italian Ambassador on the subject of the Ægean Islands.

In a conversation which I had with M. Sazonof on the preceding day, his Excellency told me that M. Poincaré had spoken to him of a report which had reached him to the effect that the Italians intended to keep Rhodes altogether and to remain in occupation of the other islands till they were invested with some kind of autonomous régime. M. Poincaré had remarked on the undesirability of creating a number of little Crotes in the Ægean, and had said that the question, which was causing him serious preoccupation, was one on which we should have to exchange views.

M. Sazonof held very similar language to me as that which you held to the Marquis Imperiali.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[35861] No. 166.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 704.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 686 of the 14th August, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Jeddah reporting on the defeat of Seyyid Idrissi by the Imam Yahya, and on the captures of dhows effected by the Italian forces in the Red Sea.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 166.

Vice-Consul Shipley to Mr. Marling.

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Jeddah, August 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to information received here, a fight took place between Seyyid Idrissi and the Imam Yahya a fornight ago at Abbas, near Port Medi, which lasted three days, and in which the former was defeated, losing 140 killed and 100 prisoners.

It is also reported that the Italian war-ships captured 200 dhows conveying food-stuffs into Hodeidah. Of these over 100 belonged to Turkish subjects and were taken to Massowah and burnt; the rest were beached near Hodeidah and their contents left to rot.

I have, &c.
AVALON SHIPLEY.

[36087] No. 167.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 26, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs read to me to-day a telegram which he had received from Russian chargé d'affaires in London on the subject of agreement which Lynch has concluded with German bank. He was, he said, disagreeably surprised to hear that His Majesty's Government had raised no objections and had treated it as a matter that was of no political importance.

After the Potsdam conversations he had been taken severely to task for having agreed not to obstruct construction of Bagdad Railway. He had done so because it was not in the power of Russian Government to prevent line being built. Agreement now signed went much farther, as it directly facilitated the construction of the railway by placing the Lynch steamers at the disposal of the company for the transport of railway material. Result would be to accelerate construction of the line, and thus would place Russian Government in a very embarrassing situation. According to Russo-German agreement, they were bound to commence Khanikin–Tehran line within two years from the completion of line from Sadijeh or eventually to allow Germans to construct it. When they signed this agreement they believed that railway would not reach Bagdad for five or six years, but now this period might be considerably shortened. This was a very important side to the question, which, he regretted to say, had escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government.

[36090] No. 168.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August 26, 1912.*

HAVE made friendly representations to Italian Government in sense of your telegram No. 261 of 24th August.

Secretary-general does not believe that there is any intention further to bombard

Hodeidah. He pointed out that situation was difficult for Italy. Whenever she tried to inflict damage by bombardment she was met on all sides by friendly remonstrances, and was thereby prevented from action by which she hoped to bring Turkey to terms. She had, however, no desire to cause casualty or loss to subjects of friendly Powers, and he promised to call attention of proper authorities to present representations.

[35806] No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 745.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 304 of 24th August, last paragraph, and 306 of 25th August: Turco-Persian frontier.

I am not anxious to be precipitate in making any communication to Turkey as to possible territorial concessions in her favour, but I consider it very desirable that we should arrive now at a complete understanding with Russia as to the general lines of settlement.

I think we shall have considerable difficulty in inducing Turkey to agree to the maintenance of the *status quo* of 1848 along the whole frontier, since the protocol of December 1911 expressly laid down that the Treaty of Erzeroum was to be the basis of discussion, and article 2 of that treaty allocated a portion of Zohab to Turkey, and that portion has not been evacuated by Persia to this day.

North of Zohab province I agree that there is more justification for insisting as far as possible on *status quo* of 1848, but can we ignore terms of Treaty of Erzeroum in deciding about Zohab province? If we insisted on *status quo* there I doubt if we could induce Turkey to waive reference to Hague Tribunal. The alarm of the Persian Government at the rumour of concessions in Zohab has no bearing on the legal claim of Turkey. How do Russian Government meet this argument?

As to Mohammerah, in overriding mediating commissioners' line, we are not departing from Treaty of Erzeroum, since mediating commissioners, as is apparent from the *procès-verbaux*, did not strictly adhere to that instrument. Please see Mr. Parker's memorandum of April last.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 534, and Constantinople, No. 503.)

[35813] No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 94 of 24th August: Hodeidah.

The danger appears rather to be due to the unrest created amongst the Arabs by the attacks on Hodeidah, not to any special operations in contemplation.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 507.)

[34855] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 303.)
Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 691 of the 14th instant reporting the completion of the purchase of land, including river frontage, by the Bagdad Railway Company at Bussorah or Maghil.

I am not sure from the terms of your despatch whether the purchase in question is at Maghil or at Bussorah, and whether, as the result of the purchase, the Bagdad Railway Company have become possessed of the whole river frontage at Bussorah, including the port, "with the exception of a small portion of it reserved by the local authorities to their own use, the company to have the use of the remainder."

I should be glad to receive precise information on this point, and I have to request you to instruct Mr. Crow to furnish a plan of Bussorah and Maghil, showing the precise location and extent of the purchase in question.

I should also be glad to know whether the freehold has been acquired in perpetuity, or whether the land is held on lease, and if so on what terms.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36215] No. 172.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 481.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tehran, August* 27, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Russian Minister has received instructions to make joint communication with me. May I do so on lines of your telegram No. 709 of 23rd August to St. Petersburgh, and shall I make any special allusion to Mohammerah section of frontier or communicate map? Minister for Foreign Affairs receives to-morrow, and is sure to ask questions.

[36225] No. 173.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 98)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, August* 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 254 of 17th August.

Italian Minister of Marine, although desirous not to impede pilgrim traffic or injure British shipping interests, cannot sanction [? passage] of launch, which would be an infraction of blockade and would disturb its efficacy.

[36087] No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 760.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 309 of 26th August: Bagdad Railway.

Under article 9 of their concession the Bagdad Railway Company are entitled to carry building materials for railway in their own vessels should they deem that course desirable; the fact that Messrs. Lynch, as members of the transport syndicate, are to assist in the purchase and provision of vessels does not mean that the railway will be completed more expeditiously than if Messrs. Lynch had stood aside. If Messrs. Lynch had not participated the Bagdad Railway Company would merely have bought vessels of their own, as they had the right to do under their concession. It would have been quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to have prevented a strictly commercial transaction of this kind. Indeed, it was so entirely a private commercial transaction and matter of routine that it was not referred to me personally till Russian chargé d'affaires spoke of it the other day. In the absence of any agreement with Germany or Turkey we are as little desirous as anybody to facilitate construction of Bagdad Railway, but this transaction was outside of our control and has no real effect on date at which railway will be completed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 515.)

[36215] No. 175.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 544.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 481 of to-day.

You can act in accordance with my telegram No. 709 of 23rd August to St. Petersburgh.

You can also communicate maps of Mohammerah frontier, either alone or in concert with your Russian colleague. You should explain that this is the frontier as locally observed for a century, and you should point out that it approximates more

closely to the line claimed by Persian delegate in 1850 than the line proposed by the mediating commissioners in that year. You should also say that in our view it is in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Erzeroum.

You should make no reference to the draft riverain convention.

(Repeated to Constantinople and St. Petersburgh.)

[36084] No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 353.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1912.

MY telegram No. 346 of 26th August: Filibustering expedition to Samos.

Admiralty ask what should be done with ship, if captured. To preclude repetition by other ships she might be interned at Suda Bay for some time, but ask view of French Government.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 756; Rome, No. 266; Canea, No. 141; Constantinople, No. 511; and Athens, No. 128.)

[36282] No. 177.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 27, 1912.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 730 of 24th August to St. Petersburgh.

Russian Ambassador adverted a few days ago to question of prolonging period of negotiation, and expressed himself strongly against it as calculated to encourage Turks to protract negotiations. I suggest that it would be better to reserve the proposed step as long as possible, and meanwhile to use shortness of time remaining as an argument to press Porte to accept frontier suggested by ourselves and Russia.

[36340] No. 178.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirout, August* 28, 1912.

ITALIAN squadron of six ships of war anchored off Beirout this morning. Panic in town.

[35533] No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 525.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1912.

FOLLOWING for His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout:—

"My despatch No. 1, Treaty, of 22nd August.

"Are there any grounds for supposing that Turkish combatants are being conveyed disguised as pilgrims to the holy places in British ships? If so, masters should be warned that such vessels are liable to visit and search and the men themselves to be taken off as prisoners."

(Repeated to Rome, No. 272, and Cairo, No. 57.)

[36381] No. 181[a].

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, August 28, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 28th instant, from the commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean station, relative to affairs in Crete.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 181[a].

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 28, 1912.*

CONSULAR body has requested that ships may be sent to Samos in view of fact that Cretan Government will not guarantee that filibustering expedition may not leave unexpectedly from along the coast of Crete. French Government has ordered "Bruix" to proceed to Samos. I am sending "Medea." Senior naval officer, Crete, considers it impossible to ensure stopping filibustering expedition in Cretan waters.

[35533] No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

PILGRIM traffic.

My telegram No. 525 of to-day to Constantinople was sent in consequence of complaint of Italian Government that British steam-ship "Alexander" has recently been sold to Ottoman Government at Beirout for transport of Turkish troops to Yemen disguised as pilgrims. Vessel will change name but not flag.

Italian Government urge that such proceedings should be made impossible. As Italian Government are showing some readiness to meet our wishes as to avoiding interference with pilgrim traffic so far as possible, could we on our part arrange that British ships carrying pilgrims, whether coming from farther east or through Suez Canal, are inspected at Suakin before proceeding to Jeddah, as well as on their return, so as to prevent any such abuse as Italian Government apprehend?

(Repeated to Rome, No. 273, and Constantinople, No. 526.)

[36298] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 292.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 28, 1912.*

THE Russian chargé d'affaires enquired on the 23rd instant, by instructions from his Government, whether, as reported in the "Echo de Paris," it was true that Messrs. Lynch had come to an agreement with the Deutsche Bank and Ottoman Government for the carriage of railway materials and men, &c., up the Shatt-el-Arab, and what such an agreement signified.

Sir L. Mallet said that the report was true, and that it was a purely commercial and temporary arrangement come to by Messrs. Lynch on their own initiation, that the firm had asked whether His Majesty's Government had any objection, and that they had replied in the negative. There was nothing of a political nature in the business, and it did not mean any more than it said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[36455] No. 182.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 96 of 26th August.

Secretary-general sent for me to-day to confirm his statement that Italian naval authorities have no further intention of bombarding Hodeidah at present. He asked me to telegraph that Italian vessels would be at the disposal of British subjects for the purpose of refuge and removal in case the danger from Arabs proved as imminent as His Majesty's Government anticipated.

I thanked him, and repeated that you feared that Arabs might be led to attempt massacre of Europeans and Christians.

[36477] No. 183.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 316.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, August 29, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 760 of 27th August: Bagdad Railway.

I have explained the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

While admitting that it would have been very difficult for His Majesty's Government to have acted otherwise, his Excellency maintained that effect of the agreement would be to accelerate construction of railway.

[36474] No. 184.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 342.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 29, 1212.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Beirout, 28th August :—

"Italian squadron of six ships anchored off Beirout this morning. Panic in town."

[36488] No. 185.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirout, August* 29, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.
Italian ships left this morning, making for the north.

[37224] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 536.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1912.

YOUR private letter of 21st August to Sir A. Nicolson.

It is desirable that you should push the Mohammerah negotiation in the manner you think most expedient, and you can make it clear that the frontier we have indicated forms an essential part of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf region, the continued observance of which is a condition of our assent to the customs increase.

The general negotiations respecting the Bagdad Railway, &c., will be carried on here.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 553, and St. Petersburgh, No. 777.)

[36476] No. 187.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 345.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, August* 30, 1912.

MY telegram No. 342 of 29th August.
Following from consular officer at Jaffa :—

"Italian men-of-war 'Ferruccio,' 'Contit' [?], and 'Garibaldi' arrived to-day, [?] and left."

[36598] No. 188.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 30, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul at Beirout, dated 29th August :—

"My telegram of yesterday.

"Italian ships left this morning, making for the north. Yesterday they inspected the papers of two British vessels, visited Russian and Austrian mail-steamers. ? Destroyed] and searched Turkish sailing-vessels. Prompt and effective measures taken by Governor-General and military authorities to prevent troubles by Moslems and movement of Christians, who have fled in numbers to [? consulate], and panic subsided."

[36674] No. 190*.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received August 31.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, August 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th August, Confidential, stating that Secretary Sir Edward Grey would be glad to receive information regarding an arrangement between the National Bank of Turkey and the Deutsche Bank for working petroleum deposits in Turkey, and I have much pleasure in complying with this request.

For some time past negotiations have been in progress between the National Bank of Turkey, the Deutsche Bank, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company (representing a group which includes also the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the "Shell" Transport and Trading Company, and the Bataafsche Petroleum Company) for the purpose of establishing joint action with a view to the discovery and working of petroleum in Turkey.

These negotiations have now resulted in an agreement, and an English company is in course of formation. The company will be designated the Turkish Petroleum Co., Limited. One-half of its capital will be held by the National Bank of Turkey and the English group associated with it, one quarter by the Asiatic Petroleum Company and its group, and one quarter by the Deutsche Bank. The English group will appoint one-half of the board, including the chairman, who will have a casting vote.

The company is formed primarily for the purpose of exploration for petroleum, and its operations may extend to any part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia. The Deutsche Bank undertakes to make over to the company the rights relating to petroleum in Turkey which it possesses itself, or which are possessed by the Anatolian or Bagdad Railway companies.

In order that exploration and boring on a serious scale may be undertaken, it will be necessary either to obtain "permis de recherches" under the ordinary mining law, or to conclude special arrangements with the Ottoman Government.

If, in the course of the negotiations, it should be found necessary to ask for the support of the British Government, we hope that the request may meet with favourable consideration.

If the Secretary of State should desire any further information with reference to the proposed company or its intended operations I shall be happy to furnish it.

I have, &c.
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

[36599] No. 189.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 30, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reports that six Italian men-of-war appeared off Jaffa on morning of 27th August, that three left in a northerly direction in morning, and three, those mentioned in my telegram No. 345 of 30th August, followed later same day.

[33858] No. 190.

Foreign Office to Mr. F. L. Lightfoot.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 21st June, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he has been in consultation with His Majesty's representative at Constantinople in regard to your proposal for a railway scheme from Yumurtalik to Suleimanieh.

With regard to the points enumerated in your letter of the 6th June to Sir Clement Hill, I am to state that article 12 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of 1903 has not been annulled, but the Public Works Department of the Ottoman Government appear to consider that the article in question does not debar them from permitting the construction of a railway from Yumurtalik to the interior.

Sir E. Grey is unable to express any opinion as to whether the Turkish contention is sound in law.

As to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the project in question, I am to state that it must be influenced to some extent by the fact that a British syndicate is anxious to obtain a concession for the exploitation of minerals in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul. So long, however, as the project you have in view does not conflict with the interests of this syndicate His Majesty's Government will maintain a neutral attitude.

Sir E. Grey feels unable to go beyond this, especially as he gathers that the promoters of the Yumurtalik–Suleimanieh Railway represent for the most part foreign interests.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[36724] No. 191.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 31.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, August 31, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated this day, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 31, 1912.*

SCHEME for watching Samos coast in co-operation with Samos Government was drawn up the 30th August at a conference attended by the following: Prince of Samos and the officer commanding Turkish troops, the British and French consuls and senior naval officers of the two nations. A few local untrained gendarmerie were ordered to intervene at an excited demonstration, apparently anti-Turkish, to-day. Crowd immediately disarmed them, and one gendarme received severe knife wound.

About 60 Turkish troopers were then ordered to take posts, after which conference broke up.

Withdrawal of the Turkish troops will, it is said, be demanded at a large conference proposed to be held on Sunday. Serious consequences are apprehended if shots are fired during conference. As a sequel to to-day's demonstration one gendarme has been found killed in the Martello tower. Government, consisting of four senators and the Prince, complained bitterly to senior naval officer of the presence of Turkish troops in Samos, and requested him to put the case before the British Government. He referred them to the British consul. The arrival of the Russian consul-general from Turkey this morning appears to have excited the inhabitants, already aroused by presence of two men-of-war.

[36730] No. 192.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 350.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 31, 1912.

SIR R. RODD'S telegram No. 98 of 27th August.

His Majesty's vice-consul is officially appointed to Hodeidah and Camaran, and in these circumstances refusal of the Italian Government to allow him to travel between these places in boats flying the consular flag appears drastic. Would it not be possible in cases of necessity for Italian naval authorities to give him required facilities under such surveillance as they may deem requisite?

[36723] No. 193.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, August* 31, 1912.

"MEDEA" reports from Samos that yesterday commanders of British and French ships of war held conference with the Prince and officer commanding station regarding measures to be taken for watching the coast.

There was some popular excitement and disorder, and a local gendarme was seriously wounded while endeavouring to restore order. Subsequently another gendarme was found murdered in the town. Public meeting to demand withdrawal of Turkish troops is announced for to-day, which captain of His Majesty's ship fears might lead to serious disorders.

Samos senators [? are to] complain to captain of presence of Turkish troops.

Do you wish me to repeat news from Samos?

[36723] No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 381.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1912.

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 117 of the 31st August: Cretan expedition to Samos.

As foreign war-ships have gone to Samos for sole purpose of preventing expedition from landing we are instructing our commander not to land men even in event of disorders, and generally to abstain from all intervention in internal affairs of island.

Ask French Government to send similar instructions to commander of their ship.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 798; Rome, No. 281; Constantinople, No. 550; Canea, No. 147.)

[36736] No. 195.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 1, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Samos, dated 29th August:—

"His Majesty's ship 'Medea' arrived to-day. People here were much surprised to hear that Cretans intended landing at Samos. In case they [should] arrive, Samians would join them, and would no doubt compel the 500 Turkish troops stationed here to surrender. Everything is quiet at present."

[36765] No. 196.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 713. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 23, 1912.

ON the receipt of your despatch No. 271 of the 24th June, I requested the commercial attaché to this Embassy to endeavour to obtain a copy of the exact *tracé* of the new section of the Bagdad Railway between Eregli and the Euphrates River. Mr. Weakley now states that, though his efforts in this direction have not yet been successful, he has reason to believe that he will be able to obtain the document in course of time. Meanwhile, he informs me confidentially that, he has had an opportunity of consulting the engineer-in-chief of the Bagdad Railway, who surveyed the line between Eregli and Aleppo, and is at present in charge of the work of construction of the railway through the Taurus, as to the accuracy of the *tracé* shown in the new sections of the Kiepert map of Asia Minor, viz.:—

Section C 4, Kaiserije.
" D 4, Adana.
" D 5, Haleb.

The engineer, who is particularly anxious that it should not be known that he gives this Embassy any information, examined these maps very carefully and informed Mr. Weakley confidentially that the *tracé* was quite accurately shown on them, and that it was evident that the maps had been compiled from surveys and data supplied to Kiepert by the Deutsche Bank.

Mr. Weakley adds that the three tunnels now being pierced in the gorge of the Tchakit River are the:—

1. Belamadik Tunnel of 1,800 metres in length.
2. Tashdemmez Tunnel of 3,400 metres in length.
3. Hadj Kiri Tunnel of 2,100 metres in length.

The line will be carried through the Amanus Range by a tunnel 5,500 metres in length at Bagtcheh.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[36770] No. 197.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 719.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 25, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 249 of the 23rd July, I have the honour to report that, according to a telegram which I received last night from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, a party of eighty soldiers under a captain and lieutenant has been sent to act as frontier post at Zain, and Mr. Crow hears that this small force will be somewhat increased later.

There is of course nothing in this to which we can take exception, but I will take

an early opportunity of again repeating to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the representations which I have twice made to him on the subject of frontier posts on the east of the Shatt-el-Arab.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[36878] No. 198.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 253.)
Sir, *Rome, August 26, 1912.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 261 of the 24th instant, I saw the secretary-general of the Italian Foreign Office to-day, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, and pointed out to him that the recent bombardment by Italian vessels of the forts and military posts at Hodeidah was causing great uneasiness among the European community. The bombardment had stirred up feeling among the Arabs, who would be incited to make reprisals on European and Christian non-combatants.

In order to ensure security for these latter, I had been instructed to make these friendly observations, as His Majesty's Government had received information that, although the Turkish authorities had every desire to afford the necessary protection, they were practically unable to do so. His Majesty's Government were anxious that British lives and property should not be imperilled, but if these bombardments continued there was no knowing what might not happen.

Signor Bollati observed that the Italian position was one of great difficulty; they were at war with Turkey, and, owing to circumstances, found it next to impossible to inflict sufficient damage on her to bring her to terms. Whenever Italy had endeavoured to bombard Turkish forts her friends made representations and she was unable to continue. He cited Beirout as an example. Italy had no desire to endanger the lives and property of the subjects of friendly Powers, but war was war, and brought with it natural consequences which it was hard to avoid. He did not think, however, that there was any intention, so far as he knew, of further bombardment of Hodeidah, and he would not fail to bring the friendly representations of His Majesty's Government to the notice of the naval and military authorities.

I have, &c.
H. G. DERING.

[37002] No. 199.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, August 31, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated to-day, to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, August 31, 1912.*

YOUR 429.

Presence of ship at Samos is solely to prevent arrival of filibustering expedition from Crete. Commanding officer is to be careful to abstain from any interference in internal affairs.

[37000] No. 200.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

Sir, *Admiralty, August 31, 1912.*

IN reply to your letter of the 28th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state that my Lords concur that the commanding officers of the British and French men-of-war in Crete and at Samos can be left to use their discretion as to the method in which they execute their orders to prevent the arrival of a filibustering expedition at Samos.

2. My Lords presume that the Russian enquiry had reference to the legality of force being used by British and French men-of-war in the territorial waters of Samos, and that Sir E. Grey is of opinion that no difficulty need arise on this point.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[37058] No. 201.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 357.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 356 of 1st September.

Russian Ambassador has information that secret committee was formed in Samos to assist Cretan expedition.

[36723] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 117 of 31st August: Crete and Samos, last paragraph.

Yes.

[36730] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Dering.

(No. 285.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 350 of 31st August: His Majesty's vice-consul's journeys between Hodeidah and Camaran.

You should enquire of Italian Government in sense of last sentence.

[36200] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 410.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 289 of the 13th August, containing the views of Mr. Consul Crow on the proposed riverain commission for the Shatt-el-Arab, I caused the enclosed letter to be addressed to the India Office.*

I have now ascertained that the Secretary of State for India concurs with my conclusions respecting the recommendations of Mr. Crow.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* To India Office, August 31, 1912.

[36723] No. 205.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 31st August relative to the projected filibustering expedition from Crete to Samos, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea,* describing the situation in the latter island.

In view of the fact that the sole purpose for which foreign war-ships have proceeded to Samos is to prevent the landing there of the proposed expedition from Crete, it is desirable that the captain of His Majesty's ship "Medea" should not land men on the island even in the apprehended event of disorders occurring there, and should in general carefully abstain from intervention in its internal affairs.

Sir E. Grey has no doubt that the captain will act with complete discretion in this respect, but he would nevertheless suggest that, if the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty see no objection, he should, in order to strengthen his position, be furnished with categorical instructions to this effect.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, instructing his Excellency to ask the French Government to send similar orders to the commander of the French ship at Samos.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[37090] No. 206.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 122.)
Sir, *Athens, August 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in original, accompanied by a translation, a further communication from the "Executive Council of the Free State of Icaria," addressed to His Majesty's Minister, stating that they have taken as ensign a white cross on a blue ground, and requesting its recognition by His Majesty's Government.

This document was, I believe, left at the legation by one of the persons whose signature is affixed to it, Z. Moraitis, a lawyer habitually resident in Athens. Another signature, John N. Malachias, is that of a Greek who is said to live in Alexandria.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

Enclosure in No. 206.

The Executive Council of the Free State of Icaria to Sir F. Elliot.

(Translation.)
Excellency, *Icaria, August 3 (16), 1912.*

THE Island of Icaria, after revolting and casting off the abominable Turkish yoke, is free and self-administered for the good of civilisation, and composes a separate free State.

The free State of Icaria has voted that its flag shall be a white cross on a blue ground, and this as the symbol of a free State flies on all the public buildings of the State and on its vessels both public and private.

The whole of the commerce of the State is conducted by those vessels covered by the flag of the Icarian State, and its shores are guarded as far as possible in combination with the land garrison against any new Turkish attack on the State.

Believing in our right, and in the gracious protection of the revered British Government, we beg your Excellency to be kind enough to communicate the above to the revered British Government, whom we implore to recognise our flag and the

* No. 193.

right of the ships of the State to trade under that flag, and to defend themselves against Turkey, and to protect our flag.

We are respectfully the Executive Council of the Free State of Icaria.
(Eight signatures follow.)

[37127] No. 207.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 731.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah reporting on the course of the rebellion in the Yemen and Assyr.

The Constantinople press yesterday reproduced from Syrian newspapers a report, which is stated to come from Sana'a, to the effect that Seyyid Idriss had recently been heavily defeated at a place called Vazat.

Two Italian guns in possession of the rebels are said to have been put out of action, and the Seyyid is said to have destroyed fifty villages in his flight. It is added that the town of Siba is still invested by the Turkish troops under the command of Mohammed Ali Pasha.

It is impossible to verify this intelligence, and I give it for what it is worth.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 207.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22 E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, July 8, 1912.*

IT is some time now that I reported to your Excellency on the progress of the rebellion in the Tehema and Assyr under Seyyid Mohammed Idriss, which, I might mention, has assumed a more or less chronic form since the summer of last year.

The big Turkish expedition of last year under the command of the then Vali and Commander-in-Chief of the Yemen, Mohammed Ali Pasha, it might be recalled, received a severe check at the outset, in the *débâcle* that befell it at Geezan at the beginning of June in the same year.

Active operations were then suspended, and it was proposed to dispatch forces against the Pretender from Yemen and Assyr respectively in the following winter, and elaborate preparations with that object in view ensued.

Fresh troops were concentrated at Geezan to replace the remnants of Mohammed Ali's defeated and demoralised force.

A considerable quantity of condensed water, stores, and munitions were collected there, and it was hoped that the advance would have taken place in October last year.

The garrisons at Loheia, Zahra, and throughout the Zaidyia district were greatly strengthened.

At the same time, the Grand Shereef of Mecca and his son with a Turco-Arab force from the Hedjaz were engaged in subjugating the tribesmen in Assyr professing allegiance to the Pretender, and occupying the country between Cumfuda on the coast and Abha.

At the latter place, Suleiman Pasha, the Military Commander and Governor in Assyr, was making preparations for an advance towards Sabyeah, in co-operation with the armies expected from Geezan and Zahra respectively.

The outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war, and, incidentally, the total destruction of the Turkish Red Sea fleet and the complete interruption of their communications by sea, necessitating the abandonment of Geezan and the retreat of Mohammed Ali Pasha's force, firstly to Farsan and subsequently to Cumfuda, was another and still greater set-back to the contemplated operations against the Pretender.

It was always firmly believed locally that undercurrents of European intrigue were the principal factors at work in keeping the smouldering embers of the Idriss revolt alive during the past two years.

Events of the last eight months have more than justified the suspicions

entertained, and it is now established that Italy had been secretly urging Seyyid Mohammed Idriss on against the Turks before the war, as she has been assisting him openly since.

Towards the close of last year it was generally supposed that that Pretender was being deserted and gradually abandoned by his former adherents, and that he had been obliged to retire to his mountain fastness, far outside the reach of the Turks.

The evacuation of Geezan and its immediate occupation by his followers raised new hopes and encouraged the Pretender to return to Sabyeah and unfurl once more the banner of revolt.

Since then, the supply of guns, rifles, munitions, and money by the Italians has enabled him to prosecute with greater energy his endeavours to overthrow Ottoman authority in Northern Yemen and Assyr, and has, moreover, rallied to his standard the tribesmen in the Sabyeah, Beni Marwan, and Abs districts, by whom he had been forsaken previously.

The assistance thus lent to Seyyid Idriss by the Italians, and the recovery of his influence with the Arabs in the Tehema, have naturally caused the Yemen authorities not a little perturbation.

During the months of February and March, as has already been reported, 16 battalions of infantry, 2 batteries of mountain artillery, and 1 mitrailleuse company, under the command of General Hamdi Pasha, have been dispatched to Zahra, that is fifty miles to the north of Hodeidah and between three and four days' march from the rebels' stronghold at Sabyeah.

Two howitzers and a company of gunners were also moved to the front at the beginning of April.

The whole force concentrated for operations against the Pretender, including the garrisons at Loheia, consists of some 24 or 25 battalions of infantry with a total strength of between 7,000 to 8,000 men, 30 cannon, and 3 or 4 companies of mitrailleuses.

As has been reported in a previous despatch, Midi fell into the hands of the rebels early in March, after a bombardment of that town from the sea by Italian warships.

The garrison of sixty or eighty Turkish troops were forced to surrender and were removed to Sabyeah as prisoners.

Towards the end of March last, Mahmoud Nedim Bey, the acting vali, proceeded to Zahra with the object of interviewing the sheikhs and influential men in the Soleil, Wayidat, and Abs country, and endeavouring to purchase the co-operation of the tribes in that quarter against the Pretender. Mahmoud Bey returned to Hodeidah about the end of April, but it is doubtful whether his mission was attended by much success.

The Sheikh of Abs, whose tribe inhabits the country bordering on the Pretender's sphere of influence, stoutly declined the Turkish overtures and announced his intention to stand loyally by Seyyid Mohammed Idriss.

During the months of May and June some fighting took place between the rebels under Sheikh Yahya Ali Tawwab, chief of the Abs clans, who advanced into the Wayidat country, and the Arab loyalists under the principal chieftain of the latter district, Hadi Hajj, supported by a battalion of Turkish troops and two guns.

On one occasion the rebels were worsted and compelled to retire after suffering very heavy loss. They, however, returned some time afterwards with two guns that had been landed from an Italian warship at Geezan, and succeeded in regaining the lost position and in driving off the loyal tribesmen. The Turkish casualties in the last of these engagements are estimated at about 150.

Hamdi Pasha has not assumed the offensive for several reasons, having received instructions not to advance, but simply to hold the rebels in check for the time being and to prevent them from making a dash on Hodeidah. Amongst others, the fidelity of the tribesmen in his rear, *i.e.*, between Zahra and Hodeidah, is somewhat questionable.

Seyyid Mohammed Idriss has been in correspondence with the Zereneek clans, inviting their participation in the revolt against the Turks and assuring them of Italian active co-operation by sea.

Several emissaries from the Pretender to the tribes in Southern Tehema have from time to time been arrested by loyal sheikhs and seyyids and handed over to the authorities here.

So far, there are no signs of the Zereneek tribesmen responding to the call of their fellow-rebels in the north, which circumstance is due to the fact of their

having received heavy blackmail recently from the Yemen administration as the price of their neutrality.

Ample compensation has been demanded by and paid to their clans for confiscations effected against their property and sailing vessels during the past few years by the local customs in connection with the former's illicit trade in tombac, &c.

According to reports received here some little time ago, it would appear that a section of the rebels in Assyr, under one of the Pretender's lieutenants, attacked the garrison at Cunfuda simultaneously with the Italian bombardment of that port on or about the 29th April. The insurgents were badly beaten and put to flight.

About the same time, another band of rebels suffered severely during an encounter with a Turkish force in the vicinity of Abha.

News reached the local authorities early in May that Feysul Pasha, son of the Grand Shereef of Mekka, had left Taif with a strong Turco-Arab force and some guns to co-operate against the Idriss rebels.

Nothing definite appears to have been since accomplished by Feysul Pasha, who was reported to have arrived at Abha shortly afterwards and where he is still supposed to be.

It is inferred from information to hand at the end of June that on or about the 10th May thirty of forty of the Idrissites landed from dhows at Farsan and surrounded a mosque during the prayer hour. Some of the party then entered and seized a certain Sheikh Abdulla Soheil, the headman of the island, who with his followers had always assisted the local authorities in their defence of that place against the incursions of the rebels from the opposite adjacent mainland.

The above-mentioned sheikh had, moreover, refused to listen to the secret overtures of Seyyid Idriss, calling on him to surrender Farsan. He is now confined in the Pretender's stronghold.

As mentioned in my preceding despatch, the Farsan Islands for some months past have been practically blockaded by Italian warships, with a view to facilitate raids on them by the Idriss bands from Geezan and Midi.

Towards the end of May a force of armed Arabs with two guns were deputed from Midi to attack Farsan. They appeared off the islands in seven or eight large dhows and opened a bombardment on the garrison stationed there, that consisted of a battalion of regulars (Reg. 23, Bn. 1), 250 or 300 men strong, under the command of Adjutant Major Mohammed Seyyid.

The troops and civil officials, who were already in great straits, retired to the interior after a feeble resistance. The invaders thereupon landed and succeeded in cutting off the water supply of the garrison.

After a few days' further resistance the troops and officials surrendered to the rebels, when they were embarked in dhows and taken to Midi.

The capture of the Farsan Islands by the insurgents and the imprisonment of the civil officials and troops at Midi is now officially admitted.

It will thus be seen that since the war started the ports of Geezan, Midi, and Farsan have fallen into the hands of the Pretender. The latter, with the assistance of one, Mohammed Salim of the Erythrean Customs, whose services have been placed at his disposal by the Italians, it would appear, is now setting up a sort of administration at the above-mentioned ports, to which customs officials have also been appointed.

I hear that Geezan has been well fortified on the advice of the Italians.

The Sheikh of Midi, Mohammed Tahir, who has generally occupied the post of acting mudir at that place, is reported to be at the head of a rebel band in the Abs country.

A rumour to which the local authorities have always lent credance, and which has been current for some time past, is to the effect that the Zeidi Imam Seyyid Yahya Hamid-Uddin had agreed to dispatch a large force under one of his lieutenants, the famous Abu Naib, to Djebel Razeh, in the vicinity of the mountain frontier of the Pretender's sphere of influence, to co-operate with the Turkish troops and to intercept the Idriss's retreat to the mountains.

Although five months have now elapsed, there are no signs of Yahya's promises of aid materialising.

On the contrary, I am informed that Seyyid Mohammed Idriss and the rival imam, the Dhaiyani, have concluded an agreement to assist each other mutually and to take the offensive against Seyyid Yahya; further, that one of the latter's most powerful

leaders, Nasir Mabkooth, has been induced to secede from him and to make common cause with the allies above referred to.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[37166] No. 208.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, September 2, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 2nd instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to affairs in Crete (Samos filibustering expedition).

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 208.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September 2, 1912.*

SAMOS. General demonstration reported to be temporarily postponed. Population of island very excited. People and Government, except Prince, demand withdrawal of the garrison.

[37140] No. 209.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 2, 1912.*

LATEST report from His Majesty's ship "Medea" is that demonstration in Samos has been postponed, but great excitement still prevails.

In view of [deterring?] effects produced here by the presence of ships of war off Samos, I have told British senior naval officer that it would be a pity to recall His Majesty's ship "Medea" at present, although we have no further information concerning likelihood of an expedition leaving Crete. I understand that it is desired to send her to Alexandria as soon as she can be spared.

[37308] No. 210.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 4.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, September 3, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th August and my subsequent interview with Mr. Parker, I have submitted the question involved to my colleagues, and am desired to request that in any redistribution of territory between Persia and Turkey the rights granted by the Persian Government to Mr. D'Arcy under the concession dated the 8th June, 1901, shall be fully safeguarded and recognised.

My board venture to point out that the proposed redelimitation of territory affords an opportunity to His Majesty's Government of pressing forward Mr. D'Arcy's claim to the oil concessions for the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad, and they therefore beg to suggest that, as a condition of any such redelimitation, it should be stipulated (1) that the Turkish Government shall recognise our rights by granting to us a concession for the exploitation of oil and the laying of pipe-lines in the ceded territory on exactly the same terms and conditions as those contained in the Persian concession, and (2) that the Turkish Government grant to Mr. D'Arcy a concession for the exploitation of oil and the laying of pipe-lines in the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad on the same terms as in the Persian concession.

[37181] No. 208*.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, September 2, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo, and of the accompanying copy of the convention concluded in 1904 by the Anatolian Railway Company with the Civil List at Constantinople.

I have placed Sir Edward Grey's suggestion before Mr. D'Arcy, and after full consideration he has come to the conclusion that the proposed association with the Deutsche Bank, National Bank of Turkey, and Shell Transport Company group is not acceptable to him or to any of his colleagues, unless the group is prepared to admit him to at least one-half share in their syndicate, as otherwise the syndicate would be under foreign control, to which, from his point of view, there would be many serious objections.

He is, however, as he always has been, quite ready to take up the concession for the vilayets of Mossoul and Bagdad independently, and as a purely British undertaking, on the basis which has been under negotiation, with the support of His Majesty's Government, for some years past.

Ever since he began his negotiations with the Turkish Government, to whom the rights were transferred by the Civil List, it has always been represented to him, not only by the Sublime Porte, but also by the various successive Ministers, that the option which was given to the Anatolian Railway Company had completely lapsed, and that this company had no claim to the concession whatsoever. The correctness of this view seems to be fully supported by the convention of which you have kindly sent me a copy, and from our knowledge of the actual circumstances.

I may mention that the Deutsche Bank group has already on more than one occasion during the past few years indirectly invited Mr. D'Arcy's co-operation in their syndicate, doubtless because they were aware of the weakness of their pretensions, and knew that unless they could secure the withdrawal of the only serious competitor to themselves they would be quite unable to secure the concession. But for the reasons given in the early part of my letter he has always declined these overtures.

In the circumstances Mr. D'Arcy therefore ventures to request that His Majesty's Government will continue to give their fullest support to the negotiations which have, at considerable cost, been carried on by him for so many years past.

His representative, Mr. Nicols, has not recently been in Constantinople, because he found it quite impracticable to make any progress with his negotiations owing to the chaotic state of Turkish political affairs, and to the determination of the Turkish Government not to deal in any way with the Mesopotamian oil concession until their policy with regard to the various railway-cum-mineral rights proposals had been fully considered and settled. If, however, there is now a reasonable prospect of the Turkish Government being disposed to grant the concession on reasonable terms, and the full support of His Majesty's Government can still be relied upon, Mr. D'Arcy is quite ready to move again in the matter.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY.

As you are aware, a very large sum has been expended by us on drilling and other operations at Kasr-i-Shirin, where we are now again carrying on active work, and should the proposed cession of territory by Persia to Turkey deprive us of the benefit of our concession so far as it relates to the province of Zohab we shall naturally expect to be compensated, not only for our large expenditure up to date, but also for estimated damages covering the loss which we are likely to suffer in consequence of this deprivation. It is needless to point out that the oil-fields in Zohab will, when the Bagdad and other contemplated railways in Mesopotamia and Northern Persia are operating, be of considerable value, as oil will be the only cheap fuel available for these railways.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

[37316] No. 211.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 362.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 3, 1912.*

ROME telegram No. 83 of 23rd July, and my despatch No. 625 of 24th July.

Vice-consul at Hodeidah suggests that, in view of delay caused by [? interruption of cables], Aden should be asked to telegraph necessary details to Rome. He states that most pilgrim ships touch at Aden.

[37391] No. 212.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, September 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 58 of 28th August: Pilgrim traffic.

Suggestion of inspection at Suakin presents great difficulties.

Pilgrim ships are under control of International Quarantine Board and outside sphere of Egyptian Government.

Regulations of quarantine board forbid pilgrims to land anywhere except Jeddah, and arrests therefore could not be made even if inspection possible. Modification of quarantine regulations could not very well apply to British ships only, and they would have to be voted by delegates of Powers.

[34850] No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 421.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1912.*

I HAVE had under consideration your despatch No. 686 of the 14th August, transmitting a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah relative to the recent Italian naval operations in Yemen waters and the blockade of the Yemen coast. I am of opinion that, as the connivance by the Italian authorities at the systematic violation of the blockade at Taif, for their own purposes and to the detriment of British interests, has now ceased, no useful purpose would be served by protesting on the subject to the Italian Government, even if we had fuller and more circumstantial material for such purpose than is furnished by the vice-consul's report.

You should, however, instruct Mr. Richardson that any fresh case of such connivance should be brought to my notice by the most expeditious means possible, and that, in order for any remonstrance on the part of His Majesty's Government to be effective, it is necessary that it should be based on precise statements of such particulars in regard to time, place, the name and number of vessels affected, &c., as may be available.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[37634] No. 214.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 366.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 525 of 28th August and your telegram to Cairo No. 58 of same date: Pilgrim traffic.

Following from Beirout:—

"I have no knowledge of sale of British ship named, but I am making discreet enquiries and will report the result.

"Pilgrims being elderly and combatants young men, it ought to be easy to detect their embarkation, and I will act on instructions if detected here or other Syrian ports."

[37766] No. 215.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No 121.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 6th September: Expedition to Samos.

So far as I can ascertain idea of an expedition has been abandoned, and I think that danger is over. My colleagues are of the same opinion. French ship "Bruix" has already left Samos and arrived at Suda Bay this morning

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[37855] No. 216.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 741.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1912.*

THE despatches addressed to me by His Majesty's consular officers in Eastern Anatolia point to an unsatisfactory state of affairs in Kurdistan.

The reorganisation of the tribal light cavalry initiated under the late Government seems to have caused discontent among the Kurds, and the appointment as honorary commandant of Hussein Pasha of Patnotz, a notorious "Hamidian" Kurdish chieftain, made a bad effect on the Armenians, as the question of the lands usurped by him under the Hamidian régime remains unsettled. The local authorities seem to place little reliance on the loyalty of the Kurds, and it is alleged that the Russians have been trying to buy over their chieftains, so that Hussein Pasha's appointment seems to have been made to prevent him succumbing to such temptations.

The general security of the Van vilayet has not shown much improvement, and some nervousness was displayed earlier in the year in regard to Russian action on the Turco-Persian frontier, the local Tashnak journal going so far as to say that Russia had taken into her pay all the principal frontier chieftains.

The lawless condition of the Diarbekir and Bitlis vilayets seems to have got steadily worse, both Armenians and Kurds being equally discontented with the lack of administration of the committee Government and their forcible electioneering methods. The local Tashnakists, even, were reported to have quarrelled with the Union and Progress party in regard to the non-settlement of the land question, while the discontent among the Kurds was such that it was said they would welcome any change, even a foreign protectorate. Here, also, as in the Van and Erzeroum vilayets, suspicions seem to have been entertained as to Russia's policy and alarm excited among the local Armenians, who would be the first to suffer in case of a Russian ingression.

The unrest among the Kurds does not seem to have abated since the fall of the late Cabinet. At Diarbekir the news seems to have given rise to a hope that Abdul Hamid would return to power, and the Kurds set about preparing victims to celebrate the event. Much anti-Christian feeling is reported among certain tribes, while on the other hand a movement seems to be on foot, under the influence of the Bederkhan

chieftains, to profit by the difficulties in European Turkey in order to establish an autonomous Kurdistan under Russian tutelage.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[37856] No. 217.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 742.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 294 and 350 of the 16th and 31st August respectively, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting on the difficulty of communication between that place and Camaran owing to the Italian blockade. It will be noted that this despatch puts the attitude of the local Italian naval authorities in a somewhat more favourable light than Dr. Richardson's previous telegrams led me to infer. It would seem that they are anxious to give him all the facilities that he wants, a fact which would not be gleaned from the previous telegraphic correspondence.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 217.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Mr. Marling.

(No. 23 E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, August 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I left here on the afternoon of the 26th ultimo for Camaran, travelling overland viâ Salif, having learnt that the first vessel from India with pilgrims this season, was due to arrive at the former place on or about the above-mentioned date.

The journey between Hodeidah and Salif that is both tiresome and inconvenient, takes at least fifteen hours on horse-back, travelling at a fair pace. The road is somewhat unsafe, but I was nevertheless obliged to undertake the land route, owing to the fact of the Italian blockade precluding the possibility of communication with Camaran by sea.

The local authorities provided me with an adequate escort to Salif, and the Italian naval officer commanding the blockading squadron, very kindly placed a steam launch at my disposal to transport me thence to Camaran.

The steam-ship "Islami," of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, arrived at Camaran on the evening of the 26th July from Bombay, with a batch of pilgrims, chiefly Indian, and will complete the prescribed period of five days' quarantine to-day.

I found that the sanitary mission dispatched by the Board of Health, and headed by Dr. Bedanski, had arrived at Camaran about a month ago, and that the lazaretto was working satisfactorily.

I have to observe, however, that telegraphic communication between Camaran and the outer world, which is absolutely essential in the interests of the pilgrim traffic passing through the lazaretto, is more or less, completely interrupted. It will be remembered that on the 30th March last, previous to the declaration of extension of the blockade of the Yemen coast, an Italian warship cut the submarine cable connecting the Island of Camaran with the Arabian mainland opposite, at Salif. (Please see my telegram No. 16.)

The land telegraph line between Salif and Hodeidah, which is generally interrupted, was found, at the time of my visit to the former place, to be out of order. I am, therefore, addressing the necessary representations to the local authorities, with a view to cause the regular and efficient working of the above-mentioned line.

It might, at the same time, be added that even when the land telegraph line between Salif and Hodeidah is in function it will be found most difficult to dispatch telegrams from Camaran, as communication by means of boat is very restricted, on account of the blockade, and special permission from the Italian naval authorities is necessary on each occasion that it is desired to thus communicate with Salif.

As pointed out by me in a previous despatch, serious inconvenience to both

shipping and pilgrims at Camaran might be anticipated, especially in the event of the outbreak of an epidemic.

On the morning of the 28th July, the pro-consul at Hodeidah forwarded a report to me by special messenger, to the effect that on the previous day, two Italian war-ships had bombarded the military buildings and camp situated outside and to the north and north-east of the town, and that the whole city was in a state of panic.

I thereupon decided to return here immediately, and reached Hodeidah yesterday.

I am now deputing the pro-consul, Mr. Mirza Mahmud Sultan to Camaran to watch the pilgrim traffic during the remainder of the season. He (Mr. Mirza) will most probably leave with a small staff to-morrow on board of an Italian man-of-war under arrangements made by me with the commander of the blockade squadron, with the approval of the local authorities.

In view of the existing state of blockade at the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Camaran, respectively, and the necessity for frequent communication between Hodeidah and Camaran during the present pilgrim season, I have already suggested to your Excellency in my telegram No. 27 that His Majesty's Government be recommended to request the Italian Government to facilitate my movements and those of my staff.

As it will not always be convenient to accept the hospitality of the Italian war-ships, nor is it expedient under present circumstances to do so, I am now proposing that the authorisation be obtained from the Italian Government for the free passage, when necessary, during the present season, between Hodeidah and Camaran, and *vice versâ*, of a sailing boat flying my consular flag.

Notice might first be given by this vice-consulate to the local Italian naval authorities, whenever it is proposed to dispatch a boat to or from Camaran, to obviate any undue interference with it.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India for their information.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[37818] No. 218.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 267.)
Sir, *Rome, September 3, 1912.*

ON receipt last evening of your telegram No. 285 respecting the transport of His Majesty's vice-consul from Hodeidah to Camaran in a boat flying the consular flag, I addressed a note on the subject to the Italian Government, which I handed to the secretary-general at the Foreign Office this morning.

In explaining its contents to Signor Bollati I pointed out that the exigencies of the pilgrim service made it highly desirable that the vice-consul should be able to visit Camaran from time to time, as he was also officially appointed to that post. The refusal of the Italian Government to allow him to travel between his two posts created considerable inconvenience, and His Majesty's Government were anxious that the Italian authorities should reconsider their decision. I thought it likely that they had not realised that the permission for the boat's passage was required solely for the transport of the vice-consul on His Majesty's service, and for no other purpose. The Italian naval authorities could exercise any surveillance they saw fit if they would consent to afford the necessary facilities.

The secretary-general replied that the argument employed by the naval authorities was that the passing backwards and forwards of such a boat rendered the blockade, if not actually, yet in appearance ineffective. They were especially desirous to avoid this, for such an impression would create difficulties for them. However, in view of my note and of what I had said, he would refer the case again to the Ministry of Marine without delay. I have but slender hope that the naval authorities, who are singularly tenacious and disinclined to cede to pressure from their own Foreign Department, will be induced to change their minds.

I have, &c.
H. G. DERING

[37862] No. 219.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 748.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Fontana, reflecting the present state of mind and temper of the Moslem population of Aleppo. The latter are notoriously fanatically inclined, and this tendency has no doubt been accentuated by the distorted versions of events in Tripoli, distributed by the committee during the last year mainly through the medium of the "Agence ottomane." As the committee agents have been credited with attempts to bring about disorders in the Roumelian provinces, as explained by Yorghaki Effendi in the enclosure in your despatch No. 304 of the 9th July, it is not unlikely that the placards referred to by Mr. Fontana are the work of the committee's *agents provocateurs*.

In this connection I should add that the army officers who brought about the recent changes in the Central Government were fully alive to the danger that any abrupt or prolonged crisis at Constantinople might lead to untoward events in Anatolia.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 219.

Consul Fontana to Mr. Marling.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Aleppo, August 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report upon recent events at Aleppo:—

The untruthful telegrams and reports received at Aleppo regarding the progress of the war in Tripoli, and the unsettled state of affairs at Constantinople, seem to have created a certain anti-Christian feeling among the Arabs, which might readily be fanned into fame. Arabs have boasted to Christians that the Turkish and Arab troops skinned the faces of any Italian soldiers made prisoners in the time of war, and threw them to the dogs. Written papers threatening the Christians have been found in the streets, and at the beginning of this month a placard bearing the emblem of the Cross, under which gross insults were written in Arabic in a fine clear handwriting, was gummed to the door of a Christian merchant's office. The placard bore at the foot the words, "O Christians, adorers of this wretched wood, the Moslems will show you what you are . . . ." A complaint lodged with the police by the merchant was met by a promise to arrest the culprit, but no arrest was made. On the fourth day of the present month of Ramazan a Christian smoking a cigarette in the market was rudely accosted and threatened by a Moslem, who loudly blasphemed the Christian religion. A large crowd collected, but was quickly dispersed by the police, who displayed laudable energy in preventing a tumult.

A certain Abdul-Razzak Effendi, brother of the late Aboul Hida (a creature of the ex-Sultan), who disappeared from Aleppo and whose house was sequestered after the constitution was proclaimed, has now returned to Aleppo bringing an Imperial iradé ordering that the house shall be delivered up to him. It is at present the head-quarters of the reserve troops. The Moslem notables appear to welcome Abdul-Rezzak as the forerunner of the restoration of despotism.

On the 2nd August, Edhem Pasha, spoken of as the "hero of the Tripolitain war," reached Aleppo by train from Beirout. He was met and welcomed at the station by the commandant and a staff of officers. His reputation, however, at Aleppo, where he formerly resided for a time, is not a high one.

On the 7th instant, after the reading of an Imperial iradé at the barracks, the officers of all ranks took an oath not to interfere in political matters. A printed form to this effect was signed by each officer, and the following day a similar ceremony was performed by the private soldiers belonging to the Aleppo garrison.

Instructions have been received here regarding the new elections, which are expected to commence before long. The position of the vali, who is a staunch upholder of the Committee of Union and Progress, is said to be very insecure.

It seems that the pay of the officials is now in some measure curtailed, owing to

the state of the public finances. There exists discontent, and much apprehension among the Christians as to complications at Constantinople producing wide-spread disturbance in the provinces. Moslem notables seem to rejoice at heart at the evident instability of the constitutional Government, and especially at the discredit into which the committee is sinking.

I have, &c.
R. A. FONTANA.

[37000] No. 220.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, relative to the proposed filibustering expedition to Samos.

In reply to the last paragraph of that communication, I am to observe that the point of public law raised need not, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, be raised, and that the action of the British and French naval commanders, in pursuance of the orders which they have received from their Governments, must, he considers, be taken independently of local law.

I am to add, however, that the question is unlikely to become a practical one, because the measures of prevention taken by the two Governments have, according to the latest information received at this Office, resulted in the abandonment, or, at least, in the postponement, of the proposed expedition, and also because the two war-ships, being already on the spot, could presumably intercept the filibustering vessel, should she appear, outside the limit of territorial waters, and effect her capture on the high seas.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[37766] No. 221.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1912.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 4th September relative to the proposed filibustering expedition from Crete to Samos, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea,* reporting that the danger of such a movement is now over, and that the French war-ship which had been sent to the latter island has now left for Suda Bay.

I am to suggest for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, in these circumstances, His Majesty's ship "Medea" might also be withdrawn from Samos.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[38030] No. 222.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 431.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1912.

THE Councillor of the Turkish Embassy called on the 4th instant to thank His Majesty's Government for sending a ship to Samos to stop the filibustering expedition from Crete, for which the Porte were deeply grateful.

He asked whether the commander had received a memorial from the islanders, and Sir L. Mallet replied that he had been told not to intervene in the politics of the island, but to confine himself to watching the coast.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 215.

[38230] No. 223.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September* 10, 1912.

HIS Majesty's ship "Medea" reports from Samos that there was some political disturbance in the interior yesterday, and that a conflict is feared between the inhabitants and the Turkish troops.

[37316] No. 224.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, respecting the communication to Rome of details relative to ships conveying pilgrim traffic in the Red Sea.* As you are aware, the provision of this information, which was requested by the Italian Government, has been rendered difficult owing to the interruption, by the Italian naval authorities, of cable communication in those waters.

Sir E. Grey would therefore be glad to know whether, in accordance with the suggestion of His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, it would be possible for the resident at Aden, in regard to such pilgrim ships as touch at that port, to telegraph direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome the details referred to in Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 83 A of the 23rd July.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[38433] No. 225.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 372.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 12, 1912.

MY telegram No. 367 of 8th September.

Following from vice-consul at the Dardanelles :—

"The Broussa reserve are being disbanded as they are disaffected and out of hand."

[36874] No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 608. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 12, 1912.

SIR H. B. SMITH informs me confidentially that an agreement has been arrived at between the National Bank, the Deutsche Bank, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, a market company of the Shell Company, for the purpose of exploration for petroleum in any part of the Ottoman Empire. The Deutsche Bank undertakes to make over to the new company the rights which it possesses, or which are possessed by the Bagdad Railway Company.

They propose to obtain a "permis de recherche" from the Ottoman Government, and they request the support of His Majesty's Government if at any time it becomes necessary.

In view of the future importance of the supply of oil, His Majesty's Government are carefully considering the whole position. For if this company obtained the concession, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company would be forced to come to terms with them, and the oil supply of the world would be foreign-controlled by the Shell Company,

* No. 211.

who have been long endeavouring to force the hands of the Persian Oil Company. An interim reply of a non-committal nature has been returned to Sir H. B. Smith.

In the meantime, what is your opinion as to the likelihood of the Porte granting the concession? The matter should be carefully watched.

[38216] No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(No. 60.)

Foreign Office, September 12, 1912.

Sir,

THE Greek Minister called on the 6th instant and read to Sir L. Mallet a telegram from his Government stating that the people of Samos had been encouraged by the presence of British and French ships of war to express their feelings in regard to the presence of Turkish troops on the island.

They had presented a memorial to the British and French commanders.

Sir L. Mallet said that the ships had been sent to Samos to prevent the disembarkation of a filibustering expedition from Crete, and orders had been given to the British commander to abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of Samos and to confine himself to watching the coast.

M. Gennadius asked whether Sir L. Mallet thought it likely that the Powers would take some action with a view to the removal of the Turkish troops.

Sir L. Mallet promised to refer the point to me, but said that he did not think that I should consider the moment opportune for any action of this kind, because I did not wish at this time to give a handle to the reactionary party in Turkey. The present Government had given satisfactory assurances of their intentions in regard to a reform policy, and I disliked the idea of doing anything which might affect their stability.

M. Gennadius added that M. Sofoulis had had nothing to do with the agitation in Samos.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38710] No. 228.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, relative to the lighting and buoying of the Persian Gulf.

Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, September 14, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 13, 1912.

RESIDENT, Persian Gulf, telegraphs 10th instant to following effect:—

"I am informed by consul at Bussorah that a large circular buoy, painted red, and about 8 feet in diameter, is being prepared by Turks. Consul is not sure whereabouts it is intended to place this buoy, which is not yet quite complete; but he presumes it is for bar."

[36674] No. 227*.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* respecting an arrangement arrived at between the National Bank of Turkey, the Deutsche Bank, and the Asiatic Petroleum Company, for working petroleum deposits in any part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia.

Sir H. B. Smith indicates that the new company propose to apply to the Porte for such a concession, and he asks for the support of His Majesty's Government if it should at any time become necessary.

It should be explained that the Asiatic Petroleum Company are a market company of the Shell Company, which, as their Lordships are aware, is a foreign-controlled company, and that although on the face of it it would appear that the British character of the new company is safeguarded by the fact of the reservation to the English group of the appointment of the chairman, who will have a casting vote, it appears probable that the company will in reality be managed and controlled by the Asiatic Petroleum Company in view of the facilities at the disposal of the Shell Company's organisation.

Their Lordships are aware of the position occupied by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and of the support given for some years past to Mr. D'Arcy's application for the concession of the Mesopotamian oil wells.

On learning, therefore, of the negotiations in progress between the National and Deutsche Banks, I communicated with Mr. Greenway, of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, with the object of ascertaining how these negotiations were viewed by that company, and how it would affect their interests. It was thought that an amalgamation of the interests of the two enterprises might be feasible.

A thorough discussion of the whole question has since taken place between me and Mr. Greenway, an account of which Sir E. Grey desires me to place before the Board of Admiralty.

Mr. Greenway informed me that one of the objects of the Shell Company for years past has been to arrive at an amalgamation of interests with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The latter company, however, largely on Imperial grounds, have hitherto rejected all overtures made to them by the former.

Mr. Greenway mentioned that the Persian enterprise would never have been entered upon at all but at the instance of the Admiralty, who pressed the Burmah Oil Company to undertake it on Imperial grounds. It was entirely for these reasons that Lord Strathcona embarked upon it.

Mr. Greenway said that if the company promoted by Sir H. Babington Smith succeeds in securing the Mesopotamian concession the Shell Company will have achieved its object, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will be obliged to come to terms as they would be unable to continue to compete with a company drawing upon the whole of the oil supplies of the Ottoman Empire.

In that case practically the whole oil supply of the world would be under the foreign control of the Shell Company, an eventuality which Sir E. Grey thinks the Lords Commissioners might view with disfavour in view of the increasing importance of oil as fuel and of its possible adoption for naval purposes.

I explained to Mr. Greenway in reply that the position of the Foreign Office was a somewhat difficult one.

The National Bank—a British enterprise—was asking for support to obtain a concession for a British company, which it would be hard to find good reasons for refusing in view of the attitude of impartiality always adopted by this department between rival British competitors.

I asked whether some sort of local combination of interests could be arrived at, whereby the two companies should retain their general independence.

I suggested that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company might receive a one-fourth share in the enterprise, i.e., one-half the share of the National Bank and allied British Companies.

Mr. Greenway replied that such an arrangement would do if the Anglo-Persian

* No. 124; Sir H. B. Smith, August 29; and No. 226.

Oil Company managed and controlled the business and if a British-appointed chairman had the casting vote.

I then enquired whether, even in these circumstances, competition would not be eliminated between the Shell Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and Mr. Greenway replied in the affirmative.

If, therefore, Sir E. Grey is right in supposing that it would be to the interest of this country that competition should be maintained, it would be unwise to encourage any proposals for amalgamation of interests between the companies.

Should the Lords Commissioners be of this opinion, then it will be necessary to explain the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the National Bank, and intimate the necessity under which His Majesty's Government would find themselves of opposing the concession and of making every endeavour to secure it for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

It is possible that in these circumstances it might be suggested to the National Bank that they should eliminate the Shell and substitute the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This proposal, however, is very unlikely to be acceptable to the Deutsche Bank, as they would be most unlikely to consent to the renunciation of their rights in favour of what would be a British undertaking. In these circumstances, the only solution would be to suggest to the National Bank that they should detach themselves from both the Deutsche Bank and Asiatic Petroleum Company, and form a combination with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

This proposal would naturally not be so advantageous to the National Bank as the present combination, by which German competition is eliminated, but it might be suggested.

It may be of interest to the Lords Commissioners to know Mr. Greenway's opinion of the value of their Persian concession, although it is probable that the commission which is understood to be considering the question of the adoption of oil fuel for the Navy is probably already in possession of the information. Mr. Greenway informed me that the oilfields stretch from the neighbourhood of Kasr-i-Shirin as far south as Bunder-Abbas, between the mountain range and the Persian Gulf, and are of greater extent than the American fields. If the whole of this supply is controlled by one company—the Shell organisation—the wells would be only exploited gradually in order to maintain a high level of prices, whereas if the Anglo-Persian Oil Company remains independent it would be to their interest to develop them.

The position of these oilfields in the neutral sphere along the Persian Gulf might presumably be an important consideration in determining the future of the policy of this country in regard to Persia and in strengthening the determination of His Majesty's Government to maintain their naval supremacy in the Gulf.

As it appears probable that their Lordships have a considerable amount of information on the subject, Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive their views at their earliest convenience—if possible, before the 19th instant, when he returns to London for two days.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[38719] No. 229.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 373.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 15, 1912.*

ROME telegram No. 100 of 28th August.

Following from consular officer at Hodeidah, 14th September :—

"Your telegrams Nos. 27 and 31.

"Pro-consul at Camaran reports that His Majesty's ship 'Fox' called there 29th August, and left 30th August.

"No idea of situation here can be formed at Camaran, which is in the blockaded area, and is completely cut off from Hodeidah.

"Situation now quiet owing to cessation of hostile action by sea and failure of Italian intrigues with the Arabs to attack this town. [Group undecyphorable: ? I fear] that communication with Italian ship would be impracticable, but, in view of change of Italian attitude, I think question will not arise."

[38720] No. 230.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Hodeidah, 13th September :—

"July 17th and July 20th 'Caprera' bombarded Maudar, that is a harmless hamlet, unfortified, without garrison.

"(Confidential.)

"Italian action was taken on demand of Zereneek and Jahha tribes, who have been paid by Italians to attack Hodeidah, but who led the latter to believe that they anticipated molestation during passage through Maudar on account of blood feud with its inhabitants.

"This information is quite reliable."

[38743] No. 231.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 754.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 357 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting that he has no information in regard to the formation of a committee in Samos to assist a Cretan invasion of the island.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 231.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 105.)
Sir, *Smyrna, September 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 1st instant, I have the honour to state that I have no information as to the formation of a committee in Samos acting in concert with the Cretans who planned the invasion of the island with the object of expelling the Turkish garrison.

As this information has reached the Russian Ambassador, I conclude that it has been communicated through M. Kahl, the Russian consul-general at Smyrna, who proceeded to Samos last week ostensibly for the purpose of arranging the establishment of a Russian vice-consulate at Vathy, and who is still there.

I have not yet received a written report from M. Mare, but I am communicating with him with reference to your present enquiry.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[38744] No. 232.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 756.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 754 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna respecting the plot for a Cretan invasion of Samos and the operations organised by the British and French commanders to prevent a landing in the island.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING

Enclosure 1 in No. 232.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 106.)
Sir, *Smyrna, September 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch received from the British vice-consul at Samos in which Mr. Mare shows that the plot for the invasion of Samos by armed Cretans was conceived by M. Sofoulis, the notorious political agitator.

I beg also to enclose copies of the plan of operations drawn up by the commanders of the British and French cruisers in agreement with the Prince Governor and British and French vice-consuls.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 232.

Vice-Consul Mare to Mr. Marling.

Sir, *Samos, August 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's ship "Medea" and the French cruiser "Bruix" have arrived at Vathy from Suda Bay for the purpose, as I have already telegraphed you, of preventing the landing of an armed Cretan expedition at Samos.

As you are aware, the Samians have during the last few years turned special attention to the application of article 5 of the organised charter of the island, which states that there will be absolutely no troops on the island, and on this point they constantly apply to the embassies at Constantinople praying for their intervention in the matter.

A few months ago owing to steps taken by the Prince Governor or most probably by reasons of the Italo-Turkish war the Sublime Porte withdrew 350 troops, and there have remained here since then about 500.

M. Sofoulis, it appears with a few party leaders in Greece, considering the time suitable for a Samos question on account of the present anomalous situation in Turkey, succeeded, it is stated with the consent of the Cretan Government in forming a body of about 500 armed men ready to be sent here to expel the Turkish troops with the assistance of the Samians.

I must say that this expedition had been so well organised and the matter kept so secret that no one knew of it here, not even the Samian Government.

I beg to transmit to you herewith copy of a document containing all the measures the commanders have considered necessary to take to prevent the Cretans landing at Samos.

I further beg to bring to your notice that the presence of the two men-of-war here, and the arrival from Smyrna of the Russian consul-general, have rather excited the

inhabitants. A demonstration took place yesterday insisting upon the removal of the troops. The Prince Governor at once ordered the gendarmerie to intervene; but they were soon disarmed by the people. One of these gendarmes received a severe wound by a knife, and another was found killed on the evening of the same day. The Prince also called down the troops, but in my opinion and that of my French colleague the Prince ought to abstain under the present circumstances from making use of the Turkish troops, as if a shot was to be fired on either side the consequences would be very grave.

I have, &c.
GREGORY D. L. MARC.

Enclosure 3 in No. 232.

Measures taken to prevent Cretans landing at Samos.

A LA suite d'une réunion tenue au Sénat de Samos entre son Altesse le Prince, les commandants des navires de guerre "Bruix" et "Medea" et les représentants de l'Angleterre et de la France, les dispositions suivantes ont été prises d'un commun accord:—

1. Surveillance permanente de la côte sud de l'île par l'un des croiseurs.

2. Surveillance de la côte nord à des époques à déterminer d'après les circonstances atmosphériques par le deuxième croiseur, qui se tiendra plus particulièrement à Vathy pour être en relations avec l'autorité locale. Ce bâtiment sera chargé d'avertir par télégraphie sans fil le croiseur en surveillance dans la partie sud de tous les événements qui pourraient être signalés par les troupes ottomanes à terre ou les autorités locales.

3. Son Altesse le Prince s'engage à surveiller étroitement toutes les côtes de l'île et à faire parvenir au croiseur qui se trouvera à Vathy les renseignements sur les mouvements des bâtiments cherchant à effectuer un débarquement dans l'île.

4. Son Altesse le Prince s'engage à donner des instructions pour éteindre jusqu'à nouvel ordre les feux des différents ports de Samos, autres que celui de Vathy.

5. Également, de pareilles instructions devront être données par son Altesse à toutes les autorités subalternes de l'île pour qu'elles aient à aviser par téléphone ou par toute autre voie rapide, toute tentative de débarquement.

6. Une garnison permanente de cinquante à soixante hommes de troupes régulières devra immédiatement envoyée à Carlovassy pour la garde de ce port.

7. Pendant toute la durée de la surveillance des exercices de communication entre Vathy et tous les points de la côte auront lieu à des heures à déterminer après entente avec l'autorité locale.

9. Il est indispensable que les autorités locales assurent les correspondances téléphoniques jour et nuit.

Fait en quintuple expéditions, dont l'original est resté entre les mains du commandant du "Bruix."

M. DELAGE.
GEORGE M. KEANE.
GREGORY D. L. MARC,
British Vice-Consul.
GREG. VEGLERE.
L. J. MISSIR,
Agent consulaire de France.

Port Vathy, Samos, le 30 août, 1912.

[38746] No. 233.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 759.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 754 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, relative

to the proposed Cretan expedition at Samos, and on the subject of the agitation for reform in the administration in that island.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 233.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 109.)
Sir, *Smyrna, September 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the British vice-consul at Samos, from which it appears that Mr. Sofoulis had not taken his Samian friends into his confidence, as Mr. Marc reports that no previous arrangements had been made in the island with a view to assist the Cretan expedition

Mr. Marc enumerates certain reforms demanded by the islanders.

I have, &c,
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 233.

Vice-Consul Marc to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Samos, September 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 31st August and to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to report to you that :—

Nothing is known in the island of any arrangements having been previously made for the reception of the expedition that was to have left Crete on Sunday, the 25th August. Had, however, a certain number of armed Cretans landed, no doubt that the Samians would have joined with a view to capture or drive out the Turkish troops.

The aim of the inhabitants above all things is to proclaim the annexation of the island to Greece, but realising the difficulties attending such an act, the idea is not openly spoken of.

The Samians are always afraid of an immediate intervention of the Powers, and the probable permanent establishment of a large number of Turkish troops at Samos, as was done in 1908 during the riots here. For this reason the Samians limit themselves at present to certain changes in their constitution, stating that, in case the protecting Powers do not intervene on their behalf the island will always be in a restless state and the consequences sooner or later very grave.

The Samians ask that :—

1. The Prince governor be appointed by the Sublime Porte, subject to the approval of the three protecting Powers for a fixed period of five years.

2. The president of the High Court of Appeal and the attorney-general be strangers to the island. To understand the necessity of this change I simply mention that during the administration of the present Prince's predecessor, his private secretary was the president of the General Assembly, and at the same time the president of the Court of Appeal.

3. The reorganisation of the local gendarmerie be entrusted to three or four European officers. The existing gendarmerie is always composed of persons entirely dependent on the leaders of the party in power.

4. The withdrawal of the Turkish troops be granted in accordance with the charter of 1832, signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia.

The senators have addressed to the commanders of the British and French cruisers certain petitions regarding the political situation of the island. These documents have been returned through me and the French consul with a suitable excuse by the commanders. The Russian consul-general has also received such a petition, which he has accepted.

I beg further to bring to your notice that a large demonstration was to have been held on Sunday last, but was put off at the suggestion of the Russian consul-general, the French consular agent, and myself.

The situation at present is quieter.

I have, &c.
GREGORY D. L. MARC.

[38752] No. 234.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 766.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting excitement and agitation amongst Druses and Maronites in Mount Lebanon.

I have the honour to state that I have conveyed to Mr. Cumberbatch my approval of his action in this matter.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 234.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Beirout, August 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a certain amount of excitement has been caused in the Lebanon during the past week by the following incidents:—

On the 24th instant three or four gendarmes were dispatched from the Sofar guard-house to arrest three or four Druses, of the village of Sharoun, accused of having robbed and ill-treated a Bedouin shepherd.

An altercation, followed by a struggle, took place between the relations of the accused and the gendarmes, in which one of the latter was severely wounded by a pickaxe. Whereupon the gendarmes fired and wounded two, one fatally.

The villagers—hearing of the matter and already irritated by the arrest of three of their number a few days previously on suspicion of having assaulted some Maronite muleteers—armed themselves and came to Sofar clamouring for the gendarme who had fired the fatal shot.

The latter being suspected of having taken refuge in a large hotel, they crowded into the yard yelling for him and firing off their guns in the air; several bullets hit the building. The other three or four gendarmes had also taken refuge in private houses, but the officer in charge courageously confronted the mob, and several shots were fired at him, one of which hit his horse. Nessib Bey Djumblatt, Kaimakam of the Shouf, arrived on the scene during the night with a small force of gendarmes and some cavalry and dispersed the crowd.

He wisely refrained from proceeding to the village to arrest the ringleaders, as in their excited state he feared resistance to his insufficient force, but by the 28th instant he had induced twenty-three of them to give themselves up to the authorities, thus restoring confidence among the Christians and foreigners at Sofar and neighbouring villages who had got very alarmed.

In the meantime a Maronite of Abadiyeh was killed on or about the 23rd instant, whilst working in the fields near Schweit, in the Metn, and some Druses of that village were suspected owing to the existence of a quarrel between them and the murdered man's companion, for whom they mistook him.

Foreseeing trouble the Kaimakam of the Metn, Antoun Bey Khouri, came to Abadiyeh on the 26th with a force of gendarmes to conduct the enquiry, but he could not induce the Druses to deliver the four men suspected of the murder.

This delay, added to threatening attitude of the Druses of the locality, irritated the Maronites and a shot fired in Abadiyeh on the 28th by a brother of the dead man led to indiscriminate firing on both sides, which was soon stopped by the kaimakam, and no one was killed. A bullet came through the window of the house of an English lady teacher, but occupied by an American lady, who took refuge, with a native teacher, in the house of M. Flecker at Araya.

Exaggerated reports of this affray and the flight of Maronite women and children from the place stirred up the Maronites in that district and they commenced arming and assembling in several pre-arranged centres.

On my way back from Beirout in the evening to Araya, which is close to Abadiyeh, I met many armed Maronites and saw numbers of women and children from Abadiyeh who had taken refuge in other places. On arrival at Araya I was given details of the morning's proceedings and learnt that the Maronites were gathering in large numbers at some distance below my house and the Druses of Abadiyeh were being joined by armed parties coming in from villages higher up. After dining I proceeded with Naoum Bey Shoucair, of the Egyptian Intelligence Department, to the Maronite church in Araya, where I found over a hundred armed men in a most excited state assembled in the large churchyard, and before the principal men could be brought there were quite two hundred, all armed with guns. The apparent leaders were several returned emigrants, and they told me that their grievances were the murder of their co-religionist in cold blood and the non-arrest of the Druses suspected of the crime. They could not stand this sort of thing any longer and were determined to capture the murderers, who they knew had taken refuge in the "halewah" (Druse place of worship) above Abadiyeh and protected by Druses.

Notwithstanding the excited state of the crowd, which was being augmented every minute by arrivals from other distant villages, I induced the men to listen to reason and disperse at once, and I undertook to prevail upon the Druses to deliver up the suspected men to the authorities.

I then proceeded with Naoum Bey and M. Flecker, who joined us on the way, to Abadiyeh about 2 miles further up the mountain, where I found that the kaimakam and the colonel of gendarmerie had retired for the night in apparent ignorance of the assembling of Maronites below and Druses above Abadiyeh. I came across no gendarmes patrolling the roads, and the twenty-four Turkish cavalrymen were retiring to their night quarters on the road in the village.

After a conversation with Antoun Bey and the colonel of gendarmerie, who accepted my assistance, I had a long interview with the Druse sheikhs, and persuaded them to undertake to make the four accused Druses give themselves up.

I learnt yesterday morning that the Maronites had dispersed, and in the evening the kaimakam and the colonel called on me to report that the four Druses had been handed to them, and about forty arrests on both sides had been made in connection with the affray of the 28th.

They considered that the danger of a serious conflict had been removed, and whilst thanking me for my action, they promised to see that the judicial proceedings are conducted rapidly and impartially.

The deductions to be made from these events are that owing to its inherent weakness, the administration enjoys little or no respect of its authority on the part of the various sects in the Lebanon, and that the racial hatred between Druse and Christian is still as bitter as ever.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[38753] No. 235.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 768.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 10, 1912.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 393 of the 26th August, I instructed His Majesty's consul at Bussorah by telegraph to furnish by post full particulars of the lands acquired by the Bagdad Railway Company, and to send plans of Bussorah and Maghil showing the extent and location of the lands in question.

On the following day I received from Mr. Consul Crow the despatch of which I have the honour to transmit a copy herewith. In answer to a telegraphic enquiry from Mr. Crow received to-day, I am informing him that the particulars contained in his despatch appear to answer your requirements, but that he should still endeavour to obtain plans of the property acquired. On one point Mr. Crow's report seems to me a little obscure. He describes the building of a jetty on the purchased land after having stated that this land lies "at the back of" the leased land on the river frontage, but a plan will doubtless make this clear.

Mr. Crow has also telegraphed to point out that the position of these lands was stated in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 540 of the 24th June last.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 235.

Consul Crow to Mr. Marling.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Bussorah, August* 14, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 83 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that I visited yesterday the new depôt for the Bagdad Railway material in the company of Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co.'s representative.

The river frontage hired from the Turkish Government is about 200 metres long, and forms part of the ground used by the marine department as a dockyard. It is situated about 4 miles above Bussorah, on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, a little below Messrs. Lynch Brothers' dockyard at Maghil, from which it is separated by another private property and a small creek. The Turks have reserved the southern end of the ground for themselves. This portion of it is covered with pieces of old iron and rusty machinery, and the so-called dock contained the hull of an old blockade runner, used in the American Civil War, which they bought at the time and deposited there. It has now been removed, I am told, as it was rapidly falling to pieces. They have let the rest of the ground, about 2 acres, to the Germans for £ T. 50 a-year for five years.

At the back of this the Germans have purchased from the Zobeyr family about 16 or 17 acres of date planted land. Part of it has already been cleared, and a German engineer, Herr Barker, lives there in a tent. He is at present engaged in levelling the land preparatory to erecting sheds, and will build a substantial jetty, capable of accommodating two lighters, for which the piles and material have been imported from Germany, and are now stored on the spot. He expects to have the depôt ready to receive material before the end of the year. The price paid for the land was, so the agent informed me, £ T. 2,200, which is at the rate of about £ T. 130 per acre. The property is to be registered in the name of an Ottoman subject in their employment.

The work was begun about two months ago, and, in view of the difficulties encountered, seems to be progressing satisfactorily. I saw about a kilometre of trolly-line laid down and five hand-pushed iron wagons at work, discharging earth brought from some mounds situated at the back of the property.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[38755] No. 236.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 770.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the despatch No. 419 of the 2nd instant, in which you were so good as to inform me of your conclusions respecting the observations of His Majesty's consul at Bussorah on one or two points of the draft convention for the establishment of a Shatt-el-Arab navigation commission. Although I note that you are not disposed to accept Mr. Crow's views, there is one point, viz., that of the commission's corresponding with the local authorities, on which I take leave to offer some observations.

Article 16 of the draft convention, and still more paragraph 5 of Sir L. Mallet's letter to the India Office of the 21st ultimo, appear to contemplate that there shall be no direct correspondence at all between the Riverain Commission and the local authorities, but that all communications shall be carried out through the medium of the Central Government. In my opinion, however desirable it may be in theory that the Riverain Commission should be quite independent of the local authorities, in practice the successful working of the commission will depend more than anything else on its having close and cordial relations with them, and this can scarcely be secured if official relations, involving of course the right of correspondence, are not permitted to the commissioners. A concrete example will perhaps best illustrate my meaning. One of

the first matters to occupy the commission on its institution will be to acquire a site for its offices, &c. Difficulties about the price or questions as to expropriation are certain to arise, and will be referred to Constantinople. The Central Government will ask the vali for a report, and anyone possessing the smallest experience of this country can predict with absolute confidence that unless the ground has been carefully prepared by the commission—which will be impossible if there are to be no relations between it and the vilayet—the vali's report will, in four cases out of five, be obstructive and unfriendly. To take another case: the Riverain Commission's police action is necessarily limited, but cases will frequently occur when, for the arrest of thieves and river pirates who have taken refuge on shore, the co-operation of the Turkish police will be indispensable. To obtain such co-operation quickly and effectively, the commission must be able to correspond directly with the local authorities, and not through Constantinople, a course which could in this country only lead to delay and friction. I venture to think that it was such cases as these that Mr. Crow had in mind when he urged, as I think with good reason, that direct communication and association with the local authorities appears indispensable. Nor do I understand from Mr. Crow's telegram, as paragraph 5 of Sir L. Mallet's letter above mentioned leads me to think is your impression, that he advocates that the commission shall not be precluded from communicating officially with the vilayet. Communication with the local authorities does not seem incompatible with direct correspondence with the Central Government, and it is in my opinion absolutely essential to the working of the commission that such direct relations with the vilayet shall be provided for.

Having no local knowledge myself, I do not feel justified in commenting on the other points raised by Mr. Crow, but I venture to suggest with all deference that Mr. Crow's nine years' experience of Bussorah entitles his views to careful consideration.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

P.S.—I have just received a telegram from Mr. Crow, informing me, in reply to my enquiry on the point, that the draft convention reached him on the 8th ultimo.

C. M. M.

[38762] No. 237.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September 16.*)

(No. 777.)
Constantinople, September 11, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 741 of the 4th instant, reporting on the unsatisfactory state of the Eastern Anatolian provinces, I have the honour to state that for some days past the local press has published reports of outrages committed by Kurds on Armenians in the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and Diarbekir. On a recent visit to Daniche Bey, on his appointment to the Ministry of the Interior, Mgr. Archarouni, Patriarch of the Armenians, had already drawn attention to the intolerable position of the Armenians in those vilayets and added that recent outrages which his Excellency seemed to consider as ordinary crimes might very well, in existing circumstances, be the prelude to a general massacre. Daniche Bey seems to have further dwelt on the difficulty of establishing general security to Armenians in Kurdistan, owing to the want of means of communication, and the Patriarch himself and the Armenian press have shown themselves thoroughly dissatisfied with this interview.

Ali Pasha, an energetic soldier, has been appointed vali at Bitlis with extended powers. Since then telegrams addressed to the Patriarch have appeared in the local press, reporting outrages at several villages in the Van vilayet. Two villages in the caza of Chadak appear to have been pillaged, and some twelve men and two women massacred, while eight women were carried off.

On receipt of this news the Armenian National Council met at the patriarchate and decided to send a delegation to the Government to urge that immediate measures should be taken. Accordingly, on Thursday the 6th instant, a delegation, headed by the Patriarch and two Archbishops, proceeded to the Porte, and were received by the Grand Vizier and by the Minister of Justice. His Beatitude went so far as to threaten to resign and to close the patriarchate unless adequate protection were assured to his countrymen in Kurdistan, and the Grand Vizier promised that the Government would use every means in their power to procure the punishment of the brigands who had committed the outrages and to prevent the recurrence of similar events. The Vali of

Van has since been recalled, and the government of the Van vilayet placed in the hands of the commandant of the troops, pending the arrival of the new vali, while stringent orders have been sent to the authorities both there and at Bitlis to re-establish order and to punish the guilty.

A meeting of the Armenian National Assembly was held on Friday the 6th instant, under the presidency of the Patriarch, to consider the condition of affairs. Several resolutions for submission to the Government and foreign missions were proposed, and the speakers dwelt on the little change in the position of the Armenians under the last four years' administration. The Tashnak Armenians used rather violent language, and urged strong measures, but on the advice of the Patriarch and the more moderate Armenian representatives it was decided, in view of the promises of the Government, to adjourn the Assembly for a week and await the result of the Government's action. It should be noted that the Patriarch, in interviewing the Grand Vizier, declared that under the Hamidian régime the Armenians had felt obliged to solicit the intervention of the foreign Powers, that now they addressed themselves earnestly to their own Government, but that if the latter failed to afford them the protection they sought, they may be forced to have recourse to other quarters.

Since the adjournment of the Assembly a takrir has been presented to the Minister of the Interior, giving a list of the murders, and drawing the Government's attention to the grievances of the Armenians, *e.g.*, to the unsettled claims arising out of the Adana massacres of 1909, the agrarian question, and the sequestration of Armenian church property.

The condition of the Erzeroum vilayet seems to have been less disturbed than that of Van, Diarbekir, and Bitlis, but widespread discontent seems to be extant there. In this connection I have the honour to transmit copy of an interesting despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, in which he gives the substance of an article in the local Tashnakist paper, commenting on the political programme of that party, copy of which was enclosed in my No. 648 of the 31st July last.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 237.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 54.)
Erzeroum, August 22, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35 of the 21st June, 1912, reporting that there had been in Erzeroum no such open rupture between the Tashnagists and the Union and Progressists as had occurred in Bitlis, I have now the honour to submit the following matter from recent numbers of the "Haratch" ("forwards,") the local Armenian Tashnagist organ.

On the 14th instant it publishes the decision of the Tashnagist central committee as announced in the Constantinople Armenian newspaper, the "Azadamard," to observe neutrality towards the different Turkish parliamentary parties in the present crisis. On the 17th instant, under the heading "Bitter Confession," it remarks that the confession of Djavid Bey, on the occasion of the recent dissolution, "the great fault of the Union and Progressists was not to have properly punished Abdul Hamid and his crew," was made too late; that Abdul Hamid and the rest should have been put to death, and that many other confessions must be made by the Union and Progressists if they wish to regain power; and the same number of the 17th instant contains the article of which a translation is herewith enclosed, expressing mistrust in both the great parliamentary parties.

In this vilayet the Tashnagists are comparatively few, and they are not popular, but they are powerful, being the only organised Armenian political party, and the "Haratch" is the only Armenian newspaper published in the vilayet. It would appear that the Union and Progressists cannot count on the support of the Tashnagists in the coming elections here. In spite of all that has happened the Union and Progress party is supposed to be still secretly powerful enough to carry the elections at Erzeroum, but I know little of its intrigues which, unless they disturb the army, seem likely to have little direct effect on the condition of this part of the Empire. In this lull of Ramazan time it is difficult to learn anything of the attitude towards politics of the officers or officials or Moslems in general.

With regard to the somewhat vague complaints in the article of which a translation is enclosed, I would submit the following observations:—

Security has been well maintained in the vilayet of Erzeroum, though not in those of Van, Bitlis, and Diarbekir, but a great caravan robbery in the day-time, on the 18th instant, near Erzeroum town, by armed Kurds, whose capture is improbable, may perhaps be ominous. If the army, police, and gendarmerie continue to be regularly paid, well disciplined, and undisturbed by political faction, there seems to be no immediate danger of politically serious disorder, at least in the town and neighbourhood of Erzeroum. On the other hand there seems to be little hope of a settlement of the claims of Armenians in regard to lands unlawfully taken from them by Moslems (see Consul McGregor's Confidential despatch of the 5th March, 1912). As a small matter in favour of the Government it may be noted that it finally decided two months ago not to allow some nomad Kurds to settle on lands of Armenians near Baiburt. Though prices of necessaries have doubled or trebled within the last thirty years, yet, much money coming from workers abroad, everyone seems to have enough food, but squalor and stagnation prevail. Many, perhaps some thousands, in Erzeroum town, and they, by the way, nearly all fanatical Moslems, get a bare subsistence by collecting, stamping on, patting, and shaping dung for sale as fuel. The country has been recklessly stripped of trees. From one important forest, perhaps the nearest to Erzeroum town, being about two days distant, no wood can be brought for want of roads. The vali's piteous appeals to the Minister of the Interior, which are published in the local newspapers, for funds for roads and other improvements, seem to have no result. A slight worsening of the economic condition is likely, I think, to cause serious disorder.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 237.

Extract from the "Haratch" of the 17th August, 1912.

(Translation.)

IN our unfortunate country the promises are renewed with the renewal of each new Government.

It appears that the successive constitutional Governments look upon the Ottoman population as naughty boys; and in order to stop their noise are constantly promising them various kinds of sweets, and they know that by those means they will at least for a moment stop their cries.

Naturally this Cabinet of old men would not form an exception; and here in a lately received telegram are assurances for the security of Armenia, for the solution of the land question, and for all sorts of reforms. . . . .

But now the naughty boys have grown hard and are accepting such mellifluous promises rather with mistrust, and we must at once hasten to say that those who are to blame are not these boys.

A thousand promises and no result would naturally scandalise even the cleverest boy who would continue making the noise until he felt in his hands and tasted the promised sweet.

Alas! One of those boys, the Armenian population, who is the most credulous, the most moderate, and also the most considerate in critical days, is for years begging material security from all young and old Cabinets, and for years is receiving only benumbing promises, pleasant words, and smiling caresses.

Both the old and new Turkey are enchanted worlds of promises which have dazzled the eyes of that bitterly despairing population, and if the clever boy has always been appeased they have thought that they have done their duty and have attained their object.

To-day faith in the Government is dead among the Armenian population as well as among Turk, Kurd, and other grievously working masses. To-day all of them are watching with compassion the groping for reforms of the constitutional Turkey.

And whereas it is already too late to go back from this destructive path of deceiving themselves and each other and take the right, natural, and constitutional route, the Government of the day continues to distribute promises to take "strict measures" to prevent robberies, promises to solve the land question, to build roads, to establish security, and to do justice.

Re-establish the people's faith in Government, Effendis!

The Armenian population, also millions of tortured sweating peasants, are not asking from you special favours. Do according to law and justice, act as reforming constitutional Government.

This is what they claim from these distant ruins of the country, millions of throats weakened by crying and beseeching.

Care for material needs is an inseparable part of your duty, but unfortunately the sons of the country are every hour compelled to remind you of this duty, to remind you by innumerable heaps of takrirs and protocols, to remind you by telegrams with a thousand forms of requests.

Show by proofs, by real work that you are capable of reforming the country, and wipe away the causes of dissatisfaction; show that you feel that the Ottoman country is in danger in every respect, and that you have the strength or the will to save it.

You left the population to itself. Do not look for them in critical days. They are now apart, with broken heart, watching your doings and awaiting the proofs of your sincerity and reforming capacities.

Do your duty! Do it spontaneously, without waiting for heaps of takrirs!

Prove that Turkey will live!

[39010] No. 238.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 411 of 14th September: Ægean islands.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to repeat warning, and French chargé d'affaires at Rome is being instructed to concert with his British colleague with a view to drawing attention of Italian Government in a friendly way to the difficulties which the retention of any Ægean island would raise.

[39178] No. 239.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 17, 1912.*

OIL in the Ottoman Empire.

Your telegram No. 608 of 12th September.

I understand that Minister of Mines is favourably disposed towards scheme, and, given the acquired position of German companies interested, coupled with good disposition of present Cabinet towards Great Britain, its prospects seem fairly good.

From a recent remark of the Russian Ambassador, I fear that, following on the Lynch Bagdad Railway arrangement, this further evidence of Anglo-German co-operation will be ill understood in St. Petersburgh.

[39187] No. 240.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 411 of 14th September to Paris.

French chargé d'affaires informed me this morning that a telegram from his Government stated that His Majesty's Government were afraid that Italian Government would allege pressure of public opinion as a reason for retaining some or all of the Ægean islands after the signature of peace, and that you had asked French Government to join in reminding the Italian Government of the grave difficulties which would be created by such detention.

French chargé d'affaires was instructed to concert with me for a friendly representation to Italian Government in this sense, deprecating any acquisition by Italy of islands. I told him that I was aware that you had informed French Government that you were willing to warn Italian Government again if the French Government wished to do so too, but was under the impression that suggestion had emanated from Paris. In any case I had no instructions to give any warning to Italian Government here.

This appeared to relieve French chargé d'affaires, who has strong objections to making any further representations about the islands at present in view of information which he has received, and is to-day telegraphing to Paris.

He [? saw] Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, who had just [? had] long interview with Signor Bertolini. His Excellency informed him that peace negotiations were proceeding very well and might be concluded shortly, and stated that as regards question of sovereignty over Libya Turkey was inclined to be accommodating and it only remained to find the necessary formula. But, he said, the Italian public would not be satisfied with some of the conditions of peace, and there was only one man in Italy strong enough to overcome public opinion and press, and that was the Prime Minister. French chargé d'affaires is convinced that by conditions unsatisfactory to Italian public opinion his Excellency meant that Italy would give up all the Ægean islands. He has received other information strengthening his conviction, and will repeat it in detail to his Government, expressing at the same time the hope that France and England will not pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Germany and Austria. He learns that Italy has been strongly pressed by both her allies not to take any of the islands; Austria, as Italy well knows, will not see Italy establish herself in the Ægean Sea without taking compensation for herself in Albania or elsewhere. This would be too unpleasant for Italy to risk.

French chargé d'affaires is urging his Government to wait and see what the next few days bring. Delay will not harm the situation, he considers, and if France and England make proposed friendly representations, the Italian Government will be enabled to shield Germany and Austria from indignation of Italian public by pointing to France and England as the objectors.

In view of his apparent conviction of the accuracy of his information and of the impression which he gathered from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the islands would certainly be returned to Turkey, I agreed with him in thinking that we have said enough to Italy about the islands, and have told him that I would submit my view to you by telegraph.

I am to see Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and I will telegraph again should he give me any news of peace negotiations. I shall refrain from asking questions as to the islands.

[39149] No. 241.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

Foreign Office, September 17, 1912.

PRINCE OF SAMOS telegraphs to Porte that 1,000 Cretans are preparing descent on Samos, and asks for return of ships of war.

Is there any foundation for this rumour?

(Repeated to Paris, No. 416; St. Petersburgh, No. 369; Athens, No. 154; and Constantinople, No. 623.)

[39149] No. 242.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.**

(No. 624.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1912.

MY telegram No. 163 of 17th September to Canea: Samos.

Have you any information?

[39328] No. 243.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 155 of 17th September.

Prime Minister attaches no importance to rumour of new expedition of Cretans to Samos. Request of Prince may be explained by reported movement to eject Turkish troops in contravention of guarantee of 1832.

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* Also to Mr. Beaumont (No. 155).

163

[39330] No. 244.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 380.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 18, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 624 of 17th September: Rumoured new expedition of Cretans to Samos.

I have no information.

[39570] No. 245.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 382.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 632 of 18th September: Turco-Persian frontier.

It has been suggested by his Government to Russian Ambassador that the consuls of the two Governments at Bagdad should undertake joint journey to investigate tribal conditions. He is inclined to deprecate proposal as of little practical utility. Mr. Lorimer is in India, and I doubt personally whether visit of acting consul-general would be productive of such good results as consultation with vice-consul at Kasr-i-Shirin who takes great interest in tribal affairs. Latter might be summoned to Bagdad, where he would have access to all correspondence and could consult with Russian consul, which would gratify Russian Government.

[39571] No. 246.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 380 of 18th September.

Vice-consul at Samos reports movement of armed party in interior, and concentration of about 150 armed Samians at Marathocampo, to the west of Samos. They are awaiting Cretans, who, it is reported, will arrive from Nikaria, and they intend to help latter to drive Turkish troops from the island.

Vice-consul considers situation serious.

[39584] No. 247.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, September* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 383 of 20th September.

Following received to-day from vice-consul at Samos:—

"Fighting going on outside Vathy. Result not known. Great excitement prevails here."

[39585] No. 248.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, September* 20, 1912.

MY telegram No. 385 of 20th September.

Following from vice-consul, Samos, dated to-day:—

"About 300 Cretans or others, fully armed and equipped, landed at Marathocampo last night.

"All the troops have been concentrated at Vathy and have occupied surrounding mountains. Critical state of affairs. Presence man-of-war for a few days considered necessary."

[39072] No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 638.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 20, 1912.*

GOVERNMENT of India enquire whether difficulties caused by Italian operations still exist in provisioning Camaran, rendering it necessary for pilgrims to carry adequate supplies of provisions.

Please enquire of His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah and report as soon as possible.

[39499] No. 250.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 463.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador reminded Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th instant that some time ago he had enquired privately of his Excellency whether the French Government still desired to participate in the Bagdad–Bussorah section of the Bagdad Railway, as the Turkish Government were, he had said, likely to be averse from agreeing to the mode of participation which His Majesty's Government had originally proposed, and perhaps His Majesty's Government might be inclined to abstain from insisting on participating themselves.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said M. Cambon, had been considering the question, and had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable that France should participate in the section above named, in order that Anglo-French co-operation should be maintained, and the section not be handed over to the Germans.

Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that this intimation had arrived too late. His Majesty's Government had waited for some time to ascertain the views of the French and Russian Governments, while the Turkish Government were continually pressing for a reply to their proposals. So long as the terminus of the section was at Bussorah the question as to who should construct the line was not of such importance to Great Britain as was the settlement of the Persian Gulf and other questions. In view of the difficulty of ever inducing the Turkish Government to consent to a participation in the sense desired by His Majesty's Government, and also in face of the possibility of indisposing them, were His Majesty's Government to continue to insist towards a satisfactory settlement of other very important questions, it had been decided to abstain from demanding a participation, if certain conditions, which would safeguard British commercial interests, were conceded.

M. Cambon asked what were those conditions, and Sir A. Nicolson replied that he was not at liberty to mention them, but if they were granted they would, so His Majesty's Government thought, adequately and completely safeguard Great Britain from any unfair differential treatment. This, of course, was on the assumption that the line ended at Bussorah; were it to be prolonged further His Majesty's Government would have to consider other conditions.

M. Cambon asked whether Great Britain would admit the Turks handing over the concession to the Germans, and Sir A. Nicolson said that if the conditions for which His Majesty's Government had stipulated were accorded, and if a settlement could be reached on all the questions, they should probably raise no difficulties on the point he had mentioned. The British proposals had been before the Turks for some weeks, but they had probably been too fully occupied with other matters to examine them thoroughly.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39498] No. 251.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 469.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 20, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador asked Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th instant whether His Majesty's Government had any news of a projected descent of 1,000 Cretans at Samos,

as, if the rumours on that point were true, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was of opinion that Great Britain and France should send back their ships to Samos to prevent any attempt of that nature.

Sir A. Nicolson read to M. Cambon the telegrams which I had sent to Constantinople, Athens, and Canea, and said that I was awaiting confirmation of the reports. If they were true, he presumed the two Powers would have to send vessels, as had been done on a recent occasion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[39691] No. 252.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 21.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, September 20, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 24th ultimo respecting the draft convention for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it was fully recognised that the naval officer proposed by their Lordships would be subordinate to the commissioners, and that the description "independent status" in Admiralty letter of the 1st ultimo (which appears to have been misunderstood) was intended to convey the meaning that the position should be independent of and not subordinate to the chief engineer, as might easily be implied by the sequence of the words in clause 5 of the convention ("the chief engineer and the surveyor").

2. There would presumably be one captain of the port (as on the Danube Commission), and their Lordships' view is that he should be a (retired) naval officer, whose status on the commission should be that of an official holding a most responsible and important position.

3. The officer of political and consular experience appointed as commissioner will continually require expert advice as regards the duties contained in clause 6 of the convention, and only a naval officer with the necessary knowledge of nautical surveying would be fully competent to advise as regards these duties, with the exception of those at (*a*) which would fall to the chief engineer. The title "surveyor" would describe an official employed in actually making surveys rather than the officer who seems to their Lordships to be required for this responsible position, for whom the most appropriate title appears to be "captain of the port." As, however, this title might possibly be regarded by some people as conveying the suggestion that the British officer was in charge of a Turkish port, the title "inspector of navigation" is suggested.

4. For these reasons and in view of the number of questions that are certain to be referred in the future for Admiralty opinion, it is considered by their Lordships that there should be a naval officer who can speak with authority, and that the "inspector of navigation" should appear before the "chief engineer," if possible, in clause 5.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[39711] No. 253.

Consul-General Winthrop to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 21, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 383 of 20th September.

It is quite possible that small parties of Cretans have crossed to Nicaria in sailing-vessels from distant parts of the island without our hearing of it.

[39570] No. 254.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 896.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1912.*

MR. MARLING'S telegram No. 382 of 20th September: Turco-Persian frontier.
Submit Mr. Marling's suggestion, which I approve, to Russian Government.
(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 645, and Tehran, No. 600.)

[39585] No. 255.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Foreign Office, September 21, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to a proposed filibustering expedition from Crete to Samos, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegrams from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople,* reporting the landing of 200 armed men, possibly Cretans, on the latter island, and the development of a dangerous situation.

In view of the opinion expressed by the British vice-consul at Samos, as reported in Mr. Marling's later telegrams, I am to ask that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may be moved to issue immediate telegraphic instructions for the dispatch of one of His Majesty's ships to the island with the least possible delay, and the commander may receive orders, as on the last similar occasion, carefully to abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of Samos, but to confine his action to the prevention of any further disembarkation of armed men and to the protection of the foreign consular officers and residents, if any measures for this purpose should be, in his judgment, necessary.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has instructed His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris to ask the French Government to take similar measures, as their Lordships will observe from the enclosed copy of a telegram addressed to his Excellency.†

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[39719] No. 256.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 434 of 21st September.
French Government yesterday instructed commander of "Bruix" to proceed to Samos immediately to co-operate with British commander.
Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that sole mission of two commanders should be to protect Vathy, and that parties should only be landed in case of absolute necessity and should then on no account go outside town. Above is only put forward as a suggestion.

[39723] No. 257.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September 22, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 267 of the 3rd September.
Further request for passage of consular launch between Hodeidah and Camaran refused by Italian Government. Ministry of Marine fear that exception made in one case would cause demand from other Powers, even in Mediterranean.
Although impossible to give way on question of principle, they offer, as a sign of friendly intentions, and good-will, to transport British consul from Hodeidah on Italian man-of-war in case of necessity whenever exigencies of war will permit them. They await our reply to offer in order to instruct their naval commander.

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* Nos. 247 and 248 † To Sir F. Bertie, No. 434, Telegraphic, September 21, 1912.

166*

[39585] No. 254 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 434.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 21, 1912*

MR. MARLING'S telegrams Nos. 385 and 386 of 20th September: Samos.
In view of the events reported we are asking Admiralty to send a ship.
Request French Government also to send one. It is possible that other Cretans may endeavour to land, and this should be prevented. Instructions similar to those issued on last occasion will be given to British naval commander, viz., to prevent disembarkation of Cretans, but not to land bluejackets on the island or intervene in internal affairs.
(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 895; Constantinople, No. 644; Athens, No. 164; and Canea, No. 170.)

[39741]

No. 258.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 787. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 17, 1912.

I ASKED the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday what he could tell me of the state of Armenia, which the reports of the local press represented as very disquieting. Gabriel Effendi said that although nothing resembling a massacre had yet taken place, there had been a disquieting amount of lawlessness of late and the Government was apprehensive that serious disorders might occur; he said that there was no specific cause for this unrest, and when I suggested that it might be due to the same agencies as brought about the Adana massacres in April 1909, his Excellency said he feared it was so, an admission which, coming from an Armenian, is as good as saying that it is the work of the committee. Gabriel Effendi went on to say that the Government was sending up troops with the intention of surrounding and overawing the Kurdish tribes in the affected districts. The command of these forces was being given to Ali Pasha, the newly appointed Vali of Bitlis, but it must unfortunately be three weeks before he could reach his post to commence operations.

Izzet Bey, the new Vali of Van, and Ali Pasha have called upon the Armenian patriarch and discussed at length the remedies for the situation in the Eastern Anatolian provinces. These evidences of good-will by the present Cabinet have produced an excellent impression on the Armenian community and it is only to be hoped that the new governors, on reaching their posts, may be able to carry out their present intentions of curbing the predatory instincts of such Kurdish chiefs as Mousa Bey and Mir Mehe, and of solving the question of restoring to returning Armenian refugees their lands occupied during their absence by Kurds.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

[39743]

No. 259.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 23.)

(No. 789.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 630 of the 24th July, I have the honour to report that the questions of the appointment of a successor to Yussuf Pasha as Mutessarif of the Lebanon, and of the revision of the Organic Statute, have made but slow progress. Ministers, indeed, have had too many important and more urgent matters to occupy them, but at length, thanks to the insistence of the French Ambassador, supported by my own representations, the Russian Ambassador, since the departure of M. Bationshkof, has shown no interest whatever in the matter, the Cabinet referred the matter to a committee of its members, composed of the President of the Council of State, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ministers of the Interior and Justice, with Reshid Bey, one of the *légistes* of the Porte and Yussuf Pasha as consultative advisers. It was legitimate to hope that, with Kiamil Pasha as president, the commission would approach the question in a liberal spirit, but when on the 3rd September the result of its labours was communicated to the French Embassy by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the proposals of the Porte for the revision of the statute were found to be quite inacceptable. Indeed, as will be seen from the enclosed copy, the only useful reform that they included is that for the mode of election to the Medjliss, article 1, while by articles 2, 3, and 4 an attempt was made to open the door to the direct interference of the Turkish Government in Lebanon affairs.

The result was very disappointing, and M. Bompard suggested, and the Russian Ambassador and I agreed, that the former should, by way of counter-proposal, communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the enclosed memorandum of the reforms which we considered desirable in the interests of the Lebanon. These proposals, as you will see, embrace the essential points of the French programme, copy of which was enclosed in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 381 of the 4th May. On the 15th instant M. Bompard called on me and said that it had been intimated to him by Gabriel Effendi that the real opposition to the demands of the Lebanese, as formulated by the three embassies, came from Kiamil Pasha, and his Excellency suggested that we should tak

an early opportunity to call together on his Highness and discuss the question with a view of hastening a solution. Accordingly, M. Bompard and I called on his Highness by appointment, and the Ambassador explained the present situation and the various points of the Lebanese demands with great clearness and at some length, and Kiamil Pasha promised to give the question his best consideration in the light of the arguments adduced by his Excellency. I did not think that Kiamil Pasha showed an alacrity to meet our wishes, but M. Bompard thinks that the joint visit will produce a tangible result.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 259.

Proposals of Sublime Porte communicated to French Embassy.

EXTENSION à tout le Liban du mode d'élection en vigueur à Zahlé; par conséquent, les membres du conseil administratif seront élus dans les arrondissements par les chefs de villages comptant plus de cinquante contribuables, un délégué par 100 contribuables, à la condition de ne pas modifier le nombre total des membres du conseil administratif, vu la proportion des membres au point de vue des communautés représentées au sein dudit conseil.

2. Aucun membre du conseil administratif ne pourra être suspendu de son mandat ni révoqué par le gouverneur qu'après une enquête préalable effectuée sur l'ordre du gouverneur par ledit conseil. S'il y a divergence entre l'avis du gouverneur et celui du conseil administratif, la suspension sera prononcée par le gouverneur et sous sa responsabilité; toutefois, le membre suspendu pourra s'adresser au Grand Vizirat, qui prendra l'avis du Conseil d'État.

3. L'impôt actuellement fixé à 7,000 bourses sera élevé, soit graduellement, selon la nécessité, soit en une seule fois, à 14,000 bourses, qui seront prélevées conformément au statut.

Le régime financier du Liban sera conforme au régime appliqué dans le reste de l'Empire.

4. Le budget de prévision des recettes et dépenses sera établi par le gouverneur avec le concours du conseil administratif; il sera arrêté et publié avant l'ouverture de l'exercice financier qu'il concerne.

La date précise de la publication dudit budget sera fixée par le Ministère Impérial des Finances.

Enclosure 2 in No. 259.

Counter-Proposals prepared by French Embassy.

PAR analogie avec le mode d'élection en vigueur à Zahlé, les membres du conseil administratif seront élus dans les arrondissements par les cheikhs de villages, auxquels seront adjoints dans les villages comptant 100 contribuables ou davantage un délégué par 100 contribuables. Le membre du conseil pour Zahlé continuera à être élu, comme précédemment, par des délégués nommés à raison de un par cinquante contribuables.

Le nombre des membres du conseil administratif élus par chaque circonscription et leur proportion au point de vue des communautés représentées au sein du conseil ne seront pas modifiés. Toutefois, les habitants du mudiriet de Deïr-el-Kamar, privés jusqu'à présent de représentation au conseil, seront appelés à y envoyer un membre de leur rite.

2. Aucun membre du conseil administratif, une fois élu, ne pourra être suspendu par le Gouverneur général qu'après enquête et sur l'avis conforme du conseil administratif, auquel les résultats de l'enquête seront communiqués.

3. Le régime financier continuera pour le moment à être réglé par les stipulations de l'article 15 du Règlement organique du 6 septembre, 1864; par conséquent, la Sublime Porte se réserve, comme par le passé, le droit de lever, par l'intermédiaire du Gouverneur du Liban, l'impôt de la Montagne jusqu'à la somme de 7,000 bourses et a le devoir de pourvoir aux excédents de dépenses.

4. Le budget de prévision des recettes et dépenses sera établi par le gouverneur

avec le concours du conseil administratif; il sera arrêté et publié trois mois avant l'ouverture de l'exercice financier qu'il concerne. A la même date le Ministère Impérial des Finances versera chaque année au Trésor libanais la somme de £ T. 20,000, à laquelle est évalué à forfait le montant du déficit annuel que le Trésor Impérial a, de par l'article 15 du Règlement organique, l'obligation de combler. Des mesures spéciales seront prises pour le paiement de l'arriéré de cette dette accumulé depuis 1878.

Le service de Trésorerie du Liban sera confié à la Banque Impériale ottomane.

Le gouverneur présentement nommé procédera, au cours de son mandat, à la révision du cadastre et du recensement, à l'examen des diverses taxes actuellement perçues et des questions accessoires, telle que celle des terrains haradj ou émirié, qu'il est désirable de faire rentrer dans la règle commune; six mois avant l'expiration de ses pouvoirs, il présentera à la Sublime Porte ses propositions pour l'établissement d'un nouveau régime financier, qui sera ensuite fixé d'accord entre la Sublime Porte et les Puissances.

5. La défense aux bâtiments à vapeur de faire leurs opérations aux douanes maritimes établies sur territoire libanais est levée.

6. Les tribunaux de la Montagne auront la compétence entre Libanais en matière commerciale.

Les décisions des tribunaux libanais ne sont pas susceptibles de recours en cassation.

7. Le corps de police libanais prévu par l'article 14 du règlement sera porté à un effectif de 1,200 hommes, et son instruction sera confiée pendant la durée nécessaire à l'un des officiers au service de la Turquie pour la réorganisation de sa gendarmerie.

[39746] No. 260.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 792.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 777 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that, as the authorities have not as yet succeeded in arresting any of the authors of the recent outrages on Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, the meeting of the Armenian National Council was again adjourned, ostensibly on account of the feast of Bairam, but in reality to avoid the possibility of pressure being brought by certain members to force the Patriarch to carry out his threat of resignation.

Two more murders are reported to have taken place in the mountains near Bitlis, and His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reports that the murderers of the Kaïmakam of Vostan, who was killed in his house early in July by Kurdish brigands, are still at large.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[39747] No. 261.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 793.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 18, 1912.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Bussorah telegraphs that the Military Intelligence Branch has asked him, through His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, to furnish precise information with regard to the land routes between Bussorah and Fao. Mr. Crow states that the only way in which to get the information required is by personal inspection, and begs that permission may be granted to him to make the journey in about a month's time, accompanied by His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah and the latter's native surveyor. He estimates the cost of the eight days' trip at 20*l.*, and begs that he may be authorised to incur expenditure up to this amount.

I have the honour to beg that I may be informed by telegraph as to the reply which I should send to Mr. Crow.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[39875] No. 262.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 407.)

Paris, September 21, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith* an article by M. Raymond Recouly in to-day's issue of the "Figaro," entitled "Une Menace pour la Triple Entente." Under this heading the writer describes the agreement come to between the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and the Bagdad Railway Company for the creation of a joint company, with its head office at Brussels, to exploit the navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia. This project is attributed to Sir Ernest Cassel, whose activities are stated to have long been directed to establishing close co-operation in the East between British and German financiers. A tribute is paid to the skilful handling of the matter by the German Ambassador in London. This combine, it is argued, cannot fail to expedite the completion of the last section of the Bagdad Railway, and of the line from Bagdad to Khanikin. Russian interests will thus be seriously affected, as by the Potsdam agreement of 1911 Russia undertook to link up the Bagdad Railway system with Tehran within two years of the completion of the Bagdad–Khanikin branch, never doubting that the Russian line would reach Tehran first, but now she will find herself bound to assist her rival to win the race. M. Recouly alludes to the fact that M. Sazonof was responsible for the Potsdam agreement, and assumes that the matter will occupy an important place in the conversations between you and his Excellency in London. The writer expresses the conviction that His Majesty's Government will do all that is possible to protect the threatened interests of Russia, and urges that pending a satisfactory settlement of this question French and British financial support should be withheld from the Bagdad Railway Company.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[39833] No. 263.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.)

Rome, September 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 425 to Paris of 17th September.

Everything I can gather from authoritative sources confirms my impression that Italian Cabinet, with exception of Ministers of War and Marine, are in favour of returning all occupied islands of Aegean to Turkey, and that they are only considering how to obtain guarantee from Ottoman Government that Christian population will not suffer and that islands will receive better administration. It is of course impossible to obtain confirmation of this from Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs while negotiations are proceeding. I have good reason to believe that there is hesitation as to what guarantee should be required from Turkey that she would carry out her obligations in this respect.

I should be glad of your views on this last point for my information and guidance, as I have reason to believe that I may shortly be sounded privately on the subject. Would it be desirable that Italy alone, or all Powers interested in the fate of the islands, should be responsible for seeing that Turkey kept her engagements?

[40029] No. 264.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 23, 1912.

MY despatch No. 787: Armenia.

Sheikh-ul-Islam has sent telegraphic instructions to all his subordinates to exercise their influence with Mahommedans to prevent crimes being committed against Armenians as against Islamic law.

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* Not printed.

[39585] No. 265 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 651.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 386 of 20th September: Cretan expedition to Samos.

We are sending ship to Samos with instructions to act as on last occasion, and are asking French Government to do the same.

[40035] No. 265.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, September 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 386 of 20th September.

Following received from vice-consul, Samos, 21st September:—

"Situation unchanged. Imperial troops hold strong position. Insurgent bands concentrated at Carlovassy. Very few wounded slightly."

[37634] No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 652.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 366 of 6th September: Pilgrim ships.

You should ascertain if His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout has any further information.

[40102] No. 267.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 24.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st instant, relative to the landing of a number of armed men, possibly Cretans, at Samos, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that orders were sent to His Majesty's ship "Medea" at Cyprus on the 21st instant to the effect that she should return to Samos immediately.

2. The commanding officer was also instructed, as requested in your letter, to "abstain carefully from intervention in the internal affairs, and to confine his action to preventing further disembarcation, and to the protection of foreign consular officers and residents, if any such measures are necessary in his judgment."

3. I am to add that the receipt of the telegram has been acknowledged by His Majesty's ship "Medea," who reported on 22nd September that she was leaving Limasol forthwith for Samos.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[40195] No. 268.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Canea, Crete, September 24, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from British vice-consul at Vathy by wireless telegraph to-day:—

"Please telegraph at once to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople as follows:—

"'Italian man-of-war arrived yesterday and left at once after obtaining information on situation. Fighting going on at Vathy at the present moment.'"

(Sent to Embassy.)

[40188] No. 269.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 440 of 23rd September.

Political director told Mr. Carnegie that in his opinion question of the restoration to Turkey of the Ægean islands was one which concerned all the Powers. He will communicate with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is absent, and let me have his views.

He learns that peace negotiations are not making any progress.

[39719] No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 443.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 132 of 22nd September: Samos.

The principal object of the dispatch of vessels is to prevent any more Cretans from disembarking. I would prefer to let our instructions stand as they are, though, if Minister for Foreign Affairs desires it, I should be willing to add the following: "and to take such steps as may be urgently necessary for protection of foreign lives and property, should they be seriously endangered."

[40310] No. 271.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 25.)

(Confidential.)
Admiralty, September 25, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated to-day, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 271.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Gibraltar, September 25, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Senior naval officer reports continuous fighting since 2 P.M. 23rd September. General massacre thought by consul to be probable if reinforcements arrive from mainland for Turkish troops. Armed parties have been landed from French and British war-ships to protect foreign subjects in danger.

Can dispatch "Lancaster" from Malta, if required, at short notice.

[40309] No. 272.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's ship "Medea," Samos, yesterday afternoon:—

"As foreign subjects here are in danger, armed parties have landed from French ship 'Bruix' and His Majesty's ship 'Medea' in order to give necessary protection."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[40329] No. 273.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's ship "Medea," Samos, which the captain of His Majesty's ship "Diana" requests may be communicated to the Admiralty:—

"Immediate. Please communicate to Admiralty.

"In order to provide for wants of foreign subjects, to the number of 1,000, it is most necessary to protect municipality of Vathy carrying out necessary duty. Turkish troops out of hand, murdering Samos women and children. There is danger in future of conflict between seamen and Turkish troops. Instructions are requested. French ship 'Bruix' concurs."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[39679] No. 274.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 324. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 25, 1912.*

M. NICOLAS RAFFALOVITCH, who is now manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Paris, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th instant and said that Herr von Gwinner had decided to push on the construction of the Sadijé-Khanikin line as speedily as possible, and had requested the French group in the Bagdad Railway Company to undertake the construction of the fourth and fifth sections of the Bagdad Railway from Bagdad. The French group were considering the proposal. If the Russian Government do not, when the time arrives, fulfil their bargain in building the Tehran-Khanikin line, Herr von Gwinner would undertake the enterprise and ask for a concession to push it on, on the ground that a British concession for line from Mohammerah to Khoremabad was being requested to Ispahan.

M. Raffalovitch considers that Russia should lose no time in applying for a concession from Astara to Tehran, and that a loan should be granted to Persia secured on a surtax to be imposed on the northern Customs if the concession be accorded. Russia should, when the moment arrives, form a company for the Tehran-Khanikin line to stave off Herr von Gwinner's enterprise and then dally with its construction.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40199 a] No. 275.

Note respecting Turco-Italian War.

M. SAZONOF asked about the Ægean Islands. He agreed, as a matter of course, in the view that it was undesirable for any of them to pass into the hands of a naval Power; but we agreed that some conditions would be required in restoring them to Turkey for the safeguard of the Christian population.

An autonomy such as that enjoyed by Samos would perhaps be rather stiff terms to impose upon Turkey at the end of the war.

M. Sazonof suggested that a guarantee that a Turkish Christian governor of the islands should be appointed, the enormous majority of, if not the whole of, the population being Christian, might be asked for.

I said that this would do to table the question, which was one that could not be dealt with till the war between Italy and Turkey was over, and would then be one for all the Six Powers.

E. G.

September 25, 1912.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[40350] No. 276.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 26.)

India Office, September 25, 1912.

Sir,

IN continuation of the letter of this Office dated the 14th instant, enclosing copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the preparation of a large circular buoy at Bussorah, I am directed to transmit copy of a letter communicated by Trinity House,* from which it appears that the Turkish Government are endeavouring to procure a vessel for use as a light-ship in the Persian Gulf.

It is not known where it is intended to locate either the buoy or the light-ship, but since His Majesty's Government have proposed in their memorandum of the 18th July last that a commission should be established for the lighting and buoyage of the Shatt-el-Arab, and that they themselves should continue to control the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf, I am to suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople should be instructed to bring to the notice of the Turkish Government the reports received as to the buoy and light-ship, and to warn them against a disturbance of the *status quo*.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[40449] No. 277.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 26.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, September 26, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the attached copy of a paraphrase of a telegram received in cypher from Canea to-day, containing a report from His Majesty's ship "Medea" relative to affairs in Samos.

2. My Lords are proposing to dispatch a second ship to Samos in view of the situation in Samos, and I am to enquire whether the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sees any objection to orders being issued accordingly.

I am, &c.

O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 277.

Senior Naval Officer, Crete, to Admiralty.

Canea, Crete, September 26, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

"MEDEA" reports that "Bruix" has been ordered by French Government to restore order in Vathy, and has undertaken general protection of non-combatants there. "Bruix" is conferring with leaders of belligerents. "Medea," acting on instructions, limiting her action. She cannot leave Vathy in present state of affairs, and so is unable to prevent landing of Cretans or others elsewhere.

[40445] No. 278.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 134.)

Canea, Crete, September 26, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

COMMANDER of His Majesty's ship "Medea" reports that French commander has received orders to restore order in Vathy and is conferring with leaders of the belligerents, and has undertaken to generally protect non-combatants in town. Present state of things prevents His Majesty's ship "Medea" from leaving Vathy, and she cannot therefore stop Cretans or others from landing elsewhere.

M. Koundouros assured me yesterday that about fifteen Cretans only had gone to Samos from Athens, and that there was no intention of sending others from here.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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* Jescott Steamers to Trinity House, September 20, 1912 (not printed).

[39723] No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1912.*

MR. DERING'S telegram No. 110 of 22nd September: Conveyance of consul between Hodeidah and Camaran.

Italian Government await reply to their offer. I propose to accept it as best solution that can be obtained, but should be glad to first know whether you have any observations to make.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 327.)

No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 662.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September 26, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 793 of 18th September.

I see no objection to journey, and if you see none you may sanction it and authorise expenditure.

[40329] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 133 of 25th September: Samos.

Our seamen should carefully avoid coming into any kind of collision with the Turkish troops, and their duties should be strictly limited to protecting foreign lives and property. If protection of municipality at Vathy is absolutely necessary for above purpose, it will have to be afforded. Of course, the men will be re-embarked on their ships as soon as the situation permits.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 450.)

[40329] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 451.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 173 of 26th September to Mr. Wratislaw: Samos.

Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance.

[40449] No. 283.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 26, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day relative to the affairs of Samos, in which it is proposed to dispatch a second ship to that island.

I am to transmit to you, in reply, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea reporting on the situation,* from the last paragraph of which it appears that there is no longer much danger of further detachments of Cretans attempting to land on Samos.

In these circumstances it appears to Sir E. Grey that the dispatch of a second

* No. 278

ship to the island is unnecessary at present, though His Majesty's Government must remain prepared to take this step if further developments take place there of a nature to require her presence.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[40516] No. 284.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, September 26, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they have given very careful consideration to the issues of much importance to the navy which are raised in Foreign Office letter of the 13th September, dealing with the question of possible concessions of oil bearing lands in Mesopotamia to a company which would contain important foreign elements, viz., German and Dutch, and might lead to the absorption of a British company working oil in Persian territory in a more or less purely British sphere of influence.

If the Admiralty had only to consider the supply of oil in time of peace, much as the increasing monopoly of a large international concern is to be regretted as limiting competition and tending to control prices, it might be considered at the moment that sufficient competition exists to enable suitable contract arrangements to be made for the present.

Having regard, however, to the adverse influence that might be exerted by foreign interests in time of war to prevent oil from being supplied for British naval purposes, and to the possibility that the foreign holding in commercial companies might readily be increased, my Lords regard it as undesirable that foreign interests should receive any encouragement from the British Government, and they attach much importance in the present instance to the maintenance of the Persian oilfields in the hands of a British company.

An interview has been sought with Mr. Greenway of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and it is understood that his company regards the claims of the Deutsche Bank to oil concessions in Mesopotamia as by no means established, as he states that from 1906 onwards the Turkish Government regarded themselves as free to negotiate for those concessions, and in this connection I am to refer to the correspondence between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office in 1909, from which it appeared that Mr. D'Arcy (Anglo-Persian Oil Company) was then receiving the active support of the British Government in his claim to Mesopotamian oil concessions.

Mr. Greenway expresses the opinion that in light of market opposition from the other oil interests concerned, it may be inevitable that his company should fall into any combination which may succeed in establishing itself on the borders of the oil lands which his company is now working, and unless the Government can come to some arrangement with his company to assist not only in the matter of contracts for supplies, but also some form of subsidy to aid development and active support in respect of applications for concessions in Mesopotamia, it will probably be impossible for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to preserve its independence.

The question of subsidy raises very difficult issues which need not at the moment be entered into. My Lords think at this stage that it is important that the situation should be fully discussed between representatives of the Foreign Office, Admiralty, and India Office, and if that suggestion meets with Sir Edward Grey's concurrence, my Lords would be willing to take part in such a discussion at a convenient date to be arranged. My Lords assume that the Foreign Office would approach the India Office on this point. Beyond some correspondence on some practical points as to the possibility or otherwise of Persian oil being used for Indian railways, the Admiralty have had no recent communications with the India Office on the subject of Persian oilfields.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[40586] No. 285.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, September 27, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of two telegrams, dated the 26th and 27th September, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to affairs at Samos.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 285.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(No. 466.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gibraltar, September 26, 1912.*

SAMOS.

In view of instructions in Admiralty telegram No. 210, "Medea" will not join "Bruix," who is proposing bring about armistice and place Samos demands before Powers. "Bruix" has interviewed Turkish commander and insurgent leader to this end, and has also persuaded former to abstain from firing upon or pillaging Vathy. These measures have restored quiet.

Enclosure 2 in No. 285.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(No. 467.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gibraltar, September 27, 1912.*

SENIOR naval officer, Samos, reports five days' armistice agreed to through mediation of "Bruix," commencing sunset 26th September. Samians hope protecting Powers considering their demonstrations favourably.

[40463] No. 286.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 173 of to-day: Samos.

I will request British senior naval officer here to inform His Majesty's ship "Medea." Latter ship is not under his orders while at Samos, nor have I any jurisdiction over that island, which is in the consular district of Smyrna. His Majesty's ship "Lancaster" expected here to-morrow.

[40461] No. 287.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 400.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 26, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Crete telegram No. 133 of 25th September.

I have brought situation to notice of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and pointed out necessity of avoiding conflict between foreign landing parties and Turkish troops.

A Turkish battalion has, I am informed, been sent to reinforce garrison.

Cable is reported cut by insurgents.

[40597] No. 288.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 135 of 24th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that French Government have not come to a conclusion as to the régime which should be instituted in the Ægean Islands after the Italian troops evacuate them. His Excellency considers however national and political status of these islands to be eminently a European question as it affects the balance of power in the Mediterranean. All Europe and not only Italy ought eventually to guarantee administrative arrangements accorded to the islanders.

[40461] No. 289.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 458.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 671 to Mr. Marling of 27th September: Samos.

You should ask Government to which you are accredited to send similar instructions to their representatives at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 673; Athens, No. 175; and Canea, No. 176.)

[40461] No. 290.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 671.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 27, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 400 of 26th September; Samos.

You should concert with your French and Russian colleagues as to whether it should be pointed out to the Turkish Government that if further Turkish troops are allowed to land in Samos the three Powers must be assured that the excesses already begun by the Turkish soldiery (see Mr. Wratislaw's telegram No. 133 of 25th September) will be firmly checked, and that the troops thus sent will be withdrawn again as soon as the Cretan filibusters have been expelled.

You should also inform Turkish Government of the instructions sent to His Majesty's ship "Medea" (see telegram to Mr. Wratislaw, No. 173 of 26th September).

(Repeated to Paris, No. 457; St. Petersburgh, No. 920; Athens, No. 174; and Canea, No. 175, with Mr. Marling's telegram No. 400.)

[41469] No. 291.

Note respecting Conversations at Balmoral between M. Sazonof and Sir E. Grey.

M. SAZONOF has hardly mentioned the Lynch affairs. I explained the Bagdad Railway Transport contract to him, and he acquiesced without demur in the explanation.

As regards the road concession in northern Persia, I said that it was an extension of an existing concession, and that Russia had said she did not object. This he admitted. I said no concession would be asked for to run motors on the road, but it was contended that, there being no restriction, any wheeled traffic could use the road. M. Sazonof said this was a point to be discussed, and I said no more.

It is clear that the point must be discussed on this ground, and no motor concession must be asked for.

E. G.

September 27, 1912.

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 921).

[40698] No. 292.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 28.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *India Office, September 27, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th August, 1912, on the subject of the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf, and, in reply, to say that the estimates approved by the Treasury amount to 84,000*l.* initial (not 88,000*l.*, as stated by them) and 7,000*l.* recurring, and to express regret that the marginal note to my letter of 28th May last was incorrect.

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of the Treasury letter, I am to suggest that the attention of the Lords Commissioners should be drawn to the telegram from the Government of India, dated the 13th May, 1912, of which a copy has no doubt been sent to them. That telegram shows that the provision of dioptric lanterns at Bushire was necessitated by action taken by the Russian consul-general subsequently to the preparation of the general scheme for the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf and to the approval of the expenditure referred to above. The inclusion of the measure in the general scheme would therefore have been impossible.

If practicable, the cost of the lanterns will be met from the sum of which the Treasury have consented to bear a moiety. Should this not be practicable, I am to suggest that it would be reasonable, in view of the fact that the measure is an important, necessary, and inexpensive addition to the scheme previously sanctioned, that the cost should, like that of the rest of the scheme, be shared between the Imperial and Indian exchequers. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will doubtless lay this suggestion before the Treasury.

With reference to the second paragraph of your letter, I am to observe that, if the statement in the Treasury letter that their Lordships cannot entertain proposals for an increase of the expenditure already sanctioned is to be understood as merely an emphatic expression of the opinion that additional expenditure ought not to be incurred without clear and urgent necessity, Lord Crewe has no criticism to offer, since he is of the same opinion. But the statement, if literally interpreted, negatives the possibility at any time of an extension of the scheme that is now being carried out. This would involve serious consequences, since the action taken by the Imperial and Indian Governments in regard to the buoyage and lighting of the Persian Gulf is necessarily influenced by the action of other Powers; and, while there is at present no reason to doubt that the sanctioned scheme provides all that is necessary, it is impossible to acquiesce in the view that it is to be regarded as absolutely final.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[40749] No. 293.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 28, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Smyrna, dated 26th September:—

"British vice-consul at Samos reports that telegraph cable is cut; that heavy fighting was proceeding on Monday afternoon, troops doing much execution with two Krupp guns; and that cruisers had landed bluejackets to patrol town.

"Sofoulis was to come to the town yesterday in response to summons from the commanders of the cruisers."

[40750] No. 294.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 661 of 26th September.

For British consular officer to travel on Italian man-of-war would produce a very undesirable impression locally in the eyes of Arabs. Unless Italian naval

authorities will give him a permit to travel on official business between his two ports in his own sailing boat and under his own flag, I should prefer that he should not travel at all.

It seems difficult to conceive analogous case in Mediterranean.

[40823] No. 295.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 28, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Your telegram No. 443 of 24th September.

Similar instructions were sent to French commander, viz., to prevent landing of Cretans, in case of necessity to provide protection for foreign subjects.

Your telegram No. 451 of 26th September.

Supplementary instructions have been sent to commander of the "Bruix" with regard to the protection of Vathy municipality in the same sense as those to the "Medea."

[40826] No. 296.

Consul-General Whitehead to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 28, 1912*

HIS Majesty's ship "Diana" sailed to-day to relieve His Majesty's ship "Medea" at Samos. Latter comes here.

[40739] No. 297.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 28, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Communication in the sense of your telegram No. 458 of 27th September made to acting political director in the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A reply promised as soon as possible.

[40757] No. 298.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, September 28, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 921 of 27th September: Samos.

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople will be instructed to discuss matter with His Majesty's representative.

[40827] No. 299.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, September 28, 1912.*

I HEAR from Naples that Italian Government have ordered complete suspension of telephonic communication for three or four days between Rome and all South Italy. Some days ago I heard vague rumour that Italian fleet were preparing a coup for anniversary of beginning of war, which is to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I asked yesterday where Italian fleet was,

[40514] No. 300 A

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 672. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 608 of 12th September: Oilfields in Turkey.

Admiralty urge that, in view of adverse influence which might be exerted by foreign interests in time of war to prevent oil from being supplied for British naval purposes, and of possibility that foreign holding in commercial companies might readily be increased, it is undesirable that foreign interests should receive any encouragement from His Majesty's Government, and they attach much importance to maintenance of Persian oilfields in hands of British company.

Greenway states that if any other combination establishes itself on borders of oil lands which his company is working, latter may be compelled to fall into it.

Sir H. Babington Smith has accordingly been informed that his Majesty's Government have for some years supported D'Arcy group in their endeavours to obtain oil concession in Mesopotamia, and are pledged to continue that support. They cannot therefore give his group assistance if they ask for it.

[40516] No. 300 B.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Babington Smith.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 28, 1912.*

IN continuation of the letter from this Office of the 14th instant, relative to the exploitation of oil-fields in the Turkish Empire, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that a British group represented by Mr. W. K. D'Arcy with which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a purely British enterprise, is now associated, has been endeavouring for some years past to secure from the Turkish Government a concession to seek for and to work deposits of oil in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul.

I am to state that the endeavours of this group have, from the outset, received the strong support of His Majesty's Government, who are pledged to continue in the future to observe the same attitude, and I am to express to you Sir E. Grey's regret that, in the circumstances mentioned, he is unable to comply with the request contained in your letter of the 29th ultimo that he will lend his assistance, if required, to the group with which the National Bank of Turkey is associated in their efforts to obtain a similar concession from the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

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replied evasively that he thought it was at Stampalia or thereabouts watching for contraband traffic, but his Excellency gave no clue as to any projected naval action, concerning which I am inclined to be sceptical.

Acting Secretary-General observed last Wednesday that Italy was refraining from more aggressive action elsewhere than in Africa in order not to increase Turkey's difficulties in Europe, Italy having no wish to bring about a conflagration.

[40759] No. 300.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September 28, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to say that Greek Government propose sending ship-of-war to Samos to protect Greek interests. I strongly dissuaded him from taking such action, adding that British and French ships now there were sufficient for the purpose. He stated that he intended to ask three Powers to urge withdrawal of garrison which was there in contravention of guarantee and was the sole cause of trouble. I told him that present moment seemed inopportune for doing this, and that it was very improbable that the Powers would act in a manner calculated to humiliate Turkey.

[40753] No. 301.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 408.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 28, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of incorrect attitude of British consul, but could make no specific accusation. He, however, requested me to obtain your authorisation to send consul-general at Smyrna to enquire. On general grounds I think such a visit would be advantageous.

[40768] No. 302.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, September 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 135 of 26th September.

Commander of His Majesty's ship "Medea" sent following telegram yesterday to the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet:—

"Referring to telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received last night consider question of collision by [*sic*: ? with] the Turks very difficult. In order to avoid collision it may be necessary quickly to withdraw men landed for the protection of foreign subjects. The reinforcements which have reached Samos during last few days include about 100 irregular Turkish troops. Their presence will make situation far more difficult to deal with on the recommencement of hostilities. French ship 'Bruix' concurs."

[40777] No. 303.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 797.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 787 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting occurrences showing the absence of public security in that district.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 303.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Mr. Marling.

(No. 29.)

Adana, September 14, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that about the 6th instant two ladies employed by the American Missionary Society, one a Norwegian subject and the other an American, were attacked by Kurds near Hajin and robbed of a sum of £T. 35. I understand that the robbers have since been captured and that a part of the sum stolen has been recovered.

It is reported by two Armenian Catholic priests, who arrived here recently from Hajin, that at the beginning of this month an Armenian was killed at Hajin by Kurds, and that another Armenian disappeared under circumstances indicating foul play.

News reaches Adana yesterday that a French engineer employed at the iron ore mines at Anamur, had been attacked by natives. He is said to have telegraphed to the French Embassy for protection. Further details are lacking.

Last night an Armenian carriage-driver (arabaji) was murdered in the vineyards near Shakir Pasha, about two miles out of the town. It appears that three or four individuals hired him at about 11 P.M. to drive them to the vineyards. After making the wretched man undergo the last outrages, they cut his throat and threw him into the ditch at the side of the road, where his corpse was discovered this morning. The murderers have not yet been arrested, but there is no doubt that they were a party of Moslems celebrating the termination of the Ramazan Fast.

I have, &c.

W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[40783]

No. 304.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 803.)

Constantinople, September 24, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, forwarding copies of an interesting despatch from Sir Alfred Biliotti, His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes, reviewing the history of the Sporades Islands from the time of Sultan Suleiman to the present day.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 304.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 112.)

Smyrna, September 20, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting despatch received from Sir Alfred Biliotti, reviewing the history of the Sporades Islands from the time of Sultan Suleiman to the present day.

It is the history of a people singularly fortunate as compared with other races or communities in Turkey, and this report completely refutes the assertion now put forward by popular agitators, that Turkish rule in the islands has been characterised by oppression.

No one knows the islanders better than the writer of this despatch, whose suggestions as to the future administration of the Sporades will, I am sure, be appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 304.

Acting Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Rhodes, September 11, 1912.

Sir,

AS the Sporades Isles cannot fail, sooner or later, to again occupy public attention, it may interest you to have some extracts from reports which the late Consul Campbell (a retired naval officer) addressed to the Foreign Office, in the year 1858 on information personally obtained by him, in more than one visit he paid to the Sporades in ships-of-war, and which reflect as nearly as possible the views of the natives at that period.

When at the beginning of the 16th century the Sporades were incorporated in the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Suleiman granted to the four islands of Calymnos, Leros, Patmos, and Nicaria certain privileges, confirmed and gradually extended by his successors to the other seven isles of Stampalia, Nissiros, Tilos, Symi, Halki, Cassos, and Scarpantos, forming the group of the Sporades, and to Castellorizo, although that island did not form part of it.

These privileges, which were very liberal and almost amounted to autonomy, were intended to attract to the Sporades, which were very thinly populated, immigrants from the surrounding inhabited places, and at the same time enable the new comers to earn a livelihood in isles, some of which were barren rocks, and two or three of which were even deprived of drinking water.

With these two objects in view these twelve islands were exonerated from payment of "haratch," and later on of the "bedelie-askerie," or military exemption tax, and were exempted from military service. They were further exempted from payment of tithes, of custom and other minor duties, which they were empowered to levy on their own account in return for the payment to the Porte of an annual fixed tribute of about £T. 2,000.

They were allowed to elect Dimogherontes and Councils of Elders, which constituted the only authority administering their respective islands.

During the insurrection of 1828, the Sporades were occupied for a time by the Greek navy.

Sometime after their retrocession to Turkey, viz., in 1834, Sultan Mahmoud confirmed the privileges granted to them by his predecessors, and in the year 1836 they were incorporated in the vilayet of the Ottoman Archipelago, of which they have formed part ever since. The local tribunals, which exclusively consisted of natives appointed by the Council of Elders, continued to enjoy civil and penal judicial authority, but they could only investigate criminal cases, submitting the papers connected therewith to the Central Government at Rhodes for decision. The governor of this island was represented in the Sporades by a simple mudir, assisted by half-a-dozen or so of gendarmes, whose meagre salaries, amounting all together to £T. 600, were paid by the respective isles out of their income. The mudir had only to affix his seal on the written decisions of the Councils of Elders.

On the promulgation of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhané in the year 1839, the "bedeli-askeri" (military exemption tax) was imposed upon the Sporades, and amounted to an additional sum of about £T. 2,000.

The following return giving the number of inhabitants of each isle, their respective tribute and tax of exoneration from military service, is extracted from Consul Campbell's report for the year 1858 (Blue Book No. 7, 1859):—

Islands.	Population.	Government Taxes.	Soldiers.	Total.
Castellorizo	4,000	32,134	20,682	52,816
Cassos	5,000	3,439	7,666	11,105
Scarpantos	7,000	37,520	21,241	58,761
Halki	2,000	9,165	4,050	13,215
Symi	11,000	20,938	22,844	43,782
Tilos	2,000	2,200	5,731	7,931
Nisiros	2,500	13,200	8,800	22,000
Stampalia	1,500	3,540	6,675	10,215
Calymnos	9,500	11,159	24,375	35,534
Leros	5,000	15,000	2,190	17,190
Patmos	3,500	10,500	7,000	17,500
Nicaria	7,000	29,000	31,000	60,000
Total	60,000	192,795	157,254	350,049

The population, amounting to 60,000 souls, and the contribution paid by the islanders to £ T. 3,500, or, together with the mudir's salaries, to £ T. 4,000 in round numbers, the average taxation was a little more than 1*s.* per head, an unheard-of moderate rate, even with the military tax, to which they were not legally liable.

It is in consequence of the exceptional advantages conferred upon the Sporades, and of voluntary sacrifices on the part of their hardy population, that even isles consisting of barren rocks have succeeded in attaining a degree of prosperity which they could never have accomplished under any other form of administration. As a consequence, their population is now double what it was fifty-four years ago.

The sums of money collected from the inhabitants, and the spontaneous subscriptions of rich natives residing abroad, have enabled the communities, after paying the tribute and military tax due to the Porte, to endow their respective isles with excellent free schools for both sexes, and with public pharmacies, to educate native doctors, to create local industries, even to undertake public works of such magnitude as quays, moles, breakwaters at Calymnos and Symi, in the small Isle of Nissiros, and I understand that there is now intended to build an artificial port at Calymnos.

But in the year 1869 the reformed laws on vilayets having been promulgated in the Sporades, the population strongly protested against this encroachment upon their privileges, and the Vali Ahmed Kaiserli Pasha, who was at the same time special commissioner for carrying out the measure, wishing to allay the popular excitement, officially declared that the reform was purely administrative, and did not affect in any way the privileges which they had uninterruptedly enjoyed.

However, later on, when civil, judicial, and financial reforms were established in the empire, such as the tobacco régie, the Dette publique, stamps, teskérés and judicial fees, these were also extended to the Sporades.

In 1873 they were assimilated to other parts of Turkey with regard to custom dues, to the tax on sheep and goats, and the pasture rent on uninhabited islets, notwithstanding the repeated protests of the islanders.

But nearly all these innovations, as I shall now proceed to explain, have never been fully carried out. The principle involved in them was far more important than the real material damage entailed on the population.

To begin with the tobacco régie, it was with the greatest difficulty and at no small outlay (all computed, it perhaps balanced its income) that the régie could be maintained in the Sporades, where contraband, in which even a special Greek steamer was engaged, was never satisfactorily suppressed.

The Dette publique, in presence of the persistent opposition it encountered, took the wise course of shutting its eyes to small contraventions, such as clandestine importation of salt and the unimportant fabrication of wine and spirits, but insisted on the regular payment of the duty on sponges fished in Turkish waters, a most important industry, now limited to the three islands of Calymnos, Symi, and Halki. Directly or indirectly, a contribution had been levied at all times, as explained in Mr. Consul Campbell's report in the following words:—

"A duty of 20 per cent. is levied on all sponges taken on the coasts of Crete, but the divers are gradually leaving that island for the coasts of Barbary, where no duty is exacted, although their boats have to be carried there in vessels, and brought back in them to their respective islands at a great expense, whereas they could proceed to Crete in their boats themselves."

When later on they built larger boats in which they proceeded also to Africa, the tax on sponges appears to have been levied on those coasts. Therefore, the real change which has taken place under this head has been that the sponge boats, instead of paying the tax on the fishing grounds, paid it in the isle to which they belonged.

Teskérés being no longer in use in Turkey, the abolition of stamps and of any other minor taxes which might still be levied by the Dette publique or other departments, and which can only represent quite insignificant amounts, would cause the taxation of the Sporades to revert to the sums paid up to the year 1869, against which the natives had not formulated serious complaints. However, as in course of time the necessity arose of appointing more suitable governors than the primitive mudirs and an increased gendarmerie, the increase of the population, proportioned to the sum of 600*l.* originally fixed, had to be augmented to 3,000*l.*, but as the inhabitants had more than doubled in the interval, the average rate per head did not exceed 1*s.*

I understand that the percentage which the natives had been allowed on the customs dues established in 1873 was augmented to compensate for this increase of outlay.

Now if we examine Turkish statistics, we find that a return sent to the Porte in 1910 by the Vali Reshid Pasha, although slightly differing in details, practically arrives at the same result as Mr. Consul Campbell's return, except in so far as concerns pasture, rent, and tithe on uninhabited islets, which are not considered by the Porte as entitled to the exemptions granted to the twelve inhabited isles of the Sporades.

But the income derived therefrom, amounting to only 750*l.*, is not worth mentioning, as if it were even made a charge upon the islanders it would only be an increase of 1*d.* per head. The sheep tax mentioned in that return has been since abolished.

Reshid Pasha was in favour of doing away with all the innovations introduced since the year 1869, no doubt with the exception of the indispensably increased salaries of the governors, &c. This would have given a total sum of 7,000*l.* to be annually paid to the Porte.

A far more important recommendation is that made by the financial commission appointed in 1910 to enquire into and report on the grievances of the inhabitants of the Sporades.

After stating that the natives had declared that if the financial system under which they had hitherto lived were to be abolished they would as a consequence be unable to continue to reside in their respective isles, the financial commission proceeds as follows: "In order to obviate this difficulty, they suggest to the Porte that while assimilating these islands to other parts of Turkey there should be granted to each of them, in compensation, an annual sum of money equal to their respective annual income," which was considered to amount to the aggregate sum of £ T. 14,000.

My object in entering into all these details is to point out that all those who had to deal with the question of the Sporades, and who are therefore competent in the matter, are of opinion that these twelve islands should continue, with two exceptions, of which I shall speak hereafter, to enjoy the privileges granted to them by Sultan Suleiman and his successors, and which were confirmed in 1834–36 by the Sublime Porte with the sanction of Europe. It might well happen that the abolition of the special privileges which caused the prosperity of the Sporades by an influx of population would lead to their ruin by the wholesale emigration of their inhabitants.

Another circumstance which might lead to so undesirable a result and should be taken into consideration is the following:—

The two original privileges granted in order to induce immigrants to settle in the Sporades were exemption from "haratch" and a small fixed tribute to be paid to the Porte. Owing to a series of transformations the "haratch" (exemption from which had been formally promised) is now substituted by military service, but the natives have a certain legal right to claim the maintenance of the privilege of exemption, the more so, that they still pay the exemption tax. But even if it were not so, there can be no doubt, for those who are acquainted with the character of these islanders, that they will prefer expatriation rather than submission to military service. Hundreds of sponge divers and others of all crafts and callings have during the last few years emigrated to America and elsewhere.

Whatever may be in store for these islands in the near future, it is indispensable for the welfare of their population and for the tranquillity of their neighbours that they should not be allowed uncontrolled self-administration. They should be placed under a central Government at Rhodes, or elsewhere, according to circumstances. Without such a precaution these isles would before long present an unheard-of example of anarchy and disorder.

The two exceptions above alluded to concern the privilege of custom-house dues and that of the appointment of judges by the Council of Elders to the respective local tribunals.

It is evident that such a power, which might have been granted, and was granted in years past, to small, or, so to say, patriarchal communities, can no longer be tolerated. Therefore, the members of the civil and penal courts of justice in each island should be appointed by the central Government, and consist, not exclusively of natives of the Sporades, but of individuals specially qualified to fulfil the functions of judges of first instance in the islands, under the superintendence of a court of appeal in the seat of the central Government.

With regard to the privilege of exemption from custom dues conceded to these isles four centuries ago, circumstances have so much changed during that long period that its maintenance at the present time would make it impossible to the populations living in the neighbourhood of the Sporades to compete with them in commercial

transactions. In fact, the difference of 11 per cent., which is the present tax on imports, constitutes a sufficient margin in favour of the natives of the Sporades to satisfy the most eager speculator. If I am well informed, the islanders themselves admit these two exceptions. These two questions do not exclusively concern the neighbours of the Sporades, but affect all outsiders whose commercial affairs or interests of any sort whatever may require their temporary presence in these islands.

In conclusion, I may state that the Italian occupation in the Ægean Sea comprises the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and the Sporades, with the exception of Nicaria and Castellorizo. It is a current impression amongst Christians that, in the event of Italy evacuating these islands, Mussulmans will take revenge on them for the sympathy they have shown to the Italians on their arrival here. The Rhodian Turks are not so bellicose as they are supposed to be by those who are not acquainted with them; but, even if they were, an adequate force of gendarmes, under the effective command of European officers, and mixed courts of justice for civil, penal, and criminal cases of the first instance and of appeal (both at Rhodes, the seat of the central Government), would be a sufficient and perfect guarantee and security against any possible reprisals by the Mahommedans, who represent only one-fourth of the whole populations in Rhodes and Cos. There is not a single Mussulman residing in any of the ten isles of the Sporades now occupied by the Italians.

I have, &c.
ALFRED BILIOTTI.

[40788] No. 305.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 808.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 792 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that on the 18th instant the "Conseil Mixte" of the Armenian National Assembly forwarded to the Sublime Porte a list of the recent outrages on Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, and protested in writing against the denial by the Ministry of the Interior of the grave nature of these murders, which it attributed to the weakness of the Imperial administrative authorities in the Kurdish vilayets, who seemed to be now endeavouring to conceal their own faults by furnishing the Government with misleading reports as to the seriousness of the situation.

On the 20th instant the adjourned meeting of the Armenian National Assembly took place, and the resignation of the Patriarch and the "Conseil Mixte" was tendered in a letter which, in the absence of His Beatitude, was read to the Assembly by the secretary, Mgr. Himayag. His Beatitude stated that the Government did not seem to appreciate the situation, as had been shown by the attempted denial of its gravity by the Minister of the Interior, and that their promises of redress had so far had no satisfactory result. On the contrary, the murders of Armenians were continuing. Two had been killed in the streets of Bitlis, another had disappeared from Mouche, while, at Diarbekir, an Armenian notable had been publicly done to death, and the Mufti of Silouan had preached a violent sermon against the Armenians on the occasion of Bairam.

The assassinations since the 12th June had been systematically carried out, and, in these circumstances, no other course was open to His Beatitude and the "Conseil Mixte" but to resign their responsible positions.

The National Assembly added a few words, associating themselves with the terms of the Patriarch's letter, and placing their resignation likewise in the hands of the Government.

The reading of this letter was followed by a series of violent speeches, including one by Vartkess Effendi, the ex-deputy for Erzeroum, attacking the present Government, and even threatening reprisals similar to those attempted by the Armenians under the Hamidian régime. Mgr. Himayag closed the debate by suggesting that the execution of article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin should be insisted upon.

Telegrams of sympathy with the objects of the Assembly were received from the Catholicos, the religious head of the Gregorian Armenians, and from other prominent Armenians, while similar meetings of protest have been held by the Armenian communities in various cities, *e.g.*, at Smyrna, and at Rustchuk in Bulgaria, where the press is reported to have taken up the attitude of comparing the grievances of the Armenians in Anatolia to those of the inhabitants of Macedonia.

Interviews with both the Patriarch and the president of the Armenian National Assembly have appeared in the committee organ, "Jeune Turc." The latter is reported as having stated to the reporter that, of the two Governments, he would prefer the committee Cabinet, although they had not carried out their good intentions. In an article of to-day's date, the same paper points out that Russia will be only too ready to profit by disorder in Kurdistan unless a stop is put to them.

It appears to me that the Patriarch has been ill-advised in resigning, as his action can but tend to embarrass the Government, which I am confident is sincerely anxious to do its duty, and that His Beatitude has unwittingly played into the hands of an unscrupulous party that will not shrink from assassination, and even wholesale massacre to serve its own ends.

The Government appears to be doing its best to restore confidence, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam has, as I reported in my telegram No. 392 of yesterday's date, addressed a circular to the naibs of the vilayets of Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, and Mamouret-el-Aziz, enjoining on them to use all their influence to put a stop to crimes against Armenians, as being contrary to the precepts of the sacred law. During the past fortnight the newly-appointed valis of Van and Bitlis, both energetic and capable men, have conferred with various members of the Cabinet in regard to the situation, and are leaving for their provinces immediately.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

[40791] No. 306.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 811.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna relative to the position of affairs at Samos, where a body of armed men has landed to assist the Samians in expelling the Turkish garrison.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 306.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. Marling.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Smyrna, September 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Marc, reporting the landing of armed men at Samos and the preparations being made to drive the Turkish troops out of the island.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 306.

Vice-Consul Marc to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Samos, September 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you as follows:—

Certain movements of armed bodies were observed on the 18th instant in the interior of Samos towards the western parts of the island, and next day a body of about 300 men fully armed landed at Marathocampo. From information the Prince Governor and the senators had obtained from their authorities there, these 300 people were supposed to be Cretans, but it was afterwards ascertained that there were only 125 strangers, *i.e.*, Cretans, Macedonians, Greeks, and Nicariottes, and the remainder Samians from different villages.

All these men are under the command of M. Sofoulis, their only object being to drive away the 500 Turkish troops stationed at Samos.

Fighting took place yesterday evening between the advanced guards, but,

fortunately, on account of the obscurity, firing did not last very long. Five or six Turks were only slightly wounded and one or two Samians.

A large armed demonstration was held yesterday at Carlovassi. I enclose for your information a document signed by the notabilities of that place. In this you will observe that nothing is mentioned regarding annexation of this island to Greece.

Many Samians are joining daily the insurgents, and in my opinion, which is the general one, there will be in a very short time a sufficient number of armed men to attack the troops successfully, who are occupying at present the surrounding mountains overlooking Vathy.

The situation, on account of these events and the great excitement of the inhabitants, is very critical, and unless the protecting Powers intervene there will be general bloodshed. It is rumoured that the troops expect reinforcements from the mainland.

I have, &c.
GREGORY D. L. MARC.

Enclosure 3 in No. 306.

A Summary of the Proclamation of Themistocle Sofoulis to the Samiotes.

RESPONDING to the voice of my country, I hastened to participate in its noble struggle.

Samiotes,

United like brothers, you are called upon to-day to hallow with new sacrifices the sacred rights won by your ancestors and guaranteed by the Great Powers.

Pressure and violence from outside have worked hard to deprive the Samiote people of those rights.

The Samiote autonomy as it stands to-day is a mere shadow.

This ill-fortune of the Samiotes is easily explained when we realise that in recent years the governing princes have not been as they ought to, defenders of the autonomous statutes of the country, but the irresponsible instrument of the Porte's orders; thus always in opposition and enmity towards the general interests and liberties of the Samian people.

What completes the annihilation of the autonomy of the country is the presence of the Turkish troops, contrary to the charter of the island, their interference with every act of internal administration, and their prevention of the Samian people, by force of bayonet, from doing what is lawful.

The conduct of the Turkish troops in recent years has been one series of unlawful acts, respecting neither private dwellings nor sacred buildings, not even the liberties of the person or the religious sentiment of the people.

Samiotes,

We have often complained in the past to the protecting Powers about this state of things. We have exhausted all peaceful means asking for justice.

But seldom do the timid obtain justice from the strong. Freedom is not granted to people like alms to the beggars.

The autonomy granted to our country by the protecting Powers was in reward of the heroism and self-sacrifices of our ancestors. The same Powers have undertaken to guarantee that autonomy on the presumption that we, the children of those liberators of our country, would prove ourselves worthy of the guaranteed liberties; that we would, by our own strength and means, uphold and keep the treasures won by our fathers.

We are not disturbers of peace; we ask for justice; we want to become masters in our house. If we take up arms, it is because our peaceful requests are not heard. In doing this, we are acting loyally both towards the Porte and the protecting Powers.

We are the conservative element, as we are defending consecrated rights.

The willingness with which you hasten to serve your country does great honour to you. You must show yourselves able to vindicate your rights as it becomes a noble and civilised people.

As you are the courageous defenders of the liberties of the fatherland, you must likewise show yourselves to be protectors of law and order, ensuring the complete security of the life, honour, and property of the individual.

We have lived a long life of great misfortune, injustice, oppression, and tyranny, but all those trials were not enough to estrange the Samian people from its glorious traditions.

I am certain that this great moment will awaken in the hearts of the Samiotes those noble impulses which have through centuries led the Samiote people on to great and glorious achievements.

The people of Carlovassi have spontaneously met to-day in general armed meeting in order to take a last and irrevocable decision in defence of the privileges of our island, which are being trodden down.

It passed the following resolution:—

1. The application in its full and true sense of the Charter of Privileges of 1832.
2. The complete departure of the Turkish troops stationed in our island against the express provisions of the charter.
3. Guarantees should be given for the preservation of our privileges in future. The Prince's administration should be rendered stable and unaffected by intervention.
4. Declares its irrevocable determination that, if its rightful demands are not heard again this time, to vindicate its rights by every possible means and sacrifice.
5. Grants full powers to M. Themistocle P. Sofoulis to do the needful for the fulfilment of its demands.
6. Appoints a committee composed by the undersigned, who are to submit the present to the Vouli (Parliament or Ministry) of the Samiotes and to the representatives of the protecting Powers at Samos.

(List of Committee follows, nineteen Signatures.)

[41000]

No. 307.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)

Admiralty, September 30, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams respecting the dispatch of one of His Majesty's ships to the Shatt-el-Arab.

Copies have also been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 307.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

September 26, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

POLITICAL resident, Persian Gulf, is urging desirability of sending ship to Shatt-el-Arab for date season. I concur, and propose to send "Sphinx," which is not required at Muscat.

Enclosure 2 in No. 307.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

Admiralty, September 28, 1912.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 150.

Approve "Sphinx" proceeding to Shatt-el-Arab for date season after your arrival at Muscat.

[41011] No. 308.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, September 30, 1912.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 30th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to affairs at Samos.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 308.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

Gibraltar, September 30, 1912.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SAMOS.

Turks and insurgents, now with recent reinforcements, both 1,000 strong, are holding positions on the hills round Vathy. Turks have 4 guns. When armistice expires "Medea" anticipates situation will be rendered more difficult by presence of 100 Turkish irregulars recently landed. While armistice lasts "Diana" expects no change will be made in *status quo ante*. No Italian ships seen in Strait of Samos since hostilities commenced.

[41018] No. 309.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 412.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 30, 1912.*

SAMOS.

Your telegram No. 671 of 27th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs undertakes to withdraw reinforcements only at end of war.

[41019] No. 310.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 413.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 30, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Smyrna, dated to-day :—

"Following from consular officer at Samos ;—

"'800 Turkish troops, together with irregulars, have landed from mainland with four guns, pillaging many houses on the way to Vathy. Owing to measures adopted by French ship, things quiet.'"

[39747] No. 311.

Foreign Office to Director of Military Operations.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Operations, and is directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to him herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople relative to a journey which His Majesty's consul at Bussorah and Mohammerah propose to make to obtain precise information with regard to the land routes between Bussorah and Fao,* which Mr. Crowe has been asked to furnish by Brigadier-General Wilson's department.

* No. 261.

Sir A. Nicolson is to state that Sir E. Grey has no objection to the journey in question being undertaken by these officers, subject to the concurrence of Mr. Marling, and has so informed Mr. Marling by telegraph, sanctioning at the same time the expenditure of the sum required for the purpose.

Sir A. Nicolson is, however, to point out that requests of this kind which General Wilson's department wish to convey to His Majesty's consular officers should more properly be made through this Office and through the mission concerned, and he is to request that this procedure may be followed in similar cases in the future.

Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.

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